Rock Foundation Properties CC and Another v Dosvelt Properties (Pty) Limited and Another (20/28515) [2023] ZAGPJHC 408 (2 May 2023)
- Citation
- [2023] ZAGPJHC 408
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
- Panel
- I Opperman
- Case number
- 20/28515
More details
- Court
- South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
- Panel
- I Opperman
- Case number
- 20/28515
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court found that the applicants failed to demonstrate that the agreements constituted a disguised loan rather than an investment and sale transaction. The applicants' arguments were inconsistent with the common cause facts and the founding affidavit. Applying the Plascon Evans rule, the suite of agreements must be accepted as they purport to be—a sale, a lease, and an option to purchase. The court held that the applicants did not meet the threshold for leave to appeal as required by section 17 of the Superior Courts Act. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded against the applicants, including the costs of senior counsel and two counsel where employed.
Court disposition
Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs, including costs of senior counsel and two counsel where employed.
Orders
- The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.
- Costs are to be paid by Rock Foundation Properties CC and Esther Nyarwai Ndegwa jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.
- Costs include the costs of senior counsel and the costs of two counsel, where so employed.
02
Material facts
Parties
Rock Foundation Properties CC
Applicant Counsel: C van der MerweEsther Nyarwai Ndegwa
Applicant Counsel: C van der MerweDosvelt Properties (Pty) Limited
Respondent Counsel: S Symon SCEli Nathan Chaitowitz
Respondent Counsel: S Symon SC03
Procedural history
Posture
Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal After Judgment
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the agreements between the parties constituted a loan or an investment and sale transaction.
- 02
Whether the application for leave to appeal meets the threshold of reasonable prospects of success under section 17 of the Superior Courts Act.
- 03
Whether the costs order should include costs of senior counsel and two counsel.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The applicants, represented by Adv C van der Merwe, argued that a careful analysis of the suite of agreements, especially their cross-referencing, reveals that the true nature of the transaction was a loan disguised as an investment and sale to avoid the application of the National Credit Act. They contended that the property was not purchased at market value but at half its value, which further exposes the real nature of the agreements. The applicants maintained that all agreements should be considered together and that the structure was designed for tax efficiency and investment flexibility.
- Respondent
- The respondents, represented by Adv S Symon SC, argued that the applicants' version was inconsistent with Ms Ndegwa's founding affidavit, which revealed a shared intention of an investment. They relied on the Plascon Evans rule, asserting that the agreements must be accepted as they purport to be—a sale, a lease, and an option to purchase—not a loan. The respondents emphasized that nothing sinister was alleged under oath and that Mr Chaitowitz was unwilling to loan money to Ms Ndegwa due to her poor payment history. They argued that the applicants failed to meet the threshold for leave to appeal.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Dexgroup (Pty) Ltd v Trustco Group International (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (6) SA 520 (SCA)
A court should not grant leave to appeal unless the applicant has cleared the threshold warranting such leave; judicial resources should not be spent on appeals lacking merit.
- 02
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, section 17
The test for granting leave to appeal under section 17 of the Superior Courts Act is whether the appeal would have reasonable prospects of success, not merely might have.
- 03
Plascon Evans rule
Where facts are disputed, the version of the respondent must be accepted unless it is so far-fetched or untenable that it can be rejected on the papers.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court found that the applicants failed to demonstrate that the agreements constituted a disguised loan rather than an investment and sale transaction. The applicants' arguments were inconsistent with the common cause facts and the founding affidavit. Applying the Plascon Evans rule, the suite of agreements must be accepted as they purport to be—a sale, a lease, and an option to purchase. The court held that the applicants did not meet the threshold for leave to appeal as required by section 17 of the Superior Courts Act. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded against the applicants, including the costs of senior counsel and two counsel where employed.
Obiter and limits
- The market value of the property must be viewed in the context of the sale in execution and the default judgment against Ms Ndegwa.
- The use of nominees for tax efficiency and investment flexibility does not imply any sinister motive, nor was any such motive alleged under oath.
- The legislature's intention regarding the threshold for leave to appeal under section 17 of the Superior Courts Act remains debated, but the court assumed the lower test in favour of the applicants.
Court disposition
Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs, including costs of senior counsel and two counsel where employed.
- The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.
- Costs are to be paid by Rock Foundation Properties CC and Esther Nyarwai Ndegwa jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.
- Costs include the costs of senior counsel and the costs of two counsel, where so employed.
