Mamokebe Investment (Pty) Limited v Provincial Commissioner of the South African Police Services, Mpumalanga and Others (6453/2024) [2025] ZAMPMHC 11 (7 February 2025)

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

(MPUMALANGA DIVISION, MIDDELBURG)

CASE NO: 6453/2024

(1) REPORTABLE:NO

(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES

(3) REVISED: YES

07/02/2025

In the matter between:

MAMOKEBE INVESTMENT (PTY) LIMITED

(REGISTRATION NUMBER: 2006/028647/07)

APPLICANT

And

THE PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONER OF THE

SOUTH AFRICAN

POLICE SERVICES, MPUMALANGA

1ST RESPONDENT

THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MIDDLEBURG

POLICE STATION, MPUMALANGA

2ND RESPONDENT

THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE WITBANK

POLICE STATION, MPUMALANGA

3RD RESPONDENT

THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER ILLICIT

MINING OPERATION, MPUMALANGA

4TH RESPONDENT

This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties and/or parties’ representatives by email. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 7 FEBRUARY 2025 at 12:00.

JUDGMENT

MALANGENI AJ

Introduction

[1] The applicant seeks the following relief against the respondents on urgent basis, in the form of ex-parte application:

"1. That the Applicant’s non -compliance with the normal rules of this Honourable Court relating to service, filling and time limits be condoned and that such be dealt with as one of urgency in terms of rule 6(12).

2. That a rule nisi be issued calling upon the respondents or any other interested party why the following orders should not be made final:-

2.1. That members under the respondent’s control – i.e members of the SAPS be interdicted from proceeding to shut down and / or cause harm and / or interrupt and disrupt in any manner, the Applicant’s operations at the mining colliery known as Mamokebe Colliery situated at – farms Grootspruit 23 HT, Kaffir Locatie 24 HT, Voorslang 25 HT, and Sobbeken 390 IT situated at Mpumalanga Magisterial/ Administrative District of Wakkerstoom (“the Colliery” ) over which the Applicant’s mining right MP/30/5/1/2/1341 MR (“the mining right” ) is vested.

2.2. That any and all actions taken by the Respondents during 6 December 2024 in closing the Colliery is rescinded and declared invalid.

2.3. That the current and future attempts at shutting down of the mining operations currently being conducted by the Applicant in terms of its mining rights MP/30/5/1/2/1041 MR (“the mining right”) be interdicted and prohibited.”

3. Directing the respondent, -

3.1. To take all reasonable steps to ensure that their affiliates, association, members and / or other third parties refrain from engaging in all or any of the interdicted activities, including by informing such affiliates, associates, members and/ or other third parties of the provisions of this order and calling on them categorically and unequivocally not to engage in all or any of the interdicted activities; and

3.2. To adhere to any such further and / or alternative relief as may be warranted on the papers.

4. That the applicant and court order be served by Sherriff; -

4.1. On the Respondents, being the Provincial Commissioner of the South African Police Service (SAPS) Mpumalanga, situated at [...] F[...] Street, Mbombela, and Witbank Police Station.

5. The respondents or any interested party have the right to anticipate the return date with 24-hour notice to the Applicant directly or by notifying the Applicant’s appointed legal representatives in this matter.

6. That there is no order as to cost save in the event of opposition to this application.

7. Further and / or alternative relief.”

[2] The respondents did not oppose this application. However, before the return date, there was an application filed by Mariam Bibi Adam N.O, Potlaki Maine N.O and Protus Francis Mhawukelwa Sokhela N.O. They call themselves intervening parties in their application. This application anticipates the return date of the main application.

[3] In their application they seek relief in the following terms:

“3.1That in terms of rule 6(12)(a), the form and service provided for in the uniform rules of court be dispensed with and that the matter be treated as an urgent intervening application; alternatively, that the intervening parties are in terms paragraph 5 of the order of 7 December 2024, granted leave to anticipate the return date on no less than 24 hours’ notice.

3.2. That the proposed 1st, 2nd, and 3rd intervening parties (“the interterveinng parties”) be and are hereby granted leave to intervene in the above matter.

