Road Accident Fund v Moshani (EL311/06) [2008] ZAECHC 213 (14 October 2008)

FORM A

FILING SHEET FOR EASTERN CAPE

JUDGMENT

ECJ no

PARTIES:

ROAD

ACCIDENT FUND APPLICANT

AND

ZINISELI

MOSHANI RESPONDENT

Registrar CASE NO: EL311/06

Magistrate: HIGH COURT, EAST LONDON CIRCUIRT

LOCAL

DIVISION

Supreme Court of Appeal/Constitutional Court:

DATE HEARD: 19 AUGUST 2008

DATE DELIVERED: 14 OCTOBER 2008

JUDGE(S): GREENLAND, AJ

LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES -

Appearances:

For the State/Plaintiff(s)/Applicant(s)/Appellant(s):Mr L B NOMPOZOLO

for the accused/defendant(s)/respondent(s): ADV

A DUGMORE

Instructing attorneys:

Plaintiff(s)/Applicant(s)/Appellant(s): NOMPOZOLO & GABELANA

Respondent(s)/Defendant(s):

MESSRS YAZBEKS

CASE INFORMATION -

Nature of proceedings :

CIVIL MATTER

Topic:

DAMAGES

IN

THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

(EAST LONDON CIRCUIT LOCAL DIVISION)

CASE NO: EL311/06

In the matter between:

and

ZINISELE

MOSHANI RESPONDENT

JUDGEMENT

GREENLAND AJ

This matter arises as an opposed motion.

The applicant gave notice, on 16 April 2008, that it intended amending its plea by, inter alia, deletion of an admission and substitution with a denial, i.e., to now deny that the respondent was involved in a collision with a motor vehicle having previously admitted this in its plea.

By notice of objection, filed on 24 April 2008, the respondent objected to what it correctly termed withdrawal of admissions.

For ease of understanding I propose to refer to the Respondent as the plaintiff and the Applicant as the defendant in accordance with their roles in the main action.

Background

[1] The historical facts and circumstances are summarised as follows –

Plaintiff served a summons on the defendant on 05 June 2006.

In par 3 of his “Particulars of Claim” he alleged that –

“On or about 24 December 2002 and at Dice Street, Reeston, East London, within the jurisdiction of the above Honourable Court, (East London) an unidentified motor vehicle (hereinafter referred to as “the insured vehicle”) driven by a driver unknown, struck the Plaintiff who was a pedestrian at the time.”

The defendant entered appearance and served this on the plaintiff on 19 July 2006.

A Notice to Bar calling on the defendant to file its plea was served on the defendant on 26 February 2007.

Defendant’s Plea was filed and served on 09 March 2007, i.e., nine (9) months later. It reads –

“Ad paragraph 1 thereof

…………………

Ad paragraph 3 thereof

The allegations contained in this paragraph are admitted. ”

A pre-trial conference was held on 26 June 2007 in which it was agreed that the plaintiff bore the onus regarding both merits and quantum which issues would not be separated.

The defendant’s attorney undertook to revert, after taking instructions from client, on whether or not the defendant was prepared to admit “Plaintiff’s Frere Hospital medical records”.

On 14 April 2008 the defendant filed and served a notice of intention to amend seeking to withdraw the admission made per e) herein to which plaintiff filed notice of objection on 24 April 2008.

The matter was inexplicably first enrolled on the motion court roll of 20 April 2008 and postponed sine die with costs reserved.

On 24 April 2008 Plaintiff filed a Notice of Objection to the proposed amendment(s) in terms of Rule 28(3).

On 29 April 2008, a day before trial was due to commence, an application for leave to amend was filed and served by defendant. The matter had been set down for trial to commence on 30 April 2008 and the belated filing of the application resulted in the trail being aborted immediately after being called and the presiding judge being informed of developments, i.e., postponed sine die with costs reserved.

On 19 May 2008, pursuant to a notice to amend dated 14 April 2008, the plaintiff filed a three (3) page proposed amendment to his particulars of claim regarding the merits, injuries and quantum.

