Mankuroane and Others v Buti and Others (M164/23) [2025] ZANWHC 118 (15 July 2025)

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,

NORTH WEST DIVISON, MAHIKENG

CASE NO: M164/23

Reportable: YES / NO

Circulate to Judges: YES / NO

Circulate to Magistrates: YES / NO

Circulate to Regional Magistrates: YES / NO

In the matter between:

MANKUROANE TSHEPO FREDRICK 1st Applicant BAPHUDUHUCWANA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL 2nd Applicant RETHUSE RE DIRE PRIMARY AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE LIMITED 3rd Applicant and BUTI SEKAMOENG 1st Respondent KGOLOLO KGAMANYANE 2nd Respondent MXOLISI GOTYANA 3rd Respondent OLEBILE GAOKUMELWE 4th Respondent GAOBUSE AOBAKWE 5th Respondent MARUPING ERIC 6th Respondent PHOLO TUMELO 7th Respondent CHIPETA JAMES 8th Respondent THE UNLAWFUL OCCUPIERS OF THE LAND DESCRIBED AS THE LAND NEXT TO N18 ROAD STARTING FROM THE ENTRANCE OF TAUNG EXPERIMENTAL FARM TO ITIRELENG VILLAGE THE UNLAWFUL OCCUPPIERS OF THE LAND SITUATED IN TAUNG AT THE CORNER OF N8 AND R 372 ROAD 9th Respondent THE UNLAWFUL OCCUPIERS OF THE LAND SITUATED IN TAUNG AT THE CORNER OF N8 AND R372 ROAD 10th Respondent GREATER TAUNG LOCAL MUNICIPALITY 11th Respondent

Judgment is handed down electronically by distribution to the parties’ legal representatives by e-mail. The date that the judgment is deemed to be handed down is 15 JULY 2025 at 16h00.

ORDER

1. The application postponed to 11 September 2025 to the opposed roll for a further hearing before Reddy J.

2. The applicants will amend or supplement their papers, if necessary, within 15 days of this order to address the primary issue raised by this Court. The respondents shall file their answering affidavit within 15 days of receipt of the applicants amended papers if any.

3. The applicants shall file their heads of argument within five days of filing their replying affidavit.

4. The respondents shall file their heads of argument within five days of receiving the applicants’ heads of argument.

5. If any party does not strictly comply with this order without good cause shown, an appropriate order will be handed down.

6. Costs are to be costs in the cause.

JUDGMENT

REDDY J

Introduction

[1] This is an application launched by the applicants for the eviction of the first to fifth respondents from the property described as portion Rethuse Re Dire Primary Agricultural Land in terms of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act, 19 of 1998 (“PIE”). The applicants have abandoned the relief sought against the sixth, seventh and eighth respondents with these respondents to be appropriately relocated to land demarcated for residential purposes. The Notice of Motion does not make any reference to the ninth and tenth respondents.

[2] The following order sought by the applicants, is opposed by the first to fifth respondents:

“That:

Buti Sekamoeng; Kgamanyane Kgogolo; Mxolisi Gotjana; Olebile Gaokumelwe; Gaobuse Aobakwe and anyone in occupation of the immovable property, described and identified as a portion of Redire Primary Agricultural Land in Mahikeng under the care and ownership of the Traditional Council under the leadership of Chief Mankuroane Tshepo Fredrick be evicted from the said property in terms of section 4(1) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998.

The Sheriff be authorized and directed:

To eject the respondents and anyone in such occupation through or under them from the portion of the property described in 1 above.

To take all the necessary steps to execute the above-mentioned eviction order and to hand over the vacant property to the applicants.

To execute the eviction order in paragraph 2.1 hereinabove on a date to be determined.

The respondents pay the cost of this application on attorney and client scale.

Further and/or alternative relief be granted to the applicant. ”

The parties

[3] For purposes of convenience a proper description of all the parties is peremptory for ease of reading and for the navigation of the application.

[4] The first applicant is Mankuroane Tshepo Fredrick, the Paramount Chief of the Baphuduhucwana Traditional Council holding the office and conducting duties as Kgosikgolo, (the Paramount Chief). The Paramount Chief is the custodian of land with the power to rationally allocate land in accordance with the laws of the Republic of South Africa. The second applicant is Baphuduhucwana Traditional Council, established in Terms of the Traditional Leadership and Government Framework Act 41 of 2003, (the Traditional Council). The third applicant is Rethuse Re De Dire Primary Agricultural Cooperative Limited, a registered cooperative with Registration Number (Reg No. 2017/005343/24).