3.3. That the Rule nisi granted by this honourable court on 7 December 2024 be and is hereby discharged.

3.4. That DMI Attorneys is ordered to pay the costs of the application on an Attorney and client scale de bonis propiis, including counsel’s fees.

3.5. Such further and /or alternative relief as this Honourable Court deems meet.”

4. The applicants herein further filed a counter-application claiming the following relief:

“4.1. The rule is confirmed.

4.2. The appointment and substitution of the 1st,2nd, and 3rd respondents as directors of the applicant be declared to be null and void and set aside.

4.3. Any activities taken and undertaken by the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Respondent after 22 March 2024, including any actions taken on any date by them and or their agent in their purported capacity as a director of Applicant is declared to be null and void and of no force and effect.

4.4. the 4th Respondent be directed to take the necessary actions and investigate the change in directorship of the applicant in terms of section 169 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.

4.5. Costs on an Attorney client scale to be paid by the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Respondents, the one paying the other to be absolved.

4.6. the 4th Respondent be interdicted from effecting any further directorship change pending the finalization of the pending and related litigious

disputes between the parties.

4.7. further and / or alternative relief.”

Factual background

[5] Save to mention that all the respondents (being members of the SAPS) do not oppose the application, the intervening parties do oppose both the main application and the counter application. The applicant also opposes the application to intervene by the intervening parties. I need to mention that the intervening parties’ application is on an urgent basis. I have already made a ruling in this regard against the intervening parties and indicated that reasons would follow.

[6] Against the counter application, the respondents have filed notice in terms of rule 30 (2). The grounds of complaint being the following:

a. The applicant’s counter application (“CA”) is brought in terms of extremely truncated timelines, to wit:

i. The CA was served via email on the respondents on 18th December 2024 at 17:23.

b. The notice of counter application, dated 18th December 2024 prescribe the following timelines:

i. The respondents are required to deliver their notice to oppose not later than 18:00 on 18th December 2024, which is half an hour after service of the counter applications.

ii. The respondents must deliver their answering affidavit by not later than 21:00 on 18th December 2024.

iii. If no notice of intention to oppose is delivered, the CA will be heard on an unopposed basis on 19th December 2024 at 09:00.

[7] The respondents further aver that the CA is irregular and constitutes irregular step for the following reason:

a. Firstly, the applicant does not seek the court’s condonation in terms of rule 6(12) (2) for time limits and forms of service as prescribed by the rules to be dispensed with.

b. Secondly, the founding affidavit in support of the CA, does not contain a single allegation why the CA should be heard on an urgent basis which is also a requirement in terms of the rule.

c. Thirdly, the CA is a separate application and does not relate to the relief sought in the main applications which the respondents as the intervening parties in the main application seeks to have discharged. The Applicant’s CA although a separate application, seeks a completely different relief against parties not cited in the main application under the same case number.

d. Fourthly, the relief sought in terms of the CA is already pending before the high court in Pretoria under case Number: 2023-067386 (Annexure SKM 4 to the CA), to have the appointment of the respondents declared void. This is typical an instance of lis pendens.

e. Respondents are severely prejudiced to answer to purported urgent CA, where the Respondents were allowed only 3Hours to deliver an answering affidavit in respect of a dispute which has been serving before the High Court in Pretoria since 2023. The applicant seeks out no grounds why its CA is urgent, which is a requirement in terms of rule 6(12).

f. The CA therefore constitutes an irregular step.

[8] Furthermore, the respondents (intervening parties) in the counter-application disputes the authority of DM I Attorneys to represent the applicant. They need a satisfactory proof that Mr. Stanley Kgaapu Mphahlele is indeed the sole Director of the applicant and therefore compromises the board of directors of the applicant and that he is authorised to appoint an Attorney to represent the applicant.

Principal arguments

[9] Advocate Lamprecht SC started by questioning the locus standi of Mr Graham Cormac (Deponent to the founding affidavit of the main application) and the Attorneys (DMI) representing the applicant. In respect of the Attorneys, he referred this court to rule 7 that was filed, and no answer came forth. Mr Cormac on paragraph 1.2 of his founding affidavit is saying “I am competent” instead of saying he is duly authorised.” The applicant is a company run by Directors therefore any person acting on behalf of the company must be authorised.

