Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Leslie and Others (JR2427/15) [2019] ZALCJHB 62 (27 March 2019)

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG

Not Reportable

Case no: JR 2427/15

In the matter between:

THE STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA

LIMITED Applicant

and

HEIDEN LESLIE

First Respondent

COMMISSIONER DESMOND LYNCH N.O

Second Respondent

THE COMMISSION FOR CONCILIATION,

MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION

Third Respondent

Decided: In Chambers

Delivered: 27 March 2019

JUDGMENT - LEAVE TO APPEAL

MAHOSI. J

[1] This is an opposed application for leave to appeal against the whole judgment of this Honourable Court handed down on 06 February 2019 in terms of which the Court dismissed the applicant’s review application. The application is opposed by the first respondent.

[2] Parties are cited as they were in the review application.

[3] The applicant raised two of grounds of appeal. The first ground is that the Court erred in failing to consider the second respondent’s failure to give reasons for not having taken Ms Motsepi’s evidence and the video footage into account.

[4] The second ground is that the Court misdirected itself by refusing to watch the video footage of the incident in question in order to properly assess the evidence as a whole, a result of which was that the Court was not in a position to decide whether this particular ground of review had merits or not.

[5] In opposing the application, the first respondent submitted that the applicant, by electing to proceed with the review application while being aware that the record is incomplete ran the risk of having its case dismissed. Further that the video footage did not form part of the discovered records provided to the first respondent by the applicant. Lastly, the first respondent submitted that the evidence of Ms Motsepi could not be looked at in isolation to the other witnesses of the applicant.

[6] The traditional test in determining whether to grant an application for leave to appeal, is whether there is a reasonable prospect that another court may come to a different conclusion.[1] In terms of section 166(1) of the Labour Relations Act (LRA),[2] a party to proceedings before the Labour Court, may apply to the Labour Court for leave to appeal to the Labour Appeal Court (LAC)

against any final judgment or final order of the Labour Court. Section 17 of the Superior Court Act,[3] which applies to the Labour Court, regulates instances in which the appeal may be granted. Section 17(1) provides as follows:

‘Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges are of the opinion that–

(a)

(i) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or

(ii) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, including conflicting judgments on the matter under consideration;

(b) the decisions sought on appeal does not fall within the ambit of section 16(2)(a); and

(c) where the decision sought to be appealed does not dispose of all the issues in the case, the appeal would lead to a just and prompt resolution of the real issue between the parties.’

[7] Section 16(2)(a) of the Superior Court Act provides as follows:

‘(i) When at the hearing of the appeal the issues are of such a nature that the decision sought will have no practical effect, the appeal may be dismissed on this ground alone.

(ii) save under exceptional circumstances, the question whether the decision would have no practical effect or result is to be determined without reference to any consideration of costs.’

[8] In Martin and East (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers and Others,[4] the LAC made it clear that leave to appeal is not simply there for the taking, and that this Court must be cautious in granting leave to appeal and in assessing the requirement of the prospect of success. In this case, the Court stated as follows:

‘…The Labour Relations Act was designed to ensure an expeditious resolution of industrial disputes. This means that courts, particularly courts in the position of the court a quo, need to be cautious when leave to appeal is granted, as should this Court when petitions are granted.

There are two sets of interests to consider. There are the interests of the parties such as appellant, namely who are entitled to have their rights vindicated, if there is a reasonable prospect that another court might come to a different conclusion. There

are also the rights of employees who land up in a legal “no-man’s-land” and have to wait years for an appeal (or two) to be prosecuted.

This was a case which should have ended in the labour court. This matter should not have come to this court. It stood to be resolved on its own facts. There is no novel point of law to be determined nor did the Court a quo misinterpret existing law. There was no incorrect application of the facts; in particular the assessment of the factual justification for the dismissals/alternative sanctions.

I would urge labour courts in future to take great care in ensuring a balance between expeditious resolution of a dispute and the rights of the party which has lost. If there is a reasonable prospect that the factual matrix could receive a different treatment or there is a legitimate dispute on the law that is different. But this kind of case should not reappear continuously in courts on appeal after appeal, subverting a key purpose of the Act, namely the expeditious resolution of labour disputes.’

[9] Having had regard to the parties’ submissions, I am not persuaded that the applicant has made out a case for the granting of leave to appeal, has showing good cause, or that there are reasonable prospects of a successful appeal or that there are some other compelling reasons why the appeal should be heard. As such, I am of the view that this application is without merit and must be dismissed.

[10] With regard to costs, taking into account the requirements of law and equity, I am of the view that this is a matter in which there should be no order as to costs.

[11] Accordingly, I make the following order:

Order

1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

2. There is no order as to costs.

__________________

D. Mahosi

Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa

[1] See Karbochem Sasolburg (A Division of Sentrachem Ltd) v Kriel and Others (1999) 20 ILJ 2889 (LC) at 2890B; Ngcobo v Tente Casters (Pty) Ltd (2002) 23 ILJ 1442 (LC) at 1443 para 2 and Tsotetsi v Stallion Security (Pty) Ltd (2009) 30 ILJ 2802 (LC) at 2804 para 14.

[2] Act 66 of 1995 as amended.

[3] Act 10 of 2013.

[4] (2014) 35 ILJ 2399 (LAC) at 2405-2406.