Public Servants Association of South Africa obo Moditswe v Nsibanyoni and Others (JR1702/12) [2014] ZALCJHB 310 (5 August 2014)

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG

JUDGMENT

Reportable

Case no: JR 1702/12

In the matter between -

PUBLIC SERVANTS ASSOCIATION OF

SOUTH AFRICA obo P W MODITSWE

Applicant

and

COMMISSIONER T NSIBANYONI First

Respondent

PUBLIC SERVICE CO-ORDINATING

BARGAINING COUNCIL Second

Respondent

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE Third

Respondent

Date heard: 31 January 2014

Date of Judgment: 05 August 2014

Summary: Review jurisdictional ruling. Interpretation and application of Resolution 7 of the PSCBC. Respondent raising unreasonable delay rule. Bargaining Councils and CCMA not having inherent powers to dismiss matters for unreasonable delay. Powers of Commissioners of the CCMA and panellist of Bargaining Councils limited to those set out in section 142 of the LRA.

MOLAHLEHI J

Introduction

[1] This is an application to review and set aside the jurisdictional ruling made by the first respondent (the panellist). In terms of the ruling the panellist found that the second respondent did not have jurisdiction to conciliate or arbitrate the dispute which the individual applicant had referred to the second respondent. The applicants have also applied for condonation for the late filing of the review application. The delay of 13 days, is in my view not extensive and I find the explanation set out in the applicants’ founding affidavit to be reasonable and acceptable.

Background facts

[2] The applicant who is employed by the third respondent as ground man by the South African Air Force in its Air Servicing Unit, declared a dispute concerning his applications for temporary incapacity leave. The applicant was employed in terms of the Public Service Act of 1994. It would appear he was not informed about the outcome of his application. He became aware of the outcome when he noticed that his absence due to ill-health was treated by HR as unpaid leave.

[3] He then lodged a formal grievance about the matter. He was informed during July 2011 that the several days that he was absent from work during December 2011, was not treated as temporary incapacity leave. It was for that reason that he referred a dispute to the bargaining council regarding the interpretation and application of resolution 7 of 2000. The relevant clause of resolution 7 of the PSCBC reads as follows:

“7. 5 Disability management leave

7.5.1 Temporary disability leave

(a) An employee whose normal sick leave credits in a cycle have been exhausted and who, according to the relevant practitioner, requires to be absent from work due to disability which is not permanent, may be granted sick leave on full pay provided that:

i) her or his supervisor is informed that the employee is ill; and

ii) a relevant registered medical and /or dental practitioner has duly certified such a condition in advance as temporary disability except where conditions do not allow.

b) The employer shall, during 30 working days, investigate the extent of inability to perform normal official duties, the degree of inability and the cause thereof. Investigations shall be in accordance with item 10(1) of Schedule 8 in the Labour Relations Act of 1995.”

[4] Following the adoption of resolution 7 of the PSCBC, the Minister of Public Service and Administration issued a directive on leave of absence in terms of section 41 (3) of the Public Service Act 103 of 1994. It was subsequently renamed during 2005 to be known as “Determination on Leave of Absence in the Public Service” (the determination). The issue of the determination of temporary incapacity leave is dealt with under clause 15 of the determination. It has not been contended that the determination contradicts the resolution 2 of the PSCBC. It is therefore not necessary to deal with the provisions of the determination in any details.

[5] The outcome sought by the applicants was that the unpaid leave should be converted into the temporary incapacity leave as contemplated in the PSCBC resolution. The panellist found the bargaining council did not have jurisdiction to entertain such a dispute and accordingly dismissed the individual’s claim.

The grounds for review

[6] The applicants contended that the first respondent made a serious or material error of law when she concluded that she did not have jurisdiction to arbitrate the dispute before her, alternatively that she did not properly apply her mind or came to a conclusion which a reasonable arbitrator could not have reached on the issue of jurisdiction, by-

32.1 failing to appreciate her lawful powers in relation to the dispute before her; and/or

32.2 becoming confused, and not distinguishing between jurisdiction on the one hand and the merits of the matter on the other hand.

[7] It was argued that the arbitrator misunderstood her powers, in that in terms of the Labour Relations Act the bargaining council has the power to arbitrate in a case where the employer failed to act in a fair manner.

