Mothuloe v Standard Bank of South Africa Limited (2016/42510) [2017] ZAGPPHC 703 (16 October 2017)
- Citation
- [2017] ZAGPPHC 703
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Panel
- LM Grenfell
- Case number
- 2016/42510
More details
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Panel
- LM Grenfell
- Case number
- 2016/42510
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate reasonable prospects of success on appeal. The applicant's claim of non-receipt of summons was not supported by the facts, and his evasion of communication attempts by the respondent's attorney undermined his position. The over-indebtedness defence did not constitute a triable issue, as the facts did not provide a sufficient basis for raising the argument, and the alleged reckless granting of credit for subsequent vehicle finance transactions was irrelevant to the present matter. No other compelling reason for granting leave to appeal was identified. The application for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent on an attorney and client scale as provided for in the parties' agreements.
Court disposition
Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent on an attorney and client scale.
Orders
- The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
- The applicant is ordered to pay the respondent's costs on an attorney and client scale.
02
Material facts
Parties
Wycliffe Earnest Thipe Mothuloe
Applicant Counsel: G JacobsThe Standard Bank of South Africa Limited
Respondent Counsel: G Amm03
Procedural history
Posture
Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal Following Dismissal of Rescission Application
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the applicant has reasonable prospects of success on appeal against the dismissal of the rescission application.
- 02
Whether the applicant was in wilful default for failing to note intention to defend due to alleged non-receipt of summons.
- 03
Whether over-indebtedness constitutes a triable issue under the bona fide defence leg of the rescission test.
- 04
Whether there is any other compelling reason for granting leave to appeal.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The applicant contended that he did not receive the summons served at his domicilium address and was therefore not in wilful default. He argued that the over-indebtedness defence raised a triable issue under the bona fide defence leg of the rescission test. The applicant further submitted that the appropriate forum for appeal should be the Supreme Court of Appeal due to the novel point of law regarding the retrospective application of over-indebtedness under the National Credit Act.
- Respondent
- The respondent argued that the applicant evaded all attempts to communicate the pending litigation and that the distinction between periods before and after service of summons was artificial. The respondent submitted that the facts did not support the raising of the over-indebtedness argument, as there was no suggestion of over-indebtedness at the relevant time. The respondent maintained that the reckless granting of credit for subsequent vehicle finance transactions was irrelevant to the present action.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
Leave to appeal may be granted only if the court is of the opinion that the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other compelling reason for it to be heard.
- 02
Colyn v Tiger Food Industries Ltd t/a Meadow Feed Mills (Cape) 2003 (6) SA 1 (SCA)
A party seeking rescission must show a bona fide defence with reasonable prospects of success.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate reasonable prospects of success on appeal. The applicant's claim of non-receipt of summons was not supported by the facts, and his evasion of communication attempts by the respondent's attorney undermined his position. The over-indebtedness defence did not constitute a triable issue, as the facts did not provide a sufficient basis for raising the argument, and the alleged reckless granting of credit for subsequent vehicle finance transactions was irrelevant to the present matter. No other compelling reason for granting leave to appeal was identified. The application for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent on an attorney and client scale as provided for in the parties' agreements.
Obiter and limits
- The attempt to distinguish between the time period before and after service of the summons is artificial and does not assist the applicant.
- The commentary on the National Credit Act by an academic author does not provide sufficient authority to support the applicant's argument.
Court disposition
Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent on an attorney and client scale.
- The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
- The applicant is ordered to pay the respondent's costs on an attorney and client scale.
Source and reliance status
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
Judgment
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO.: 2016/42510
Before Her Ladyship Ms Acting Justice Grenfell
Heard on Wednesday 11 October 2017
Judgment delivered Monday 16 October 2017
In the matter between:
WYCLIFFE
EARNEST THIPE MOTHULOE Applicant
And
THE
STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED Respondent
JUDGMENT
ON LEAVE TO APPEAL
GRENFELL AJ:
[1]
INTRODUCTION
1.1. The applicant seeks leave to appeal the judgment handed down on 8 September 2017, which dismissed the application for rescission and directed the applicant to pay the respondent's costs on an attorney and client scale.
1.2. The applicant's grounds for seeking leave to appeal are contained in a Notice for Leave to Appeal dated 27 September 2017. The grounds can be summarised as contesting the findings in the judgment that the applicant was in wilful default of noting an intention to defend, as he did not receive the summons which was served on his domicilium address and that the over-indebtedness defence fell to be decided in the applicant's favour as comprising a triable issue on the bona fide
defence leg of the rescission test.
1.3. In argument, Mr Jacobs who appeared for the applicant. submitted that although he had originally agreed that the appropriate appeal forum would be a
Full Bench of this court. upon queries raised during his submissions, it was during argument contended for the applicant, that the Supreme Court of Appeal would be the appropriate forum to decide this novel point of law.
[2]
TEST FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
2.1. In order to grant leave to appeal, I need to be of the opinion that either, the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success or that there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard.
3.3. This must be seen in the context of the evasion by the applicant of all attempts to communicate the reality of the pending litigation to him by the respondent's attorney and in my view, the attempt to draw a distinction between time period before and after service of the summons is artificial.
3.4. The second and more troubling aspect on deciding whether to grant leave to appeal and the best point for the applicant which was well argued on his behalf by Mr Jacobs, is whether the over-indebtedness contended for by the applicant, does not comprise a triable issue with a reasonable prospect of success.
3.5. This point, which is novel, would have the applicant seek to persuade an Appeal Court that the time at which the over-indebtedness should be determined would operate retrospectively, to cover debts from agreements concluded at the time that the National Credit Act ("Act") was not yet in force.
3.6. There is a passing comment on the possibility of the matter being uncertain in a commentary on the Act by an academic author, but no other authority.
3.7. I am persuaded that the answer lies in Mr Amm's submission that the facts do not provide a factual platform allowing for the raising of the argument at all, in that on the information as to asset value of the applicant known to the respondent at the time, there can have been no suggestion of over-indebtedness in what was really an attempt to raise the reckless granting of credit for subsequent vehicle finance transactions which are irrelevant to this action.
3.8. Accordingly, I cannot form the opinion that the applicant would have reasonable prospects of success on appeal on the over-indebtedness point.
3.9. It remains for me to consider whether there is any other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard. I am unable to think of any reason and none was suggested to me in argument.
3.10. The scale of costs is provided for in the agreements between the parties and I propose to give effect thereto in the exercise of my discretion.
[4]
ORDER
I make the following order:
4.1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
4.2. The applicant is ordered to pay the respondent's costs on an attorney and client scale.
________
LM
GRENFELL
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Date of hearing:
11 October 2017
Judgment delivered: 13 October 2017
Appearing for applicant: Adv G Jacobs
Counsel for Respondent: Adv G Amm
Case-aware research
Ask AI about this case
The judgment and available research above are public. New questions open in a separate private conversation grounded in this case.