This application to amend was enrolled on 24 June 2008 and postponed to 18 August 2008 the date of this hearing. On this occasion the application was substantively formulated as is the requirement under the rules regarding application on notice. The notice of motion which is the subject of this judgement includes –

an affidavit by Lindile Brian Nompozolo, (“Nompozolo”) attorney for the defendant;

an opposing affidavit by Gary Joseph Stirk, (“Stirk”) attorney for the plaintiff;

a confirmatory affidavit by Heather Dicker, (Dicker”) secretary to the plaintiff’s attorney

a replying affidavit by Lindile Brian Nompozolo, attorney for the defendant;

a confirmatory affidavit by Zukile Dotwana, (“Dotwana”) attorney for the defendant.

Factual grounds for the application

[2] The grounds in support of the application are advanced in the affidavit of Nompozolo includes the following –

“By the date on which we received the Notice of Bar we had not yet received the file contents from the Applicant to enable us to assess the matter and file a plea timeously. I attach hereto a letter dated 26 February 2007 which was sent to the Defendant calling upon them to furnish us with the file contents …”

“The Applicant’s Plea was subsequently drafted, served and filed ….without the benefit of us having the contents of Applicant’s

file …. done to protect our client’s interests as the dies for filing of the plea were going to elapse.”

Because, in terms of instructions by defendant, there is a high incidence of fraud as regards claims involving unidentified vehicles defendant’s attorney firm decided that the claim needed close examination and investigation. As a result plaintiff’s attorneys were requested in writing to make the plaintiff available for interrogation scheduled for 30 October 2007. Interrogation did not occur as the plaintiff was unavailable as advised by letter dated 02 November by his attorney.

A perusal of defendant’s file revealed that the hospital records relating to the plaintiff classified his injuries as having been as a result of “assault” with no mention of his involvement in a motor vehicle accident. The defendant, by law, only provides compensation to victims of motor vehicle accidents. The records which are included in the papers confirm this. In his Replying Affidavit Nompozolo insists that that the medical records were within the plaintiff’s possession and knowledge prior to institution of the claim against the defendant and that -

“…the claim was instituted with this now apparently wrong information which as it is put by Mr Stirk (attorney for the plaintiff) might not be the correct reflection of the causes on the injuries”

At the stage of discovery by Nompozolo, Dotwana, who had actually drafted the plea without sight of the defendant’s file, was no longer with the firm. However defendant, as client, upon contact confirmed that no instruction to make the admission had been given to Dotwana. By confirmatory affidavit Dotwana confirms all of this. However there is simply no confirmatory affidavit from the RAF.

To the above must be added the following statement by Nompozolo –

“It is common knowledge amongst practitioners dealing with RAF matters that it is not uncommon for attorneys acting on behalf of the Road Accident Fund will file a plea without having the file contents from the RAF and proper instructions thereto, which situation results in many instances in pleas of bad denials being filed. It is also common knowledge that in most instances attorneys acting for claimants against the RAF do not take sections (sic) to those pleadings as they are well aware of the administrative difficulties in dealing with instructions from RAF.”

From the above can be abstracted the submission that the defendant should be permitted a withdrawal of an admission previously made in its plea as such admission was done without instructions, without its knowledge and in contradiction of its stance which stance is supported by official medical records, the existence of which must have been within the knowledge of the plaintiff.

Discussion on merits

[3] Right at the outset it is as well to set out what is the approach to be adopted as regards this application. 1

“An amendment cannot however be had for the mere asking. Some explanation must be offered as to why the amendment is required and if the application for amendment is not timeously made some reasonably satisfactory account must be given for the delay. Of course if the application to amend is mala fide or if the amendment causes an injustice to the other side which cannot be compensated by costs, or in other words, if the parties cannot be put back for the purposes of justice in the same position as they were in when the pleading it is sought to amend was filed, the application will not be granted. These principles are I think to be found summed up somewhat along these lines, but perhaps in other words, in Herbstein and van Winsen Civil Practice of the Superior Courts in South Africa, pp. 290 to 292 and the authorities there cited by the learned authors.

An amendment to a pleading involving the withdrawal of an admission has, however, been regarded in a somewhat different light from that of other amendments. In Rishton v Rishton, 1912 T.P.D. 718, the Court held that it would only allow an admission in the pleadings to be withdrawn on proof that it was made in error and that no prejudice was thereby caused to the other side. In that case WESSELS, J., as he then was, said at p. 720:

'In judging whether it ought or ought not to grant an amendment it is very necessary for the Court to consider whether the admission as contained in the pleading is exactly as the client would have wished the admission to have been made before the Court.'

and at p. 721:

'I think it is the duty of the Court to have recorded on the pleadings exactly what the parties estimate the facts to be and what they think are the defences that they ought to lay before the Court. Under these circumstances, I think, whatever the consequences of such an amendment may be, that it is the duty of the Court to allow the amendment, because it is the duty of the Court to see that the facts are correctly represented before it and that it is not being deceived by some mere technicality.'