[5] The first respondent is Buti Sekamoeng. The second respondent is Kgololo Kgamanyane. The latter are both adult males. The first respondent and second respondents are allegedly responsible for the sale and occupation of land to the fifth respondent. The third respondent is Mxolisi Gotyana. The fourth respondent is Olebile Gaokumelwe. The fifth respondent is Gaobuse Aobakwe. The sixth respondent is Eric Maruping. The seventh respondent is Pholo Tumelo. The eighth respondent is Chipeta James. The ninth respondent is The Unlawful Occupiers of the Land Described as The Land next to N18 Road Starting from Entrance of Taung Experimental Farm to Itireleng Village. The tenth respondent is the unlawful occupiers of the land

situated in Taung at the corner of the N8 and R373 Road. The eleventh respondent is the Greater Taung Local Municipality (the municipality).

Background facts

[6] This application is predicated on the unlawful invasion of land by the respondents, which impugns the proper functioning of the Traditional Council. A distinction must be made between the land unlawfully occupied by the fifth and sixth respondents as this unlawful occupation relates to two different pieces of land. The land occupied by the sixth respondent is unallocated and falls within the custody and authority of the Paramount Chief.

[7] To this end, the land occupied by the fifth respondent is land which was allocated to the third applicant by the Paramount Chief. The third applicant is a cooperative which has existed since about 1952 for the benefit of the community. It is community centered with the primary objective of farming and environmental conservation. Pertinently, rotational crops are planted which may have a lifespan of about eight (8) years, which would be beneficial to the community.

[8] To make short shrift of the matter, this cooperative existed afore its registration. It was first registered during the year 2000. Importantly, this registration was confined to the members of the committee. In 2017, subsequent registration was affected, which caused 137 (one hundred and thirty-seven) members to be registered. The cooperative was granted permission to occupy and use the land in question by the Tribal Council. It is against this backdrop that the land unlawfully occupied by the fifth respondent is identified for agricultural and not residential purposes.

[9] On 27 March 2021, a group of people fenced part of the third applicant’s land for residential purposes. This unlawful conduct gained momentum with several unidentified individuals following suit. The applicants sprang into action and on 29 April 2021, interim relief was obtained. On 26 November 2021, Gura J ordered final relief against Mr Buti Sekamoeng (the first respondent), Mr Mxolisi Gotyana (the third respondent), and Mr Olebile Gaokumelwe (the fourth respondent). The application was dismissed against Mr Kgololo Kgamanyane (the second respondent).

[10] The applicants contend that the first to fourth respondents, and (notwithstanding the dismissal of the application against the second respondent), undeterred by the court order, continued with the allocation of land for residential purposes to innocent third parties. Notwithstanding the contemptuous conduct, further legal action was jettisoned due to financial constraints.

[11] The overarching fact is that the respondents have no right to occupy and use this land. Moreover, the land which is currently being allocated by the first and second respondents was earmarked for the construction of a balancing dam to enhance irrigation of the agricultural land. On this basis an eviction order is sought against the first to fifth respondents. The respondents have embarked on what is colloquially referred to as “land grabs” which is unlawful and/or unauthorized. In sum, the respondents’ have not disclosed a legal right either in terms of African, European, Customary and or any statutory law.

[12] Moreover the occupation of the immovable property by the first to fifth respondents is unlawful and none of the occupiers have any permission or right to occupy same. The occupation by the occupiers is therefore equally unjustified and unlawful. Notably, the applicants assert that the first to the fifth respondents and any other occupiers are not elderly people, neither are their children and people with disabilities. Significantly, alternative accommodation is available, which it would appear these respondents can easily afford. This excludes the likelihood that these respondents may be categorized as homeless or destitute.

[13] Curiously, the sixth, seventh and eighth respondents deposed to recanting affidavits which mirrored each other. The affidavit, of Mr. Eric Maruping, demonstratively reads as follows:

“1. I am an adult male, member of the Itireleng community house number 1[...] ID 5[...].

2. The facts contained in this affidavit are within my personal knowledge, unless it is stated to the contrary, and are to the best of my knowledge both true and correct. I have read the replying affidavit deposed to by Kgosi TSHEPO FREDRICK MANKUROANE, the Applicant in the above matter and I confirm the content thereof as far as it relates to me.

