S v Mahako (403/2011) [2012] ZAFSHC 83 (3 May 2012)
- Citation
- [2012] ZAFSHC 83
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
- Panel
- Lekale, Mhlambi
- Case number
- 403/2011
More details
- Court
- Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
- Panel
- Lekale, Mhlambi
- Case number
- 403/2011
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court held that although the practice of taking offences together for sentencing is generally advantageous to accused persons, the composite sentence must be legally competent for each offence when considered individually. The trial court, by invoking section 112(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, was limited in its sentencing jurisdiction and exceeded that limit by imposing a composite sentence that was not competent for the immigration offence. The proper approach is to impose separate sentences for each offence, ensuring each is within the court's jurisdiction, and to temper the cumulative effect by making sentences concurrent or suspending one. The convictions were confirmed, but the sentence was set aside as a nullity and replaced with separate, legally competent sentences for each charge.
Court disposition
Convictions confirmed; composite sentence set aside as a nullity and replaced with separate sentences for each charge.
Orders
- The sentence of the trial court is set aside and substituted with the following:
- Charge 1: The accused is sentenced to R3,000.00 fine or 18 months imprisonment with a further 18 months imprisonment suspended in whole for 4 years on condition that the accused is not convicted of contravention of section 5(b) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act No 140/1992 during the period of suspension.
- Charge 2: The accused is sentenced to a R500.00 fine or 10 days imprisonment, suspended in whole for 3 years on condition that the accused is not convicted of contravention of section 49(1)(a) read with sections 1, 10, 25 and 26 of the Immigration Act No 13 of 2002 during the period of suspension.
- The sentences are antedated to take effect from 1 August 2011.
02
Material facts
Parties
The State
ApplicantThabo Mahanko
RespondentAmounts and remedies
- Fine for Charge 1: ZAR 3,000
- Imprisonment for Charge 1 (months): 18
- Suspended Imprisonment for Charge 1 (months): 18
- Suspension Period for Charge 1 (years): 4
- Fine for Charge 2: ZAR 500
- Imprisonment for Charge 2 (days): 10
- Suspension Period for Charge 2 (years): 3
03
Procedural history
Posture
Criminal Review / Automatic Review After Conviction and Sentence
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the trial court was competent to impose a composite sentence exceeding the penal jurisdiction prescribed by section 112(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act for both offences.
- 02
Whether the sentence imposed was a nullity in law and required correction.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The trial magistrate argued that the composite sentence was proper and not prejudicial to the accused, believing that the sentencing jurisdiction under the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act superseded the limitations of section 112(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act. The magistrate further opined that the sentence was advantageous to the accused and did not vitiate the proceedings.
- Respondent
- No formal argument was advanced by the accused, who pleaded guilty to both charges. The review was initiated by the reviewing judge's concern regarding the legality of the sentence imposed under section 112(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
S v S 1981 (3) SA 377 (A); S v Hayman 1988 (1) SA 831 (NC)
When offences are taken together for sentencing, the composite sentence must be competent for each offence individually.
- 02
S v Ntuli 1975 (1) SA 429 (A) at 435 C
The invocation of section 112(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act limits the penal jurisdiction of the trial court, and any sentence exceeding that limit is a nullity.
- 03
Kriegler and Kruger: Hiemstra’s Criminal Procedure at 28-41
Where the severity of the sentence for one offence exceeds the penal jurisdiction for another, separate competent sentences should be imposed and their cumulative effect tempered by concurrency or suspension.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court held that although the practice of taking offences together for sentencing is generally advantageous to accused persons, the composite sentence must be legally competent for each offence when considered individually. The trial court, by invoking section 112(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, was limited in its sentencing jurisdiction and exceeded that limit by imposing a composite sentence that was not competent for the immigration offence. The proper approach is to impose separate sentences for each offence, ensuring each is within the court's jurisdiction, and to temper the cumulative effect by making sentences concurrent or suspending one. The convictions were confirmed, but the sentence was set aside as a nullity and replaced with separate, legally competent sentences for each charge.
Obiter and limits
- The practice of taking offences together for sentencing purposes is well-founded and generally advantageous to accused persons, as it avoids duplication and undue harshness.
- The composite sentence imposed should be competent in respect of each offence involved when looked at individually.
Court disposition
Convictions confirmed; composite sentence set aside as a nullity and replaced with separate sentences for each charge.
- The sentence of the trial court is set aside and substituted with the following:
- Charge 1: The accused is sentenced to R3,000.00 fine or 18 months imprisonment with a further 18 months imprisonment suspended in whole for 4 years on condition that the accused is not convicted of contravention of section 5(b) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act No 140/1992 during the period of suspension.
