Rosebank Mall (Pty) Ltd v Johannesburg City Council (659/92) [1994] ZASCA 85 (30 May 1994)
The court held that the obligation to levy and collect the development contribution under section 51 of the 1965 Ordinance was a matter 'pending before' the respondent at the time the 1986 Ordinance commenced. The ordinary meaning of 'pending' applies, covering any process begun but not completed. The respondent's statutory duty to determine and collect the contribution persisted, and the repeal did not extinguish this obligation. The subsequent proviso to section 141(2) merely clarified the legislature's original intention. Accordingly, the appellant remained liable for the development contribution, and the appeal was dismissed.
- Citation
- [1994] ZASCA 85
- Parties
- Appellant: Rosebank Mall (Pty) Ltd; Respondent: Johannesburg City Council
- Court
- Supreme Court of Appeal
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Judgment Date
- 30 May 1994
- Case Number
- 659/92
- Procedural Posture
- Civil Appeal / Appeal From Witwatersrand Local Division
- Outcome
- Appeal dismissed with costs, including costs of two counsel.
- Judges
- Hoexter, Botha, EM Grosskopf, Kumleben, Van Den Heever
- Legal Topics
- Town Planning Ordinance, Development Contribution, Statutory Interpretation, Pending Matter, Repeal and Savings, Municipal Taxation
Case Brief
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Rosebank Mall (Pty) Ltd
Appellant
Johannesburg City Council
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Civil Appeal / Appeal From Witwatersrand Local Division
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether liability for a development contribution under the repealed 1965 Ordinance remained pending before the respondent on 10 June 1987.
- 2 Whether the appellant was liable to pay the development contribution after the repeal of the 1965 Ordinance.
- 3 Proper interpretation of section 141(2) of the 1986 Ordinance regarding pending matters.
Ratio Decidendi
The court held that the obligation to levy and collect the development contribution under section 51 of the 1965 Ordinance was a matter 'pending before' the respondent at the time the 1986 Ordinance commenced. The ordinary meaning of 'pending' applies, covering any process begun but not completed. The respondent's statutory duty to determine and collect the contribution persisted, and the repeal did not extinguish this obligation. The subsequent proviso to section 141(2) merely clarified the legislature's original intention. Accordingly, the appellant remained liable for the development contribution, and the appeal was dismissed.
Court Disposition
Appeal dismissed with costs, including costs of two counsel.
Orders
- The appeal is dismissed with costs, such costs to include the costs consequent upon the employment of two counsel.
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