Nkomazi Municipality v Ngomane of Lugedlane Community and Others (LCC 74 / 06) [2007] ZALCC 28; [2010] 3 All SA 563 (LCC) (4 December 2007)

IN THE LAND CLAIMS COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

CASE NO. LCC 74 / 06

Held at MALELANE on 21 -23 November 2007

Before Meer J and Padayachi (assessor)

Decided on: 4 December 2007

In the matter between:

NKOMAZI MUNICIPALITY Applicant

and

NGOMANE OF LUGEDLANE COMMUNITY First Respondent

NGOMANE OF SIBOSHWA COMMUNITY Second Respondent

NGOMANE OF HOYI Third Respondent

MKHATSHWA OF MBAMBISO COMMUNITY Fourth Respondent

MAWEWE TRIBAL AUTHORITY Fifth Respondent

MATSAMO TRIBAL AUTHORITY Sixth Respondent

MAHLALELA COMMUNTY Seventh Respondent

MINISTER OF AGRUCULTURE AND LAND AFFAIRS Eighth Respondent

REGIONAL LAND CLAIMS COMMISSIONER:

MPUMALANGA Ninth Respondent

MANUEL ROCHA Tenth Respondent

JUDGMENT

MEER, J

Introduction

[1] This is an application in terms of Section 34 of the Restitution of Land Rights Act No 22 of 1994 (“the Act”) in which the Applicant, a local government body, the Nkomazi Municipality seeks an order in terms of Section 34(5) (b) of the Act, that when the land claims lodged by the First to Seventh Respondents in respect of land within Applicant’s jurisdiction is finally

determined, certain land shall not be restored to any claimant. The land sought to be excluded from restoration is that which falls

within the delineated urban edges of the towns of Malelane, Hectorspruit, Komatipoort and Marloth Park (hereinafter “the land

within the four towns”), in the province of Mpumalanga. It is the Applicant’s contention that, as specified at Section 34 (6)(a) of the Act, it is in the public interest that the land in question should not be restored and that, as per section 34 (6) (b), the public will suffer substantial prejudice unless an order is made in terms of Section 34 (5) (b) before the final determination of Respondents’ claims. Of the seven Respondents who have lodged land claims in the area, it is only the First, Second and Third

Respondents who oppose this application. I shall refer to them as the Opposing Respondents.

Parties

[2] The Applicant is a Local Government as contemplated in section 151 read with section 155 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 106 of 1996, with municipal offices at the Civic Centre, Malelane. The land within the four towns falls within the Applicant’s jurisdiction, which covers a large and productive area. Large portions of the area are affected by competing and overlapping restitution claims by several communities including the first to seventh Respondents and various individuals. Exactly what is claimed by whom, as well as the validity of the claims, is still in dispute and will form part of the disputes to be determined in the main land claim, (“the main action”). A resolution by Applicant’s full council mandated its Municipal Manager, Mr Shabangu, to bring the current application and ratified all steps taken by him in that regard.

The Respondents

[3] The First to Seventh Respondents represented by the Greater Tenbosch Land Claims Committee, lodged claims for restitution of rights in land, with the Ninth Respondent in the main application, claiming physical restoration of over 30 000 hectares of land within the Applicant’s jurisdiction.

[4] The Eighth Respondent is the Minister of Land Affairs who is cited in her official capacity as responsible Minister in terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act No 22 of 1994, as she may have an interest in the relief claimed.

[5] The Ninth Respondent, the Regional Land Claims Commissioner, Mpumalanga, is the representative of the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights, a Commission established in terms of section 4 of the Restitution Act. The referral report by the Ninth Respondent, referring the claims to this Court in the main application, has accepted the claims lodged by Respondents as being valid for the purposes of the Restitution Act. For the purposes of the present application in terms of Section 34 of the Act, the Ninth Respondent has filed a report as it is required to do in terms of Section 34 (2), in which it expresses support for this application. The report favours financial compensation to Respondents as an alternative to restoration to them of land, within the four towns.

[6] The Tenth Respondent is an entrepreneur and director of companies and has an interest in 30 properties in Komatipoort. He was joined as a Respondent at the hearing as is permitted at Rule 12 (5) of the Land Claims Court Rules

[7] The relief sought by Applicant in terms of Section 34 of the Act is not available to private individuals but only to a national, provincial or local government body, and in respect of land which is owned by it or falls within its area of jurisdiction. The relevant subsections provide as follows:

“34. Ruling by Court on restoration before final determination of claim.---

Any National, Provincial or Local Government Body may, in respect of land which is owned by it or falls within its area of jurisdiction,

make application to the Court for an order that the land in question or any rights in it shall not be restored to any claimant or prospective claimant.

