Nic's Joinery Close Corporation v Adlem and Others (3350/2006) [2007] ZAECHC 20 (2 April 2007)
- Citation
- [2007] ZAECHC 20
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- High Courts - Eastern Cape
- Panel
- Leach
- Case number
- 3350/2006
More details
- Court
- High Courts - Eastern Cape
- Panel
- Leach
- Case number
- 3350/2006
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court held that although the plaintiff's affidavit used the word 'confirm' rather than 'verify' in relation to the amount claimed, the substance of the affidavit, read in context, amounted to verification as required by Rule 32(2). The deponent had personal knowledge of the facts and verified the cause of action, which in this case necessarily included the amount claimed. The court emphasized that technical defects should not prevent relief where there is substantial compliance with the rule and no prejudice to the defendant. As the first defendant did not oppose the application or provide any defence, summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff.
Court disposition
Summary judgment granted in favour of the plaintiff against the first defendant.
Orders
- The first defendant is ordered to pay the sum of R328,611.04 to the plaintiff.
- Interest on the aforesaid amount from the date of service of the summons until the date of payment at the legal rate.
- Costs of suit on the scale as between attorney and client.
02
Material facts
Parties
Nic's Joinery Close Corporation
Plaintiff Counsel: Adv Dela HarpeKaren Tilana Adlem
DefendantFrederick Jacobus Brits
DefendantHester Magdalena Brits
DefendantAmounts and remedies
- Amount Claimed: ZAR 328,611.04
03
Procedural history
Posture
Summary Judgment / Application for Summary Judgment
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the plaintiff's affidavit complies with Rule 32(2) regarding verification of the cause of action and the amount claimed.
- 02
Whether the use of 'confirmation' instead of 'verification' in the affidavit is sufficient for summary judgment.
- 03
Whether technical defects in the affidavit should prevent the granting of summary judgment.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The plaintiff argued that the affidavit substantially complies with Rule 32(2), as the deponent verified the cause of action and confirmed the amount claimed. The plaintiff contended that, in the context of this case, confirmation is akin to verification, and that the first defendant has not opposed the application or provided any bona fide defence. The plaintiff sought summary judgment for the stolen amount, interest, and costs on the attorney and client scale.
- Respondent
- The first defendant did not appear or file any affidavit opposing the summary judgment application. No argument was presented on her behalf regarding the adequacy of the plaintiff's affidavit or the merits of the claim.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Rule 32(2) Uniform Rules of Court
A plaintiff seeking summary judgment must file an affidavit verifying both the cause of action and the amount claimed, as required by Rule 32(2).
- 02
Absa Bank Ltd v Coventry 1998 (4) SA 351 (N)
Verification and confirmation may have similar meanings depending on context, but strict compliance with procedural rules is generally required.
- 03
Maharaja v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA 418 (A); Trans-Africa Insurance Co Ltd v Maluleka 1956 (2) SA 273 (A)
Form should not triumph over substance; technical imperfections should not prevent the resolution of litigation if there is substantial compliance and no prejudice.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court held that although the plaintiff's affidavit used the word 'confirm' rather than 'verify' in relation to the amount claimed, the substance of the affidavit, read in context, amounted to verification as required by Rule 32(2). The deponent had personal knowledge of the facts and verified the cause of action, which in this case necessarily included the amount claimed. The court emphasized that technical defects should not prevent relief where there is substantial compliance with the rule and no prejudice to the defendant. As the first defendant did not oppose the application or provide any defence, summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff.
Obiter and limits
- The court expressed ongoing concern that plaintiffs frequently struggle to comply with the simple requirements of Rule 32(2).
- The judgment cautioned that this decision should not be interpreted as a general rule that confirmation will always suffice for verification in summary judgment applications.
- The court reiterated that its function is not to protect dishonest defendants due to technical imperfections in plaintiffs' pleadings.
Court disposition
Summary judgment granted in favour of the plaintiff against the first defendant.
- The first defendant is ordered to pay the sum of R328,611.04 to the plaintiff.
- Interest on the aforesaid amount from the date of service of the summons until the date of payment at the legal rate.
- Costs of suit on the scale as between attorney and client.