3. In particular, I confirm that:

3.1. I am not opposing the Kgosi and I knew that what we attempted to do at the land dispute was not authorised by the Traditional Council.

3.2. I confirm that all of us cited from the First to the Eighth Respondents were responsible for the unlawful allocation of the land at Rethuse Re Dire Primary Agricultural Cooperative.

3.1. I am not opposing the Kgosi and I knew that what we attempted to do at the land dispute was not authorised by the Traditional Council.

3.2. I confirm that all of us cited as from the first to the eighth Respondents were responsible for the unlawful allocation of the land at Rethuse Re Dire Primary Agricultural Cooperative.”

[14] The second respondent contends that he is a serving member in the sub-council of the Matolong Village Community which falls under the auspices of the Traditional Council. The portion of land which forms the center of this dispute has been a place of grazing for livestock over a protracted period. The Department of Agriculture (as it was then titled) applied to the Traditional Council for a portion of this land which would be used to construct a home for the extension officer who was to assist the community with environmental conservation. The house was subsequently constructed and occupied by the extension officer. However, when the extension officer left, the house and the portion of land on which the house was built was abandoned.

[15] During 2007 the late Mr. MK Pule (Pule) applied to the Traditional Council for the portion of land, which was previously occupied by the extension officer. The community had no issue with this allocation to Pule as he was a member of the Motolong Extension village. Tensions started to rise when Pule purportedly sold the portion of land that he had been given consent to occupy to Mr. TJ Lepholletse (Lepholletse) who hailed from Schweizer-Reneke. Lepholletse intended to use this land for agricultural purposes, pertinently for animal husbandry. Disgruntled, by the way Lepholletse had acquired this land

and given the inability of the Paramount Chief to address the land crisis, the community confronted Lepholletse.

[16] The Paramount Chief’s ignorance of the contentious issue surrounding the allocation of land is acknowledged, so the respondents posit. To this end, the Paramount Chief only became aware of the dispute between Lepholletse and the community when Lepholletse approached the Magistrates’ Court at Taung to seek an eviction order against members of the community who had begun occupying this portion of land and erecting permanent structures.

[17] During April 2021, without informing or consulting the community, the Paramount Chief instituted these eviction proceedings. Moreover, the respondents contend the Paramount Chief’s failure to interact with the community does not fit the brook of his responsibility that he is clothed with in terms of section 4(1) of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003. Notably, they contend that it is peculiar that the Paramount Chief has initiated eviction proceedings to have his own subjects evicted from the land which he is enjoined to administer in the interests of traditional community.

[18] Importantly, the respondents assert that by April 2021, the portions of land which is the subject of these eviction proceedings had already been developed. Significantly, the Paramount Chief has not indicated whether he is willing to relocate his subjects to other land for the purposes of accommodation and has not engaged the community on whether there is alternative accommodation for all the families that have established themselves on the land in question.

[19] The respondents proceed on a tangent on the conduct of the Paramount Chief focusing on the fact that the Paramount Chief seeks to evict his own subjects from land which he is enjoined to administer in the interests of the traditional community. To this end, the respondents’ parrot section 4(1) of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003.

[20] The respondents argue that the conduct of the Municipality suggests that the Municipality was complicit in the respondents’ unlawful occupation of land by identifying the needs of the community and by the supplying of inter alia electricity. To reinforce this contention and negate the unlawfulness of their occupation the respondents anchor this assertion on stand numbers used by the Department of Statistics South Africa during Census, which stands were allocated by the Municipality when electricity services were installed.

[21] The respondents contend that the occupation was not unlawful. Appositely they contend that their occupation does not adversely affect the administration of the Traditional Council as the third applicant has never utilized the land occupied by the first to nineth respondents which has always been used for communal grazing. Surprisingly, the respondents assert that the Paramount Chief fails to disclose a willingness to allocate other land for the purposes of accommodation, which is a clear indicator that the applicants collectively are not acting in public interest but have operated from a self-serving platform.

[22] As a final salvo the respondents bemoan the failure of the Paramount Chief to have engaged them on whether there is alternative accommodation for all the families that have established themselves on the land in question. The respondents emphasize that the Paramount Chief has discounted the financial implications of the development which includes public finances that have been expended by servicing the land by the Municipality. Allied to these contentions, they contend that the application falls to be dismissed.