………….

…………..

…………..

(5) After hearing an application contemplated in subsection (1), the Court may –

(a) dismiss the application;

(b) order that when any claim in respect of the land in question is finally determined , the rights in the land in question, or in part of the land, or certain rights in the , shall not be restored to any claimant;

(c) make any other order it deems fit

(6) The Court shall not make an order in terms of subsection (5)(b) unless it is satisfied that-

it is in the public interest that the rights in question should not be restored to any claimant; and

the public or any substantial part thereof will suffer substantial prejudice unless an order is made in terms of subsection (5)(b)

before the final determination of any claim.”

[8] Section 34 vests the Court with extraordinary powers to order in advance under Section 34 (5) (b) that, when a claim for restitution of a right in land is finally determined, the remedy afforded to the claimants will not include restoration of the land itself. It is clear from Section 34 that two threshold or jurisdictional requirements that have to be present before an ante omnia ruling on restoration in terms of Section 34(5)(b) is made, are those set out at Section 34 (6) (a) and (b)1.

[9] In Khosis Community, Lohatla & Another v Minister of Defence & Others 2004(5) SA 494 (SCA) in which the majority decision of the Land Claims Court to grant a Section 34 order was upheld, the SCA enunciated the following principles pertaining to Section 34 Applications:

9.1 Once the Court is satisfied that the two jurisdictional requirements have been met, the Court does not have a further overriding discretion in terms of Section 34(5) not to grant an order;

9.2 Both threshold requirements involve the exercise of a value-judgment based on the proven facts. The Court is entitled to have regard to a number of disparate and incommensurable features in coming to a decision, exercising a wide descretion2.

9.3 In reaching a decision in respect of the threshold requirements, the Court has to take into account the factors listed in Section 33 of the Restitution Act. Not all of them are necessarily applicable in any given case3. Factors such as the feasibility of restoration (Section 33(c)A), social upheaval (Section 33(d)) and the current use of the land are closely related to the public interest considerations in Section 34(6)(a)4. What is involved in determining the question of public interest, is a weighing or balancing of private interests on the one hand and public interests on the other.5

9.4 It is not in the public interest to have trials on issues without any realistic prospects of success6.

Background to the Application

[10] It is common cause that the area within the Applicant’s jurisdiction is extremely rich in natural resources, has some of the most valuable agricultural land in the Republic and consists of intensive and large scale farming activities which make a significant contribution to the economy of the region and the agricultural requirements of the whole country. Fresh produce is distributed to all major centres in the country as well as the export market. In addition the area makes a large contribution to the tourism industry in the region and in the Republic because of its unique location adjacent to the Kruger National Park. Within the urban edges of the four towns are built up areas.

[11] The four towns have a large number of tourist facilities catering to the national and international market. The N4 Highway to Mozambique runs through the towns of Malelane, Hectorspruit and Komatipoort. It is an extremely important and busy route. Marloth Park is a holiday town. The four towns contain the necessary infrastructure to sustain these important activities. The towns are also centres of business, making a considerable contribution to the creation of the income and wealth in the area with educational and health facilities for the thousands of private owners of both residential and business sites.

[12] The four towns as they are today, have expanded considerably since the 1950’s when the Respondents on their own versions were not dispossessed of any urban properties, but of the rural land they occupied. This is evident from the pleadings in the main application. The referral report submitted to this Court by the Ninth Respondent in respect of the claims lodged by Respondents,

describes the claims as being,

“for the rights of beneficial occupation in land which were held by the communities in the farms Tenbosch 162 JU; Tenbosch 234 JU; Grimman 193 JU and others all situated in the Magisterial District of Barberton in the Mpumalanga Province”

[13] The Respondents in responses to the referral report alleged that they had traditional and/or communal ownership rights over the land which they used for agricultural and grazing purposes between 1924 and 1954 when they were dispossessed thereof under provisions of the 1936 Land Act. They submitted they did not receive just and equitable compensation at the time of their dispossession when they were removed to inferior land in Nkomazi East, which was later incorporated into the Ka Ngwane Homeland. It is common cause that the land occupied by them prior to their removal was rural land.

