S v Mohumi (CA 80/08) [2008] ZANWHC 40 (1 November 2008)
- Citation
- [2008] ZANWHC 40
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- North West High Court, Mafikeng
- Panel
- A M Kgoele, R D Hendricks
- Case number
- CA 80/08
More details
- Court
- North West High Court, Mafikeng
- Panel
- A M Kgoele, R D Hendricks
- Case number
- CA 80/08
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court found that the presiding officer's reference to Part III of Schedule 2 was a genuine error and did not reflect his intention, as the evidence supported a conviction under Part I. The mistake was only realized after a reasonable time had lapsed, making it impossible for the magistrate to correct it under section 176 of the Criminal Procedure Act. The court therefore set aside the original conviction and substituted it with a conviction under Part I of Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1977, and referred the matter back for sentencing.
Court disposition
Conviction under Part III of Schedule 2 set aside and substituted with conviction under Part I of Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1977; matter referred back for sentencing.
Orders
- The conviction of the accused of rape as referred to in Part III of Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1977 is set aside and substituted with a conviction of rape as referred to in Part I of Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1977.
- The matter is referred back to the trial court to determine a proper sentence for the accused.
02
Material facts
Parties
The State
ApplicantDichaba Mohumi
Respondent03
Procedural history
Posture
Criminal Review / Special Review After Conviction
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the conviction was correctly recorded under the appropriate part of Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1977.
- 02
Whether the presiding officer could amend the judgment after realizing the error.
- 03
Whether the error was a slip of the tongue or a substantive mistake.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The presiding Regional Court Magistrate submitted that he had made an error in pronouncing the conviction, finding the accused guilty of rape under Part III of Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1977, when the evidence supported a conviction under Part I. He explained that this was a slip of the tongue and that he intended to convict under Part I, as the complainant was under 16 and raped twice. He realized the mistake only when the trial resumed for sentencing and believed it was too late to correct it under section 176 of the Criminal Procedure Act.
- Respondent
- The accused did not make submissions on the review; the matter was referred by the presiding officer for correction of the error in the conviction.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Firestone SA Ltd v Gentiruco AG 1977 (4) SA 298 (A)
Once a judicial officer has given judgment, he is functus officio and cannot alter or revoke an order made.
- 02
S v Wandrag 1970 (2) SA 520 (O); R v Mthembu 1959 (1) SA 129 (N)
Section 176 of the Criminal Procedure Act allows for amendment of judgments in prescribed circumstances, specifically where the mistake does not relate to the merits and is inherent in the judgment.
- 03
R v Armoed 1936 EDL 214
A mistake may be amended if the judicial officer says something different to what he intended or passes an incompetent sentence, provided the mistake is realized within a reasonable time.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court found that the presiding officer's reference to Part III of Schedule 2 was a genuine error and did not reflect his intention, as the evidence supported a conviction under Part I. The mistake was only realized after a reasonable time had lapsed, making it impossible for the magistrate to correct it under section 176 of the Criminal Procedure Act. The court therefore set aside the original conviction and substituted it with a conviction under Part I of Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1977, and referred the matter back for sentencing.
Obiter and limits
- The functus officio principle generally prevents a judicial officer from altering a judgment once delivered, except in limited circumstances as provided by statute.
- What constitutes a reasonable time for correction of a judicial error depends on the facts of each case.
Court disposition
Conviction under Part III of Schedule 2 set aside and substituted with conviction under Part I of Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1977; matter referred back for sentencing.
- The conviction of the accused of rape as referred to in Part III of Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1977 is set aside and substituted with a conviction of rape as referred to in Part I of Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1977.
- The matter is referred back to the trial court to determine a proper sentence for the accused.
Source and reliance status
North West High Court, Mafikeng
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
North West High Court, Mafikeng
Judgment
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA BOPHUTHATSWANA PROVINCIAL DIVISION
CA 80:08
In the matter between:
THE
STATE
and
DICHABA
MOHUMI
REVIEW
JUDGMENT
KGOELEAJ:
[1] This matter came before me on special review. The presiding Regional Court Magistrate asked this court to set aside the conviction he had pronounced in this matter because of the error he made.
[2] The accused in this matter was charged with rape read with the provisions of section 51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1977 in that he raped a 12 year old child.
[3] The presiding officer however submitted in his reasons for sending the matter on review that the evidence tendered by the State proved that the rape committed is an offence referred to in Part I of Schedule 2 of the said Act because the complainant was by then a girl under the age of 16 years old and she was raped twice. He further indicated that he had made that finding in his judgment, but that when he gave the verdict he inadvertently found the accused guilty of rape which is referred to in Part III of Schedule 2 of Act 105 of 1977.
[4] He maintained that the reference to Part III of Schedule 2 of Act 105 of 1977 which he made when he was trying to explain what he meant by "guilty as charge" in his judgment was a mere slip of the tongue as he intended to say "Part I" of Schedule 2 of Act 105 of 1977. He realised this mistake some time later when the trial resumed for arguments in respect of sentence. He further
conceded that at the time he realised this mistake he was of the view that it was too late for him to correct his mistake as provided for in sec 176 of the Criminal Procedure Act.
[5] The general principle is that once a judicial officer has given judgment he is functus officio and it follows that he cannot alter or revoke an order that he might have made. (Firestone SA Ltd v Gentiruco AG 1977 (4) SA 298 (A)
[6] section 176, however, allows for amendment of judgments in prescribed circumstances. The section can only be invoked were there is a mistake inherent in the judgment which does not relate to the merits (S v Wandrag 1970 (2) SA 520 (O); R v Mthembu 1959 (1) SA 129 (N). The mistake must either consist of the judicial officer saying something different to what he intended or where he had passed an incompetent sentence (R v Armoed 1936 EDL 214). The realisation of the mistake must also occur within a reasonable time. What is reasonable depends on the circumstances of a particular
matter.
[7] Having considered the explanation given by the presiding officer and having read the record of proceedings, I am satisfied that, the verdict that was pronounced by the presiding officer was erroneously meted out and does not reflect what the presiding officer intended. I am also of the view that in the circumstances of this case, a reasonable time has lapsed before the mistake could be detected and therefore agree with the presiding Magistrate that it became impossible for him to correct his mistake as provided by section 176 of the Criminal Procedure Act.
[8] Consequently the following order is made:
1. The conviction of the accused of rape as referred to in Part III ofSchedule 2 to Act 105 of 1997 as pronounced by the court a quo is setaside and is substituted by the following:
"Accused is found guilty of rape as referred to in Part I of Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1997."
2. The matter is referred back to the trial court to proceed with thedetermination of a proper sentence for the accused.
A
M KGOELE
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT I agree
R
D HENDRICKS
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
A
M KGOELE
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
I agree
R
D HENDRICKS
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
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