Source and reliance status
High Courts - Eastern Cape
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
High Courts - Eastern Cape
Judgment
FORM A
FILING SHEET FOR EASTERN CAPE
JUDGMENT
ECJ no : 92
PARTIES:
NICâS JOINERY CLOSE CORPORATION Plaintiff
(With registration number 1995/006361/23)
and
KAREN TILANA ADLEM First Defendant
FREDERICK JACOBUS BRITS Second Defendant
HESTER MAGDALENA BRITS Third Defendant
REFERENCE NUMBERS -
Registrar: 3350/2006
Magistrate:
High Court: Eastern Cape Division
DATE HEARD: 29 March 2007
DATE DELIVERED: 2 April 2007
JUDGE(S): Leach
J
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES -
Appearances
for the State/Applicant(s)/Appellant(s):Adv Dela Harpe
for the accused/respondent(s):
Instructing attorneys:
Applicant(s)/Appellant(s): Wheeldon Rushmere and Cole
Respondent(s):
CASE INFORMATION -
Nature of proceedings : Summary Judgment
Topic:
Keywords:
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CAPE DIVISION)
CASE NO: 3350/2006
In the matter between:
JUDGMENT
______________
LEACH,J
A plaintiff who wishes to apply for summary judgment is required by Rule 32(2) to file an affidavit:
ââ¦.made by himself or by any other person who can swear positively to the facts verifying the cause of action and the amount, if any, claimed and stating that in his opinion there is no bona fide defence to the action and notice of intention to defend has been delivered solely for the purpose of delayâ (my emphasis).
It is a source of never ending amazement to me that so many plaintiffs continually find so much difficulty complying with so simple a rule. This is one of those cases.
It is alleged in the summons that:
(a) that during the period 30 January 2004 to 10 October 2005 while the first defendant was employed as its bookkeeper, she stole R328 611,04 from the plaintiff
(b) that on 13 October 2005, the plaintiff concluded a written agreement with the second and third defendants (who are the parents of the first defendant) under which they undertook to repay the amounts the first defendant had stolen, and,
that the defendants have not repaid any amount of the stolen money.
The plaintiff therefore claimed payment of the sum of R328 611,04 from the three defendants, jointly and severally, the one paying the others to be absolved.1 When the first defendant entered appearance to defend, the plaintiff applied for summary judgment. At the hearing of the application, the first defendant neither appeared nor filed an affidavit to attempt to show that she indeed has a bona fide defence and, if the plaintiffâs affidavit can be construed as being in proper form, there is no reason why summary judgment should not to be granted against her.2
But as is so often the case, the author of the plaintiffâs Rule 32(2) affidavit has made life difficult for the plaintiff. The deponent to the affidavit, one Nagel, stated under oath that he is a member of the plaintiff close corporation duly authorised to make the affidavit, the contents of which are within his personal knowledge, and I am satisfied that he is a person who can swear positively to the facts as required by Rule 32(2). The difficulty I have relates to Nagelâs verification of the cause of action and the amount claimed. In this regard his affidavit reads as follows:
âI can swear positively to the facts contained in the Particulars of Claim and:
Verify the cause of action; Confirm the correctness of all allegations made in the Particulars of Claim; Confirm that the amount due to the Plaintiff, as claimed in the Particulars of Claim, is the following:
The sum of R328 611.04 (Three Hundred and Twenty Eight Thousand Rand, Six Hundred and Eleven Rand and four Cents); Interest on the aforesaid amount from date of service on the summons until the date of final payment at the legal rate; Alternative Relief; Costs of Suit, on the scale as between Attorney and Clientâ (emphasis added).
Accordingly, while he verified the cause of action required by the rule, Nagel only confirmed that the amount claimed in the summons was due to the plaintiff. As the sub-rule requires both the cause of action and the amount of the claim to be verified (not confirmed), the affidavit prima facie appears not to confirm with the requirements of the rule. And if the requirements of the rule in regard to verification have not been met, this court has no jurisdiction to grant summary judgment.3
Mr De la Harpe, who appeared on behalf of the plaintiff, very properly conceded that, conceptually, âverificationâ differs from âconfirmationâ. However, in many instances, a confirmation is akin to a verification. In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary4, the verb âverifyâ is defined, inter alia, as meaning to âassert or affirm to be true or certainâ and to âconfirm the truth or authenticity ofâ while the verb âconfirmâ is inter alia, defined as meaning to âcorroborate, verify, put beyond doubtâ. Similarly the Concise Oxford English Dictionary5 defines the verb âconfirmâ as meaning, inter alia, to âstate with assurance that something is trueâ while the verb âverifyâ is defined as meaning âmake sure or demonstrate that (something) is true, accurate or justifiedâ.
