South African Legal Practice Council v Nieuwoudt and Another (58531/19) [2020] ZAGPPHC 769 (30 November 2020)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA

Case number 58531/19

REPORTABLE:NO

OF INTEREST OF OTHER JUDGES:NO

REVISED

DATE: 24/11/2020

In the matter between :

SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL

Applicant

and;

ZUZETTE DIPPENAAR NIEUWOUDT

First respondent

PAUL ANDREW SPECTOR

Second respondent

JUDGMENT

Moritz AJ;

1. This is an application by the South African Legal Practice Council, for the suspension from legal practice of two attorneys. Ancillary relief is also claimed, the objective of which is to enable the applicant to take control of the trust accounts, accounting records, files and practices of the respondents.

2. The applicant is the entity enjoined to exercise control over legal practitioners in terms of the Legal Practice Act, 28 of 2014 ('the LPA").

3. The first respondent was admitted as an attorney in July 2013. The two respondents had practised together as partners in a firm for a brief period - from July 2015 until September 2017. For about two years before that, the first respondent was employed by the second respondent, who had practised on his own since about 2004.

4. After the respondents had dissolved their partnership in September 2017, the first respondent continued to practise on her own and still does , while the second respondent continued to practise until 10 May 2018, when he ceased practising altogether.

5. This application was brought mainly because both the respondents had failed to submit audit reports in respect of their trust account s, as were required by the Rules for the Attorneys' Profession promulgated under the Attorneys' Act of 1979 and now under the LPA.

Consequently, neither of the respondents had been issued with Fidelity Fund Certificates from 1 January 2018 but they nevertheless

continued to practise in contravention of the Attorneys Act, of 1979

which was in force until 31 October 2018 and thereafter of consonant · provisions of the LPA.

6. During 2018, both respondents had been summoned to appear before a disciplinary committee of the (then) Law Society, on charges of unprofessional and dishonourable conduct, for failing to furnish the 2017 audit reports. Both failed to appear.

7. Both respondents were subsequently also summoned to appear before a disciplinary committee for their respective failures to submit audit reports for the 2018 year. Again, they both failed to appear. The first respondent was convicted in her absence and a fine of R13,000.00 was imposed.

8. The first respondent's explanation for all this is that, about September 2016 (when the respondents were still practising in partnership) she had appointed one Ms Jantjies as "financial officer" in the practice, whose duties included drafting of accounts, receipt of payments and deposits, maintaining financial records and liaison with the Law Society on matters concerning it. When the first and second respondents parted ways, Jantjies apparently continued to be employed as the first respondent's "financial officer". However, Jantjies did in fact not submit audit reports. She allegedly deceived the first respondent to believe that trust audits had been performed by an auditor, the audit reports had been submitted to the Law Society and that Fidelity Fund Certificates had been issued by the Law Society and later the applicant. Jantjies also intercepted letters and e-mails from the Law Society and the applicant. This, according to the first respondent, Jantjies did to conceal her own theft from the first respondent's business account.

9. In May 2019, Jantjies just disappeared and never returned to work. This was after the first respondent - who had been practising on her own since September 2017 - started questioning certain suspect transactions.

10. The result of Jantjies' deceit - so the first respondent explains - was that she (first respondent) was unaware of the fact that audit reports had not been submitted for the 2017 and 2018 book years and that Fidelity Fund Certificates had not been issued in 2018 and 2019. She was also previously unaware of the disciplinary proceedings to which she had been summoned by the Law Society, which is then also the reason why she had failed to attend. At the same time the first respondent also learnt about the fine of

R13,000.00 that had been imposed by the Law Society due to her failure to attend a meeting of a disciplinary committee, which she

ten paid.

11. The fact remains that, for the year ending February 2017, a period when the respondents practised in partnership with each other, no audit report was submitted. For the year ending February 2018, a period during which the respondents were for a part still practising as partners and for a part practising on his/her own, neither had submitted audit reports in either capacity. Similarly, for the year ending February 2019, a period during which both had practised, albeit only for about two months in the case of the second

respondent, neither had submitted audit reports and no Fidelity Fund Certificates were issued to them.

12. Upon learning of these matters, the first respondent ' s attorney made contact with the applicant but was informed that this application is being brought. That was about May 2019. The first respondent nevertheless continued to practise without being issued with a

Fidelity Fund Certificate, which was clearly illegal and a criminal offence in terms of section 84 read with section 93(8) of the LPA.

