Municipal Employees Pension Fund v Ntabankulu Local Municipality (11262/2022) [2025] ZAGPJHC 36 (22 January 2025)
- Citation
- [2025] ZAGPJHC 36
- Status
- Ruling
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
- Panel
- MB Mahalelo
- Case number
- 11262/2022
More details
- Court
- South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
- Panel
- MB Mahalelo
- Case number
- 11262/2022
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court considered the statutory test for leave to appeal under section 17(1) of the Superior Court Act, which requires a definitive prospect that the appeal would succeed or compelling reasons such as conflicting judgments. The applicant raised issues regarding the interpretation and application of the requirements for rescission under Rule 42(1) and the common law, and pointed to conflicting judgments on these requirements. The court found that these issues warrant attention by the Supreme Court of Appeal and concluded that there are reasonable prospects of success on appeal. Accordingly, leave to appeal was granted.
Court disposition
Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal is granted.
Orders
- The application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal is granted.
- Costs in the appeal.
02
Material facts
Parties
Municipal Employees Pension Fund
Applicant Counsel: Mr V MovshovichNtabankulu Local Municipality
Respondent Counsel: Adv S Khumalo SC & Adv M MtshaliAmounts and remedies
- Pension Contributions Ordered in Default Judgment: ZAR 127,149.63
03
Procedural history
Posture
Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal Against Refusal of Rescission of Default Judgment
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the applicant has reasonable prospects of success on appeal against the refusal of rescission of default judgment.
- 02
Whether the requirements for rescission under Rule 42(1) and the common law were properly considered.
- 03
Whether there are compelling reasons, including conflicting judgments, justifying leave to appeal.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The applicant contended that the court failed to properly consider the requirements for rescission under both Rule 42(1) and the common law. It argued that there are reasonable prospects that an appeal court would reach a different conclusion and that conflicting judgments on the requirements for rescission constitute compelling reasons for leave to appeal under section 17(1)(a)(ii) of the Superior Court Act.
- Respondent
- The respondent opposed the application, asserting that the grounds of appeal are meritless and that the applicant failed to meet the high threshold required for leave to appeal. The respondent maintained that the original judgment was correct and should not be disturbed.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Superior Court Act 10 of 2013, section 17(1)
Leave to appeal may only be granted where the appeal would have reasonable prospects of success or there are compelling reasons, such as conflicting judgments.
- 02
The Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen & 18 Others 2014 JDR 2335 (LCC) at para 6
The threshold for granting leave to appeal is high; the court must be satisfied that another court will differ from the judgment appealed against.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court considered the statutory test for leave to appeal under section 17(1) of the Superior Court Act, which requires a definitive prospect that the appeal would succeed or compelling reasons such as conflicting judgments. The applicant raised issues regarding the interpretation and application of the requirements for rescission under Rule 42(1) and the common law, and pointed to conflicting judgments on these requirements. The court found that these issues warrant attention by the Supreme Court of Appeal and concluded that there are reasonable prospects of success on appeal. Accordingly, leave to appeal was granted.
Obiter and limits
- The threshold for granting leave to appeal has been raised by the Superior Court Act, requiring a measure of certainty that another court will differ.
- Conflicting judgments on the requirements for rescission applications justify consideration by a higher court.
Court disposition
Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal is granted.
- The application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal is granted.
- Costs in the appeal.
Source and reliance status
South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
Ruling
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case Number: 11262/2022
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED.
In the matter between:
THE
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES PENSION FUND
Applicant
and
NTABANKULU
LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
Respondent
This judgment was delivered electronically by circulation to the parties’ legal representatives and uploading on caselines.
JUDGMENT - LEAVE TO
APPEAL
MAHALELO, J
Introduction
[1] On 7 October 2024 I handed down a judgment in this matter dismissing the rescission application brought by the applicant. The rescission application was launched in terms of Rule 42(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court, alternatively, the common law. The case is centered around the default judgment which was granted against the applicant wherein the applicant was ordered to pay to the respondent the following:
(a) An amount of R 127 149.63 being the purported value of the pension contributions allegedly due to the respondent.
(b) All investment returns and on the purported pension contributions paid by the respondent to the applicant from 01 September 2018 to 30 June 2020.
(c) Interest on the aforesaid amount at the legally prescribed rate from 29 March 2019, alternatively from the date of the order to the date of payment, and
(d) the cost of the application for default judgment and the main action.
[2] This is an application for leave to appeal against the judgment and order refusing rescission of the default judgment. The application was filed timeously. The applicant and the respondent filed written submissions and argued the matter in open court.
[3] The respondent opposed the application and submitted that the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant are meritless and should be rejected by the court.
The grounds for leave to appeal
[4] The applicant submitted that in determining whether to grant rescission, the court failed to properly consider the scope and requirements of rescission applications, both in terms of the common law and rule 42(1) and as a result, there are reasonable prospects that an appeal court would come to a different conclusion. The applicant also submitted that there are other compelling factors justifying leave to appeal being granted in terms of section 17(1)(a)(ii) of the Superior Court Act[1] as there are conflicting judgments in as far as the requirements for rescission are concerned.
Test for Leave to Appeal
[5] Section 17 (1) of the Superior Court Act deals with the relief for leave to appeal. In terms thereof, leave to appeal may only be granted (a) where a judge/s are of an opinion that (a) the appeal “would” not “may”, have reasonable prospects of success (b) there are some compelling reasons why the appeal should be heard, including the existence of conflicting judgments on the matter under consideration.
[6] It has been confirmed that the use of the words “only” and “would” implies that the threshold is set too high to a point where this Court must only give leave in instances where a definitive prospect exist that the appeal would succeed.
[7] The court held in the case of The Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen & 18 Others[2] that:
“It is clear that the threshold for granting leave to appeal against a judgment of a High Court has been raised in the new Act. The former test whether leave to appeal should be granted was a reasonable prospect that another court might come to a different conclusion, see Van Heerden v Cornwright & Others 1985 (2) SA 342 (T) at 343H. The use of the word “would” in the new statute indicates a measure of certainty that another court will differ from the court whose judgment is sought to be appealed against.”
[8] I have had regard to the test for leave to appeal and I note that the application brought by the applicant raises issues which necessitate attention by the Supreme Court of Appeal. I have thus concluded that there are reasonable prospects of success on appeal.
[9] In the premises, the following order is granted:
1. The application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal is granted.
2. Costs in the appeal
MB
MAHALELO
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
Heard: 10 December 2024
Judgment: 22 January 2024
For the applicant: Mr V Movshovich
Instructed by: Webber Wenzel
For the respondent: Adv S Khumalo SC & Adv M Mtshali
Instructed by: T.L Luzipho Attorney
[1] 10 of 2013
[2] 2014 JDR 2335 (LCC) at para 6
Case-aware research
Ask AI about this case
The judgment and available research above are public. New questions open in a separate private conversation grounded in this case.