[14] Large areas of land have already been restored to some of the Respondents as a result of mediated settlements facilitated by the Ninth Respondent. This includes valuable and highly developed farms including farms belonging to the Transvaal Sugar Board which have been leased back to the Board for farming purposes. The value of the land already restored to the Respondents is estimated to be in excess of 1.2 billion rand.

Points in limine raised by the Opposing Respondents.

[15] Mr Shokoane on behalf of the Opposing Respondents raised as a first point in limine that Mr Shabangu, the Municipal Manager of Applicant who deposed to the founding affidavit, had neither authority nor locus standi to bring the application. A resolution by the full council of Applicant dated 20 November 2007 authorizing Shabangu to bring the application and ratifying the steps taken by him to date, was attacked as being fatally defective for not complying with Sections 12, 19, 29, 30, 31, 49-52 and 54 of the Municipal Structure Act 117 of 1998 and Sections 19 and 20 of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. This submission is without substance. The sections of the two Acts referred to are taken out of context and have no bearing on the validity or otherwise of the resolution. It is trite law that a decision can be ratified, and indeed the decision in the present instance has clearly been properly ratifed.

[16] A second point in limine that the non joinder of the member of the executive counsel (“MEC”) for local government in the Mpumalanga Province and the Minister for local government (“the Minister”) renders the application fatally defective, is similarly without substance. A municipality has the requisite locus standi to bring an application in terms of Section 34 of the Restitution Act7 and neither the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 nor the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 prescribe for the joinder of those

officials. In this regard also, Mr Shokoane’s referral to Section 24 of the Municipal Systems Act, is misplaced.

[17] The third point in limine that the lodging of the Section 34 application by Mr Shabangu amounted to a violation/contempt of a Court order made at a pre-trial conference of 17 August 20068, to the effect that the parties should not be prevented from embarking on settlement negotiations, also has no substance. I note that no court order was made, but directions on this aspect were given at the conference. A Section 34 application and settlement negotiations are not per se mutually exclusive and the former does not necessarily prevent the latter.

[18] The final point in limine seeks the striking out of the affidavit of the Tenth Respondent on the grounds that it was “filed ultra vires the provision of Section 34” as Tenth Respondent was not joined as a party. As already alluded to he was joined at the commencement of this hearing in terms of Rule 12(5). It was also submitted that Tenth Respondent’s s affidavit was filed late, the Opposing

Respondents did not have an opportunity to respond thereto, and were prejudiced. I note the affidavit was filed on 9 November 2007, the extended date granted to Respondents for the filing of answering affidavits, giving the Opposing Respondents sufficient time, if they wished, to file a supplementary affidavit in response thereto, which they did not. Nor did they seek a postponement to enable them to reply thereto.

The First Threshold Requirement: Public Interest

[19] Mr Havenga for the Applicants submitted that is in the interest of the public at large, the communities occupying the four towns and indeed the claimants themselves that the integrity and functioning of the towns be maintained. It can neither be feasible

nor in the public interest for the State to buy out the four towns and dislodge the current owners, businesses and other enterprises

for the purpose of restoration to claimant communities, who, on their own versions were not dispossessed of urban properties, but of rural land. The major social disruption that would follow in the wake of restoration, speaks for itself.

[20] He emphasised that expropriating land within the urban edges of the towns would be prohibitively expensive and counterproductive. Restoration, he argued, is neither physically nor economically possible, nor realistic. The public at large would be better served by an order for financial compensation or other equitable relief. Some of the factors at Section 33 of the Act militated against restoration.

[21] A report by the Ninth Respondent in terms of Section 34(2) endorsed these submissions. Mr De Jager for the Ninth Respondent emphasised that with the limited resources of the country restoration of entire townships is unthinkable, economically impossible and absurd. He emphasized also that the Ninth Respondent as Regional Land Claims Commissioner for Mpumalanga had always been supportive of Respondents’ claims and willing to provide a remedy for past violations of their human rights. To this end in the restoration to the Respondent communities of the vast area of land valued in excess of 1.2 billion rand, already effected by Ninth Respondent through mediated settlement, land given as alternative consideration at the time of dispossession had, moreover not been taken into account in this process.