13. Even after this application had been launched and served, the first respondent still continued to practise. While this application was pending, the first respondent still continued to practice, still without a Fidelity Fund Certificate - at least until May 2020 - when such a certificate was issued to her .

14. The respondents filed their answering affidavits on 27 September 2019. (The format of the second respondent's affidavit was only in the form of a confirmatory affidavit, confirming the first respondent ' s version). In her answering affidavit, the first respondent gave the version summarised above. She also stated that, on the day before filing her answering affidavit (26 September 2019) she had submitted audit reports in respect of her trust account for the 2017, 2018 and 2019 book years.

15. Nevertheless, she continued to practise, undaunted. That was still the case when this matter first came before us in May 2020.

16. In her answering affidavit the first respondent further defended herself on the following bases:

16.1. The first respondent took issue with the fact that the Notice of Motion asks for her suspension from practice, while it is also suggested by the applicant, in the founding affidavit that it should be considered whether she is a fit and proper person to remain on the roll of attorneys, which left her uncertain about the relief claimed.

16.2. Next, the first respondent complained about the fact that both respondents had been joined in this application which, according to her, amounts to a misjoinder.

16.3. The first respondent went on to say that, although she had failed to submit the outstanding audit reports, had practised without a Fidelity Fund Certificate and had failed to appear before the disciplinary committees, she had not done so knowingly or intentionally. In these regards she relied of the deceitful conduct of Janties.

16.4. In conclusion, while criticising the drafting style of the founding affidavit, the first respondent tendered not to pursue and order as to costs against the applicant, should the application be withdrawn forthwith.

17. Shortly before the first hearing of this application before us on 5 May 2020, the first respondent filed a supplementary answering affidavit. No objection to the admission thereof was raised by Mr Groome, appearing for the applicant. The rein, the first respondent raised the following issue:

17.1. She again referred to the audit reports that had been outstanding but which were submitted at the same time as her answering affidavit - in September 2019.

17.2. She again claimed that those audit reports were unqualified and revealed that there had never been any trust deficit in her books.

17.3. The first respondent complained about the fact that the applicant had still not issued a Fidelity Fund Certificate to her. She referred to an e-mail message from the applicant on 26 March 2020, and states about it:

“….I can only assume from the applicant 's undertaking to issue me with a fidelity fund certificate that the applicant is satisfied with my explanation deems me to be a fit and proper person to hold a fidelity fund certificate , and thus to practice [sic] as an attorney."

17.4. While it was common cause at the time that the first respondent had submitted the outstanding audit reports on 26 September 2019, did not know whether those reports were sufficient to convince the applicant to issue a Fidelity Fund Certificate in respect of the year 2020.

17.5. All we knew in this regard was the contents of an e-mail of 26 March 2020 by Ms Hlogoana - Auditor: Practitioners' Affairs of the applicant, stating:

"Based on consultation with our head of department, I will approve your audits. Kindly note however that we are still awaiting a resolution from the investigation committee on the matter. In the interim you may proceed to apply for a Fidelity Fund Certificate."

17.6. The investigation mentioned in this e-mail message seemed to have been about the first respondent's allegations of fraud on the part of Ms Jantjies.

17.7. At the time, we considered it crucially important to know whether the applicant had in fact been satisfied by the audit reports for the years 2017, 2018 and 2019, in other words, whether the applicant had been satisfied that the first respondent's books of account, trust account and financial administration were indeed satisfactory. From the e-mail quoted above, this seemed to be the case, but we were informed from the bar that the applicant had not concluded its investigations.

17.8. The matter was then stood down over a weekend, to enable the applicant to consider its stance.

17.9. Eventually, we were informed that the issuing of a Fidelity Fund Certificate to the first respondent had in fact been authorised by the applicant, but the first respondent was for some reason not able to print it. However, we were also informed that the applicant had not concluded its investigations into, inter alia, the allegation of fraud by Jantjies and whether that had had any impact on the first respondent's trust account.

17.10. It was specifically stated by Mr Groome that, one specific aspect which required further investigation , was certain discrepancies between the audit report for the 2017 book year eventually submitted , and another report for the same year that was never submitted but nevertheless attached to the first respondent's answering affidavit in this application. (This unsubmitted report was allegedly discovered in Janties' desk drawer after she had disappeared).

17.11. This court then ruled that the application be postponed until 5 November 2020, to enable the applicant to conclude its investigations and to report to the court before then.

