Download PDF

South Africa Judgment

North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria

Mkhwanazi-Sigege and Another v Mottee and Others; Mkhwanazi obo Mkhwanazi and Another v Mottee and Others (64484/2020;10475/2021) [2021] ZAGPPHC 830 (13 December 2021)

On this page

Professional case brief

Research organized from the available case record

Source document

01

Holding and result

The court considered the written heads of argument and submissions by both parties. Applying the principles in section 17 of the Superior Courts Act and relevant case law, the court found that the applicants had demonstrated a reasonable prospect that another court would come to a different conclusion regarding the dismissal of their consolidated urgent application. The threshold for granting leave to appeal was met, and leave to appeal was accordingly granted to the Full Court of the Division, with costs in the appeal, including costs of counsel.

Court disposition

Leave to appeal granted to the Full Court of this Division, with costs in the appeal, including costs of counsel.

Orders

  • The application is granted leave to appeal to the Full Court of this Division.
  • Costs in the appeal, including costs of counsel, are awarded.

02

Material facts

Parties

S N N Mkhwanazi-Sigege

Applicant Counsel: Adv. C.H.J. Badenhorst SC & Adv. N. Nortje

B C Mkhwanazi

Applicant Counsel: Adv. C.H.J. Badenhorst SC & Adv. N. Nortje

Bongekile Cynthia Mkhwanazi obo Xolani Siviwe Mkhwanazi

Applicant Counsel: Adv. C.H.J. Badenhorst SC & Adv. N. Nortje

Bongekile Cynthia Mkhwanazi obo Nhlakanipho Okuhle Manqele N.O.

Applicant Counsel: Adv. C.H.J. Badenhorst SC & Adv. N. Nortje

Peter Le Mottée

Respondent Counsel: Adv. J.D. Botha

Lloyd Robert Ball

Respondent Counsel: Adv. J.D. Botha

The Master of the High Court, Pretoria

Respondent

Mercia Khanyile Ngema

Respondent

Mbali Ngema

Respondent

Nhlanhla Ngema

Respondent

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal Against Judgment and Order Dated 21 September 2021

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
The applicants contend that the court erred in dismissing their consolidated urgent application and that there are reasonable prospects that another court would reach a different conclusion. They rely on the grounds set out in their application for leave to appeal, arguing that the matter is not hopeless and is arguable on appeal.
Respondent
The respondents maintain that the applicants have not met the higher threshold required for leave to appeal under section 17 of the Superior Courts Act. They argue that there is no sound, rational basis for concluding that another court would differ from the judgment, and that the prospects of success are remote.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Section 17 of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013

    Leave to appeal may only be granted where the judge is of the opinion that the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard.

  2. 02

    The Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen & 18 Others 2014 JDR 2325 (LCC)

    The threshold for granting leave to appeal has been raised; there must be a measure of certainty that another court will differ from the judgment appealed against.

  3. 03

    S v Smith 2012 (1) SACR 567 (SCA) at para 7

    An applicant must establish more than a mere possibility of success; there must be a sound, rational basis for the conclusion that there are prospects of success on appeal.

  4. 04

    Fair-Trade Independent Tobacco Association v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another, Case no: 21688/2020 [2020] ZAGPPHC 311 (24 July 2020)

    The higher threshold for leave to appeal requires more than a mere possibility that another court will find differently on facts and law.

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

The court considered the written heads of argument and submissions by both parties. Applying the principles in section 17 of the Superior Courts Act and relevant case law, the court found that the applicants had demonstrated a reasonable prospect that another court would come to a different conclusion regarding the dismissal of their consolidated urgent application. The threshold for granting leave to appeal was met, and leave to appeal was accordingly granted to the Full Court of the Division, with costs in the appeal, including costs of counsel.

Obiter and limits

  • The judgment highlights the increased threshold for granting leave to appeal under the Superior Courts Act, emphasizing the need for a realistic prospect of success rather than a mere possibility.
  • The court notes the importance of written heads of argument in facilitating virtual hearings and ensuring efficient adjudication.

Court disposition

Leave to appeal granted to the Full Court of this Division, with costs in the appeal, including costs of counsel.

  • The application is granted leave to appeal to the Full Court of this Division.
  • Costs in the appeal, including costs of counsel, are awarded.

Source and reliance status

North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria

This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.

Judgment reading view

Judgment text

The complete available source text.

Source document

North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria

Judgment

[2021] ZAGPPHC 830

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH

AFRICA

IN THE HIGH

COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

(GAUTENG DIVISION PRETORIA)

(1) REPORTABLE: NO

(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO

(3)

REVISED

13 DECEMBER 2021

CASE NO:64484/2020

In the matter between:

S N N MKHWANAZI-SIGEGE

FIRST APPLICANT

B

C

MKHWANAZI

SECOND APPLICANT

And

PETER LE MOTTéE

FIRST RESPONDENT

LLOYD

ROBERT

BALL

SECOND RESPONDENT

THE MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT,

PRETORIA

THIRD RESPONDENT

CONSOLIDATED WITH:

CASE NO: 10475/2021

In the matter between:

BONGEKILE

CYNTHIA MKHWANAZI

obo

XOLANI SIVIWE MKHWANAZI

FIRST APPLICANT

obo NHLAKANIPHO OKUHLE MANQELE N.O.