[22] Mr Terblanche, on behalf of the Tenth Respondent endorsed the above submissions. The Tenth Respondent, who stated he had interests in property in Komatipoort to the value of R62, 430 000.00, in illustrating the prejudice to the public that restoration would entail, highlighted the importance of Komatipoort, as a commercial and retail node for the surrounding farming area and as a gateway for transient traffic between Mpumalanga Mozambique and Swaziland. The commercial enterprises in Komatipoort, he said serve

many thousands of farm workers in the area as well as miners employed on the South African mines who are transported by bus to Mozambique via Komatipoort.

The Opposing Respondents’ submissions

[23] Fosi Bhila, a trustee and chairperson of the board of trustees of the Ingwenyama Simhulu Trust, for the Third Respondent deposed to the answering affidavit. He pointed out that the Third Respondent’s intended use of the land in the four towns if restored, would be consistent with their current use and could therefore not be said to be inimical to the public interest and/or detrimental to the public or a substantial part thereof as submitted by Applicants. The Applicant, he contended could still remain in control of properties within the towns, either on the basis of servitude, lease or ad hoc agreements with the Respondents in a manner that would preserve the Third Respondent’s rights on the restored land. He referred to ongoing settlement discussions along these lines between the Third Respondent and the owners of the Komatipoort Golf Club. He submitted that an order in terms of Section 34 would hamstring and prejudice settlement negotiations.

[24] Whilst Bhila’s affidavit disputes the assertion that restoration within the four towns will compromise and possibly destroy their integrity and economic viability, it does not attempt to set out the plans envisaged by the Opposing Respondents towards maintaining such integrity and economic viability. On this aspect their heads of argument countered against an enquiry into the social and economic viability of the Opposing Respondents’ intended use of land within the towns, submitting this would burden the Courts with an enquiry they are ill equipped to conduct.

[25] The answering affidavit further contended that there were material disputes of fact, without stipulating precisely what these were, that it was impossible for the Court to adjudicate the application, and that unless the Applicant successfully applied for the matter to be referred to trial, the application ought to be dismissed. The Opposing Respondents themselves did not apply for the matter to go to trial on account of there being disputes of fact.

Finding on the First Threshold Requirement

[26] An assessment of the public interest requires a comparison of the deprivation of some private convenience or resource, in this case properties within the delineated urban edges of the four towns, with the benefit that is likely to result from such deprivation for the general public or part thereof. A balancing of private as against public interests is called for.9

[27] The practical effect of restoration of the land within the delineated urban edges of the four towns, would entail the expropriation of that land by the state for the purpose of restoration thereof to the claimant communities. The public purse would have to pay just and equitable compensation to owners of expropriated properties, taking into account inter alia the market values of such properties.10 Properties in the four towns would be expropriated at huge and prohibitive financial cost to the state and restored to Respondents

who were dispossessed of rural land, the value whereof by any standard must have been significantly less than the expropriated

built up land, restored. Add to this the fact that land has already been restored to the Respondents, paid for by the public purse, with no regard to compensatory land received upon dispossession, and the benefits of restoration to the Respondent Claimants’ private interests not only far outweigh but topple the benefit to the public interest. Were this scenario to prevail the Respondent Claimant Communities would be substantially overcompensated11 contrary to the interests of justice and equity, factors which have to be taken into account at Section 33(c) of the Act.

[28] The factors listed at Section 33(e)(B) namely the history of the dispossession, current use of the land and the history of acquisition and use of the land, as well as those specified at Section 33(e)A, the amount of compensation or any other consideration

received in respect of the dispossession, and the circumstances prevailing at the time of the dispossession, also militate against

overcompensation and the restoration of land within the delineated urban edges of the four towns.

[29] Then there is the reality that restoration of land within the towns could well require, as envisaged by Ninth Respondent, towns people to be expropriated of their houses, the expropriation of schools, churches, parks and other facilities, as could occur also in respect of the numerous businesses industries and other economic activities in the town. Major social disruption, the avoiding whereof is advocated at Section 33(d) of the Restitution Act, would be inevitable.

[30] Given the prohibitive expense of expropriating land within the urban edges of the towns, there is merit in the submission by Ninth Respondent that with the limited resources of our country, restoration of entire townships is unthinkable, economically impossible and contrary to equity and justice. The Ninth Respondents characterization of a restoration scenario as absurd, is understandable given the circumstances. The fact that the Opposing Respondents intend using the land within the delineated urban edges of the towns for the same purpose as the current owners, or indeed that they may be in negotiation with the owners of a golf course does

not counter the extent to which the public would be prejudiced at the expense of the Respondents were restoration to occur.