18. On 7 September 2020 the applicant filed a supplementary affidavit, attaching a report by one Ashwin Reddy. Reddy is an auditor employed

by the applicant. He had been tasked and mandated to investigate the first respondent's financial records, particularly pertaining to her trust account. He reported the following:

18.1 Reddy contacted the first respondent on 20 May 2020. He informed her of his mandate to conduct an inspection of her trust accounting records. It was then agreed that they would meet at the first respondent's offices on 28 May 2020.

18.2 On the same da y, Reddy e-mailed to the first respondent, a list of documents to be gathered and collated before the meeting scheduled for 28 May 2020. That list was attached to the supplementary affidavit. Those documents were clearly limited to matters relevant the first respondent's trust account.

18.3 However, the meeting did not happen and the documents required by Mr Reddy were not forthcoming. The reason was that, two days before the scheduled meeting, the first respondent wrote a letter to Mr Reddy, stating:

18.3.1 A fidelity Fund Certificate for 2020 had been issued by the applicant, which had rendered the applicant's argument about discrepancies without merit;

18.3.2 The first respondent insisted on being furnished with copies of a complaint against her, details of the investigating committee and its mandate was required;

18.3.3 Only if these particulars are given and only to the extent that documents or books sought are relevant to a complaint - in the judgment of the first respondent - will it be made available.

18.4 Mr Reddy referred this response to Mr Fourie, Senior Legal Officer: Disciplinary Department of the applicant. Mr Fourie then wrote to the first respondent, confirming the mandate of Mr Reddy and insisting that the documents sought by Mr Reddy be provided.

18.5 To this, the first respondent's attorney responded on 23 June 2020. That response was to the effect that the investigating committee is perhaps not properly constituted and, in any event, the first respondent does not agree that her trust account poses any threat to a member of the public, the applicant or the Fidelity Fund. The first respondent would therefore only consent to an inspection of her books once the applicant has satisfied her about the aforementioned matters.

18.6 In response, Mr Fourie drew first respondent's attention to section 87 of the LPA and the applicant's right to inspect the first respondent's books and again implored her to comply.

18.7 To this, the first respondent's attorney replied by stating that some unrelated professional dispute exists between the first respondent and the member of the investigating committee . The existence of a formal complaint being investigated was also again questioned, on which basis the nature or scope of an inspection was also again questioned .

19. The upshot of all this was that Mr Reddy and the applicant could not perform the inspection they needed to do. It has still not been done.

20. In her own supplementary affidavit, the first respondent took the following stance about the investigation by Reddy and the applicant:

20.1. The committee appointed to conduct an investigation in terms of section 37 of the LPA is apparently not investigating a specific complaint of misconduct.

20.2. In any event, the member of that committee is conflicted as a dispute with the first respondent, about his firm's unpaid fees, existed a year earlier.

20.3. The applicant "misses the point" if it wants to investigate discrepancies between the two audit reports for the 2017 book year. This is because only one of those reports was submitted to the applicant. (The other was the one Jantjies had failed to submit and was later found in her desk drawer).

20.4. The first respondent is now "astounded" to hear that her conduct is seen as obstructive towards the applicant's investigation.

20.5. The first respondent tenders to cooperate with any investigation, on condition that it is done with reference to a specific complaint of misconduct, which the first respondent describes as a "jurisdictional requirement" before the applicant would be entitled to investigate her trust account at all.

21. The misconduct complained of in this case had been proved. In fact, it is common cause that both respondents had failed to submit audit reports in respect of the 2017 and 2018 book years. Both respondents also continued to practise without being in possession of Fidelity Fund Certificates. In the case of the first respondent, she continued this illegal conduct for the whole of 2018, 2019 and the first quarter and most of the second quarter of 2020. The second respondent ceased practising altogether in May 2018.

22. This begs the second question: in view of their proven conduct, are the respondents still fit and proper persons to practice as attorneys?

23. In my view, the first respondent is not a fit and proper person to practice as an attorney. Even accepting her version of fraud and deceit on the part of Jantjies, she had still abdicated all her responsibilities in respect of the preparation and submission of audit reports in respect of her trust account. So too, her responsibility to make sure that she complies with all requirements and obtains a Fidelity Fund Certificate when it becomes necessary.

