S v Gwadiso (1950/94) [1995] ZAWCHC 2 (16 February 1995)
- Citation
- [1995] ZAWCHC 2
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
- Panel
- Traverso, Conradie
- Case number
- 1950/94
More details
- Court
- Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
- Panel
- Traverso, Conradie
- Case number
- 1950/94
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court found that the only evidence presented by the State was that the accused was found in possession of dagga, with no direct evidence of intent to deal. The trial magistrate relied on the statutory presumption in section 21(1)(a)(i) of Act 140 of 1992, which places the burden on the accused to prove he did not possess the dagga for dealing. The court agreed with the reasoning in S v Bhulwana that such a presumption is prima facie inconsistent with section 25(3)(c) of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to a fair trial, including the presumption of innocence and the right to remain silent. Given that the quantity of dagga in this case was even less than in Bhulwana, the court found itself compelled to refer the question of the constitutional enforceability of the presumption to the Constitutional Court for determination. If the presumption is found invalid, the conviction must be amended to possession of an undesirable dependence-producing substance, and the sentence reconsidered.
Court disposition
The question of the constitutional validity of the statutory presumption in section 21(1)(a)(i) of Act 140 of 1992 is referred to the Constitutional Court for determination.
Orders
- The constitutional validity of the presumption in section 21(1)(a)(i) of Act 140 of 1992 is referred to the Constitutional Court.
- If the Constitutional Court finds the presumption invalid, the conviction must be amended to possession of an undesirable dependence-producing substance.
- The sentence must be reconsidered if the conviction is amended.
02
Material facts
Parties
The State
ApplicantJoe Gwadiso
DefendantAmounts and remedies
- Quantity of Dagga: ZAR 444.7
03
Procedural history
Posture
Criminal Review / Referral to Constitutional Court
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the statutory presumption in section 21(1)(a)(i) of Act 140 of 1992 is constitutionally enforceable.
- 02
Whether the presumption infringes the accused's right to be presumed innocent under section 25(3)(c) of the Constitution.
- 03
Whether the conviction for dealing in dagga can stand in light of the constitutional challenge.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The State relied solely on evidence that the accused was found in possession of 444.7 grams of dagga. No direct evidence was presented to prove that the accused intended to deal in dagga. The State invoked the statutory presumption in section 21(1)(a)(i) of Act 140 of 1992 to shift the burden onto the accused to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that he did not possess the dagga for the purpose of dealing.
- Respondent
- The accused pleaded not guilty and explained that he was found in possession of dagga but denied any intention to deal or that he had dealt in dagga. He argued that the statutory presumption violated his constitutional right to be presumed innocent and to remain silent during trial, as protected by section 25(3)(c) of the Constitution.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Section 25(3)(c) of the Constitution of South Africa
A statutory presumption that shifts the burden of proof to the accused to disprove intent to deal is prima facie inconsistent with the constitutional right to be presumed innocent and to remain silent during trial.
- 02
S v Bhulwana 1995(1) SA 509 (KPA)
The reasoning in S v Bhulwana establishes that such presumptions undermine the essential content of the accused's right to be presumed innocent.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court found that the only evidence presented by the State was that the accused was found in possession of dagga, with no direct evidence of intent to deal. The trial magistrate relied on the statutory presumption in section 21(1)(a)(i) of Act 140 of 1992, which places the burden on the accused to prove he did not possess the dagga for dealing. The court agreed with the reasoning in S v Bhulwana that such a presumption is prima facie inconsistent with section 25(3)(c) of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to a fair trial, including the presumption of innocence and the right to remain silent. Given that the quantity of dagga in this case was even less than in Bhulwana, the court found itself compelled to refer the question of the constitutional enforceability of the presumption to the Constitutional Court for determination. If the presumption is found invalid, the conviction must be amended to possession of an undesirable dependence-producing substance, and the sentence reconsidered.
Obiter and limits
- The quantity of dagga in this case is significantly less than in S v Bhulwana, reinforcing the need for constitutional scrutiny of the presumption.