- Charge 2: The accused is sentenced to a R500.00 fine or 10 days imprisonment, suspended in whole for 3 years on condition that the accused is not convicted of contravention of section 49(1)(a) read with sections 1, 10, 25 and 26 of the Immigration Act No 13 of 2002 during the period of suspension.
- The sentences are antedated to take effect from 1 August 2011.
Source and reliance status
Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
Judgment
FREE STATE HIGH COURT, BLOEMFONTEIN
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
Review No. : 403/2011
In the review between:
THE
STATE
versus
THABO
MAHANKO
_____________
CORAM: LEKALE, J et MHLAMBI, AJ
JUDGMENT BY: LEKALE, J
DELIVERED ON: 3 MAY 2012
[1] The accused, a Lesotho National, was convicted of and sentenced for dealing in dagga and being an illegal foreigner in the Republic of South Africa by the Ficksburg Magistrates’ Court on 1 August 2011.
[2] He pleaded guilty on both charges and the charges were taken together when he was sentenced to R3 000,00 or 18 (eighteen) months imprisonment with a further 18 (eighteen) months imprisonment being conditionally and wholly suspended for 4 (four) years.
[3] In convicting the accused on charge 2 for being an illegal foreigner in contravention of section 49(1)(a) of Immigration Act No. 13 of 2002, the trial court invoked the provisions of section 112(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act No. 51 of 1977 (CPA). The matter, thereafter, served before my sister Naidoo AJ on automatic review and she felt uncomfortable with the sentence imposed in the light of the
applicability of section 112(1)(a) of the CPA. She, therefore, directed the following query to the trial magistrate:
“Whether the consideration of counts 1 and 2 as one count for the purpose of sentence is proper, in view of the limitations on sentencing
prescribed in Section 112(1)(a).”
[5] The learned magistrate has since responded for which the court is grateful. In response the trial magistrate, inter alia, points out that:
“... the sentence in my view [is] proper because it is not prejudicial to the accused... and I [am] of the view that the limited sentence in terms of section 112(1)(a) of Act 51/1977 is in any event superceded by the sentencing jurisdiction of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140/1992.”
[6] The learned magistrate further opines that the sentence is both proper and advantageous to the accused and it did not vitiate the proceedings at all.
[7] It is true that the practice of taking offences together for sentencing purposes is well-founded and generally advantageous to accused persons insofar as it avoids duplication of sentences and resultant undue harshness where, inter alia, justice demands that the offences be viewed as one transaction by imposing a composite or joint sentence. (See FOURIE v S [2001] 4 ALL SA 365 (SCA) at par. [20].)
[8] The aforegoing opinion by the trial magistrate, however, with respect, misses the point. The question is whether or not the trial court, in law, has the power to impose the sentence in question where it invokes the provisions of section 112(1)(a) of CPA. The view in question, further, with due respect, loses sight of the fact that, in law, the composite sentence imposed should be competent in respect of each of the offences involved when looked at individually. (See S v S 1981 (3) SA 377 (A) and S v HAYMAN 1988 (1) SA 831 (NC).)
[9] The trial magistrate correctly concedes that the invocation of section 112(1)(a) procedure limits the penal jurisdiction of the trial court and that the sentence imposed herein exceeds that limit.
[10] In the circumstances of the present matter where the severity of the sentence competent for dealing in drugs exceeds the penal jurisdiction of the court in respect of the offence of being an illegal foreigner, the proper approach, in my view, is that separate competent sentences be imposed in respect of each offence and the severity of their cumulative effect be tempered by making them to run concurrently, where appropriate, or by imposing a suspended sentence in respect of one of them. (See Kriegler and Kruger: Hiemstra’s Criminal Procedure at 28-41.)
[11] I am satisfied that the convictions are in accordance with justice but that the sentence imposed is, however, a nullity in law and falls to be corrected. (See S v NTULI 1975 (1) SA 429 (A) at 435 C.)
[12] ORDER:
For the aforegoing reasons the convictions are confirmed and the sentence of the trial court is set aside and in its place and stead is substituted the following:
“Charge 1: The accused is sentenced to R3 000,00 fine or 18 (eighteen) months imprisonment with a further 18 (eighteen) months imprisonment
suspended in whole for 4 (four) years on condition that the accused is not convicted of contravention of section 5(b) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act No 140/1992 committed during the period of suspension.
Charge 2: The accused is sentenced to a R500,00 (five hundred rand) fine or 10 (ten) days imprisonment which is suspended in whole for 3 (three) years on condition that the accused is not convicted of the contravention of section 49(1)(a) read with sections 1, 10, 25 and 26 of the Immigration Act No 13 of 2002.”
[13] The sentences are antedated to take effect from 1 August 2011.
_____
L.J. LEKALE, J
I concur.
____
J. J. MHLAMBI, AJ
/sp
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