Monama and Another v First Rand Bank Limited (2025/043482) [2025] ZAGPJHC 382 (8 April 2025)
- Citation
- [2025] ZAGPJHC 382
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
- Panel
- WJ du Plessis
- Case number
- 2025/043482
More details
- Court
- South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
- Panel
- WJ du Plessis
- Case number
- 2025/043482
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court found that the applicants failed to establish urgency justifying immediate intervention. The respondent's written undertaking not to sell the vehicle pending the rescission application mitigated any risk of irreparable harm. The applicants did not provide a legal basis to prevent lawful repossession under the default judgment, and mere fear of loss is insufficient for urgent relief. The second applicant lacked standing, having no contractual or legal interest in the matter. Costs were awarded on the ordinary scale, as the application was not brought in bad faith.
Court disposition
Application struck from the roll for lack of urgency; costs awarded against applicants on the ordinary scale.
Orders
- The matter is struck from the roll due to lack of urgency.
- Costs to be taxed on scale A (ordinary party-and-party scale) against the applicants.
02
Material facts
Parties
Anette Parane Monama
Applicant Counsel: In personDavid Moetji
Applicant Counsel: In personFirst Rand Bank Limited t/a WesBank
Respondent Counsel: M Arroyo03
Procedural history
Posture
Urgent Application / Application to Strike Matter From Roll Due to Lack of Urgency
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the application is urgent and justifies immediate court intervention.
- 02
Whether the applicants have a legal basis to prevent repossession of the vehicle pending rescission.
- 03
Whether the second applicant has standing in the matter.
- 04
Appropriate costs order in the circumstances.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The applicants argued that the respondent may imminently repossess and sell their vehicle, which is essential for daily family needs, including transporting children and attending medical appointments. They requested urgent protection pending the outcome of their rescission application, fearing irreparable harm if the vehicle is taken before the court decides on rescission.
- Respondent
- The respondent contended that it is the legal owner of the vehicle under the instalment sale agreement, which was breached by non-payment. It has already obtained a default judgment entitling it to repossess the vehicle. The respondent provided a written undertaking not to sell the vehicle pending the rescission application but maintained its right to collect it. The respondent also sought costs on an attorney-and-client scale.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Rule 42 of the Uniform Rules of Court
A rescission application does not automatically suspend the operation of a default judgment; enforcement may proceed unless a court orders otherwise.
- 02
Luna Meubel Vervaardigers (Edms) Bpk v Makin and Another (1977 (4) SA 135 (W))
Urgent relief is only granted where the applicant demonstrates imminent and irreparable harm that cannot be addressed in the ordinary course.
- 03
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Gush (1983 (4) SA 783 (C))
Costs generally follow the result, but attorney-and-client costs are reserved for cases of bad faith or abuse of process.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court found that the applicants failed to establish urgency justifying immediate intervention. The respondent's written undertaking not to sell the vehicle pending the rescission application mitigated any risk of irreparable harm. The applicants did not provide a legal basis to prevent lawful repossession under the default judgment, and mere fear of loss is insufficient for urgent relief. The second applicant lacked standing, having no contractual or legal interest in the matter. Costs were awarded on the ordinary scale, as the application was not brought in bad faith.
Obiter and limits
- The judgment was written in accessible language to ensure the lay applicant understood the outcome and reasoning.
- The inclusion of the second applicant was unnecessary and did not affect the merits of the case.
- The respondent's undertaking not to sell the vehicle was a relevant factor in assessing urgency.
Court disposition
Application struck from the roll for lack of urgency; costs awarded against applicants on the ordinary scale.
- The matter is struck from the roll due to lack of urgency.
- Costs to be taxed on scale A (ordinary party-and-party scale) against the applicants.
Source and reliance status
South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
Judgment
THE
HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case 2025-043482
(1) REPORTABLE: No
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: No
(3) REVISED: Yes
08 April 2025
In the matter between:
ANETTE
PARANE MONAMA First Applicant
DAVID
MOETJI Second Applicant and
FIRST RAND BANK LIMITED T/A WESBANK Respondent
JUDGMENT
DU PLESSIS J
Introduction
[1] The first applicant appeared in person in this urgent application. The respondent was legally represented. I decided to reserve judgment to prepare a written decision for the applicant to keep on record and, more importantly, explain what happened in court. This judgment is, therefore written with a layperson as the intended audience.
[2] The applicants brought this application because they are afraid the respondent will take away their vehicle. At the same time, they have instituted a rescission application for the default judgment that the respondent obtained against them. They explained that they need the vehicle urgently for important daily activities, especially to take their children to school and attend medical appointments. I do not doubt that this vehicle is important to them and their family.
[3] The respondent, however, has already given a written promise that it will not sell the vehicle while the court is still deciding whether to cancel (rescind) the earlier default judgment. This promise was confirmed again in court by the respondent’s lawyer. However, this promise only covers selling the vehicle, but it does not mean the respondent will not come to collect it.
[4] The respondent (WesBank) signed a written agreement with the first applicant in March 2022. Under that agreement, WesBank allowed the applicant to buy the car and pay it off in monthly instalments. However, WesBank remains the legal owner of the vehicle until the full amount is paid. Unfortunately, the applicant fell behind on her payments, which means that there was a breach of the contract.
[5] Because the applicant broke the agreement by not paying, the respondent was legally allowed to end the contract and go to court to ask for the vehicle back. The court granted that request in a default judgment on 5 March 2025 because the applicant did not respond to the summons in time. That judgment gave the respondent the legal right to collect the vehicle.
[6] The applicant has since filed a rescission application. However, the law is clear: simply asking for rescission does not stop the judgment from being enforced. So unless a court order says otherwise, the respondent can still act on the judgment and collect the vehicle.
[7] The respondent, as the legal owner of the vehicle and holder of a valid court order, is therefore entitled to possession of the vehicle. The applicant has not given a legal reason for keeping the car for now. Although I understand her concern and do not doubt her honesty, fear alone is not enough for the court to block a lawful repossession.
[8] The court can only hear a matter urgently if the person asking for help can show that they will not get a proper chance to get redress. But here, because the respondent has promised not to sell the vehicle and the rescission application is pending, there is no immediate or permanent harm to the applicants that justifies urgent intervention. They will still be able to make their case in the rescission application.
[9] The second applicant, Mr Moetji, was not part of the original contract or legal case, and there is no evidence that he has a direct legal interest in the outcome. His inclusion in this application appears to be a mistake and unnecessary. I have explained that in court to Mr Moetji and the applicant. He can also not represent the applicant in the proceedings because he is not a legal practitioner.
[10] As for costs, the respondent asked for a higher-than-usual costs order (on an attorney-and-client scale). I do not believe that is warranted in this case, even if that is in the contract. The applicants did not bring this case out of bad faith but rather out of fear of losing something they rely on. Even though they were unsuccessful, they acted out of concern, not malice. Costs will therefore follow the normal rule that the losing party pays the costs, but only on the ordinary scale (scale A).
Order
[11] The following order is made:
1. The matter is struck from the roll due to a lack of urgency, with costs to be taxed on scale A.
WJ du Plessis
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division, Johannesburg
Date of hearing;: 8 April 2025 Date of judgment: 8 April 2025 For the applicant: In person For the respondent: M Arroyo instructed by Strauss Daly attorneys.
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