The law

[23] The PIE Act primarily gives expression to the right of access to adequate housing as provided for in s 26 of the Constitution. It regulates the circumstances under which evictions may be conducted. See: Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers [2004] ZACC 7; 2004 (12) BCLR 1288 (CC)[2004] ZACC 7; ; 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) from para 8.

[24] Section 4(7) of the PIE Act provides that:

‘If an unlawful occupier has occupied the land in question for more than six months at the time when the proceedings were initiated, a court may grant an order for eviction if it is of the opinion that it is just and equitable to do so, after considering all relevant

circumstances, including, except where the land is sold on execution pursuant to a mortgage, whether the land has been made available or can reasonably be made available by a municipality or other organ of state or another land owner for the relocation of the unlawful

occupier, and including the rights and needs of the elderly, children, disabled person and household headed by women.”

[25] Section 4(8) of the PIE Act provides that:

“If the court is satisfied that all the requirements of this section have been complied with and that no valid defence has been raised by the unlawful occupier, it must grant an order for the eviction of the unlawful occupier, and determine –

(a) a just and equitable date on which the unlawful occupier must vacate the land under the circumstances; and

(b) the date on which an eviction order may be carried out if the unlawful occupier has not vacated the land on the date contemplated in paragraph (a).”

[26] In Ndlovu v Ngcobo, Bakker and Another v Jika (1) (240/2001, 136/2002) [2002] ZASCA 87; [2002] 4 All SA 384 (SCA) (30 August 2002) at paragraph 11, the court held that:

“… PIE Act applies to all unlawful occupiers, irrespective of whether their possession was at an earlier stage lawful.

[27] Section 4(2) of PIE provides that least 14 days before the hearing of the proceedings contemplated in subsection (1), the court must serve written and effective notice of the proceedings on the unlawful occupier and the municipality having jurisdiction. The applicants have failed to serve this peremptory notice on the third and fourth respondents. This is fatal. It follows that the

application against the third and fourth respondents must fail. What remains is a consideration of the relief against the first, second and fifth respondents.

[28] Turning to this, the primary issue that warrants consideration, which is central to the relief sought by applicants, is whether the applicants are clothed with the necessary locus standi to move for the eviction of the respondents. The Paramount Chief in his founding affidavit asserts that ‘I have authority to depose to this affidavit as the ownership of the land in question vests with the traditional/tribal authority.’

[29] In reply, the applicants bolster the existence of their locus standi by positing the following:

“32. I am advised that the Applicants’ powers are enshrined in chapter 12 of the Constitution which provides inter alia that this Honourable Court must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law.

33. As a result of the Constitutional imperative the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act No. 41 of 2003.

34. Significantly, it is the functions of Traditional Council provided for in section 4 of the Act which states that amongst other things, the Council shall deal with the Administration of the affairs of the traditional community in accordance with customs and tradition.

35. The First and Second Applicants are the lawful custodians of the land encompassing N8 and R372 and the third Applicant is a cooperative aimed at making an income for the communities under my leadership and that of the Council.

36. I am advised that permission to occupy and/or informal land rights are protected under section 25 of the Constitution. Meaning that all the rights of the people are limited with respect to which rights they can exercise over the land.

37. In this instance, I am the custodian of the land with the power to rationally allocate land in accordance with the laws of South Africa and also for the benefit of all persons under my leadership.

38. I assert that I have not given any permission to occupy the land to the Respondents, and this much is acknowledged by the respondents

themselves in their answering affidavit.

39. There is an African expression which I agree with, which the Respondent have quoted that say “he is the child of the community”, (ad para 3 of the answering affidavit) the irony of this assertion is that it is lost on the Respondents that children must obey lawful instructions.”

[30] In written heads of argument, the applicants contend that, (i) the three applicants possess ownership and the requisite legal standing to seek the eviction of the respondents, (ii) the applicants are the custodians of the said land and are responsible for the maintenance, control, allocation, production, and access to

land under the authority, (iii) there are families within this territory who have lawful possession for the use and enjoyment of the said land and thus the respondents have interfered with such use and enjoyment, (iv) the applicants do not only act for themselves but also in the public interest as envisaged by section 38 of the Constitution. On this score, counsel for the applicants referred to Four Wheel Drive CC v Leshni Rattan NO (1048/17) [2018] ZASCA at 124.