[8] It was further argued on behalf of the applicant that the present matter is distinguishable from PSA obo Liebenberg v Department of Defence and Others [1], on the ground that the issue of fairness did not arise in that case.

The arbitration award

[9] The arbitrator found that the bargaining council did not have the power to overturn the decision made by the third respondent based on failure to comply with the time frames provided for in the bargaining council resolution. The time frames which the arbitrator was referring to concern the 30 day period within which the third respondent ought to have responded to the applicant’s application for temporary incapacity leave.

[10] The arbitrator further found that the applicant’s claim was disingenuous, in that he lodged it only after he realised that the application for temporary incapacity leave was declined.

[11] In assessing whether the bargaining council had jurisdiction, consideration should according to the third respondent be given to the relief which the applicant sought. The third respondent contends in this respect that the bargaining council should convert the absence without authorisation into temporary illness leave.

[12] The essence of the third respondent’s contention is that in considering the issue of jurisdiction the nature of the dispute and the relief sought need to be taken into account.

[13] It was conceded on behalf of the third respondent that non-compliance with the time frame for deciding on temporary incapacity leave falls within the interpretation and application of the resolution 7 of 2000 of the PSCBC.

Evaluation

[14] The key issues raised by the third respondent in opposing the applicant’s review application are the following:

1. The applicant had failed to provide comprehensive information which could have assisted in the consideration of the individual’s application for temporary incapacity leave.

2. The applicant delayed unreasonably in referring the dispute. The dispute ought, according to the third respondent, to have been brought within 90 days after the expiry of the 30 days of the investigation.

3. The true nature of the dispute is not interpretation and application but rather of the temporary incapacity leave.

[15] In my view, the alleged issue of the failure to provide comprehensive medical information by the applicants is not an issue of jurisdiction but rather has to do with the merits of whether the applicant satisfied the requirement of the application for the temporary incapacity leave. It would appear from the reading of the arbitration award that the panellist failed to distinguish between the issue of jurisdiction and the merits of the individual applicant’s complaint. The panellist was of course correct in determining the issue of jurisdiction, in particular because it was raised as a point in limine by the third respondent. She had to determine the issue of jurisdiction based on the objective facts before her.

[16] The common cause facts as they appear from the record are as follows:

Ø the individual applicant had exhausted his leave days,

Ø the individual applicant fell sick again after exhausting his sick leave days.

Ø The applicant applied for temporary incapacity sick leave.

Ø The third party who investigated the applicant’s application head recommended that the temporary incapacity leave declined.

Ø The individual applicant was not in the form of the outcome of the investigation on the expiry of the 30 days.

[17] The case of the individual applicant before the panellist was that the third respondent had lost its discretionary power to refuse temporary incapacity leave application of due to failure to inform him about the outcome of the investigation after the expiry of the 30 days period. In other words the individual applicant had in terms of clause 7.5 of the PSCBC resolution acquired the right to incapacity leave. Put in another way, the individual applicant asserted that the failure to comply within 30 days on completion of the investigation entitled him to automatically qualify for the temporary incapacity leave. It has already been indicated somewhere in this judgment that the temporary incapacity leave is governed by the provisions of resolution 2 of the PSCBC.

[18] In light of the above, I am in agreement with the applicants that the PSCBC does have jurisdiction to entertain the dispute brought before it and accordingly in refusing to entertain the dispute on the ground of lack of jurisdiction the arbitrator committed a material error of law which rendered her decision incorrect. The view is in line with the approach adopted in the Public Servants Association of South Africa obo De Bruyn v Minister of Safety and Security and Another,[2]where the Court in dealing with the same issue held:

‘The appellant’s complaint clearly concerns a denial of incapacity leave. The alleged the right appellant seeks to assert derived from the provisions of the PSCBC Resolution, as the Labour court, correctly in our view, found… there is no doubt that the

aspect of the leave of absence is an issue falling squarely under the PSCBC Resolution . . . therefore, the court a quo… correctly proceeded to consider whether the LRA requires the kind of dispute which existed between the applicant and the respondent to be resolved through arbitration. The court concluded that leave, including incapacity leave and temporary incapacity leave… is governed by the provisions of Resolution . . .of the PSCBC, which is a binding collective bargaining agreement. This means that the dispute between the parties was required to be submitted to arbitration as concerning the application and/or interpretation of the provisions of the PSCBC Resolution.’