[10] Authority of Mr Mphahlele was also challenged. Counsel indicated that Mr Mphahlele in paragraph 14.1 of his founding affidavit is saying “He is the sole Director”. It was argued that this is not true because the CPI which is a public document contradicts Mr Mphahlele. 5. He emphasised the fact that the intervening parties have substantial interest in the subject matter therefore they need to be joined. This document shows that intervening parties are rightful directors. Therefore, Mr Mphahlele’s view is not supported by any evidence.

[11] Rule 30(2) notice still stands against the counter application. When this application was filed (main application), there has been non-compliance with the required 72 hours’ notice in terms of section 35 of the General Law Amendment Act 62 of 1955 (General Law Amendment Act).

[12] Advocate Marneweck argued that the intervening parties do not have real and substantial interest in the subject matter. The order sought goes against members of the SAPS and does not affect them. They are not allowed to act on behalf of the company as they are facing a fraud case. They were appointed illegally.

[13] Mr Mphahlele is the sole director of the applicant as his co- director passed away. He is saying there was compliance with the General Law Amendment Act. He stated that the Applicant’s Attorneys are being criticised unfairly. The Attorneys acted reasonable in terms of the mandate.

Issues

[14] The following are the issues to be determined:

a. Locus Standi of the applicant and its legal representative.

b. Failure by the applicant to comply with section 35 of the General Law Amendment Act.

c. Urgency in the intervening parties’ application for anticipation and joinder.

d. Counter application as an irregular step in terms of Rule 30 (2) of the Uniform Rules of Court.

e. Confirmation and/or discharge of the rule nisi.

The law

[15] South African courts are accessible to members of the public at large. Access to courts is governed by section 34 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution). This section provides that everyone has the right to have any disputes that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.

[16] The main application deals with interim interdict. The requirements for an interim interdict were discussed in Setlogelo v Setlogelo[1] as follows;

a. A prima facie right even though open to some doubt;

b. A well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm if the interim order is not granted.

c. That the balance of inconvenience favors the granting of an interim interdict, and the lack of another satisfactory or adequate remedy in the circumstances.

[17] Urgency is covered under rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court. Rule 6(12) (a) provides that in urgent applications, the court or a judge may dispense with the forms and service provided for in these rules and may dispose of such matter at such time and place in such manner and in accordance with such procedure (which shall as far as practicable be in terms of these rules as it deems fit).

[18] Further, Rule 6(12)(b) provides that in every affidavit filed in support of any application under paragraph (b) of this subrule, the Applicant must set forth explicitly the circumstances which is averred, and which render the matter urgent and the reason why the applicant claims that it could not be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course.

[19] In Maqubela v SA Graduate Development and Others[2] where it was stated that:

“whether a matter is urgent involves two considerations. The first is whether the reasons that makes the matter urgent have been set out and secondly whether the Applicant seeking relief will not obtain substantial relief at a later stage. In all circumstances where urgency is alleged, the Applicant must satisfy the Court that indeed the Application is urgent. Thus, it is required of the Applicant adequately to set out in his or her founding affidavit the reason for urgency, and to give cogent reason why urgent is necessary.”

[20] Urgency must not be self-designed. Notshe A J stated in East Rock Trading (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd and Others[3] observed:

“In my view the delay in instituting proceedings is not on its own a group for refusal to grant the matter urgent. The court is obliged to consider the circumstances of the case and explanation given. The delay might be an indication that the matter is not urgent as the matter is not urgent as the Applicant would want to believe. On the other hand, delay might have been caused by the fact that the applicant has attempted to settle the matter or collect some facts with regards thereto.”

[21] Rule 6(11) provides that, notwithstanding the aforegoing subrules, interlocutory and other applications incidental to pending proceedings maybe brought on notice supported by such affidavits as the case may require and set down at a time assigned by the Registrar or as directed by a Judge.

[22] Rule 6(12) (C) states that a person against whom an order was granted in such person’s absence in an urgent application may by notice set down the matter for reconsideration of the order. Further, Rule 6(8) states that; any person against a whom an order is granted ex parte may anticipate the return day upon delivery of not less than twenty-four hours’ notice.