In the same case CURLEWIS, J., said at p. 722:

'When the application was made yesterday I personally felt, as I feel now, that the only question to consider was whether it was a bona fide application for amendment, and whether, if the amendment was allowed, it would cause an injustice to the other side.'

The modern practice is in favour of granting applications for leave to amend whenever the amendment facilitates the proper ventilation of the dispute between the parties. South African Steel Equipment Company (Pty.) Ltd v Lurelk (Pty.) Ltd., 1951 (4) SA 167 (T).”

a) Erroneous pleading

Counsel for the plaintiff argues strongly that the central factual basis for the application is flawed in that –

the claim that it was the defendant’s stance to dispute that the plaintiff was in collision with a motor vehicle is hearsay in the absence of an affidavit from the defendant itself; and

the decision to make the admission was in any event, not an error, (and therefore an “erroneous pleading”) but a “conscious tactical decision to admit the collision and thereafter to investigate the circumstances of the collision

later”; and

that Dotwana does not in fact confirm that there was an error in pleading.

To enter a plea without instructions is, with respect not a “conscious tactical decision” but is to act with reckless disregard and absence of authority. It is not a tactic. It is grossly irresponsible conduct. If true the resultant plea was not that of the client but a figment of Dotwana’s imagination.

Since it is inherently improbable that an attorney would act in such a manner I have little option but to agree with counsel for the plaintiff that express confirmation of all of this is required from the defendant itself. It is not acceptable that this court should be asked to rely on a person as to what the stance of the Road Accident Fund (“the RAF”) was/is when that person has to admit that he has acted without the authority of the very entity whose stance is now in issue.

That the defendant’s stance was to dispute that the plaintiff was involved in a collision with a motor vehicle is hearsay in the absence of a confirmatory affidavit from the RAF itself.

It is pertinent to point out that section 24 of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996, (“the Act”) as read with the Road Accident Fund Regulations published

under GN R609 in GG 17939 of 25 April 1997[with effect from 1 May 1997] (Prior to repeal by GN R770 in GG 31249 of 21 July 2008)

provided for the inclusion of a medical report in the following format –

“24 Procedure

(1) A claim for compensation and accompanying medical report under section 17 (1) shall-

(a) be set out in the prescribed form, which shall be completed in all its particulars;

(b) be sent by registered post or delivered by hand to the Fund at its principal, branch or regional office, or to the agent ………..

(2) (a) The medical report shall be completed on the prescribed form by the medical practitioner who treated the deceased or injured person for the bodily injuries sustained in the accident from which the claim arises, or by the superintendent (or his or her representative) of the hospital where the deceased or injured person was treated for such bodily injuries: Provided that, if the medical practitioner or superintendent (or his or her representative) concerned fails to complete the medical report on request within a reasonable time and it appears that as a result of the passage of time the claim concerned may become prescribed, the medical report may be completed by another medical practitioner who has fully satisfied himself or herself regarding the cause of the death or the nature and treatment of the bodily injuries in respect of which the claim is made.

(my underlining)

FORM 1

CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION AND MEDICAL REPORT

(Sections 17(1) and 24(1)(a)of Act No. 56 of 1996 and Regulation 3(1) of the Regulations under the Act)

Notes:

……………..

1. Claimant

……………………

………………….

…………………………..

Signature of claimant

MEDICAL REPORT

NOTES

Section 24(2)(a) provides that this report shall be completed by the medical practitioner who treated who treated the injured or deceased person for injuries sustained by him/her in the accident from which this claim arises or by the superintendent (or his/her representative) of the hospital in which the injured or deceased person was treated for such bodily injuries.

…………..

………..

Date when first seen after accident …………………………………………………….

Did you treat him/her at any time before the accident …………………………………

Parts of body injured and degree of injury:

…………………………………….

In par 7 of the summons the plaintiff alleges that he complied with all the “… prescribed requirements in respect of the submission of the claim”.

