Msi and Others v National Union of Mineworkers National Executive Committee (J1714/19) [2019] ZALCJHB 222 (16 August 2019)
- Citation
- [2019] ZALCJHB 222
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- Labour Court Johannesburg
- Panel
- Van Niekerk
- Case number
- J1714/19
More details
- Court
- Labour Court Johannesburg
- Panel
- Van Niekerk
- Case number
- J1714/19
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The applicants failed to establish a prima facie right to the relief sought. The suspension was effected by the deputy general secretary, who was authorised to act in the general secretary's absence according to the union's constitution. The constitution permits precautionary suspension without a prior hearing or right of appeal. The applicants' suspensions were not disciplinary penalties but precautionary measures pending investigation. The requirements for interim relief were not met, and the application must be dismissed.
Court disposition
Application dismissed with costs.
Orders
- The application is dismissed, with costs.
02
Material facts
Parties
Vuyolwethu Msi and 8 Others
Applicant Counsel: N.D SekwakwengNational Union of Mineworkers National Executive Committee
Respondent Counsel: C Orr SC03
Procedural history
Posture
Urgent Application / Interim Relief Application Before Final Review
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the applicants' suspension was effected in breach of the union's constitution.
- 02
Whether the deputy general secretary was authorised to suspend the applicants.
- 03
Whether the applicants were entitled to a hearing or to make representations prior to suspension.
- 04
Whether the requirements for interim relief have been met.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The applicants contend that their suspension was unlawful due to non-compliance with the union's constitution, lack of opportunity to conduct their defence, and absence of a chance to make representations. They argue that the disciplinary process was flawed and seek reinstatement pending final determination.
- Respondent
- The respondent maintains that the suspensions were precautionary and effected in accordance with the union's constitution, specifically item 6 of Annexure 3. The deputy general secretary was authorised to act in the general secretary's absence. The applicants were not entitled to appeal or make representations prior to suspension, as the constitution does not provide such rights for precautionary suspensions.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC)
For interim relief, the applicant must establish a prima facie right, a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm, and the absence of an adequate alternative remedy. The court must also consider the balance of convenience.
- 02
Myeni v Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse and Others [2019] ZASCA 58
A voluntary association's constitution defines the rights and obligations of its members and office bearers. Compliance with the constitution is essential in internal disputes.
- 03
NUM Constitution, Annexure 3, item 6
Precautionary suspension is distinct from disciplinary sanction and may be imposed if in the interests of the union and the investigation of the matter.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The applicants failed to establish a prima facie right to the relief sought. The suspension was effected by the deputy general secretary, who was authorised to act in the general secretary's absence according to the union's constitution. The constitution permits precautionary suspension without a prior hearing or right of appeal. The applicants' suspensions were not disciplinary penalties but precautionary measures pending investigation. The requirements for interim relief were not met, and the application must be dismissed.
Obiter and limits
- The court noted that the applicants are not before the court as employees and that unfair labour practice rules do not apply to union office bearers in this context.
- The broad powers conferred by the union's constitution on the president and general secretary regarding suspension were emphasised.
Court disposition
Application dismissed with costs.
- The application is dismissed, with costs.
Source and reliance status
Labour Court Johannesburg
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Labour Court Johannesburg
Judgment
THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
JUDGMENT
Of interest to other Judges
CASE NO: J1714/19
In the matter between:
VUYOLWETHU MSI AND 8 OTHERS Applicant
and
NATIONAL UNION OF
MINEWORKERS
NATIONAL
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Respondent
Heard: 14 August 2019
Delivered: 16 August 2019
VAN NIEKERK J
[1] The applicants are office bearers of the respondent (the union). On 11 July 2019, the union suspended the applicants. They seek an interim order reinstating them to their previous positions pending ‘the finalization of Part B of this application…’. There is no Part B to the notice of motion, but for the heading. The founding affidavit discloses that the nature of the final relief to be sought is that of a review ‘in respect of the unlawful disciplinary procedure’. The basis of that application is said to be that the disciplinary process was unlawful on account of a failure to comply with the union’s constitution, that the applicants were not afforded an opportunity to properly conduct their defence, and that they were not afforded an opportunity to make representations.
[2] The application is brought in terms of s 158 (1) (e) of the Labour Relations Act (LRA), in terms of which this court is empowered to determine a dispute between a registered trade union and any one or more of its members about any alleged non-compliance with the constitution of that trade union. I accept that the applicants are not guilty of any undue delay in filing the present application, and that the application is urgent.
[3] The nature of the application is such that the applicants’ case must necessarily be founded on the union’s constitution. The union is a voluntary association and its constitution is definitive of the rights and obligations of its members and office bearers. Annexure 3 to the Constitution provides in item 64 precautionary suspension. That provision reads as follows:
6. Precautionary Suspension
6.1 The President or General Secretary, after consulting with other national office bearers and elected officials, may suspend a member, elected official or office-bearer as a precautionary measure if this is in the interests of the union and the investigation of the matter with the prosecution of the disciplinary proceedings.