[23] On the other hand, Rule 12 provides that any person entitled to join as a Plaintiff or liable to be joined as a defendant in any action may, on notice to all parties, at any stage of the proceedings apply for leave to intervene as a Plaintiff or a Defendant. The court may upon such application make such orders, including any order as to costs, and give such directions as to further procedure in the action as to it may seem meet.

[24] The locus standi of the respondent in the counter application and attorney representing the applicant is in issue. Rule 7(1) provides that; subject to the provisions of such rules (2) and (3) a power of Attorney to act need not be filed, but the authority of anyone acting on behalf of a party may, within 10 days after it has come to the notice of a party that such person is so acting, or with the leave of court on good cause shown at any time before judgement, be disputed, whereafter such person may no longer act unless he satisfied the court that he is authorized so to act, and to enable him to do so the court may postpone the hearing of the action or application.

[25] In firm O-Seal CC v Prinsloo & Van Eeden Inc and Another[4] it was stated that:

“Locus stand in iudicio is an access mechanism controlled by the court itself. Generally, the requirements for Locus standi are these: the Plaintiff must have an adequate interest in the subject matter of the litigation, usually described as direct interest in the relief sought, the interest must not be too remote, the interest must be actual, not abstract, or academic; and it must be a current interest and not a hypothetical one. Standing is thus not just a procedural question, it is also a question of substance, concerning as it does the sufficiency of litigant’s interest in the proceedings. The sufficiency of the interest depends on the particular facts in any given situation. The real enquiry being whether the events constitute a wrong as against the litigant.”

[26] In these proceedings, the issue of Lis pendens has been raised. There are some formal requisites to be met before the defence of Lis Pendens becomes successful. These requisites are listed in Amler’s Precedents of pleadings, sixth edition on pages 227 to 228; being the following:

a. There must be litigation pending.

b. The other proceedings must be pending between the same parties or their privies.

c. The pending proceedings must be based on the same cause of action.

d. The pending proceedings must be in respect of the same subject matter. This does not mean that the form of relief claimed in both proceedings must be identical.

[27] In DB v NB[5]7it stated that:

“It is trite that it is inappropriate for a dispute (Lis) between the parties to be litigated in two different courts. Put differently, if there is pending litigation between the parties in respect of the same subject matter in one Jurisdiction, the defendant, respondent

may raise the plea of Lis pendens in the other Jurisdiction where the matter is instituted entitling him to stay of the latter

proceedings.”

[28] The onus of proving the the above-mentioned requisites lies with the party that raised lis pendens. The intervening parties allege that the applicant failed to give people notice in terms of section 35 of the General Law Amendment Act no 62 of 1955

Analysis

[29] The intervening parties assert that they have interest in these proceedings as they are directors of the applicant. In this regard, they refer this court to the Annexure “A1”, which is a CIPC Company Search. This document contains their names as directors of the applicant. Furthermore, they referred this court to Annexure “B” which is a resolution of the Board of Directors authorising Mariam Bibi Adams to represent them and to bring the application on behalf of the applicant.

[30] For the court to allow the party to intervene, such a party must show a direct and substantial interest in the subject matter of the case. In Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality v Greyvenouw CC[6] it was held that:

“The applicants based their claim to intervene on the direct and substantial interest in the subject matter of the dispute, the court

has no discretion: it must allow them to intervene because it should not proceed in the absence of parties having such legally recognized interest.”

[31] What convinced me that they have got a direct and substantial interest in these proceedings is the fact that they are mentioned in the CIPC as applicant’s directors. This suggests that as directors, anything that happens with the applicant will affect them. I would be doing injustice if I were to allow these proceedings to proceed in their absence having established such legally recognized interest.

[32] The intervening parties moved their application on urgent basis. This is a worrying factor to the respondent as they claim that the intervening parties failed to prove urgency. Although, I verily believe that their urgency does not change the colour of these proceedings, but urgency is governed by rule 6(12) with its specific requirements. I am alive to the fact that in terms of this rule, once urgency is not established, the matter must be struck of the roll due to lack of urgency. Each case must be dealt with on its own merits. The circumstance of this case deserves a caution in that the intervening parties’ interest in the subject matter that is not remote. If I were not allow them to intervene in proceedings under discussion, they will suffer irreparable harm.