SECOND APPLICANT

MERCIA

KHANYILE NGEMA

FOURTH RESPONDENT

MBALI

NGEMA

FIFTH RESPONDENT

NHLANHLA

NGEMA

SIXTH RESPONDENT

This judgment is issued by the Judge whose name is reflected herein and is submitted electronically to the parties/their legal representatives by email. The judgment is further uploaded to the electronic file of this matter on Caselines by the Judge or his/her secretary. The date of this judgment is deemed to be 13 December 2021.

APPLICATION FOR

LEAVE TO APPEAL JUDGMENT

COLLIS J

INTRODUCTION

[1] This is an application for leave to appeal against the judgment and order I made on 21 September 2021. The full order of the court reads as follows:

1.1 “The applicants namely case no: 64484/2020 and case no: 10475/2021 are consolidated in terms of Rule 11 and shall proceed as one application;

1.2 The application is enrolled as an urgent application in terms of Rule 6(12);

1.3 The application is dismissed;

1.4 The applicants are ordered to pay the costs of the application.”

[2] The application is premised on the grounds as listed in the Application for Leave to Appeal dated 11 October 2021.

LEGAL

PRINCIPLES

[3] Section 17 of the Superior Court’s Act provides as follows:[1]

(1) Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned are of the opinion that-

(a) (i) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or

(ii) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should

be heard, including conflicting judgments on the matter under

consideration;

(b) the decision sought to appeal does not fall within the ambit of section 16(2)(a);

and

(c) where the decision sought to be appealed does not dispose of all the issues in the case, the appeal would lead to a just and prompt resolution of the real issues between the parties.

[4] In the present instance the Applicant applies for leave on the first leg;

i.e. that the “…an appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success”.

[5] As to the test to be applied by a court in considering an application for leave to appeal, Bertelsmann J in The Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen & 18 Others 2014 JDR 2325 (LCC) at para 6 stated the following:

‘It is clear that the threshold for granting leave to appeal against a judgment of a High Court has been raised in the new Act. The former test whether leave to appeal should be granted was a reasonable prospect that another court might come to a different conclusion, see Van Heerden v Cronwright & Others 1985 (2) SA 342 (T) at 343H. The use of the word “would” in the new statute indicates a measure of certainty that another court will differ from the court whose judgment is sought to be appealed against.’

[6] ‘In order to succeed, therefore, the appellant must convince this Court on proper grounds that he has prospects of success on appeal and that those prospects are not remote, but have a realistic chance of succeeding. More is required to be established than that there is a mere possibility of success, that the case is arguable on appeal or that the case cannot be categorised as hopeless. There must, in other word, be a sound, rational basis for the conclusion that there are prospects of success on appeal.’[2]

[7] In Fair-Trade Independent Tobacco Association v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another[3] the Full Court of this Division observed that:

“As such, in considering the application for leave to appeal it is crucial for this Court to remain cognizant of the higher threshold that needs to be met before leave to appeal may be granted. There must exist more than just a mere possibility that another court, the SCA in this instance, will, not might, find differently on both facts and law. It is against this background that we consider the most pivotal grounds of appeal.”

[8] The applicant and the respondent on request by this court had filed written Heads of Argument in order to facilitate the virtual hearing of the matter.

[9] Having read the papers and having carefully heard counsel I come to the conclusion that there is a reasonable prospect that another court would come to a different conclusion on the order of the court.

ORDER

[10] Consequently I make the following order:

10.1 The application is granted leave to appeal to the Full Court of

this Division, with costs to in the appeal, including costs of

counsel.

COLLIS C

JUDGE OF THE HIGH

COURT

Appearances

Counsel for the Applicants : Adv. C.H.J. Badenhorst SC

& Adv. N. Nortje

Attorney for the Applicants : Aaron Stanger & Associates

Counsel for the 1st & 2nd Respondents : Adv. J.D. Botha

Attorney for the 1st & 2nd Respondents : Kotzé & Roux Attorneys Inc

Date of Hearing

: 01 December 2021

Date of Judgment

: 13 December 2021

Judgment transmitted electronically.

[1] Act 10 of 2013

[2] S v Smith 2012 (1) SACR 567 (SCA) at para 7.

[3] Case no: 21688/2020 [2020] ZAGPPHC 311 (24 July 2020) at [6].

Source wording is retained. Consult the source document for its original formatting and pagination.

Authorities

Authorities used by the court

Cases, legislation, regulations, and constitutional provisions identified in the available record.

The Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen & 18 Others 2014 JDR 2325 (LCC)

Case cited

Van Heerden v Cronwright & Others 1985 (2) SA 342 (T)

Case cited

S v Smith 2012 (1) SACR 567 (SCA)

Case cited

Fair-Trade Independent Tobacco Association v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another, Case no: 21688/2020 [2020] ZAGPPHC 311 (24 July 2020)

Case cited

Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

Case-aware research

Ask AI about this case

The judgment and available research above are public. New questions open in a separate private conversation grounded in this case.

About this LexChat collection

This page organizes the available case record for research. Verify quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the source document. Corrections can be reported to hello@esheria.ai.

Legal information, not legal advice. Research summaries do not replace the judgment.