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South Africa Judgment

South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg

Pico v Malgas (A3114/2018) [2019] ZAGPJHC 214 (31 May 2019)

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Source document

01

Holding and result

The magistrate erred in dismissing the application for rescission of the default judgment. The default judgment was granted by the clerk of the court for an unliquidated amount without any oral or affidavit evidence as required by Rule 12(4) of the Magistrates’ Court Rules. This procedural irregularity rendered the judgment susceptible to rescission. Although the appellant's explanation for her default was weak, she demonstrated a bona fide intention to defend and had good prospects of success at the procedural level. The magistrate should have granted the rescission application. Accordingly, the appeal succeeds and the magistrate’s order is set aside.

Court disposition

Appeal upheld; magistrate’s order set aside; default judgment rescinded.

Orders

  • The appeal is upheld.
  • The order of the magistrate issued on 27 March 2018 is set aside and replaced with an order rescinding and setting aside the default judgment granted on 15 June 2009.
  • No order as to costs.

02

Material facts

Parties

Pico Ogopoleng Cathrine

Appellant Counsel: Adv Pretorius

Malgas Molebogeng Letitia

Respondent

Amounts and remedies

  • Default Judgment Amount: ZAR 100,000

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Civil Appeal / Appeal Against Dismissal of Rescission Application

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
The appellant argued that she was served with summons and immediately instructed her attorneys to defend the matter. She relied on her attorneys to file a plea, but they failed to do so. She maintained her intention to defend throughout and only became aware of the default judgment when warrants of execution were served. She contended that the default judgment was improperly granted by the clerk for an unliquidated amount without supporting evidence, and that she has a bona fide defence with good prospects of success.
Respondent
The respondent opposed the rescission application, maintaining that the appellant failed to act upon being served with warrants of execution and did not provide a reasonable explanation for her default. The respondent argued that the appellant's explanation was inadequate and did not justify rescission of the judgment.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Section 36(1) of the Magistrate’s Court Act 32 of 1944

    A court may rescind or vary any judgment granted in the absence of the person against whom it was granted, or which was void ab origine, obtained by fraud or mistake, or in respect of which no appeal lies.

  2. 02

    Rule 12(4) of the Magistrates’ Court Rules

    Requests for judgment for unliquidated amounts must be referred to the court by the clerk, and the plaintiff must provide oral or affidavit evidence for the court to assess the amount recoverable.

  3. 03

    New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd v Du Toit 1965 (4) SA 136 (T)

    Quantum of damages should normally be established by oral evidence, but in special circumstances, affidavit evidence may be accepted.

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

The magistrate erred in dismissing the application for rescission of the default judgment. The default judgment was granted by the clerk of the court for an unliquidated amount without any oral or affidavit evidence as required by Rule 12(4) of the Magistrates’ Court Rules. This procedural irregularity rendered the judgment susceptible to rescission. Although the appellant's explanation for her default was weak, she demonstrated a bona fide intention to defend and had good prospects of success at the procedural level. The magistrate should have granted the rescission application. Accordingly, the appeal succeeds and the magistrate’s order is set aside.

Obiter and limits

  • The appellant’s failure to act upon the warrants of execution was not satisfactorily explained, but this deficiency was outweighed by her procedural defence.
  • Normally, damages should be established by oral evidence, but affidavit evidence may suffice in special circumstances.

Court disposition

Appeal upheld; magistrate’s order set aside; default judgment rescinded.

  • The appeal is upheld.
  • The order of the magistrate issued on 27 March 2018 is set aside and replaced with an order rescinding and setting aside the default judgment granted on 15 June 2009.
  • No order as to costs.

Source and reliance status

South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg

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Judgment text

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Source document

South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg

Judgment

[2019] ZAGPJHC 214

REPUBLIC

OF SOUTH AFRICA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION,

JOHANNESBURG

CASE NO: A3114/2018

In the matter between:

PICO

OGOPOLENG CATHRINE Appellant

and

MALGAS

MOLEBOGENG LETITIA Respondent

J U D G M E N T

MAHALELO, J:

[1] On 13 February 2018 the appellant launched an application for rescission of a judgment which had been granted by default in favour of the respondent on 15 June 2009 by the clerk of the Magistrate’s Court in Fochville. The application for rescission was opposed by the respondent.

[2] On 27 March 2018 the magistrate dismissed the application for rescission of the judgment. The magistrate furnished her reasons for the dismissal on 16 May 2018. The present appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the magistrate dismissing the application for rescission.

[3] Section 36(1) of the Magistrate’s Court Act 32 of 1944 empowers a court:

(a) to rescind or vary any judgment granted by it in the absence of a person against whom that judgment was granted;

(b) to rescind or vary any judgment granted by it which was void ab origine, or which was obtained by fraud or by mistake common to the parties;

(c) to correct patent errors in any judgment in respect of which no appeal is pending; and

(d) to rescind or vary any judgment in respect of which no appeal lies.