[33] The intervening parties distance themselves from the view of Mr. Cormac to interdict SAPS from closing the mine. Paragraphs 24.3 (J) of the founding affidavit states that, to further inform urgency, if the coal is illegally mined, removed, and sold, it will be impossible to recover the losses from persons who are unknown to the applicant. An empty damage claim in due course, is in any event not satisfactory remedy in the circumstances.

[34] The fact remains that the intervening parties have not authorized the applicant, that is why they distance themselves from the uniliteral “initiative” taken by Mr Cormac to interdict the SAPS, and that they wish for the Rule Nisi to be discharged on the anticipated return date, which would allow the SAPS to perform their work.

[35] SAPS is an organization of the State, therefore before a Court issues a Rule Nisi operating as an Interim Interdict against this Organ of the State, there should be compliance with section 35 of the General Law Amendment Act 62 of 1995. In the proceedings under discussion, there is non-compliance with the provisions of section 35 of the General Law Amendment Act. I could not find any authority dealing specifically with non-compliance with it however, it is peremptory for this notice to be issued before a rule nisi is issued against the state organ.

[36] Mr. Cormac, being the deponent in the founding affidavit of the main application, and DMI Attorneys have up to this stage of the proceedings failed to prove locus standi. The issue of their locus standi `was raised by the intervening parties on the day of filing their application, being the 17/12/2024.

[37] Instead of them satisfying this requirement, a counter application was filed. In terms of this application, the applicant changed the deponent to the founding affidavit, by removing Mr. Cormac and substituted him with Mr. Kgaaphu Stanley Mphahlele. Mr Mphahlele hijacked these proceedings from Mr Cormac solely to resuscitate the main application. This plan does not have room in these proceedings.

[38] Mr. Mphahlele, being the deponent in the founding affidavit of the counter application, does not change the colour of the main application. From the beginning, I did not understand why the parties of the applicant would change even if the applications were different. I understand the counter application to be like a counterclaim. In a counter claim parties remain the same, what changes is the relief sought by the party filing the counter claim, such relief becomes different from the main claim. This status quo is supposed to exist and or to be maintained in terms of the counter application.

[39] This view is qualified in the Amlers’ Precedents of Pleadings[7]. Where reciprocal claims between parties exist, the proper course is to adjudicate on them all simultaneously and to arrive at a decision as to who is on balance, the really successful party and consequently the true creditor. The deponent in the counter application is not the same person with the deponent in the main application (The Interdict).

[40] The counter application in question is two-fold. Firstly, the deponent deals with the answering affidavit against the application for the intervention and secondly it covers the founding affidavit in favor of the counter application. To me such roles are supposed to be played by one and the same person (being the deponent in the main application). No reasons have been advanced as to why such deponent (in the main application) did not proceed in these proceedings or to put its differently, no reasons were advanced as to why he has been replaced hence I concluded by saying the main aim is to resuscitate the main application as it has already been established that Mr. Comac is not the director of the applicant. The counter application in the main supports the main application (prayer I ask that the Rule be confirmed).

[41] The affidavit of Mr. Mphahlele shows that there has been a conflict in terms of directors of the applicant and it shows a sour relationship amongst them. The other three directors are singing the same song as they are the intervening applicants in these proceedings and have taken a unanimous decision to appoint Ms Mariam Bibi Adam to represent the applicant. They lack the knowledge of Mr. Mphahlele representing the applicant. Mr. Mphahlele on the other hand has taken a unilateral decision in the form of his own resolution to represent the applicant in the counter application.

[42] The common sense is that the voices of the majority should supersede the one of minority. In terms of section 66(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Companies Act), the business and the affairs must be managed by or under the direction of its board members, which was the authority to exercise all of the powers and perform any of the functions of the company except to the extent that this Act or Companies Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise.

[43] Section 69 of the Companies Act deals with the Ineligibility and disqualification of person to be director or prescribed officer. Section 69(8) provides that a person is disqualified to be a director of a company if:

a) A court has prohibited that person to be a director, or declared the person to be delinquent in terms of section 162 or in terms of section 47 of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 or subject suspicion or (12), the person –

i. is an unrehabilitated insolvent;

ii. is prohibited in terms of any public regulation to be the director of the company;

iii. has been removed from the office of trust, on the grounds of misconduct involving dishonestly; or

iv. has been convicted, in the Republic or elsewhere and imprisoned without the option of a fine or fined more than the prescribed amount for theft, fraud, forgery or any other offence.

aa) Involving fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty or money laundering, terrorist financing, or proliferation financing activities as those terms are defined in section 1 (1) of the financial Intelligent Act 38 2001.