This was admitted by the defendant in its plea.

The implications of this must be that defendant was/is in possession of a claim form which, in its medical section, profiles the plaintiff as an accident victim. Without and affidavit from the defendant producing controverting evidence, that is the conclusion I must come to.

In terms of ZARUG, supra, it absolutely clear that it is critical that this court be satisfied as to what the client’s position was/is. On the papers this is, at worst, impossible and, at best highly, problematical.

Delay

Counsel submits also that the defendant has not furnished a reasonably satisfactory explanation for the delay in bringing the application.

In his Opposing Affidavit, Stirk (attorney for the plaintiff) specifically pointed to the fact that Nompozolo, in his Founding Affidavit, had not disclosed when the claimed problem had been discovered so that this court would have knowledge of the period between the date of discovery and the application to amend.

Despite being thus put on notice that the plaintiff was concerned that Nompozolo was apparently consciously concealing this relevant fact and that this must reflect on the issue of bona fides, Nompozolo maintains silence on the issue in his replying affidavit.

I have to accept therefore that this court is being kept in the dark as regards –

when did defendant’s firm received the file from its client

when did it realize the error

when were the hospital records inspected

when did it take specific instructions from its client to make this application and

what is the reason for whatever delay occurred between the date of instructions to withdraw the admission and the date of application

see also last paragraph of par [4] a) below.

This information is critical to the exercise of judicial discretion particularly as regards delay as time is always an enemy of any litigant who is compelled to go back in time in order to assimilate and collate evidence anew.

An explanation of delay is also critical so as to displace any suggestion that the application is not simply a belated change of strategy or tactic so as to wrong-foot an opponent. In this way the issue also links to that of bona fides which consideration permeates everything.

A clear explanation is needed from the RAF as to the medical information it had in its possession from the time the claim was submitted, whether or not this was investigated, the results of such investigations, what if anything it communicated to the plaintiff and what instructions it gave its attorneys. All these matters cry out for explanation. In the absence of full disclosure this court cannot be satisfied that the application is factually well founded and that there is bona fides.

Interrogation of the plaintiff

Plaintiff’s counsel has argued strongly that Nompozolo’s advertence to the request to have the plaintiff interrogated in October 2007 is indicative of lack of bona fides for being a “red herring” artfully created to obscure the real issue. Such interrogation was not competent once action had been instituted. See Sibisi v MMF 1993 (2) SA 629 (W).

I accept that reference to this request by Nompozolo has no supportive relevance to the application other than being a matter of some historical interest.

It does however have subvertive relevance. During the hearing of this matter Mr Nompozolo contended that the plaintiff’s non-cooperation as regards the proposed interrogation was a significant contributing factor to the present state of affairs. Does this mean that the trigger to the request was the information in medical records? If so this proves that as early as October 2007 the defendant’s attorneys had possession of the file and the information on which this application is based.

As a matter of sheer probability, defendant’s attorneys must have been in possession of the file in October 2007 when it made the request for interrogation. This is especially so when one considers that in June, three (3) months earlier at the pre-trial conference,

defendant’s attorneys had undertaken to revert on the issue of having the medical records admitted. One cannot interrogate without

the information that gives rise to both the necessity for and the subject matter of the interrogation.

As the application was only filed in April 2008 I must find that there is no satisfactory explanation for the delay and bona fides remains questionable.

Triable issue – Hospital records

Nompozolo has attached hospital records. Stirk has attached more hospital records which Nompozolo is accused of having “selectively” omitted. Nompozolo has not disputed the records produced by Stirk. The net effect of this I have to accept that the records produced by Stirk relate to the plaintiff. In his heads plaintiff’s counsel admits that the medical records referred to by Nompozolo relate to plaintiff and must have been in defendant’s possession on receipt of the claim. I therefore accept that all the medical records produced relate to the plaintiff.

It is contended by plaintiff’s counsel that the records are “error strewn”, “contradictory”, “ambiguous” and “unclear” in “their meaning and effect”.