24. The first respondent gave no particulars about the qualifications, experience or employment record of Jantjies at the time when she was appointed as "financial officer" and placed in charge of the practice in the way it was done. The court is simply not in a position to consider that the first respondent had perhaps somehow acted responsibly or reasonably when doing so.

25. When - on her own version - the first respondent became aware of the fact that audit reports had not been submitted and that she had been practising without a Fidelity Fund Certificate for the whole of 2018 and the first five months of 2019, the first respondent simply continued to practise illegally, even after this application had been served on her and after she had filed her answering affidavit. This shows a total lack of appreciation of her duties and responsibilities as an attorney of this court.

26. The second respondent also abdicated his responsibilities as the senior partner for the period July 2015 until September 2017, when the respondents parted ways. According to the first respondent , the second respondent ceased practising in December 2017, although he did not inform the Law Society at the time. Only in June 2018, the second respondent applied to be exempted from the requirement of submitting an audit report for period 1 December 2017 until 10 May 2018.That period involves two book years for which the second respondent had not submitted audit reports. It does not appear whether that exemption had ever been granted.

27. The second respondent made no attempt to explain his conduct to the court. All he did was to file a confirmatory affidavit, simply confirming the version of the first respondent. In the absence of a cogent explanation for his conduct by the second respondent , I am driven to conclude that he is not a fit and proper person to continue practising as an attorney.

28. This leaves the question of an appropriate sanction in the case of the first respondent and the second respondent respectively. This is a matter within the discretion of the court. (See e.g. A vs Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 1989(1) SA 849 (A) at 851A-F; Jasat vs Natal Law Society 2000(3) SA 44 (SCA) at 51B-1; Malan and another vs Law Society, Northern Provinces 2009(1) SA 216 at 2201-21F

29. Whether to order the removal of a practitioner from the roll of practitioners or to suspend him from practice for a period of time will depend on a number of factors such as the conduct complained of; the extent to which it reflects upon the person's character or shows him to be unworthy to remain in the ranks of an honourable profession ; the likelihood or otherwise of a repetition of such conduct and the need to protect the public.

30. There is no evidence or even allegation that either the first respondent had misappropriated trust money. That is not the complaint. However, the first respondent had in my view totally flouted the legal requirements enacted for the protection of the members of the public, specifically in the context of trust accounts of attorneys. Even after she had been informed that an application to suspend her from practice will be launched because of her past failure to submit audit reports and her illegal practising without a Fidelity Fund Certificate, she continued to do just that. The absence of dishonesty is in itself no warrant to treat misconduct of this kind with kid gloves. This is to stem an erosion of professional ethical values. (Compare Malan vs Law Society, Northern Provinces supra at 221H).

31. In her answering affidavit, the first respondent had not even attempted to explain or justify this blatant disregard for the law and the rules of her profession. This shows a la ck of insight into her own illegal actions. The manner in which the first respondent had criticised and even tried to blame the applicant for her own non-compliances, coupled with her obstructive and self-righteous behaviour after this application had been postponed to allow an inspection of her trust account, convinces me that the first respondent has still not gained the necessary insight into her own illegal actions and her responsibility towards the public, when dealing with trust money. A period suspension from practice would therefore be required, to bring home to the first respondent the seriousness of her illegal actions.

32. However, because the first respondent is relatively young and inexperienced, she may still gain the necessary sense of responsibility required to conduct an attorney's trust account. (See: the remarks by Harms ADP in Malan and another vs Law Society, Northern Provinces supra at 220E to H). Therefore, the following reasoning of Forlorn JA in Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope vs Peter 2009(2) SA 18 at 24 par [23] seems to apply:

"The respondent has shown herself to be naive and immature, lacking in experience and insight. It therefore seems to have been a wise precaution for the court a quo to have restricted her from practising for her own account for a further period after the expiry of her suspension so that she has the opportunity to gain the necessary insight and maturity, the lack of which led to her present predicament."

33. The second respondent has shown no reason why he should remain on the roll of attorneys of this court. In his case , I believe an order as in the case of A vs Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope (supra) would be appropriate.

34. I therefore make the following order:

(1) In respect of the first respondent- Suzette Dippenaar-Nieuwoudt

-

(a) The first respondent is suspended from practice as attorney of this court for a period of one year from the date of this order,

(b) The first respondent is further precluded from practising as an attorney for her own account, either alone, or in partnership or as a director of a practice which is a juristic entity, for a period of one year from the expiry of the suspension in paragraph (a) above.