[31] The applicants' attempt to make a case that they are championing a public interest in the written heads of argument. The law in respect of motion proceedings is trite. In the instant proceedings the applicants rely on their statutory functions as traditional leaders of the community. There can be no doubt that the onus to establish locus standi rests upon the applicants. In the discharge of such onus, it is incumbent upon them to point out the statutory provisions upon which their power to institute these proceedings is to be found.

[32] Integral to the requirement for locus standi is that the litigant must have adequate interest in the subject matter of the litigation; the interest must not be too far removed; and the interest must be actual, not abstract or academic; and it must be a current and not hypothetical one. See: E van Loggerenberg and E Bertelsmann Erasmus: Superior Court Practice 2 ed vol 1(loose-leaf) at 01- 186. The advent of the constitution has resulted in a change in the contours of locus standi . See: Four Wheel Drive Accessory Distributors CC v Leshni Rattan NO 2018 JDR 2203 (SCA). However, the Courts still require that the litigants must have a legal interest or right to the subject matter. See: Basotho Tribal Authority and Others v Matsipa and Another (1314/2020) [2021] ZAECGHC 19 (23 February 2021) at paras 17 and 18.

[33] The following definitions in PIE are relevant:

“Owner - means the registered owner of land, including an organ of state;

Person in charge - means a person who has or at the relevant time had legal authority to give permission to a person to enter or reside upon the land in question;

Unlawful occupier - means a person who occupies land without the express or tacit consent of the owner or person in charge, or without any other right in law to occupy such land."

[34] There is no underscoring that the applicants must demonstrate what forms its locus standi and the source of its origin. As I see it, the applicants have substantially established locus standi. Upon careful consideration of the papers filed and the submissions of the legal representatives in court, I am of the view that there is no defence raised in these proceedings before me by the respondents. The absence of a defence has been bolstered by the sixth, seventh and eighth respondents who have deposed to affidavits aligning themselves to the Paramount Chief’s case, conceding that the first to the eighth respondents were responsible for the unlawful allocation of land at Rethuse Re Dire Primary Agricultural Cooperative.

[35] I am satisfied that the Paramount Chief is the person in charge of the property. The respondents are unlawful occupiers of the property as they are in occupation without the express or tacit permission of the Paramount Chief and continue to refuse to vacate the property despite repeated requests.

[36] Section 26(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that:

“No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made, after considering all relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.”

[37] In Pheko and Others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (CCT19/11A) [2015 ] ZACC 10; 2015 (6) BLCR 711 (CC); 2015 (5) SA 600 (CC) (7 May 2015), the apex court affirmed that section 26(3) of the Constitution does not permit legislation authorizing evictions without a court order. The PIE Act reinforced this by providing that a court may not grant an eviction order unless the eviction would be just and equitable in the circumstances. The court must have regard to several factors including but not limited to the following:

(a) whether the occupants include vulnerable categories of persons, that is the elderly, children and female-headed households.

(b) the duration of the occupation; and

(c) the availability of alternate accommodation in instances where occupiers are unable to obtain alternate accommodation for themselves.

[38] Clearly, the applicants fall under the definition of ‘person in charge’ as enunciated in PIE and have proved the unlawful

occupation of the respondents. In principle the applicants would be entitled to an eviction order. In City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd and Others (Changing Tides) (SCA) [2012] ZASCA 116; 2012 (6) SA 294 (SCA); 2012 (11) BCLR 1206 (SCA); [2013] 1 All SA 8 (SCA) (14 September 2012), the Supreme Court of Appeal acknowledged the relationship between subsections (7) and (8) of PIE and concluded thus: -

“[25] A court hearing an application for eviction at the instance of a private person or body, owing no obligation to provide housing or achieve the gradual realisation of the right of access to housing in terms of s 26(1) of the Constitution, is faced with two separate enquiries. First it must decide whether it is just and equitable to grant an eviction order having regard to all relevant factors. Under 4(7) those factors include the availability of alternative land or accommodation. The weight to be attached to that factor must be assessed in the light of the property owner’s protected rights under s 25 of the Constitution, and on the footing that a limitation of those rights in favour of all occupiers will ordinarily be limited in duration. Once the court decides that there is no defence to the claim for eviction and it would be just and equitable to grant an eviction order, it is obliged to grant that order. Before doing so, however, it must consider what justice and equity demand in relation to the date of implementation of that order. In that second enquiry it must consider the impact of an eviction order on the occupiers and whether they may be rendered homeless thereby or need emergency assistance to relocate elsewhere. The order that it grants as a result of these two discrete enquiries is a single order. Accordingly, it cannot be granted until both enquiries have been undertaken and the conclusion reached that the grant of an eviction order, effective from a specified date, is just and equitable. Nor can the enquiry be concluded until the court is satisfied that it is in possession of all the information necessary to make both findings based on justice and equity.”