[4] The following facts emerge from a reading of the affidavits filed in the application for rescission:

(a) The appellant was served with the summons in May 2009.

(b) She approached her Attorneys Cass Pieterse Inc to defend the matter.

(c) She was advised to relax and that she will hear from them.

(d) She called and visited their offices often and was informed that they will call her if there was a need.

(e) No plea was filed by her Attorneys.

(f) On 09 June 2009 the respondent filed a request for default judgment with the clerk of the court.

(g) Notwithstanding that the claim expressed in the summons was for payment of unliquidated damages in the amount of R100 000 no oral evidence or affidavit was placed before the clerk of the court in support of the application for default judgment.

(h) On 15 June 2009 the clerk of the court granted judgment by default in favour of the respondent in the amount of R100 000 together with interest and costs.

(i) On 11 July 2009 a warrant of execution was issued against the appellant and served on her on 13 July 2009. Pursuant thereto her movable assets were attached. On 16 July 2009, her husband, to whom she is married in community of property laid a claim to the items and they were released from attachment.

(j) In a bid to recoup the unsatisfied debt, the respondent in November 2017 lodged a section 65 A (1) application in the Magistrate’s Court. The appellant appeared in court on 5 December 2017 and the matter was postponed to 12 December 2017 for a financial enquiry. The appellant failed to appear in court on that day and a warrant for her arrest was authorised which was subsequently cancelled on 12 December 2017. On 29 January 2018 the appellant was served with the second warrant of execution.

(k) The application for rescission of the default judgment was launched on 13 February 2018.

(l) The appellant approached her attorneys from the time she received the summons and instructed them to file a plea in order to defend the action.

(m)The appellant all along demonstrated her wish to defend the action.

[5] In consideration of all the facts placed before court in this appeal, I have reservations about accepting that the appellant’s explanation of the default is satisfactory. I have no doubt that she wanted to defend the action throughout and that it was not her fault that default judgment was granted against her. Obviously she became aware of the judgment that was granted against her in her absence when she was served with warrants of execution but the reason why she did not act on them then is not explained at all. Whatever explanation she is trying to give for her failure to act upon the two warrants of execution cannot be regarded as reasonable at all. The inadequacy of the appellant’s explanation in this regard may well justify a refusal of rescission on that account unless the weak explanation is cancelled out by the appellant being able to put up a bona fide defence which has good prospects of success.

[6] The appellant has not merely a good prospect of success but an answerable case at the procedural level because the default judgment of an unliquidated amount of money should have been referred to the magistrate by the clerk of the court.

[7] In terms of Rule 12(4) of the Magistrates’ Court Rules of Court, the clerk of the court shall refer to the court any request for judgment for unliquidated amount and the plaintiff shall furnish to the court evidence either oral or by affidavit of the nature and extent of the claim whereupon the court shall assess the amount recoverable by the plaintiff and shall give an appropriate judgment.

[8] Normally the quantum of damages should be established by oral evidence, but in special circumstances the court may accept evidence on affidavit. See New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd v Du Toit 1965 (4) SA 136 (T). In the present matter there was no oral evidence led and no damages affidavit presented by the plaintiff. Given that

there was no evidence on quantum; the default judgment ought not to have been granted.

[9] It follows that upon a consideration of all the relevant factors before her, the magistrate ought to have granted the application for rescission of judgment. In the circumstances the appeal must succeed and the magistrate’s order issued on 27 March 2018 must be set aside.

[10] The appeal is not opposed, there is no reason why I should order costs against the respondents.

[11] In the result the following order is made:

1. The appeal is upheld.

2. The order of the magistrate issued on 27 March 2017 is hereby set aside and replaced with the following order:

(a) Judgment granted by default on 15 June 2009 is hereby rescinded and set aside.

3. No order as to costs.

________

M B

MAHALELO

JUDGE OF THE

HIGH COURT

I agree

H

NGOMANE

ACTING JUDGE OF

THE HIGH COURT

APPEARANCES

FOR THE APPELLANT: ADV PRETORIUS

INSTRUCTED BY: YAMKELA BUNGANE

ATTORNEYS

FOR THE RESPONDENTS: NO APPEARANCES

DATE OF HEARING: 06 MAY 2019

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 31 MAY 2019

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Authorities

Authorities used by the court

Cases, legislation, regulations, and constitutional provisions identified in the available record.

New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd v Du Toit 1965 (4) SA 136 (T)

Case cited

Magistrate’s Court Act 32 of 1944

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

Magistrates’ Court Rules

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

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