It is submitted that since this is the evidence relied on in the defendant’s contention that the plaintiff was not involved in a motor vehicle collision no “triable issue” arises on account of its complete unreliability.2

“Having already made his case in his pleading, if he wishes to change or add to this, he must explain the reason and show prima facie that he has something deserving of consideration, a triable issue; he cannot be allowed to harass his opponent by an amendment which has no foundation. He cannot place on the record an issue for which he has no supporting evidence…”

With respect whether or not the plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle collision is a triable issue. The medical records are relevant to this issue. Their reliability is really a matter for the trial court except that, in my view, it cannot be said that the problems adverted to render them so unreliable as to be completely discountable as evidence. The fact of the matter is that, ex facie these records, the plaintiff was repeatedly profiled as an assault victim. That renders his claim to having been involved in a motor vehicle accident inherently improbable. The proposed amendment is therefore not without foundation in the sense referred to in TRANS – DRAKENSBERG, supra.

Note also that the onus regarding that issue remains on the plaintiff. In this application the hospital records are but proof that disputing plaintiff’s claim is supported by independent medical evidence and not born out of capriciousness.

Prejudice to the plaintiff

That this issue is one of critical importance is supported by all the authorities. It is clear from all the authorities that this is an important factor.

On the evidence disclosed the finding must be that prejudice will accrue to the plaintiff. It means that the plaintiff will have to, at this late stage, re-visit the issue. The admission was made on 09 March 2007, i.e., more than one (1) year and a half ago. Stirk’s affidavit documents reveal in part how problematical such an exercise is. His investigation revealed a litany of recording problems, apparent contradictions, seeming inaccuracies … ect … ect … all defying explanation on account difficulties regarding authenticity. As stated by counsel a conspectus of the entire hospital records expose them as being error strewn and contradictory. Because of the passage of time it is going to be that much more difficult to resolve these issues.

In the circumstances I have to accept that, within the context of this application, I cannot be satisfied that no prejudice will accrue if the application is granted.

Mr Nompozolo argued strongly that as it was inherent to the plaintiff’s claim that the vehicle and driver were unidentified no prejudice accrues as it is not a case where plaintiff will have to now go back in time to find the evidence to support the existence of either.

This point has merit. However it begs the question of what the plaintiff would have been able to do had it been informed at the time of plea that the alleged collision was in issue on the basis that the medical evidence pointed to assault. It would have been in a position to address the problems at that stage.

It is also pertinent to point out that although the defendant’s attorney admitted the collision with a vehicle he made no admissions

linking the plaintiff’s injuries to such collision or that the plaintiff suffered any injury in consequence and put the plaintiff to the proof thereof in all respects.

The effect of this is that, despite the admission, the onus remained on the plaintiff to link the accident to the injuries in terms of medical evidence despite the admission and this onus subsists. To that extent it is somewhat ironical that Stirk complains long and hard about the medical evidence which, so it would seem, ought to have been addressed ab initio, in any event. As can be seen from par [1] f) above plaintiff’s attorneys sought admission of these very same records at the pre-trial conference in June 2007.

So failure to have the admission withdrawn is by no means fatal to the defendant’s case and it is duty bound to resist the claim (action) if the medical evidence is supportive of such resistance.

In the final analyses this application may well prove to have been a somewhat academic exercise.

Conclusion

[4] (a) Preface

It is with some reluctance that I have come to the final conclusion contained herein particularly in the light of my finding under par [3] d) above. The reason is that the defendant is a public fund and, in effect, is taking the stance that it has uncovered fraud on the part of the plaintiff.

Put differently, if it is true that the plaintiff’s injuries are attributable to an assault, the effect of this judgement will be to assist him in his fraudulent mission. The court and its judgement will be exposed to being discredited on the basis that it had clear notice of such fraud particularly as no less than three medical records produced show that the plaintiff was classified as an assault victim.

Against that I am reminded of the fact, and the law, that a court always sees parties before it as equals and presumes and assumes nothing negative about either unless proved in accordance with long established rules of substantive and procedural law.

In this context defendant’s contention must be categorised and viewed as no more than an unproved allegation. It is pertinent to point out that, if supported by evidence, it should have been reported to the State’s investigative arm and a charge of fraud laid. Whether this occurred and, if not why not, remains a mystery because, as said, the RAF has not filed an affidavit of full disclosure. It is to state the obvious that the absence of any suggestion that the plaintiff’s claim was viewed as criminal conduct, which it was on defendant’s version, strongly supports the plaintiff in his contention that this application has no merit and lacks bona fides.

