S v Phelane (16/2001) [2001] ZANWHC 18 (3 April 2001)
- Citation
- [2001] ZANWHC 18
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- North West High Court, Mafikeng
- Panel
- MTR Mogoeng
- Case number
- 16/2001
More details
- Court
- North West High Court, Mafikeng
- Panel
- MTR Mogoeng
- Case number
- 16/2001
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The conviction and sentence were set aside because the accused was not informed of his rights after the State closed its case, specifically his right against self-incrimination and his right to apply for discharge under section 174. The State led no evidence, and the accused's admissions did not amount to an admission of guilt for negligent driving. The magistrate should have discharged the accused mero motu at the close of the State's case. The failure to do so constituted a gross irregularity, rendering the conviction and sentence invalid.
Court disposition
Conviction and sentence set aside.
Orders
- The conviction and sentence imposed on the accused are set aside.
02
Material facts
Parties
The State
ApplicantKaizer Phelane @ Nono
Respondent03
Procedural history
Posture
Review Application / Review of Conviction and Sentence After Magistrate's Referral
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the accused's conviction for negligent driving was lawful given procedural irregularities.
- 02
Whether failure to explain the accused's rights after closure of the State's case constituted a gross irregularity.
- 03
Whether the accused's admissions amounted to an admission of guilt for negligent driving.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The State closed its case without leading any evidence. The accused was not informed of his rights, including the right against self-incrimination and the right to apply for discharge under section 174. The accused's admissions did not amount to an admission of guilt for negligent driving.
- Respondent
- The accused admitted to consuming alcohol but denied that his ability to drive was impaired or that he was responsible for the accident. He did not accept responsibility for the collision and suggested the other driver was at fault.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Section 174, Criminal Procedure Act
An accused must be informed of his rights after the State closes its case, including the right against self-incrimination and the right to apply for discharge under section 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act.
- 02
S v Lubaxa 2001 (2) SACR 703 (SCA)
A conviction cannot stand where there has been a gross procedural irregularity, especially where the accused's rights have not been explained and no evidence has been led by the State.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The conviction and sentence were set aside because the accused was not informed of his rights after the State closed its case, specifically his right against self-incrimination and his right to apply for discharge under section 174. The State led no evidence, and the accused's admissions did not amount to an admission of guilt for negligent driving. The magistrate should have discharged the accused mero motu at the close of the State's case. The failure to do so constituted a gross irregularity, rendering the conviction and sentence invalid.
Obiter and limits
- The accused's response 'Collision occurred' was unintelligible and did not constitute an admission of guilt.
- The magistrate's failure to discharge the accused at the close of the State's case was a serious procedural error.
Court disposition
Conviction and sentence set aside.
- The conviction and sentence imposed on the accused are set aside.
Source and reliance status
North West High Court, Mafikeng
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
North West High Court, Mafikeng
Judgment
CA NO. 16/2001
IN THE
HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(BOPHUTHATSWANA PROVINCIAL DIVISION)
In the matter between:
THE STATE
and
KAIZER PHELANE @ NONO
_______________
REVIEW
JUDGMENT
MOGOENG J.
[1] The accused in this matter was convicted of negligent driving. A wholly suspended sentence was then imposed on him.
[2] The presiding Magistrate subsequently realised that he had convicted and sentenced the accused in circumstances where he should not have done so. As a result when he sent the record for review he attached an explanatory letter alerting me to the âfatal errorâ, as he put it, and how it came about.
[3] The accused appeared before Court on 08 August 2000. He pleaded guilty. He was then questioned in terms of s 112(1)(b) but did not admit all the elements of the offence. His plea of guilty was then corrected to that of not guilty in terms of s 113. The matter was then postponed. [4] On 16 January 2001 the case proceeded before another Magistrate in terms of s 118. The Prosecutor was also not the same Prosecutor who handled the case on 08 August 2000. The State then closed its case without leading any evidence whatsoever. Instead of explaining the accusedâs rights after the closure of the State case or discharging the accused in terms of s 174, the Court allowed him to testify. His entire evidence is as set out below: âAccused D.U.O: I admit that I consumed liquor while driving CGV 492 NW on Station road, Mmabatho, on 11 December 1999. I drunk [sic] two dumpies of Hansa beer. Do you admit acting wrongfully Yes Is it your fault that the collision occurred? Collision occurred. COURT: The Court finds you guilty of negligent driving.â
[3] The accused appeared before Court on 08 August 2000. He pleaded guilty. He was then questioned in terms of s 112(1)(b) but did not admit all the elements of the offence. His plea of guilty was then corrected to that of not guilty in terms of s 113. The matter was then postponed.
[4] On 16 January 2001 the case proceeded before another Magistrate in terms of s 118. The Prosecutor was also not the same Prosecutor who handled the case on 08 August 2000. The State then closed its case without leading any evidence whatsoever. Instead of explaining the accusedâs rights after the closure of the State case or discharging the accused in terms of s 174, the Court allowed him to testify. His entire evidence is as set out below:
âAccused D.U.O:
I admit that I consumed liquor while driving CGV 492 NW on Station road, Mmabatho, on 11 December 1999. I drunk [sic] two dumpies of Hansa beer.
Do you admit acting wrongfully
Yes
Is it your fault that the collision occurred?
Collision occurred.
COURT: The Court finds you guilty of negligent driving.â
[5] The failure to explain to this unrepresented accused his rights after the State had closed its case, in particular his right against self-incrimination and the right to apply for a discharge in terms of s 174, is in itself a gross irregularity which justifies the setting aside of the conviction and sentence. The accused had only admitted that he had consumed two 340 ml dumpies of Hansa beer more than two hours before the accident took place. He denied that his power of observation or ability to drive properly was affected by the beer. He did not accept any responsibility for the accident that apparently took place. In fact he seemed to be blaming the high speed at which the other driver was driving for the accident. The learned Magistrate should, therefore, have discharged the accused mero motu at the close of the State case. [6] His testimony, after the State case was closed, did not take the State case any further. It is not clear from his admission that he acted âwrongfullyâ whether the wrongfulness relates to the consumption of liquor or that the accident occurred as a result of his negligence. Even when he was asked whether it was his fault that the accident occurred, his response was âCollision occurred.â This unintelligible response is not an admission of guilt. He should therefore have been found not guilty and discharged. [7] In the result the conviction and sentence are set aside. M.T.R.
MOGOENG
JUDGE OF
THE HIGH COURT DATED: 03 APRIL 2001
[5] The failure to explain to this unrepresented accused his rights after the State had closed its case, in particular his right against self-incrimination and the right to apply for a discharge in terms of s 174, is in itself a gross irregularity which justifies the setting aside of the conviction and sentence. The accused had only admitted that he had consumed two 340 ml dumpies of Hansa beer more than two hours before the accident took place. He denied that his power of observation or ability to drive properly was affected by the beer. He did not accept any responsibility for the accident that apparently took place. In fact he seemed to be blaming the high speed at which the other driver was driving for the accident. The learned Magistrate should, therefore, have discharged the accused mero motu at the close of the State case.
[6] His testimony, after the State case was closed, did not take the State case any further. It is not clear from his admission that he acted âwrongfullyâ whether the wrongfulness relates to the consumption of liquor or that the accident occurred as a result of his negligence. Even when he was asked whether it was his fault that the accident occurred, his response was âCollision occurred.â This unintelligible response is not an admission of guilt. He should therefore have been found not guilty and discharged.
[7] In the result the conviction and sentence are set aside.
M.T.R.
MOGOENG
JUDGE OF
THE HIGH COURT
DATED: 03 APRIL 2001
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