6.2 The President or General Secretary may determine the terms and conditions of the suspension except that where applicable such a suspension must be on full pay.
[4] Clause 24 of the constitution establishes the office of the deputy general secretary. In terms of clause 12.4.2.2, the deputy general secretary must exercise the power and perform the duties of the general secretary in the latter’s absence.
[5] The applicants were suspended, as I have indicated, on 11 July 2019 in terms of a letter addressed to each of them by the deputy general secretary. The letter reads as follows:
Your attention is drawn to the NEC decision of the 27th and 28th of June 2019 and further consultation with national office bearers on Monday, 8 July 2019 a decision was taken that you are suspended to participate in all union activities pending further investigation of the matter and possible charges on your behaviour and conduct in the union.
You are immediately suspended from 11 July 2019 but you will remain a union member until the prosecution of the disciplinary proceedings all suspension is lifted.
[6] The requirements for interim relief are well-established. The purpose of interim relief is to preserve or restore the status quo pending the final determination of the rights of the parties. Although it is not clear to me, as I have indicated, precisely what final relief the applicants seek, I would assume in their favour that they intend to
have their dispute determined in terms of s 158(1)(e), and that the final relief they seek is an order to the effect that they were suspended in breach of the union’s constitution. Whether the proceedings ought appropriately to assume the form of a review is not a matter that need be decided at this point.
[7] The requirements for interim relief are well-established. For an applicant to succeed, he or she must establish a prima facie right, though open to some doubt, a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable injury in the absence of an ordinary remedy. Further, in the exercise of its discretion, the court must weigh the prejudice to the applicant if the interdict is withheld, against the prejudice to the respondent if it is granted, sometimes referred to as the balance of convenience.
[8] In the present instance, I am not persuaded that the applicants have cleared the first hurdle, i.e. a prima facie right though open to some doubt. The high watermark in the application is the assertion that the letter of suspension was signed by the deputy general secretary and not the general secretary. As the constitution makes clear, the deputy general secretary is authorised to act on behalf of the general secretary in his or her absence. In the present instance, the general secretary has annexed a copy of a letter addressed to the deputy general secretary in which he records that he would be out of the country and it had slipped his mind to forward letters of suspension to the applicants consequent on the union’s NEC endorsing the recommendation that they be suspended.
[9] In so far as the applicants appear to submit that in substance, their suspension constitutes a disciplinary penalty, this is simply not the case. The constitution draws a distinction between disciplinary proceedings and sanctions, and precautionary suspensions. The applicants’ suspensions have been effected in terms of item 6 of schedule 3 referred to above, which contemplates suspension other than as a disciplinary sanction. Further, the applicant’s reliance on an alleged internal appeal of the decision to suspend them is misplaced. There is nothing in the union’s constitution that affords suspended office bearers or members the right to appeal a precautionary suspension and the applicants ought reasonably to have been aware of that fact. The appeal procedure applies only to those persons found guilty of disciplinary offences and entitles such persons to submit an appeal within seven days of the notice of the decision sought to be appealed. The terms of the letters of suspension make clear that the applicants have been suspended pending further investigation into possible charges. It is manifestly clear that they have not been found guilty of any offence.
[10] In so far as the applicants contend that they were denied the right to be heard prior to the suspension or otherwise denied the opportunity to make representations, it should be recalled that the applicants are not before the court in their capacity as employees, nor is the dispute one that concerned an alleged unfair labour practice. None of the rules developed under the rubric of the definition of unfair labour practice in the LRA as they relate to precautionary suspension apply in the present instance. The right to suspend in terms of the union’s constitution is broadly expressed and confers broad powers on the president and general secretary. The applicants have been unable to demonstrate that these powers were exceeded or that their suspensions were effected other than in accordance with the terms of the constitution.
[11] Having failed to establish a prima facie right to the relief they seek, it is not necessary for me to consider the remaining requirements as they pertain to interim relief. The application stands to be dismissed.
[12] Finally, the court has a broad discretion in terms of s 162 to make orders for costs according to the requirements of the law and fairness. The respondent has succeeded in its opposition to the application and there is no reason why costs ought not to follow the result.
I make the following order:
1. The application is dismissed, with costs.
André van Niekerk
Judge
APPEARANCES
For the applicant: Adv N.D Sekwakweng, instructed by MNM & Associates
For the respondent: Adv C Orr SC, instructed by CTH Inc
Case-aware research
Ask AI about this case
The judgment and available research above are public. New questions open in a separate private conversation grounded in this case.