[31] For all of the above reasons I accept Applicant’s submission that it is neither in the public interest nor feasible12 that the land within the delineated urban edges of the four towns should be restored to any claimant. In weighing up the interests of the Opposing Respondents against those of the public, the scale I believe must be tipped in favour of the public interest and against restoration of the said land. For, as was aptly put by Harms J in the Khosis SCA case referred to above, at Para 31:

“ Undeniably, the umbilical cord that joins any particular community and its ancestral land is strong and it has a highly emotional element that has to be respected. That does not, however, mean that all other public interest considerations should be ignored.

Land is finite and there are millions out there who also wish to have their share. All claims and aspirations cannot be satisfied. A balance must be struck and the limited resources of the country must be considered.”

The Second Threshold Requirement: Substantial Prejudice unless an order excluding restoration is granted before the claims are finally determined

[32] Mr Havenga argued that it is so overwhelmingly clear that there is little or no prospect of restoration orders in respect of land within the delineated urban edges of the four towns, that it cannot be in the public interest to have a protracted and costly trial on issues about which the outcome is apparent. It is also clear, he submitted that the public or a substantial part

thereof will suffer substantial prejudice, given the costs of a lengthy trial and the detrimental effect of further delays on the parties and the economy of the area, unless an order in terms of Section 34(5), excluding the possibility of a restoration order, is made prior to the start of the trial. An order excluding the four towns from restoration would release both the Applicant and the thousands of individuals who have rights and interests there from the proceedings in the main action and the costs involved therein. It would be a huge strain on the fiscus to serve notice of the claims on the thousands of interested persons in the four towns. These sentiments were equally endorsed by the Ninth Respondent.

[33] The Opposing Respondents countered that the costs of serving referral documents on the thousands of owners within the four towns were neither insurmountable nor an overriding factor. Neither the founding affidavit nor the Section 34 (2) report of the

Ninth Respondent was sufficient or reliable enough, they submitted to enable the court to exercise its discretion in terms of Sections 34 (5) (b), and 34 (6), read with sections 33 and 35 of the Restitution Act.

Finding on second threshold requirement.

[34] Pertinent to the enquiry in respect of the second threshold requirement must be the fact that I have already from the evidence presented in this application made a finding that that it is in the public interest that the land within the delineated urban edges of the four towns should not be restored. The reasons advanced by Applicant against restoration will still be valid if a fully fledged trial in the main action were to proceed also on the issue of physical restoration. There is nothing to indicate that the Opposing Respondents will be able to rebut those reasons at the trial.

[35] The public will be substantially prejudiced if, in the circumstances a lengthy and costly trial with little prospect of success, were to ensue to deal with restoration as well as equitable redress, given that public funds will continue to be used to fund the

Respondents, as Claimants and the Eighth and Ninth Respondents, being representatives of the state. It would serve little purpose for a finding to be made in terms of section 34(6)(a) that it is in the public interest that the land in question should not be restored, and thereafter for a trial to proceed inter alia on this very issue, in the circumstances.13

[36] The Opposing Respondents themselves in my view have little to gain if the issue of restoration were to proceed to trial. The effect of my finding on the first threshold requirement is that they can have no reasonable expectation that they will be able

to retain the land, and it is not in the public interest to have trials on issues without any real prospect of success14

It is in the circumstances clearly not in the public interest to involve owners of property and other interested parties in the four towns in the main action. An order excluding the four towns from restoration would, as submitted release, the Applicant and those individuals with rights and interests in the four towns from the proceedings and costs of the main action. It would also be prejudicial to the public if land within the four towns were subjected to the stultifying effect and restrictions inter alia from development and sale because of unresolved land claims15.

[37] I do not accept that an order in terms of Section 34 of the Act would necessarily hamstring and prejudice the Opposing Respondents in their settlement negotiations. This is also not a factor that has to be significantly considered at Section 33. I am of the view that in respect of the second threshold requirement also, no real defence has been showed by the Opposing Respondents.