- The reasoning in Bhulwana is clear and comprehensive, and the court respectfully concurs without repeating it.
Court disposition
The question of the constitutional validity of the statutory presumption in section 21(1)(a)(i) of Act 140 of 1992 is referred to the Constitutional Court for determination.
- The constitutional validity of the presumption in section 21(1)(a)(i) of Act 140 of 1992 is referred to the Constitutional Court.
- If the Constitutional Court finds the presumption invalid, the conviction must be amended to possession of an undesirable dependence-producing substance.
- The sentence must be reconsidered if the conviction is amended.
Source and reliance status
Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
Judgment
IN DIE HOOGGEREGSHOF VAN SUID-AFRIKA
(KAAP DIE GOEIE HOOP PROVINSIALE AFDELING)
SAAK NO. 1950/94
In die saak tussen:
DIE
STAAT
en
JOE GWADISO Beskuldigde
UITSPRAAK GELEWER OP 16 FEBRUARIE 1995
TRAVERSO R.
Hierdie aangeleentheid dien voor my op hersiening. Die beskuldigde het daarvan aangekla gestaan dat hy handel gedryf het in 444,7 gram dagga soos beoog in Artikel S(b) van die Wet op Dwelmmiddels en Dwelmsmokkelary No. 140 van 1992. In die altematief het hy aangekla gestaan van 'n oortreding van Artikel 4(b) van die Wet deurdat hy in besit was daarvan.
Die beskuldigde het onskuldig gepleit. Volgens sy pleitverduideliking in terme van Artikel 115 an Wet 51 van 1977, het hy erken dat hy in besit gevind is van die dagga maar het te alle tye ontken dat hy die dagga besit het ten einde daarmee handel te dryf, of dat hy inderdaad handel gedryf het.
Die enigste getuienis wat die Staat aangebied het, is dat die beskuldigde in besit gevind is van die dagga. Daar was dus geen direkte getuienis wat bo redelike twyfel sou kon bewys dat die beskuldigde dit ten doel gehad het om met die dagga handel te dryf nie. Bygevolg is daar deur die verhoorlanddros gesteun op die vermoede soos vervat in Artikel 21(1)(a)(i) van die Wet.
In S. v. Bhulwana 1995(1) SA 509 (KPA) het Marais R. soortgelyke feite oorweeg. Marais R. het tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat aangesien die vermoede waarna ek hierbo verwys het, die bewyslas op die beskuldigde plaas om op 'n oorwig van waarskynlikhede te bewys dat hy nie die dagga besit het met.die oog daarop om handel te dryf nie, dit prima facie in stryd is met die bepalings van Artikel 25(3)(c) van die Grondwet wat bepaal:
"Elke beskuldigde het die reg op 'n billike verhoor, waarby inbegrepe is die reg-
…
(c) om onskuldig geag le.word en om te swyg tydens pleitverrigtinge of verhoor en om nie tydens die verhoor te getuig nie. "
Die beredenering van Marais R. ·word duidelik en volledig in die Bhulwana·uitspraak uiteengesit en ek stem respekvol daarmee saam. Ek sal dit dus riie hierin herhaal nie. Ek volstaan deur te se dat ek saamstem met Marais R. dat die verrnoede die wesentlike inhoud van die beskuldigde se reg om onskuldig geag te word, ontken.
Die hoeveelheid dagga in die onderhawige saak was nog baie minder as die in die Bhulwana saak. Inderdaad is dit bykans die helfte minder. Ek is gevolglik verplig om die vraag oor die grondwetlike afdwingbaarheid van die vermoede soos geskep in Artikel 21(1) (a) (i) van Wet 140 van 1992 na die Konstitusionele Hof te verwys vir oorweging. Dit word so beveel. Indien die Hof sou bevind dat die vermoede ongeldig is, sal die skuldigbevinding gewysig moet word na een van besit van 'n ongewensde afhanklikheidsvormende stof. Insgelyks sal die vonnis in heroorweging geneem moet word.
____
TRAVERSO R
Ek stem saam:
_______
CONRADIE R.
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