[19] The Court later at paragraph [36] held that:

‘It follows therefore that where an employee… is dissatisfied with a decision by the employer with regard to the issue of the relief of absence… his remedy lies in the provisions of the Resolution. It follows that the appellant is confined to its remedy in terms of section 4 of the LRA and it may not, instead, sick to review the respondent’s decision in the Labour court in terms of section 158 (1) (h). . .’[3]

The issue of unreasonable delay

[20] In contending that the applicants unreasonably delayed in instituting the claim that the respondent relied on the case of Sithole v Nogwaza NO[4]. In that case the Court held, ‘where the employer argued that the CCMA was entitled to refuse to deal with the employee’s

referral because the dispute was referred “hopelessly beyond what would otherwise have been a reasonable time.” The Court upheld the employer’s opinion that the CCMA was not obliged to accept a dispute if there had been an unreasonable delay in referring the dispute, even though the LRA does not prescribe any time limit within which the dispute was to be referred. The reason for this view is set out in the judgment in the following terms:

“61 The Act places a premium on expedition. Not only is expedition one of the express purposes of the Act (s1 (d) (iv), but the Act requires conciliation to take place within 30 days of the date on which the dispute was referred, for dismissal dispute to be referred within 30 days of the date of dismissal (s191 (1)) and for arbitration awards to be rendered within 14 days of the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings (s 138 (7)).

62 Although the Act does not specify a time-limit for the delivery of a statement of claim or an application for a review in terms of s 158 (1) (g) in the Labour Court, the court has accepted the principle that this ought to be done within a reasonable time. . .”

63 The reason given by the court in these matters are equally applicable to the referral of disputes to the commission.

64 Although there is no time–limit prescribed in the Act for the referral to the commission of a dispute concerning a matter of mutual interest, for the reasons stated above, I believe that the dispute ought to have been referred within a reasonable time. Come to the rescue of the applicant and find otherwise would be to undermine one of the primary objects of the Act.”

[21] The essence of the above finding is that the CCMA Commissioners and bargaining council arbitrators have power to apply the unreasonable delay concept in the same way as the Court. I do not agree with the finding for the reasons that follow below. In my view the finding of the Court is so wrong that I do not find it to be binding.

[22] The Labour Court like both the CCMA and bargaining councils are creatures of statutes. They derive their powers from and are limited in the exercise of such powers to the four corners of the Labour Relations Act of 1995. The Labour Court is established as a Superior Court that has the authority, inherent powers and standing in matters falling under its jurisdiction and has the same standing as that of the Provincial Division of the High Court. It follows that Commissioners and Arbitrators operating under the auspices of these institutions can only perform their function and exercise powers only as prescribed by the LRA.

[23] Unlike the Labour Court, CCMA Commissioners and Bargaining Council arbitrators do not have inherent powers in the exercise and performance of their function. The Court for instance derives the power to dismiss a claim for unreasonable delay from the inherent

powers it derives from the provisions of section 151 of the LRA. CCMA and arbitrators of bargaining councils cannot exercise the powers not expressly given to them by the LRA. In Colyer v Essack NO ; Malan v CCMA[5] , the Labour Court set aside the contempt finding made by the Commissioner on the ground that the power to do so was not expressly

set out in section 142 (1) of the LRA.

[24] Inn light of the above, I find the applicants have made out a case for the review of the ruling made by the panellist. I however do not believe that costs should follow the results.

Order

[25] In the premises, the following order is made:

1. The late filing of the review application is condoned

2. The ruling made by the first respondent under case number PSCBC 173-11/12 is reviewed and set aside.

3. The ruling is substituted with an order to the effect that the second respondent has jurisdiction to entertain the dispute referred to it by the applicants.

4. The matter is remitted to the second respondent for consideration by a panellist other that the first respondent.

________________

Molahlehi J

Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa

APPEARANCES

For the Applicants: Advocate F Van der Merwe

Instructed by Bouwers Incorporated

For the Respondents: Advocate M B Matlejoane

Instructed by State Attorney

[1] 2013 34 ILJ 1769

[2] (2012) 33 ILJ 1822 (LAC) at paragraph 31

[3] See also PSA obo L Liebenberg v Department of Defence and Others [2013] 34 ILJ 1769 (LC).

[4] [1999] 20 ILJ 2710 (LC)

[5] (1997) 18 ILJ 1381; C1140/12