Download PDF

South Africa Judgment

North West High Court, Mafikeng

S v Mohumi (CA 80/08) [2008] ZANWHC 40 (1 November 2008)

On this page

Professional case brief

Research organized from the available case record

Source document

01

Holding and result

The court found that the presiding officer's reference to Part III of Schedule 2 was a genuine error and did not reflect his intention, as the evidence supported a conviction under Part I. The mistake was only realized after a reasonable time had lapsed, making it impossible for the magistrate to correct it under section 176 of the Criminal Procedure Act. The court therefore set aside the original conviction and substituted it with a conviction under Part I of Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1977, and referred the matter back for sentencing.

Court disposition

Conviction under Part III of Schedule 2 set aside and substituted with conviction under Part I of Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1977; matter referred back for sentencing.

Orders

  • The conviction of the accused of rape as referred to in Part III of Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1977 is set aside and substituted with a conviction of rape as referred to in Part I of Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1977.
  • The matter is referred back to the trial court to determine a proper sentence for the accused.

02

Material facts

Parties

The State

Applicant

Dichaba Mohumi

Respondent

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Criminal Review / Special Review After Conviction

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
The presiding Regional Court Magistrate submitted that he had made an error in pronouncing the conviction, finding the accused guilty of rape under Part III of Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1977, when the evidence supported a conviction under Part I. He explained that this was a slip of the tongue and that he intended to convict under Part I, as the complainant was under 16 and raped twice. He realized the mistake only when the trial resumed for sentencing and believed it was too late to correct it under section 176 of the Criminal Procedure Act.
Respondent
The accused did not make submissions on the review; the matter was referred by the presiding officer for correction of the error in the conviction.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Firestone SA Ltd v Gentiruco AG 1977 (4) SA 298 (A)

    Once a judicial officer has given judgment, he is functus officio and cannot alter or revoke an order made.

  2. 02

    S v Wandrag 1970 (2) SA 520 (O); R v Mthembu 1959 (1) SA 129 (N)

    Section 176 of the Criminal Procedure Act allows for amendment of judgments in prescribed circumstances, specifically where the mistake does not relate to the merits and is inherent in the judgment.

  3. 03

    R v Armoed 1936 EDL 214

    A mistake may be amended if the judicial officer says something different to what he intended or passes an incompetent sentence, provided the mistake is realized within a reasonable time.

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

The court found that the presiding officer's reference to Part III of Schedule 2 was a genuine error and did not reflect his intention, as the evidence supported a conviction under Part I. The mistake was only realized after a reasonable time had lapsed, making it impossible for the magistrate to correct it under section 176 of the Criminal Procedure Act. The court therefore set aside the original conviction and substituted it with a conviction under Part I of Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1977, and referred the matter back for sentencing.

Obiter and limits

  • The functus officio principle generally prevents a judicial officer from altering a judgment once delivered, except in limited circumstances as provided by statute.
  • What constitutes a reasonable time for correction of a judicial error depends on the facts of each case.

Court disposition

Conviction under Part III of Schedule 2 set aside and substituted with conviction under Part I of Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1977; matter referred back for sentencing.

  • The conviction of the accused of rape as referred to in Part III of Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1977 is set aside and substituted with a conviction of rape as referred to in Part I of Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1977.
  • The matter is referred back to the trial court to determine a proper sentence for the accused.

Source and reliance status

North West High Court, Mafikeng

This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.

Judgment reading view

Judgment text

The complete available source text.

Source document

North West High Court, Mafikeng

Judgment

[2008] ZANWHC 40

IN

THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA BOPHUTHATSWANA PROVINCIAL DIVISION

CA 80:08

In the matter between:

THE

STATE

and

DICHABA

MOHUMI

REVIEW

JUDGMENT

KGOELEAJ:

[1] This matter came before me on special review. The presiding Regional Court Magistrate asked this court to set aside the conviction he had pronounced in this matter because of the error he made.

[2] The accused in this matter was charged with rape read with the provisions of section 51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1977 in that he raped a 12 year old child.

[3] The presiding officer however submitted in his reasons for sending the matter on review that the evidence tendered by the State proved that the rape committed is an offence referred to in Part I of Schedule 2 of the said Act because the complainant was by then a girl under the age of 16 years old and she was raped twice. He further indicated that he had made that finding in his judgment, but that when he gave the verdict he inadvertently found the accused guilty of rape which is referred to in Part III of Schedule 2 of Act 105 of 1977.

[4] He maintained that the reference to Part III of Schedule 2 of Act 105 of 1977 which he made when he was trying to explain what he meant by "guilty as charge" in his judgment was a mere slip of the tongue as he intended to say "Part I" of Schedule 2 of Act 105 of 1977. He realised this mistake some time later when the trial resumed for arguments in respect of sentence. He further

conceded that at the time he realised this mistake he was of the view that it was too late for him to correct his mistake as provided for in sec 176 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

[5] The general principle is that once a judicial officer has given judgment he is functus officio and it follows that he cannot alter or revoke an order that he might have made. (Firestone SA Ltd v Gentiruco AG 1977 (4) SA 298 (A)

[6] section 176, however, allows for amendment of judgments in prescribed circumstances. The section can only be invoked were there is a mistake inherent in the judgment which does not relate to the merits (S v Wandrag 1970 (2) SA 520 (O); R v Mthembu 1959 (1) SA 129 (N). The mistake must either consist of the judicial officer saying something different to what he intended or where he had passed an incompetent sentence (R v Armoed 1936 EDL 214). The realisation of the mistake must also occur within a reasonable time. What is reasonable depends on the circumstances of a particular

matter.

[7] Having considered the explanation given by the presiding officer and having read the record of proceedings, I am satisfied that, the verdict that was pronounced by the presiding officer was erroneously meted out and does not reflect what the presiding officer intended. I am also of the view that in the circumstances of this case, a reasonable time has lapsed before the mistake could be detected and therefore agree with the presiding Magistrate that it became impossible for him to correct his mistake as provided by section 176 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

[8] Consequently the following order is made:

1. The conviction of the accused of rape as referred to in Part III ofSchedule 2 to Act 105 of 1997 as pronounced by the court a quo is setaside and is substituted by the following:

"Accused is found guilty of rape as referred to in Part I of Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1997."

2. The matter is referred back to the trial court to proceed with thedetermination of a proper sentence for the accused.

A

M KGOELE

ACTING

JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT I agree

R

D HENDRICKS

JUDGE

OF THE HIGH COURT

A

M KGOELE

ACTING

JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

I agree

R

D HENDRICKS

JUDGE

OF THE HIGH COURT

Source wording is retained. Consult the source document for its original formatting and pagination.

Authorities

Authorities used by the court

Cases, legislation, regulations, and constitutional provisions identified in the available record.

Firestone SA Ltd v Gentiruco AG 1977 (4) SA 298 (A)

Case cited

S v Wandrag 1970 (2) SA 520 (O)

Case cited

R v Mthembu 1959 (1) SA 129 (N)

Case cited

R v Armoed 1936 EDL 214

Case cited

Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1977

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

Criminal Procedure Act

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

Case-aware research

Ask AI about this case

The judgment and available research above are public. New questions open in a separate private conversation grounded in this case.

About this LexChat collection

This page organizes the available case record for research. Verify quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the source document. Corrections can be reported to hello@esheria.ai.

Legal information, not legal advice. Research summaries do not replace the judgment.