[44] No evidence tendered to the effect that the current directors of the applicant have been disqualified to act as directors. Deducing from all the above, my view is that Mr. Comac (deponent in the main application). The attorneys representing the applicant lacks local standi. The three intervening have vested interest in these proceedings. The main application was on urgent basis, therefore the was no need to also file their application on urgent basis as theirs was not urgent. One may argue that the urgent application by the intervening parties does not change the color of the main application. In addition, one may argue that whether it was moved on an urgent or normal basis it will not have any impact on the main application. The problem is that urgency is Governed by specific requirements in terms of Rule 6 (12). The counter-application has been designed as an aid to the main application, that plan is ineffective.

[45] In fact, Mr. Mphahlele shares the same status with the intervening parties, if he wanted to be part and parcel of these proceedings, he was supposed to follow the same route followed by the intervening parties that is to file a formal application to be joined to these proceedings. His counter application is an irregular step, and it must fail.

Costs

[46] It is trite that costs follow the successful party. The legal representative for the parties argued at length on this subject. Advocate Lamprecht SC argued for the cost de bonis propriis against the firm of attorneys representing the applicant claiming that such a firm acted negligently as they even failed to prove authority to act. Whereas advocate Marneweck for the applicant submitted that they acted reasonably in terms of the mandate. If not, the attorney should be granted an opportunity to file an affidavit as to why costs order of this nature should not be granted to him.

[47] The issue of costs is discretionary. I am alive to that fact that whenever I have to must exercise discretion, I must do so judicially. Costs de bonis propriis need to be awarded in most extreme circumstances, for example in circumstances of gross negligent on the part of the attorney. Although the attorney in the question failed to prove capacity to act on behalf of the deponents in the main application and the counter application, I do not regard such as an issue calling for costs de bonis propriis. However, the deponents in the main application and the counter application are the ones to be burdened with costs. Mr. Cormac instituted the proceedings on behalf of the applicant fully knowing that he was not a director of the applicant therefore he lacked the required authority. Mr. Mphahlele did not act sincere in launching a counter application. his main intention was to give life to the main application. I used the term resuscitate in this regard; He was not a party in the main application. He knew that he was not the sole director of the applicant. He is on par with the intervening parties. Therefore, his application was an irregular step as he was supposed to be admitted as a party first. However, when ordering Mr. Mphahlele and Mr Cormac to pay costs in these proceedings, I must be very cautious in that they act on behalf of the applicant. This means that costs will be paid out of the funds of the applicant. therefore, this will impact the intervening parties as they are directors of the applicant. In brief, it would mean that

they are paying costs. It would be fair and reasonable to order that each party must pay its own costs.

Order

[48] In the result, I make the following order:

1) The point in limine of locus standi of the deponent in the main application (Mr. Cormac) is upheld.

2) The point in limine of DMI attorney in both the main application and the counter application is upheld.

3) The point in limine of urgency in the intervening application is upheld.

4) The applicants in the intervening application are granted leave to intervene in these proceedings.

5) The counter application is dismissed.

6) The interim interdict is discharged and set aside.

7) Each party to pay its own costs.

M MALANGENI

ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

MPUMALANGA DIVISION, MIDDELBURG

Appearances:

For Applicant: Advocate Marneweck Instructed by: Dimi Attorneys For the intervening parties: Advocate Lampretch SC Instructed by: Jaffer Inc. Date of the hearing: 20 December 2024 Date of delivery: 7 February 2025

[1] 1914 AD 221.

[2] [2014] 6 BLLR 582 (LC]- ED]

[3] 2011 JDR 1832 (GSJ) at para 8.

[4] ZASCA 107 (27 June 2023) at para 6

[5] [2023] ZAECMKHC 51 at para 6.

[6] 2004 (2) SA 81 (SE) at 89 B-C.

[7] The Heading Purpose at p114.