[38] Regard being had to all of the above I come to the view that the requirements as specified at Section 34(6) of the Act have been met and that the Applicant has made out a case for the relief sought and is entitled to an order in terms of Section 34(5)(b). The effect thereof would not be to deprive the Opposing Respondents of their right to restitution but only of one of the methods through which restitution can be ordered. In view of the fact that the Restitution Act makes ample provision for equitable redress

and considering that substantial portions of the claimed land have already been restored, and importantly given that Respondents were not dispossessed of built up urban land, any possible prejudice to them if an order is made in terms of Section 34(5)(b), cannot weigh up against the substantial prejudice to the public if an order excluding restoration was not granted.

Costs.

[39] Mr Havenga submitted that the granting of a special costs order, if needs be de bonis propriis against Mr Shokoane should be considered in the light of the repeated scurrilous attacks throughout the answering affidavits. In this regard he referred inter alia to allegations that Mr Shabangu Applicant’s Municipal Manager and the deponent to the

founding affidavit , was attempting through this application to assist the land owners to achieve their goal “through the back

door and under guise of an application by the municipality” and the characterisation of his statements as being “reminiscent of apartheid government agents who implemented the policy and laws of racial segregation” He drew attention also to attacks on the integrity of Applicant’s legal representatives, to a respondent in the main application, the Onderberg Pro-active group of affected land owners and their legal representatives, and the Ninth Respondent and his officials.

[40] Mr Havenga submitted that in many recent applications before the Land Claims Court, this type of language, originating from the same legal representative who drafted the papers in this case seem to have become common place. He referred me to Gamevest (Pty) Ltd v Regional Land Claims Commissioner: Northern Province and Mpumalanga and Others 2003(1) SA 373 (SCA) where a special punitive cost order by this Court against an attorney who conducted himself in a reprehensible

manner was upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeal. The unacceptable conduct of the Opposing Respondents, clearly on advice from their legal team, he submitted, demanded a reconsideration of this Court’s practice not to make cost orders.

[41] The allegations in the answering affidavit, are indeed scurrilous and deserving of censure, more so to the extent that this may be common place. It ill behoves an officer of the Court to engage in attacks of this nature. I express my displeasure also that the opposition to the application, which despite the lengthy nature of the Opposing Respondents’ answering affidavit, contained

little substance concerning the merits of the application, and at the ill taken points in limine. It further ill behoves counsel to hide behind dubious technical points. Applicant’s characterisation of the application as vexatious is in the circumstances, understandable.

[42] I am however of the view that reprehensible though Mr Shokoane’s conduct may be, this situation is distinguishable from that which pertained in the Gamevest case where the attorney concerned prosecuted a case he had conceded. Mr Shokoane’s conduct

at this juncture, must attract admonishment, but not, I believe, the punitive costs order sought. He may well be lucky, as is suggested on behalf of Applicant to get off with a rap over the knuckles this time. The time is however fast approaching when cost orders de bonis propriis may be granted in instances such as these. A cost order against the Opposing Respondents was not sought and none is granted.

[43] The following order is granted in terms of Section 34(5)(b) of the Restitution of Land Rights Act No. 22 of 1994:

1. When any claim in respect of the land mentioned in paragraph 2 below is finally determined, the rights in the land in question shall not be restored to any claimant.

2. The land subject to the order is:

2.1 The town of Malelane, inclusive of:

2.1.1 Malelane Town consisting of Erven 1 – 225 established on the former Portion 17 of Malelane 389 JU;

2.1.2 Extensions 1 of the town consisting of Erven 231 – 316, established on the former Portion 92 of Malelane 389 JU;

2.1.3 Extension 2 of the town consisting of Erven 333 – 373, established on the former Portion 109 of Malelane;

2.1.4 Extentsion 3 of the town consisting of Erven 377 – 378, established on the former Portion 29 of Malelane Estate 140 JU;

2.1.5 Extension 4 of the town consisting of Erven 692 - 693, established on the former Portion 126 of Malelane Estate 389 JU;

2.1.6 Extension 5 of the town consisting of Erven 405 - 554, established on the former Portion 34 of Malelane Estate A 140 JU;

2.1.7 Extension 6 of the town consisting of Erven 826 - 897, established on the former Portion 131 of Malelane 389JU;

2.1.8 Extension 7 of the town consisting of Erven 902 – 903, established on the former Portion 139 of Malelane 389 JU;

2.1.9 Extension 8 of the town consisting of Erven 699 - 823, established on the former Portion 38 of Malelane Estate 140 JU;

2.1.10 Extension 9 of the town consisting of Erven 907 - 928, established on the former Portion 136 of Malelane 389 JU;

2.1.11 Extension 10 of the town consisting of Erven 904 - 905, established on the former Portion 14 of Malelane 389 JU;

as well as all other properties, not mentioned above, falling within the urban edge of Malelane, as it exists at the date of judgment, as delineated by the Applicant in terms of Regulation 2(4) (i)(iii) of Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations, 2001, promulgated under the Local Government : Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000.

