RB v ES (2321/2016) [2025] ZANCHC 68 (1 August 2025)
- Citation
- [2025] ZANCHC 68
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- Northern Cape High Court, Kimberley
- Panel
- M V Phatshoane
- Case number
- 2321/2016
More details
- Court
- Northern Cape High Court, Kimberley
- Panel
- M V Phatshoane
- Case number
- 2321/2016
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court found that the grounds for leave to appeal merely repeated arguments already considered and rejected in the main judgment. The applicant failed to demonstrate reasonable prospects of success or any compelling reason for the appeal to be entertained. The inclusion of trust assets in the accrual calculation was addressed in the main judgment, and the applicant's reliance on section 12 of the Trust Property Control Act and the trust deed did not establish a basis for leave to appeal. Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs, including the fees of senior-junior counsel on scale B as per rule 67A of the Uniform Rules of Court.
Court disposition
Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs.
Orders
- The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs, such costs to include the fees of senior-junior counsel on scale B in terms of rule 67A of the Uniform Rules of Court.
02
Material facts
Parties
RB
Applicant Counsel: A EillertES
Respondent Counsel: AS SieberhagenAmounts and remedies
- Accrual Claim Amount: ZAR 3,311,897
03
Procedural history
Posture
Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal After Final Judgment
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the applicant has demonstrated reasonable prospects of success for leave to appeal.
- 02
Whether the inclusion of trust assets in the calculation of accrual was lawful under the Trust Property Control Act.
- 03
Whether the settlement agreement unlawfully merged trust assets with personal assets contrary to the trust deed and statute.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The applicant argued that section 12 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 prohibits trust property from forming part of a trustee's personal estate unless they are entitled as beneficiaries. He contended that there was no evidence of abuse of the trust form and that including trust assets in his estate for accrual calculation was unlawful. He further argued that the inclusion of trust assets was not part of the dispute between the parties, that the settlement agreement was concluded under a material error of law, and that the trustees lacked the power to merge trust assets with personal assets, which would violate both the statute and the trust deed.
- Respondent
- The respondent maintained that the arguments raised by the applicant had already been considered and rejected by the court in the main judgment, relying on established authority. The respondent submitted that there were no reasonable prospects of success and no compelling reason for the appeal to be heard, as the legal issues had been properly determined and no important questions of law or public interest were at stake.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
Leave to appeal may only be granted if there is a reasonable prospect of success or some other compelling reason, such as conflicting judgments or important questions of law.
- 02
Section 12 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988
Trust property does not form part of the personal estate of trustees except to the extent that they are entitled as beneficiaries.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court found that the grounds for leave to appeal merely repeated arguments already considered and rejected in the main judgment. The applicant failed to demonstrate reasonable prospects of success or any compelling reason for the appeal to be entertained. The inclusion of trust assets in the accrual calculation was addressed in the main judgment, and the applicant's reliance on section 12 of the Trust Property Control Act and the trust deed did not establish a basis for leave to appeal. Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs, including the fees of senior-junior counsel on scale B as per rule 67A of the Uniform Rules of Court.
Obiter and limits
- The court noted that repeating arguments already decided does not advance the applicant's case for leave to appeal.
- No important questions of law or issues of public importance were identified that would justify granting leave to appeal.
Court disposition
Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs.
- The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs, such costs to include the fees of senior-junior counsel on scale B in terms of rule 67A of the Uniform Rules of Court.
Source and reliance status
Northern Cape High Court, Kimberley
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Northern Cape High Court, Kimberley
Judgment
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, NORTHERN CAPE DIVISION, KIMBERLEY
JUDGMENT
Not Reportable
Case No: 2321/2016
In the matter between:
RB
APPLICANT
and
ES
FIRST RESPONDENT
Neutral citation: RB v ES (2321/2016) (29 July 2025)
Heard: 28 July 2025
Delivered: 01 August 2025.
Summary: Law of Civil Procedure – Leave to appeal – failure to demonstrate reasonable prospects of success – the application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs.
ORDER
Application for the leave to appeal:
1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs such costs to include the fees of senior-junior counsel on scale B in terms of rule 67A of the Uniform Rules of Court.
Phatshoane DJP:
[1] This is an application for leave to appeal against the whole of the judgment and order of this Court dated 29 November 2024 in terms of which the final award of Mr André Heyns, dated 30 July 2021, in respect of the determination of the accrual in the applicant’s and respondent’s respective estate was made an order of this Court; the applicant, Mr RB, was ordered to pay R3 311 897.00 to the respondent, Ms ES, being her accrual claim against the applicant in terms of Chapter 1 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984; the applicant’s counter-application was dismissed. Further ancillary relief in respect of costs was granted in both the applications.
[2] It is not necessary to set out the grounds of appeal in any great detail. The applicant referred to a few distinguishable judgments which he contended I erred in not applying.[1] In the main, it was contended for the applicant that s 12 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 (TPCA) provides that: ‘Trust property shall not form part of the personal estate of the trustees except in so far as they as the trust beneficiaries are entitled to the trust property.’ Therefore, in the absence of any evidence on the abuse of the trust form by the applicant, the inclusion of the trust assets in his estate for the purposes of the calculation of the accrual during the marriage, was unlawful.
[3] It was further argued for the applicant that the issue of the trust’s assets and their inclusion was not part of the lis between the parties; that the parties concluded the settlement agreement under a common material error of law and beyond their
powers as the trustees. To the extent that the deed of settlement provided in clauses 2.1 and 2.2.9 that the trust’s assets be considered part of the applicant’s assets for the purposes of determining the accrual, it was argued, it was unlawful in that it offended against s 12 of TCPA and clauses 5.1.1.1, 5.1.1.2 and 7.7.1 of the trust deed which prohibits trustees from merging any of the assets of the trust with their own or holding out that any trust assets belong to them personally or appropriating any of the trust capital or income for their own benefit.
[3] The grounds of the application for leave merely rehearses the arguments that this Court has already considered and rejected based on good authority relevant to the issues. Little purpose would be served to repeat the reasoning in the main judgment. In terms of s 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013:
‘Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned are of the opinion that-
(i) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or
(ii) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, including conflicting judgments on the matter under consideration..’
[4] Having carefully considered the argument, I am of the view that there are no reasonable prospects of success, including any compelling reason to entertain the appeal such as important questions of law or discreet issues of public importance which would have a bearing or effect on future disputes. It follows that the application must be dismissed with costs.
[5] In the result:
Order
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs such costs to include the fees of senior-junior counsel on scale B in terms of rule 67A of the Uniform Rules of Court.
M V PHATSHOANE
DEPUTY JUDGE PRESIDENT
Appearances
For the applicant: A Eillert Instructed by: Adrian B Horwitz & Associates, Kimberley For the respondent: AS Sieberhagen Instructed by:
PGMO Attorneys, Kimberley.
[1] They referred to, inter alia, Schierhout v Minister of Justice 1926 AD 99; Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality v Asia Construction (Pty) Ltd 2019 (4) SA 331 (CC).
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