Mtungwa and Another v Premier of Kwazulu-Natal and Others (3618/22P) [2023] ZAKZPHC 19 (28 February 2023)
- Citation
- [2023] ZAKZPHC 19
- Status
- Order
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Pietermaritzburg
- Panel
- Mossop
- Case number
- 3618/22P
More details
- Court
- Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Pietermaritzburg
- Panel
- Mossop
- Case number
- 3618/22P
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court found that the method of succession to the position of iNkosi within the traditional community was correctly applied, following the male line through the eldest son and his male progeny. The applicants' contention that the youngest son should succeed was rejected as inconsistent with the established method of succession. The court held that there was no reasonable prospect that another court would reach a different decision, nor were there any compelling reasons to grant leave to appeal. The application for leave to appeal was therefore dismissed with costs, including the costs of senior counsel.
Court disposition
Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs, including the costs of senior counsel.
Orders
- The application for leave to appeal is refused with costs, such to include the costs of senior counsel.
02
Material facts
Parties
Mfaniseni Mboniseni Mtungwa
Applicant Counsel: M. N. XuluMembers of Umndeni Wenkosi listed in Annexure 'A'
Applicant Counsel: M. N. XuluPremier of Kwazulu-Natal
Respondent Counsel: A. J. Dickson SCDepartment of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs, Kwazulu-Natal
Respondent Counsel: A. J. Dickson SCThokozani Mtungwa
Respondent03
Procedural history
Posture
Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal Against Dismissal of Review Application
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether there are reasonable prospects that another court would reach a different decision regarding the recognition of the third respondent as iNkosi of the Mabaso clan.
- 02
Whether the method of succession to the position of iNkosi was correctly applied.
- 03
Whether there are compelling reasons justifying leave to appeal.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The applicants argued that there are reasonable prospects that another court would grant a different order regarding the recognition of the third respondent as iNkosi. They contended that the method of succession was not properly applied and that the identification of the iNkosi should be referred back to the umndeni wenkosi as provided for in section 19(4) of the KwaZulu-Natal Traditional Leadership and Governance Act 5 of 2005.
- Respondent
- The respondents submitted that the application for leave to appeal lacks merit as the method of succession was correctly applied, following the male line through the eldest son and his male progeny. They argued that there are no reasonable prospects of success and no compelling reasons for an appeal to be heard.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Section 17(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
Leave to appeal may only be granted where the court is of the opinion that the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard.
- 02
Dexgroup (Pty) Ltd v Trustco Group International (Pty) Ltd 2013 (6) SA 520 (SCA) para 24
The requirement for leave to appeal serves to ensure that judicial resources are not spent on appeals that lack merit.
- 03
Ramakatsa and Others v African National Congress and Another [2021] JOL 49993 (SCA) para [10]; S v Notshokovu Unreported SCA case no 157/15 dated 7 September 2016, para [2]; Smith v S [2011] ZASCA 15; MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Mkhitha [2016] ZASCA 176, para [17]
Applicants for leave to appeal face a higher threshold under the Superior Courts Act than under the repealed Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959; a sound rational basis for prospects of success must be shown.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court found that the method of succession to the position of iNkosi within the traditional community was correctly applied, following the male line through the eldest son and his male progeny. The applicants' contention that the youngest son should succeed was rejected as inconsistent with the established method of succession. The court held that there was no reasonable prospect that another court would reach a different decision, nor were there any compelling reasons to grant leave to appeal. The application for leave to appeal was therefore dismissed with costs, including the costs of senior counsel.
Obiter and limits
- The court noted that even if the applicants' interpretation of succession were correct, the first applicant would still not be entitled to the position, as the youngest son of the late Thembitshe would inherit the title, not the first applicant.
- The court emphasized the importance of the leave to appeal process in conserving judicial resources and preventing meritless appeals.
Court disposition
Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs, including the costs of senior counsel.
- The application for leave to appeal is refused with costs, such to include the costs of senior counsel.
Source and reliance status
Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Pietermaritzburg
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Pietermaritzburg
Order
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL DIVISION, PIETERMARITZBURG
Case No: 3618/22P
In the matter between:
MFANISENI
MBONISENI MTUNGWA
FIRST APPLICANT
MEMBERS
OF UMNDENI WENKOSI LISTED IN
SECOND APPLICANT
ANNEXURE ‘A’ WHICH IS ATTACHED TO THE
NOTICE
OF MOTION
and
PREMIER OF KWAZULU-NATAL
FIRST RESPONDENT
DEPARTMENT OF CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE SECOND RESPONDENT
AND TRADITIONAL AFFAIRS, KWAZULU-NATAL
THOKOZANI
MTUNGWA
THIRD RESPONDENT
Coram: Mossop J
Heard: 28 February 2023
Delivered: 28 February 2023
ORDER
The following order is made:
1. The application for leave to appeal is refused with costs, such to include the costs of senior counsel.
JUDGMENT
MOSSOP J:
[1] This is an opposed application for leave to appeal against a judgment handed down by me on 18 November 2022, when I dismissed a review application brought by the applicants in which they sought an order, essentially, that the recognition of the third respondent as the iNkosi of the Mabaso clan (the traditional community), be reviewed, declared invalid and set aside and that the issue of the identification of the iNkosi of the traditional community be referred back to the umndeni wenkosi of the traditional community as provided for in section 19(4) of the KwaZulu-Natal Traditional Leadership and Governance Act 5 of 2005.
[2] My judgment on the issues is comprehensive and I stand by the reasons set out therein.
[3] The purpose behind requiring litigants to obtain leave to appeal was set out in the matter of Dexgroup (Pty) Ltd v Trustco Group International (Pty) Ltd,[1] where Wallis JA said that:
‘The need to obtain leave to appeal is a valuable tool in ensuring that scarce judicial resources are not spent on appeals that lack merit.’
[4] Section 17(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Superior Courts Act, 10 of 2013 (the Act) provides that leave to appeal may only be given where a judge is of the opinion that the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, including conflicting judgments on the matter under consideration.
[5] Leave to appeal may thus only be granted where a court is of the opinion that the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success, which prospects are not too remote.[2] An applicant for leave to appeal faces a higher threshold[3] under the provisions of the Act than under the repealed Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. A sound rational basis for the conclusion that there are prospects of success must be shown to exist.[4]
[6] In their application for leave to appeal, the applicants have raised various grounds in support of their contentions that there are reasonable prospects that another court would grant a different order to the order granted by me.
[7] I have had a considerable amount of time to consider, in particular, the applicant’s notice of application for leave to appeal and the grounds stated therein. I received it on 9 December 2022, after
the conclusion of the judicial year, and read it immediately and I noticed that the copy of the notice of appeal provided to me by the Registrar was incomplete, it being obvious that at least the signature page thereof, and possibly other pages, were missing. I could, however, not deal with the application for leave to appeal at the beginning of 2023 as I was assigned circuit court duties in Madadeni during the first session of the first term. I returned last week from such duties.
[8] I have considered the papers filed by the applicants, such as they are, and I have further considered the arguments, authorities and submissions of the parties addressed to me this morning.
[9] At the core of this matter is the procedure for appointing a successor to a deceased iNkosi within the traditional community. I am satisfied that the method of identifying a successor to an iNkosi in
the traditional community is through the male line of succession and that line runs through the eldest son of the iNkosi and that son’s male progeny. If there are no male sons born of the eldest son, then the second eldest son succeeds and so on. This was the method of succession embraced by the traditional community. There is accordingly no basis for finding, as the applicants urged me to do when the matter was initially argued, that upon the death of the eldest son of an iNkosi, the youngest son succeeds to the position and the entitlement of the male progeny of the late iNkosi, and any other sons ranking between the deceased iNkosi and the youngest son, are to be ignored. As I noted in my judgment, if that was the case, which I found not to be the case, then the first applicant still could not succeed to the position that he covets because the youngest son of the late Thembitshe would inherit the title, not the first applicant. Any appeal therefore is futile, in my view.
[10] It was not submitted that there are any compelling reasons why an appeal should be allowed in the matter and I am not independently able to conceive of one.
[11] It follows that I am not persuaded that there is a reasonable possibility that another court would come to a different decision than the one to which I came. I am of the view that this is precisely the type of matter that Wallis JA was referring to in Dexgroup, namely, an appeal that lacks merit.
[12] In the circumstances, the application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs, such to include the costs of senior counsel.
MOSSOP J
APPEARANCES
Counsel for the applicants: Mr M. N. Xulu Instructed by: S N Nxumalo Attorneys Incorporated 20 Otto Street Pietermaritzburg Counsel for the first and second respondents: Mr A. J. Dickson SC Instructed by: PKX Attorneys Suite 36 3 on Cascades Crescent Montrose Pietermaritzburg
Date of Hearing
: 28 February 2023
Date of Judgment
:
28 February 2023
[1] Dexgroup (Pty) Ltd v Trustco Group International (Pty) Ltd 2013 (6) SA 520 (SCA) para 24.
[2] Ramakatsa and Others v African National Congress and Another [2021] JOL 49993 (SCA) para [10]
[3] S v Notshokovu Unreported SCA case no 157/15 dated 7 September 2016, para [2]
[4] Smith v S [2011] ZASCA 15; MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Mkhitha [2016] ZASCA 176, para [17]
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