Secotrade 72 (Pty) Ltd and Another and Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd (46/LM/Apr00) [2000] ZACT 27 (27 June 2000)
- Citation
- [2000] ZACT 27
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- Competition Tribunal
- Panel
- D.H Lewis, N.M. Manoim, P.E. Maponya
- Case number
- 46/LM/Apr00
More details
- Court
- Competition Tribunal
- Panel
- D.H Lewis, N.M. Manoim, P.E. Maponya
- Case number
- 46/LM/Apr00
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The Tribunal found that the merger would not substantially prevent or lessen competition in any of the relevant markets. Imperial's post-merger market share in passenger vehicles would increase only marginally from 6% to 7%, remaining significantly lower than its main competitors. The retail and after-sales markets are fragmented, and the estimated market shares do not indicate any competition concerns. The Tribunal also noted that the exclusive distribution agreement for three years had not been provided, and its approval of the merger does not extend to approval of that agreement. The transaction was approved without conditions.
Court disposition
Merger approved without conditions.
Orders
- The merger between Secotrade 72 (Pty) Ltd and Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd is approved without conditions.
- This approval does not extend to the exclusive distribution agreement, which was not submitted to the Tribunal.
02
Material facts
Parties
Secotrade 72 (Pty) Ltd
ApplicantImperial Holdings Ltd
ApplicantHyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd
RespondentAmounts and remedies
- Imperial Market Share Post Merger (passenger Vehicles): 7
- Imperial Market Share Post Merger (retail Distribution): 11.1
- Imperial Market Share Post Merger (spare Parts and Accessories): 6.7
03
Procedural history
Posture
Large Merger / Merger Approval
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the proposed merger would substantially prevent or lessen competition in the relevant markets.
- 02
Whether the exclusive distribution agreement raises competition concerns.
- 03
Whether the change in market share post-merger is significant enough to affect competition.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- Secotrade and Imperial argued that the acquisition of Hyundai's assets would not result in a substantial lessening of competition. They emphasized that Imperial's post-merger market share in passenger vehicles would remain below 7%, significantly less than competitors such as Volkswagen and Toyota. They also noted that the retail and after-sales markets are highly fragmented, and the change in market share is negligible. The parties contended that inter-brand competition would be enhanced and no effective competitor would exit the market.
- Respondent
- Hyundai Motor Distributors, being under provisional liquidation, did not oppose the merger. The liquidators confirmed that several buyers were approached, but Imperial was the preferred bidder. No substantive arguments were advanced against the merger, and no evidence was presented to suggest that the transaction would harm competition.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Competition Act, 89 of 1998
A merger may only be prohibited if it is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition in any relevant market.
- 02
Competition Tribunal Guidelines
Market share analysis is a key factor in assessing the competitive effects of a merger.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The Tribunal found that the merger would not substantially prevent or lessen competition in any of the relevant markets. Imperial's post-merger market share in passenger vehicles would increase only marginally from 6% to 7%, remaining significantly lower than its main competitors. The retail and after-sales markets are fragmented, and the estimated market shares do not indicate any competition concerns. The Tribunal also noted that the exclusive distribution agreement for three years had not been provided, and its approval of the merger does not extend to approval of that agreement. The transaction was approved without conditions.
Obiter and limits
- The Tribunal points out that approval of the merger does not imply approval of the exclusive distribution agreement, as the agreement was not submitted for review.
- Inter-brand competition in the passenger vehicle market is likely to be enhanced as a result of the merger.
Court disposition
Merger approved without conditions.
- The merger between Secotrade 72 (Pty) Ltd and Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd is approved without conditions.
- This approval does not extend to the exclusive distribution agreement, which was not submitted to the Tribunal.
Source and reliance status
Competition Tribunal
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Competition Tribunal
Judgment
COMPETITION
TRIBUNAL
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case Number: 46/LM/Apr00
In the large merger between
Secotrade 72 (Pty) Ltd and
Imperial Holdings Ltd
and
Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd
Reasons for the Competition Tribunalâs Decision
Approval
The Competition Tribunal issued a Merger Clearance Certificate on 1 June 2000 approving the merger between Secotrade 72 (Pty) Ltd and Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd without conditions. The reasons for our decision to approve the merger are set out below.
The merger transaction
Secotrade will acquire the assets of Hyundai, which has been placed under provisional liquidation since 11 January 2000.
Secotrade will have an exclusive contract to import and distribute Hyundai vehicles, parts and accessories in South Africa. It will buy assets from Hyundai that will, inter alia, include passenger cars and light commercial vehicles, parts and accessories, and assets of preferred dealerships.
Background
The Motor Company of Botswana manufactured passenger cars and light commercial vehicles in Botswana. Hyundai distributed the vehicles in South Africa, which were sold through its own dealership network at retail level. Hyundai was placed under provisional liquidation on 11 January 2000. The liquidators have confirmed by means of an affidavit that several buyers were approached by the consortium. Imperial, however, was the preferred bidder.
Associated Motor Holdings (Pty) Ltd controls 80% of Secotrade and Imperial Holdings Ltd in turn controls 90% of Associated Motor Holdings.
The Imperial Group, inter alia, imports Renault, Kia and Daihatsu passenger vehicles into South Africa. The companies involved in the importing of passenger vehicles are Imperial Car Imports (Pty) Ltd, Kia Motors South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Imperial Daihatsu (Pty) Ltd. The Group owns its own dealerships and also distributes passenger cars to independently owned dealers that sell and service passenger cars.
Evaluating the merger
Three relevant markets are involved namely the market for passenger vehicles, the market for retail distribution of passenger vehicles and the market for spare parts and services.
Imperialâs market share in the passenger vehicle market (post merger) is less than 7%, which is much smaller than the market shares of its main competitors Volkswagen (22%), Toyota (21%) and Samcor (12%).
The parties could not provide market shares for the retail distribution of passenger vehicles market, due to the size and nature of the retail sector. Imperial competes with McCarthy Motor Holdings, Barlow Motor Holdings, Supergroup, Unitrans and Combined Motor Holdings, which are all major players. Imperial estimates its market share (post merger) at 11,1%.
With regard to the after sales market in spare parts and accessories Imperial estimates its market share to be 6,7% post merger. The parties could not provide market shares for this market because it is fragmented and diversified. However, they estimate that Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMâs) hold approximately 60% of the business in their specific franchise and imports, both genuine and generic, holds 40%.
The Tribunal is satisfied that the change in Imperialâs total market share is negligible, from 6% to 7% post merger, and does not create competition concerns. Moreover an effective competitor will not exit the market and inter-brand competition will be enhanced.
We wish to point out that although we have been informed, at the hearing, that an exclusive distribution agreement for three years was negotiated, the Tribunal has not received a copy of it. Approval of the transaction, therefore, does not necessarily mean that we approve the exclusive distribution agreement.
D.H LEWIS 27 June 2000
Concurring: N.M. Manoim and P.E. Maponya
Case-aware research
Ask AI about this case
The judgment and available research above are public. New questions open in a separate private conversation grounded in this case.