Seleka and Others v Minister of Police and Others (288/2013) [2014] ZAGPJHC 417; 2015 (4) SA 376 (LP) (8 December 2014)

Seleka and Others v Minister of Police and Others (288/2013) [2014] ZAGPJHC 417; 2015 (4) SA 376 (LP) (8 December 2014)

The court held that neither a letter of demand nor a statutory notice in terms of section 3 of Act 40 of 2002 constitutes a 'process' as contemplated by section 15(1) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. These documents do not commence legal proceedings and therefore do not interrupt prescription. The court reasoned...

Source-derived case information.

Citation
[2014] ZAGPJHC 417
Parties
Plaintiff: Phillemon Seleka; Plaintiff: Diamond Nginenda; Plaintiff: Tshepo Klaas Baloyi; Defendant: Minister of Police; Defendant: Ngwako Kgomo; Defendant: Paulos Shika
Court
South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
Jurisdiction
South Africa
Judgment Date
8 December 2014
Case Number
288/2013
Procedural Posture
Civil Trial / Special Plea of Prescription
Outcome
The special plea of prescription is upheld; the plaintiffs' claims have prescribed.
Judges
Makgoba
Legal Topics
Prescription Act, Interruption of Prescription, Letters of Demand, Section 3 Notice, Institution of Legal Proceedings
Civil Procedure Prescription Act Interruption of Prescription Letters of Demand Section 3 Notice Institution of Legal Proceedings

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Summary, issues, holding and outcome

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Parties

Phillemon Seleka

Plaintiff

Diamond Nginenda

Plaintiff

Tshepo Klaas Baloyi

Plaintiff

Minister of Police

Defendant

Ngwako Kgomo

Defendant

Paulos Shika

Defendant

Procedural Posture

Civil Trial / Special Plea of Prescription

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether service of a letter of demand and/or a notice in terms of section 3 of the Institution of Legal Proceedings against Certain Organs of State Act 40 of 2002 constitutes a process as contemplated in section 15(1) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969.
  2. 2 Whether the service of such notices and letters of demand interrupts prescription under section 15(1) and (2) of the Prescription Act.

Ratio Decidendi

The court held that neither a letter of demand nor a statutory notice in terms of section 3 of Act 40 of 2002 constitutes a 'process' as contemplated by section 15(1) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. These documents do not commence legal proceedings and therefore do not interrupt prescription. The court reasoned that section 15(6) lists documents regarded as 'process', all of which are documents whereby legal proceedings are commenced. The letter of demand and section 3 notice are preparatory and do not formally involve the debtor in court proceedings for enforcement of the claim. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' actions were instituted after the prescription period had expired and were...

Court Disposition

The special plea of prescription is upheld; the plaintiffs' claims have prescribed.

Orders

  • The special plea of prescription is upheld.
  • The plaintiffs' claims are dismissed with costs.