[39] The applicants concede that the households that are in unlawful occupation and/or do not exceed eighteen (18). Further, the respondents were interdicted on 29 November 2021 from disposing of land unlawfully. Therefore, they have been the authors of their own unlawful activity and have reconciled themselves to the consequences that follow.

[40] Section 4(7) read with section 4(8) of PIE contemplates a two-stage process. Firstly, a finding that it is just and equitable to evict and then a second enquiry in which the court decides what conditions, if any, are to be incorporated in its eviction order and by when the unlawful occupiers must quit the property. At all times the court’s decision as to what is just and equitable and must have regard to the interests of all parties – both the occupiers and the landowner. See: City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd and others 2012 (6) SA 294 (SCA) at [12].

[41] In Changing Tides the following approach was postulated:

“[11] In terms of s4(7) of PIE an eviction order may only be granted if it is just and equitable to do so, after the court has had regard to all the relevant circumstances, including the availability of land for the relocation of the occupiers and the rights and needs of the elderly, children, disabled persons and households headed by women. If the requirements of s4 are satisfied and no valid defence to an eviction has been raised the court ‘must’, in terms of s4(8)[13], grant an eviction order. When granting such an order the court must, in terms of s4(8)(a) of PIE, determine a just and equitable date on which the unlawful occupier or occupiers must vacate the premises. The court is empowered in terms of s4(12) to attach reasonable conditions to an eviction order.”

[42] The respondents have attached several photographs depicting the structures that have been constructed. I am mindful that the applicants’ contention in this regard. It is farfetched that the applicants would have not observed the

development of these households. Moreover, the involvement of the Municipality in the provision of selected services could not have gone unnoticed.

[43] The applicants in their founding affidavit do not implicitly deal with legal principle of whether it would be just and equitable to evict the respondents. In broad strokes in the absence of primary facts, the applicant contends that, (i) there is an abundance of alternative accommodation, (ii) the respondents can easily afford alternative accommodation and, (iii) it would not be difficult for the respondents to secure rented accommodation and anyone claiming occupancy under them cannot be described as homeless or destitute.

[44] The applicants in reply, attempt to address the just and equitable principle but still miss the watermark, but proffer the following as a potential remedy:

“129. The First and Second Applicant have since the commencement of this legal proceeding stated that there is an appropriate land for residential property that can be allocated to the Respondents.

130. The Respondents despite their utter insolence, are still the sons and daughters of the soil and as their Kgosikgolo, I will never dessert (sic desert) them.

131. Thus, upon eviction of the Respondents, they shall be properly allocated appropriate land.”

[45] What the applicants lose focus of, is that prior to an eviction order, it must be found that it would be just and equitable to do so. On the conspectus of the evidence, the respondents have presented no defence. In the premises this Court must order the eviction. Given the paucity of facts, it would be prudent to make use of the mechanism provided in section 4(12) of PIE to craft an appropriate order to give life to the principle of whether it would be just and equitable to evict the respondents. It would be easy to dismiss the application predicated on the failure to, by the applicants to comprehensively address the various factors set out in Pheko and Changing Tides.

Costs

[46] Costs are at the discretion of the court. Under the circumstances, in my view, costs should be costs in the cause.

Conclusion

[47] In the premises I make the following order:

1. The application is postponed to 11 September 2025 to the opposed roll for a further hearing before Reddy J.

3. The applicants shall file their heads of argument within five days of filing their replying affidavit.

A REDDY

JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

NORTH WEST DIVISION MAHIKENG

APPEARANCES:

Counsel for Applicant

: Advocate M Mpya

Instructed by:

Mabapa Attorneys

c/o Sifumba Attorneys

No 7 Corner Impala And

Gemsbok Street

Golf View, Mahikeng

Counsel for Second Respondent: Advocate N Kapumha

Instructed by:

Sehlabo Attorneys Inc.

14 Tillard Street

Kelgor House.

Date of Hearing: 25 September 2024

Date of judgment: 15 July 2025