(c) Should the first respondent, after the expiry of the period referred to in clause (b) above, elect to practise in the manner set out in that clause, she shall satisfy the court that it is appropriate that she be permitted to practise for her own account.

(2) The second respondent - Paul Andrew Spector - is suspended from practice as an attorney of this court until such time as he satisfies the court that he is a fit and proper person to resume practice as an attorney.

(3) The first and second respondents are ordered to immediately surrender and deliver to the Registrar of this Court their certificates of enrolment as attorneys of this Court.

(4) In the event of the first and/or second respondents' failure to comply with the terms of this order detailed in paragraph (3) above within two (2) weeks from the date of this order, the sheriff of the district in which the certificates are, is authorised and directed to take possession of the certificates and to hand them to the Registrar of this Court.

(5) The first and second respondents are prohibited from handling or operating on their trust accounts. The terms of this order will apply to both Dippenaar-Nieuwoudt, Spector Attorneys and Spector (Paul Andrew) Attorneys.

(6) Johan van Staden, the Head: Risk Compliance of the applicant or any person nominated by him, in his capacity as such, Is appointed to act as curator bonis (curator) to administer and control the trust account(s) of the first and second respondents, Including accounts relating to insolvent and deceased estates; any deceased estate and any estate under curatorship connected with the first and second respondents ' practice(s) as attorneys and including , also, the separate banking accounts opened and kept by the first and second respondents at a bank in the Republic of South Africa in terms of section 86(1) of the Legal Practice Act ("LPA") and/or any separate savings or interest-bearing accounts as contemplated by sections 86(3) and 86(4) of the LPA, in which monies from such trust banking accounts have been invested by virtue of the provisions of the said sub-sections or in which monies In any manner have been deposited or credited (the said accounts being hereafter referred to as the trust accounts) , with the following powers and duties:

(a) Immediately to take possession of the first and second respondents' accounting records, records, files and documents as referred to in paragraph (7) below and subject to the approval of the board of control of the Legal Practitioners' Fidelity Fund (hereinafter referred to as the fund) to sign all forms and generally to operate upon the trust account(s), but only to such extent and for such purpose as may be necessary to bring to completion current transactions In which the first and second respondents were acting at the date of this order;

(b) Subject to the approval and control of the board of control of the fund and where monies had been paid incorrectly and unlawfully from the undermentioned trust accounts, to recover and receive and, if necessary In the interests of persons having lawful claims upon the trust account(s) and/or against the first and second respondents in respect of monies held, received and/or invested by the first and second respondents In terms of sections 86(3) and 86(4) of the LPA (hereinafter referred to as trust monies), to take any legal proceedings which may be necessary for the recovery of money which may be due to such persons in respect of incomplete transactions, if any, in which the first and second respondents were and may still be concerned and to receive such monies and to pay the same to the credit of the trust account(s);

(c) To ascertain from the first and second respondents' accounting records the names of all persons on whose account the first and second respondents appear to hold or to have received trust monies (hereinafter referred to as trust creditors) and to call upon the first and second respondents to furnish him, within 30 (thirty) days of the date of service of this order or such further period as he may agree to In writing, with the names, addresses and amounts due to all trust creditors.

(d) To call upon such trust creditors to furnish such proof, information and/or affidavits as he may require to enable him, acting in consultation with, and subject to the requirements of the board of control of the fund, to determine whether any such trust creditor has a claim In respect of monies in the trust account(s) of the first and second respondents and , if so, the amount of such claim.

(e) To admit or reject, in whole or in part, subject to the approval of the board of control of the fund, the claims of any such trust creditor or creditors, without prejudice to such trust creditor's or creditors' right of access to the civil courts.

(f) Having determined the amounts which he considers are lawfully due to trust creditors, to pay such claims in full but subject always to the approval of the board of control of the fund.

(g) In the event of there being any surplus in the trust account(s) of the first and second respondents after payment of the admitted claims of all trust creditors In full, to utilise such surplus to settle or reduce (as the case may be), firstly, any claim of the fund in terms of section 86(5) of the LPA in respect of any interest therein referred to and, secondly, without prejudice to the rights of the creditors of the respondent, the costs, fees and expenses referred to in paragraph 11 of this order, or such portion thereof as has not already been separately paid by the first and second respondents to the applicant, and, if there is any balance left after payment In full of all such claims, costs, fees and expenses, to pay such balance, subject to the approval of the board of control of the fund, to the first and second respondents, if they are solvent, or, if the first and/or second respondents (or either of them) are insolvent , to the trustee(s) of the first and/or second respondents ' insolvent estates.