Source and reliance status
South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
Judgment
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
Case No: 20/28515
NOT REPORTABLE
NOT OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES
In the matter between:
THE
ROCK FOUNDATION PROPERTIES CC First Applicant
ESTHER
NYARWAI NDEGWA Second Applicant and
DOSVELT PROPERTIES (PTY) LIMITED First Respondent
ELI
NATHAN CHAITOWITZ Second Respondent
Neutral Citation: The Rock Foundation Properties CC and Other v Dosvelt Properties (Pty) Limited and Other (Case no: 28515/ 2020) [2023] ZAGPJHC 408 (02 May 2023)
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’ legal representatives by email. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 14h00 on 2 May 2023
JUDGMENT
INGRID OPPERMAN J
[1] This is an application for leave to appeal against a judgment handed down by this court on 21 December 2022. This judgment should be read with the 21 December 2022 one (‘the judgment’).
[2] Leave to appeal is sought against the whole of the judgment. The parties are referred to as in the judgment and all abbreviated descriptions used herein are defined in the judgment.
[3] Mr C van der Merwe, who was not the counsel who argued the matter, raised arguments in this application for leave to appeal which, although in part raised in the heads of argument drafted by him for the main hearing, were not persisted with (or more accurately, raised at all) by Mr Amojee during his address.
[4] Relying primarily on paragraphs [10], [23] and [34] of Roshcon,[1] Mr van der Merwe argued that a careful analysis of the terms of the agreements and particularly as they were cross-referenced between the agreements, reveals the extraordinary nature of the agreements and exposes a loan and not an investment all of this constructed to avoid the application of the NCA. He emphasized that one is to consider all the agreements. This, coupled with the fact that the property was allegedly not purchased at market value but at half the value, revealed, so the argument ran, the real nature of the agreements.
[5] This court dealt with the market value of the property in paragraph [59] of the judgment. Crucially, at the time of the conclusion of the agreements, default judgment had been granted against Ms Ndegwa in favour of ABSA. Ms Ndegwa was attempting to stay the sale in execution and the market value must, of course, be viewed in that context.
[6] Mr Simon SC pointed out how this argument was at variance with the version of Ms Ndegwa as set out in her founding affidavit[2]. I agree, it is. The common cause version reveals a shared intention of an investment but at worst for the respondents, and applying the Plascon Evans rule, the suite of agreements must be accepted to be what they purport to be – a sale, a lease, and an option to purchase – not a loan, as that is the version of Mr Chaitowitz supported by the content of the suite of agreements. It is common cause that both Ms Ndegwa and Mr Chaitowitz used nominees for reasons of tax efficiency and the structures had investment flexibility to accommodate investors. Nothing sinister is to be inferred from this but more importantly, nothing sinister is alleged under oath. Mr Chaitowitz says that he was not prepared to loan Ms Ndegwa any money because on her track record, she was a bad payer. All of this is dealt with in the judgment.
[7] In the decision of Dexgroup (Pty) Ltd v Trustco Group International (Pty) Ltd and Others[3], Wallis JA observed that a court should not grant leave to appeal, and indeed is under a duty not to do so, where the threshold which warrants such leave, has not been cleared by an applicant in an application for leave to appeal. He held as follows:
“[24] For those reasons the court below was correct to dismiss the challenge to the arbitrator's award and the appeal must fail. I should however mention that the learned acting judge did not give any reasons for granting leave to appeal. This is unfortunate as it left us in the dark as to her reasons for thinking that enjoyed reasonable prospects of success. Clearly it did not. Although points of some interest in arbitration law have been canvassed in this judgment, they would have arisen on some other occasion and, as has been demonstrated, the appeal was bound to fail on the facts. The need to obtain leave to appeal is a valuable tool in ensuring that scarce judicial resources are not spent on appeals that lack merit. It should in this case have been deployed by refusing leave to appeal.” (emphasis added)
[8] It has been suggested that the legislature has deemed it appropriate to raise the bar by providing in section 17 of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 that what an applicant in an application for leave to appeal should show is that the appeal ‘would ’ have reasonable prospects of success not ‘might ’. It has also been suggested that the legislature did no such thing and in fact simply restated the test which had application prior to the amendment. I will assume for purposes of this application, and in favour of the applicants, that the lower test has application.
[9] Mr van der Merwe valiantly argued that leave to appeal ought to be granted. I have not been persuaded and accordingly make the following order:
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs which costs are to be paid by the Rock Foundation Properties CC (‘the Rock Foundation’) and Esther Nyarwai Ndegwa (‘Ms Ndegwa’) jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved, which costs are to include the costs of senior counsel and the costs of two counsel, where so employed.
I OPPERMAN
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division, Johannesburg
Counsel for the applicants: Adv C van der Merwe Instructed by: Kaveer Guiness Inc Counsel for the respondents: Adv S Symon SC Instructed by: Paul Friedman & Associates
Date of hearing: 24 March 2023
Date of Judgment: 2 May 2023
[1] Roshcon (Pty) Ltd v Anchor Auto Body Builders CC and Others, 2014 (4) SA 319 (SCA)
[2] Paragraphs [43] and [132]
[3] 2013 (6) SA 520 (SCA)
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