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South Africa Judgment

Competition Tribunal

Silicon Technology (Pty) Ltd and Calcium Carbide Division of Sentrachem Limited (63/LM/Sep02) [2003] ZACT 3 (15 January 2003)

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Source document

01

Holding and result

The Tribunal found that there is no product overlap between the merging parties, as the products produced by the acquirer and the target businesses are not substitutable and do not compete in the same market. The transaction does give rise to vertical integration, since the target company consumes anthracite in its production process and the acquiring group produces anthracite. However, the target’s purchases from the acquiring group constitute less than 1% of the total anthracite market, and the target requires a particular blend of anthracite that cannot be supplied solely by the acquiring group. Therefore, foreclosure of the anthracite market is unlikely. The Tribunal also found that the transaction would not negatively impact employment or raise any public interest concerns. Accordingly, the merger will not lead to a substantial lessening of competition and is approved unconditionally.

Court disposition

Merger approved unconditionally.

Orders

  • The merger between Silicon Technology (Pty) Ltd and Sentrachem Limited in respect of the Calcium Carbide Division is approved unconditionally.
  • No conditions are imposed on the approval.

02

Material facts

Parties

Silicon Technology (Pty) Ltd

Applicant Counsel: Werksmans

Calcium Carbide Division of Sentrachem Limited

Respondent Counsel: Bell Dewar & Hall Inc.

Amounts and remedies

  • Target Company Anthracite Purchases From Acquiring Group (market Share): ZAR 1
  • Calcium Carbide Sales as Desulphuriser (percentage of Turnover): ZAR 50

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Large Merger / Approval

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
The applicant argued that there is no product overlap between the merging parties, as the products produced by the acquirer and the target businesses are not substitutable and do not compete in the same market. The applicant further submitted that although the transaction gives rise to vertical integration, the target company’s purchases from the acquiring group constitute less than 1% of the total anthracite market, and the target requires a specific blend of anthracite that cannot be supplied solely by the acquiring group, making foreclosure unlikely. The applicant also contended that the transaction would not negatively impact employment.
Respondent
The respondent concurred that the products are not substitutable and that the only vertical relationship arises from the target’s purchase of anthracite from the acquiring group, which is minimal in the context of the overall market. The respondent emphasized that the target’s anthracite requirements are determined by specific product properties, and that the transaction would not result in any anti-competitive effects or public interest concerns.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Competition Act, 89 of 1998

    A merger will not be prohibited unless it is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition in any market.

  2. 02

    Competition Tribunal precedent

    Vertical integration is only problematic where it leads to foreclosure of the market to competitors.

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

The Tribunal found that there is no product overlap between the merging parties, as the products produced by the acquirer and the target businesses are not substitutable and do not compete in the same market. The transaction does give rise to vertical integration, since the target company consumes anthracite in its production process and the acquiring group produces anthracite. However, the target’s purchases from the acquiring group constitute less than 1% of the total anthracite market, and the target requires a particular blend of anthracite that cannot be supplied solely by the acquiring group. Therefore, foreclosure of the anthracite market is unlikely. The Tribunal also found that the transaction would not negatively impact employment or raise any public interest concerns. Accordingly, the merger will not lead to a substantial lessening of competition and is approved unconditionally.

Obiter and limits

  • The Tribunal noted that Sentrachem is disposing of all its non-core businesses, which is the rationale for the transaction.
  • The only customer for acetylene carbon black in South Africa is Gillette, and the supply contract is subject to annual price negotiation.

Court disposition

Merger approved unconditionally.

  • The merger between Silicon Technology (Pty) Ltd and Sentrachem Limited in respect of the Calcium Carbide Division is approved unconditionally.
  • No conditions are imposed on the approval.

Source and reliance status

Competition Tribunal

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Judgment text

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Source document

Competition Tribunal

Judgment

[2003] ZACT 3

COMPETITION TRIBUNAL

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Case No: 63/LM/Sep02

In the large merger between:

Silicon Technology (Pty) Ltd

and

Calcium Carbide Division of Sentrachem Limited

_______________

Reasons for Decision

Approval

On 6 November 2002 we unconditionally approved the merger between Silicon Technology (Pty) Ltd and Sentrachem Limited in respect of Sentrachem Limited’s Calcium Carbide Division. The reasons for our decision follow.

The transaction

This transaction entails an acquisition by Silicon Technology (“Siltech”) of certain businesses from Sentrachem Limited (“Sentrachem”). Siltech will acquire the acetylene carbon black and calcium carbide businesses of Sentrachem as going concerns. The sale constitutes one indivisible transaction.

The primary acquiring firm is Siltech, a private company subsidiary of Lion Invest AG, ultimately controlled by Glencore International AG.

The primary target firms are the businesses of Sentrachem, a subsidiary of the Dow Chemical Company.

Sentrachem is disposing of all its non-core businesses hence this transaction.

Evaluating the merger

Siltech produces “75% Ferrosilicon”, an alloy of iron and silicon, as well as its by-products, ferrosilicon slag and silica fume. However, its parent company, Glencore, is widely involved in the mining, smelting, refining and processing of metals and minerals. In South Africa, Glencore also produces anthracite.

Sentrachem is the only producer of calcium carbide in South Africa. Calcium carbide is manufactured from anthracite, pitch coke, metallurgical coke, lime dolomite and electricity. It is used extensively as a desulphuriser in the steel and metallurgical industry, in the manufacture of calcium cyanide and acetylene for the welding and cutting industries. The sale of calcium carbide as a desulphuriser constitutes approximately 50% of the turnover of this part of the target business.

Sentrachem’s acetylene carbon black business uses calcium carbide to produce high purity elemental acetylene carbon black (“ACB”). ACB is distinguishable from the carbon black, which is used in manufacture of automobile tyres. At the hearing the parties submitted that ACB is currently not imported and the only customer for ACB in South Africa is Gillette, which manufactures zinc carbide batteries. Sentrachem has an evergreen supply contract with Gillette, which is subject to annual price negotiation.

It is clear that the products produced by the acquirer and those produced by the target businesses are not substitutable and do not compete in the same market. Although there is no product overlap between the merging parties, the transaction does give rise to vertical integration since the target company consumes anthracite in its production process and the acquiring group produces anthracite. In fact, the target purchases 50% of its anthracite requirements from the acquiring group and the remaining part thereof from the Ingwe Coal Group.

However, the target company’s purchases from the acquiring group constitute less than 1% of the total market. Furthermore, the extent of this vertical integration is substantially diluted by the fact that the target company’s purchase of anthracite is determined by the actual properties of the anthracite that is required. Thus foreclosure of this market is unlikely because the target requires a particular blend of anthracite that the acquiring group, by itself, cannot provide.

Public interest concerns

The transaction will not impact negatively on employment.

Conclusion

We conclude that the merger will not lead to a substantial lessening of competition. The Tribunal therefore approves the transaction unconditionally. There are no public interest concerns, which would alter this conclusion.

15 January 2003

N. Manoim Date

Concurring: F. Fourie, M. Holden

For the acquiring firm: Werksmans

For the target firm: Bell Dewar & Hall Inc.

For the Commission: J. Mokwana, Legal Services Division, Competition Commission

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Authorities

Authorities used by the court

Cases, legislation, regulations, and constitutional provisions identified in the available record.

Competition Act, 89 of 1998

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

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