(h) In the event of there being insufficient trust monies in the trust banking account(s) of the first and second respondents, In accordance with the available documentation and information, to pay in full the claims of trust creditors who have lodged claims for repayment and whose claims have been approved, to distribute the credit balance(s) which may be available in the trust banking account(s) amongst the trust creditors alternatively to pay the balance to the fund;

(i) Subject to the approval of the chairman of the board of control of the fund, to appoint nominees or representatives and/or consult with and/or engage the services of attorneys, counsel , accountants and/or any other persons, where considered necessary, to assist him in carrying out his duties as curator; and

(j) To render from time to time, as curator, returns to the board of control of the fund showing how the trust account(s) of the first and second respondents has/have been dealt with, until such time as the board notifies him that he may regard his duties as curator as terminated.

(7) The first and second respondents are ordered to immediately deliver their accounting records, records, files and documents containing particulars and information relating to:

(a) any monies received, held or paid by the first and/or second respondents for or on account of any person while practising as attorneys;

(b) any monies invested by the first and/or second respondents in terms of sections 86(3) and 86(4) of the LPA;

(c) any interest on monies so invested which was paid over or credited to the first and second respondents;

(d) any estate of a deceased person or an insolvent estate or an estate under curatorship administered by the first and/or second respondents, whether as executors or trustees or curators or on behalf of the executor, trustee or curator;

(e) any insolvent estate administered by the first and/or second respondents as trustee or on behalf of the trustee in terms of the Insolvency Act, No 24 of 1936;

(f) any trust administered by the first and/or second respondents as trustee or on behalf of the trustee in terms of the Trust Properties Control Act, No 57of 1988;

(g) any company liquidated in terms of the Companies Act, No 61 of 1973, administered by the first and/or second respondents as or on behalf of the liquidator;

(h) any close corporation liquidated in terms of the Close Corporations Act, 69 of 1984, administered by the first and/or second respondents as or on behalf of the liquidator; and

(i) the first and second respondents' practices as attorneys of this Court, to the curator appointed in terms of paragraph 6 hereof, provided that, as far as such accounting records, records, files and documents are concerned, the first and second respondents shall be entitled to have reasonable access to them but always subject to the supervision of such curator or his nominee.

(8) That should the first and/or second respondents fail to comply with the provisions of the preceding paragraph of this order on service thereof upon them or after a return by the person entrusted with the service thereof that he has been unable to effect service thereof on the first and second respondent (as the case may be), the sheriff for the district in which such accounting records, records, files and documents are, be empowered and directed to search for and to take possession thereof wherever they may be and to deliver them to such curator.

(9) The curator aforesaid shall be entitled to:

(a) hand over to the persons entitled thereto all such records, files and documents provided that a satisfactory written undertaking has been received from such persons to pay any amount, either determined on taxation or by agreement, In respect of fees and disbursements due to the firm;

(b) require from the persons referred to in paragraph 9.1 to provide any such documentation or information which he may consider relevant in respect of a claim or possible or anticipated claim, against him and/or first and second respondents and/or the first and second respondents ' clients and/or the fund in respect of money and/or other property entrusted to the first and second respondents, provided that any person entitled thereto shall be granted reasonable access thereto and shall be permitted to make copies thereof; and

(c) publish this order or an abridged version thereof in any newspaper he considers appropriate.

(10) The first and second respondents are directed:

(a) to pay, In terms of section 87(2) of the LPA, the reasonable costs of the inspection of the accounting records of the first and second respondents;

(b) to pay the reasonable fees and expenses of the curator;

(c) to pay the reasonable fees and expenses of any person(s) consulted and/or engaged by the curator as aforesaid;

(d) to pay the expenses relating to the publication of this order or an abbreviated version thereof.

(11) The respondents are ordered to pay the costs of this application, such to be taxed on a scale as between attorney­ and-client.

C M SARDIWALLA

JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

AND

J D Maritz

Acting Judge of the High Court

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: Adv. L GROOM

Instructed by: ROOTH & WESSELS INC

For the Respondent: ADV. J J C SWANEPOEL

Instructed by: ALICE SWANEPOEL ATTORNEYS

Date of Hearing: 11 May & 5 November 2020

Date of Judgment: 30 November 2020