Conduct of defendant’s attorney

Acting without instructions, as Dotwana did in this case, and filing a plea with a reckless disregard as to whether it is true or false is an inherently serious

matter on account of its implications. One of the implications is that the RAF is a statutory fund which courts have stated presents

under “social” legislation. By this is meant that, where fault is present, the RAF presents as part of the social security network.3

“[12] The learned Judge held that it was appropriate to apply the nasciturus rule in this case. Among the factors which led him to this conclusion was the fact that Act 93 of 1989 was

'social legislation aimed at the widest possible protection and compensation against loss and damages for the negligent driving of a motor vehicle (compare SA Eagle Insurance Co Ltd v Pretorius [1997] ZASCA 107; 1998 (2) SA 656 (SCA) 659I - 660O). To a large extent it represents . . . an embodiment of the common-law actions relating to damages for bodily injury and loss of support caused by or arising from the negligent driving of a motor vehicle (Evins v Shield Insurance Co Ltd [1980 (2) SA 814 (A)], 841E).'”

Unlike a private insurer the RAF has no discretion if liability has accrued. It must admit liability and pay compensation. To do otherwise is to breach its own mandate and constitutes unlawful conduct. So to plead without instructions is to wilfully place either a claimant’s rights under the law or public funds at serious risk.

Other implications

The are other implications raised in the statement on oath by Attorney Nompozolo reproduced at par [2] f) above. A situation where it may be that the courts are being routinely misled and costs are incurred on false pleadings is untenable. It requires immediate attention.

In the circumstances the matter is referred to the Law Society of South Africa which, as the regulatory authority, may wish to investigate and, if necessary, take such corrective action as it may deem appropriate.

This matter is also specifically referred to the Chairman of the Board of the Road Accident Fund.

Costs

Advocate Dugmore has made out a strong argument in favour of costs on a punitive scale being awarded against the defendant.

As always this aspect must be considered in the light of the revealed facts. In par b) I have set out the precipitating context and factors to this application.

The losing party is the Road Accident Fund, a publicly funded statutory body. It is funded by way of a levy on fuel. Unnecessary and wasteful expenditure induces a rise in the cost of living.

Having regard to the context set out in par b) immediately above it is difficult to accept that the RAF should be subjected to a punitive costs order. I think Mr Dugmore would probably have been on safer ground in contending for costs de bonis propriis.4

Since costs were not argued on this basis I think it would be inappropriate to make such order. What appears critically important is that the underlying cause, the operational culture and climate, be addressed by the Law Society at least counselling its members as a matter of priority. As regards the RAF its functions are vested in its Board.

As I am satisfied that the defendant has not made requisite disclosure, has not satisfactorily explained the delay in bringing the application, may not be acting with bona fides and that the plaintiff may well be prejudiced if the application were granted it is ordered that –

The application is dismissed with costs including all wasted costs incurred on and since 16 April 2008 in respect of this application.

The Registrar shall, without delay, forward a copy of this judgement together with a copy of Mr Nompozolo’s affidavit, to the Chairman of the Road Accident Fund and to the Law Society of South Africa.

_____

1 Instructive is ZARUG v PARVATHIE, NO 1962 (3) SA 872 (D) at 876 -

2 See TRANS - DRAKENSBERG BANK LTD (UNDER JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT) v COMBINED ENGINEERING (PTY) LTD AND ANOTHER 1967 (3) SA 632 (D) at 641 -

3 See MALI v SHIELD INSURANCE CO LTD 1984 (2) SA 798 (SE)at 812;

RIBEIRO v SANTAM LTD 1996 (3) SA 1035 (W) at 1042; ROAD ACCIDENT FUND v MTATI 2005 (6) SA 215 (SCA) at 220 -

4 See KHAN v MZOVUYO INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD 1991 (3) SA 47 (TK) at page 48 where an order of costs de bonis propriis was made against plaintiff's attorney after finding that his “slack and unconcerned” handling of the case amounted to unreasonable conduct as to warrant such order. Also see WASTE PRODUCTS UTILISATION (PTY) LTD v WILKES AND ANOTHER (BICCARI INTERESTED PARTY) 2003 (2) SA 590 (W) where an attorney was held liable for costs occasioned on account of actions inducing severe prejudice. See also my judgement in WASHAYA v WASHAYA 1990 (4) SA 41 (ZH) where a legal practitioner consented to judgement without client’s authority.

16