Bearing these definitions in mind, and while I accept that the word âverifyingâ in Rule 32(2) may differ from âconfirmingâ, the two words may have the same connotation depending upon the context in which they are used. In the present case, it seems to me that for all practical purposes Nagel, in stating that he confirmed that the amount claimed in the summons was due to the plaintiff, was in fact verifying that to be the case.
Moreover, it is necessary to bear in mind that Nagel undoubtedly verified the cause of action. A âcause of actionâ amounts to all the facts necessary for a plaintiff to prove âin order to support his right to judgmentâ or âevery fact which is material to be proved to entitle a plaintiff to succeed in his claimâ.6 In this case, the plaintiffâs cause of action is that the first defendant stole funds totally R328 611,04. In order to succeed, the plaintiff would therefore have to establish that those funds were stolen. Verification of the cause of action in the particular circumstances of this particular case accordingly entails verification of the amount of the claim.
Strictly speaking, of course, Nagel should have said that he verified the plaintiffâs cause of action and the amount of the claim. However legal consequences should not be dependant upon the correct recitation of a jingle, and while slackness in the observance of the rules is not be encouraged, form should not be allowed to triumph over substance7 and technical imperfections should not stand in the way of the speedy and inexpensive resolution of litigation.8
Accordingly, although a court should not readily grant summary judgment where there is a material defect in any of the formalities required by Rule 32, where it is clear that the rule has been substantially complied with and there is no prejudice to the defendant, a slight failure to comply with the technical requirements of the rule should not stand in the way of relief being granted.9 After all, the function of the court is not to protect a dishonest defendant because the pleadings (or summary judgment affidavit) of a plaintiff are less than perfect.10
In the present matter, it is not without significance that although the first defendant entered an appearance to defend, she did not seek to oppose the summary judgment proceedings. Bearing that in mind, despite the deponent to the plaintiffâs affidavit confirmed the amount to (which for all practical purposes can be construed in casu as being a verification), I am of the view that summary judgment should be granted. This is not to be construed as a finding that a plaintiff in all cases confirmation of a cause of action and the amount owing will suffice. However, in the lights of the present case, the plaintiffâs affidavit is to be construed as sufficient verification.
There will be summary judgment in the plaintiffâs favour against the first defendant for:
Payment of the sum of R328 611,04 together with interest thereon calculated from the date of service of the summons until date of payment;
Costs of suit on the scale as between attorney and client.
______
L.E.LEACH
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
SUMMARY
Summary judgment â plaintiff verifying the cause of action but only confirming the amount claimed â in the light of the facts, confirmation of the amount akin to verification â summary judgment granted.
1 The second and third defendants entered appearance to defend this action on 26 January 2007. Although the plaintiff immediately sought summary judgment against them, they were granted leave to defend by order of this court on 22 February 2007. For present purposes, nothing further need be said about that application.
2 The plaintiff claims costs on the attorney and client scale. In the light of the claim being for repayment of moneys stolen from an employer, such a claim would undoubtedly succed if the matter went to trial.
3 See for e.g. Absa Bank Ltd v Coventry 1998 (4) SA 351 (N) at 353 C-F and the cases there cited.
4 5th Edition 2002.
5 11th Edition 2004
6 See e.g. Evins v Sheild Insurance Co Ltd 1980 (2) SA 814 (A) at 838 and the cases there cited.
7 See: Maharaja v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA 418 (A) at 423 E-F. Compare further Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Carports for Africa CC and Others 1998 (4) SA 811 (W) at 813H-814B.
8 See the remarks of Schreiner JA in Trans-Africa Insurance Co Ltd v Maluleka 1956 (2) SA 273 (A) at 278.
9 Charsley v Avob (Begrafinisdiens) Bpk 1975 (1) SA 891 (E) at 893C-D.
10 Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Roestof 2004 (2) SA 492 (W) at 498C.
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