2.2 The town of Hectorspruit , inclusive of:

2.2.1 Hectorspruit Town, established on the former farm Hectorspruit 164 JU;

2.2.2 Hectorspruit Extension 1, established on the former farm Hectorspruit 166 JU;

2.2.3 Hectorspruit Extension 2, established on the former Portion 20 of Thankerton 175 JU;

2.2.4 Hectorspruit Station;

as well as all other properties, not mentioned above, falling within the urban edge of Hectorspruit as it exists at the date of judgment, as delineated by the Applicant in terms of Regulation 2(4) (i)(iii) of Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations, 2001, promulgated under the Local Government : Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000.

2.3 The whole of the proclaimed town Marloth Park Holiday Town as established on Portions 49, 50 and 51 of the farm Tenbosch 162 JU and also including Portion 63 (a portion of Portion 50) of the farm Tenbosch 162 JU.

2.4 The town Komatipoort, inclusive of:

2.4.1 Komatipoort Town consisting of Erven 1 – 303, established on the former Komatipoort Townlands 182 JU;

2.4.2 Komatipoort Asiatic Bazaar consisting of Erven 1 – 50, established on the former Komatipoort Townlands 182 JU;

2.4.3 Komatipoort Koelie Locatie consisting of Erven 1 – 200, established on the former Komatipoort Townlands 182 JU;

2.4.4 Komatipoort Extension 1 consisting of Erven 309 - 819, established on the former Komatipoort 230 JU;

2.4.5 Komatipoort Extension 2 consisting of Erven 829 - 854, established on the former Portion 3 of Komatipoort Station Railway Reserve 161 JU;

2.4.6 Komatipoort Extension 4, consisting of Erven 883 - 905, established on the former Portions 41 and 45 of Komatipoort Townlands 182 JU;

2.4.7 Komatipoort Extension 5 consisting of Erven 918 - 919;

2.4.8 Komatipoort Extension 7 consisting of Erven 942 - 952, established on the former Portion 52 of Komatipoort Townlands 182 JU;

2.4.9 Komatipoort Extension 16 consisting of Erven 1210 - 1652, established on the former Portion 3 of Pholane 578 JU;

as well as all other properties, not mentioned above, falling within the urban edge of Komatipoort as it exists at the date of judgment, as delineated by the Applicant in terms of Regulation 2(4) (i)(iii) of Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations, 2001, promulgated under the Local Government : Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000.

3. There is no order as to costs.

I agree

____________________

B PADAYACHI

ASSESSOR

1 See Khosis Community , Lohatla v Minister of Defence 2004 (5) 494 SCA at para 6; The Minister of Defence and Another v Khosis Communitey at Lohatla and Others LCC 16/97 paragraph 3:

2 Khosis SCA judgment paragraph 8.

3 ibid paragraph 30.

4 ibid 33.

5 For a discussion on the meaning of the term “public interest” see Khosis LCC judgment paragraph 38, Ex parte North Central and South Central Metropolitan Substructure Councels of the Durban Metropolitan area & Another 1998(1) SA 78 LCC; Dr W de Plessis 1987 THRHR 292- “‘n Regsteoretiese ondersoek na die begrip ‘openbare belang’”.

6 Khosis SCA judgment para 42

7 Blaauwberg Municipality v Bekker & Others 1998(1) All SA 88 (LCC) and see the unreported portion of the judgment at paragraphs 9 and 11-17 with regard to locus standi in respect of Section 34 applications.

8 The conference occurred on 18 August 2006

9 Lohatla LCC16/97 supra, paragraph 38

10 Section 42E (3) of the Restitution Act read with Section 25 (3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996

11 See Mphela & Others v Haakdoornbult Boerdery CC 2007(5) SA 596(SCA) at paragraphs 48-61.

12 See IN re Kranspoort Community 2000(2) SA 124(LCC) at paragraphs 88-92 regarding meaning of the term feasibility.

13 See Lohatla LCC 16/97, supra, para 45

14 At para42 E-G

15 See Section 11(7)aA of the Restitution Act.