Pfaiff and Another v Cameron (7142/2010) [2010] ZAWCHC 421 (10 June 2010)
- Citation
- [2010] ZAWCHC 421
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
- Panel
- Louw
- Case number
- 7142/2010
More details
- Court
- Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
- Panel
- Louw
- Case number
- 7142/2010
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court found that the increase in the height of the servitude road beyond 500mm was necessitated by improvements made to the dominant tenement by the applicants, which could have been avoided with proper planning. The applicants were not entitled to raise the servitude road above the natural lie of the land as determined at the time of the servitude's creation. The court exercised its discretion not to order monetary compensation for the infringement, finding no reasonable prospect that another court would reach a different conclusion or interfere with this exercise of discretion. Accordingly, leave to appeal was refused with costs.
Court disposition
Application for leave to appeal refused with costs.
Orders
- The application for leave to appeal is refused.
- The applicants are ordered to pay the costs of the application.
02
Material facts
Parties
David Michael Pfaiff
Applicant Counsel: EngelbrechtJack Alworth Smith
Applicant Counsel: EngelbrechtLorna Fay Cameron
Respondent Counsel: Van der Merwe03
Procedural history
Posture
Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether there is a reasonable prospect that another court will reach a different conclusion regarding the servitude right of way.
- 02
Whether monetary compensation should have been ordered for the alleged infringement of the servitude.
- 03
Whether the exercise of judicial discretion in refusing compensation was correct.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The applicants argued that raising the area of the right of way on the servient tenement was reasonably foreseeable when the servitude was created to access the dominant tenement. They contended that if there was an infringement, monetary compensation should have been ordered. They submitted that the increase in road height was necessitated by improvements on the dominant tenement, which could have been avoided by proper planning, and that they were not entitled to raise the servitude road above the 500mm determined by the natural lie of the land.
- Respondent
- The respondent, represented by Mr Van der Merwe, opposed the application for leave to appeal and maintained that there was no reasonable prospect that another court would reach a different conclusion or interfere with the exercise of discretion not to order monetary compensation.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Trite principle; see S v Smith 2012 (1) SACR 567 (SCA)
Leave to appeal is granted only if there is a reasonable prospect that another court will come to a different conclusion or if the matter is of substantial importance to the parties.
- 02
Erasmus v Du Toit 1960 (3) SA 327 (A)
The scope of a servitude is determined by the circumstances at the time of its creation and not by subsequent improvements to the dominant tenement.
- 03
Van Rensburg v Coetzee 1975 (3) SA 994 (A)
The court has discretion to award monetary compensation for infringement of servitude, but such discretion must be exercised judiciously.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court found that the increase in the height of the servitude road beyond 500mm was necessitated by improvements made to the dominant tenement by the applicants, which could have been avoided with proper planning. The applicants were not entitled to raise the servitude road above the natural lie of the land as determined at the time of the servitude's creation. The court exercised its discretion not to order monetary compensation for the infringement, finding no reasonable prospect that another court would reach a different conclusion or interfere with this exercise of discretion. Accordingly, leave to appeal was refused with costs.
Obiter and limits
- The matter is of substantial importance to the parties, but importance alone does not justify leave to appeal.
- Foreseeability of the need to raise the servitude road is determined by the state of the dominant tenement at the time of servitude creation, not by later improvements.
Court disposition
Application for leave to appeal refused with costs.
- The application for leave to appeal is refused.
- The applicants are ordered to pay the costs of the application.
Source and reliance status
Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
Judgment
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CIRCUIT LOCAL DIVISION, GEORGE)
CASE NUMBER:7142/2010
DATE: 10 JUNE 2010
In the matter between:
DAVID
MICHAEL PFAIFF …....................................................................1st Applicant
JACK
ALWORTH SMITH …....................................................................2nd Applicant and
LORNA
FAY CAMERON …......................................................................Respondent
In the matter between:
DAVID
MICHAEL PFAIFF …....................................................................1st Applicant
JACK
ALWORTH SMITH …....................................................................2nd Applicant
and
LORNA
FAY CAMERON …......................................................................Respondent
JUDGMENT (Application for Leave to Appeal) LOUW, J: This is an opposed application for leave to appeal against the judgment and order made by me in this matter on 10 June 2010. The applicants were the defendants at the trial. It is trite that the criteria for leave to appeal are whether there is a reasonable prospect that another court will come to a different conclusion and also that the matter is of substantial importance to applicants or to both parties. The fact of the matter is that this is a case of substantial importance to the parties and this application turns on the reasonable prospect of another court coming to a different conclusion. I have set out in the history of the matter fully in the judgment. Mr Engelbrecht, who appeared for the applicants this morning submitted that the raising of the area of the right of way on the servient tenement was something which was reasonably foreseeable at the time that the servitude was created in order to gain access to the dominant
tenement. In any event, he contended that if there were an infringement, monetary compensation should have been ordered. Given
the lie of the land at the time, it was clearly foreseeable that in order to gain access to the dominant tenement some increase of the height of the road would be necessary. This would be determined by the state of the dominant tenement at the time and not by the improvements that were subsequently effected by the applicants on the dominant tenement. The increase in height beyond 500mm was necessitated by the improvements on the dominant tenement. This could have been avoided the applicants planning and thereafter carrying out the improvements, bearing in mind that they were not entitled to raise the servitude road to a higher level than the 500mm determined by the natural lie of the land. In addition, I exercised the discretion for the reasons set out in the judgment, not order to order that money be paid as compensation for the infringement. Mr Van der Merwe opposes the application on behalf of respondent. I am not satisfied that there is a reasonable prospect that another court will come to a different conclusion or will interfere with the exercise of the discretion not to order monetary compensation. The
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL IS REFUSED WITH COSTS. LOUW, J
JUDGMENT
(Application for Leave to Appeal)
LOUW, J:
This is an opposed application for leave to appeal against the judgment and order made by me in this matter on 10 June 2010. The applicants were the defendants at the trial. It is trite that the criteria for leave to appeal are whether there is a reasonable prospect that another court will come to a different conclusion and also that the matter is of substantial importance to applicants or to both parties.
The fact of the matter is that this is a case of substantial importance to the parties and this application turns on the reasonable prospect of another court coming to a different conclusion.
I have set out in the history of the matter fully in the judgment. Mr Engelbrecht, who appeared for the applicants this morning submitted that the raising of the area of the right of way on the servient tenement was something which was reasonably foreseeable at the time that the servitude was created in order to gain access to the dominant
tenement. In any event, he contended that if there were an infringement, monetary compensation should have been ordered. Given
the lie of the land at the time, it was clearly foreseeable that in order to gain access to the dominant tenement some increase of the height of the road would be necessary. This would be determined by the state of the dominant tenement at the time and not by the improvements that were subsequently effected by the applicants on the dominant tenement. The increase in height beyond 500mm was necessitated by the improvements on the dominant tenement. This could have been avoided the applicants planning and thereafter carrying out the improvements, bearing in mind that they were not entitled to raise the servitude road to a higher level than the 500mm determined by the natural lie of the land. In addition, I exercised the discretion for the reasons set out in the judgment, not order to order that money be paid as compensation for the infringement.
Mr Van der Merwe opposes the application on behalf of respondent.
I am not satisfied that there is a reasonable prospect that another court will come to a different conclusion or will interfere with the exercise of the discretion not to order monetary compensation.
The
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL IS REFUSED WITH COSTS.
LOUW, J
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