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South Africa Judgment

North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria

Starbuck N.O and Another v Friebus and Others (38540/20) [2021] ZAGPPHC 276 (18 March 2021)

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Source document

01

Holding and result

The court found that the first respondent had, under oath, consented to the trustees dealing with her undivided half share in the property as part of the voluntary surrender of her husband's insolvent estate. This consent was binding and vested the property in the trustees, who were duly authorised by the creditors' meeting to sell the property. The first respondent's subsequent refusal to sign transfer documents and her objections were without merit, as she had already renounced her rights in respect of the property. The trustees acted within their powers and in accordance with the law. The point in limine of lis pendens was dismissed as there was no pending dispute. The applicants were entitled to the relief sought, including termination of joint ownership, transfer of the property, and costs.

Court disposition

Application granted. Joint ownership terminated. Transfer of property authorised. Costs awarded against first respondent.

Orders

  • The joint ownership in Erf 462 Lilianton Extension 1 Township, Registration Division IR, Province of Gauteng, held by deed of transfer T 9935/2013, is terminated.
  • The first respondent is ordered to sign all documentation necessary to effect transfer within 20 days of service of this order, failing which the Sheriff is authorised to sign on her behalf.
  • Net proceeds of the sale shall be paid to the applicants, who must settle outstanding bond, administration costs, and rates and taxes; any remainder to be paid to the applicants as trustees of the insolvent estate.
  • Profits (if any) after payments to creditors to be paid to the first respondent and the applicants on behalf of the insolvent estate of Jacobus Alwyn Friebus.
  • The first respondent is ordered to pay the applicants' costs of the application.

02

Material facts

Parties

C.A. Starbuck NO

Applicant Counsel: Velile Tinto and Ass.

M. Roux NO

Applicant Counsel: Velile Tinto and Ass.

H.W. Friebus

Respondent Counsel: MW Nothnagel Attorneys

Changing Tides (Pty) Ltd

Respondent

The Master of the High Court

Respondent

Amounts and remedies

  • Purchase Consideration for Property: ZAR 450,000
  • Property Size (square Metres): 795

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Urgent Application / Application for Termination of Joint Ownership and Transfer of Property

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
The applicants argued that the first respondent had previously consented under oath to allow her undivided half share in the property to be dealt with by the trustees, as evidenced in the voluntary surrender application. They contended that the trustees were duly authorised by the creditors' meeting to sell the property and that the first respondent's subsequent refusal to sign transfer documents was contrary to her earlier consent and the authority vested in the trustees. They sought an order terminating joint ownership and authorising the Sheriff to sign transfer documents if the first respondent refused.
Respondent
The first respondent argued that as co-owner, she had not agreed to the sale nor signed any documents consenting to the sale, and that her permission was required for the trustees to deal with her undivided share. She raised a point in limine of lis pendens, referencing a previous similar application that was withdrawn without a costs tender. She further contended that the trustees lacked authority to enter into the deed of sale and that her rights as co-owner were not extinguished by the insolvency proceedings.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Insolvency Act 24 of 1936

    Upon sequestration, the insolvent's property, including any undivided shares held jointly, vests in the Master and thereafter in the trustees, who are empowered to dispose of such property in accordance with the Insolvency Act and the authority of creditors.

  2. 02

    Starbuck N.O and Another v Friebus and Others (38540/20) [2021] ZAGPPHC 276

    A co-owner's prior consent under oath in a voluntary surrender application is binding and authorises trustees to deal with the property, even if subsequent objections are raised.

  3. 03

    Starbuck N.O and Another v Friebus and Others (38540/20) [2021] ZAGPPHC 276

    Lis pendens does not apply where the previous application has been withdrawn and no pending dispute remains between the parties.

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

The court found that the first respondent had, under oath, consented to the trustees dealing with her undivided half share in the property as part of the voluntary surrender of her husband's insolvent estate. This consent was binding and vested the property in the trustees, who were duly authorised by the creditors' meeting to sell the property. The first respondent's subsequent refusal to sign transfer documents and her objections were without merit, as she had already renounced her rights in respect of the property. The trustees acted within their powers and in accordance with the law. The point in limine of lis pendens was dismissed as there was no pending dispute. The applicants were entitled to the relief sought, including termination of joint ownership, transfer of the property, and costs.

Obiter and limits

  • The court noted that even if the first respondent was entitled to costs for the withdrawn previous application, this did not affect the merits of the present application.
  • The first respondent's attempt to purchase the property failed due to her inability to secure the required deposit, and the trustees were entitled to proceed with the sale to the next highest bidder.

Court disposition

Application granted. Joint ownership terminated. Transfer of property authorised. Costs awarded against first respondent.

  • The joint ownership in Erf 462 Lilianton Extension 1 Township, Registration Division IR, Province of Gauteng, held by deed of transfer T 9935/2013, is terminated.
  • The first respondent is ordered to sign all documentation necessary to effect transfer within 20 days of service of this order, failing which the Sheriff is authorised to sign on her behalf.
  • Net proceeds of the sale shall be paid to the applicants, who must settle outstanding bond, administration costs, and rates and taxes; any remainder to be paid to the applicants as trustees of the insolvent estate.
  • Profits (if any) after payments to creditors to be paid to the first respondent and the applicants on behalf of the insolvent estate of Jacobus Alwyn Friebus.
  • The first respondent is ordered to pay the applicants' costs of the application.

Source and reliance status

North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria

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Judgment reading view

Judgment text

The complete available source text.

Source document

North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria

Judgment

[2021] ZAGPPHC 276

HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)

(1) REPORTABLE: NO

(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO

(3) REVISED: yes

18 March 2021

CASE NO: 38540/20

Hearing before Rabie J by way of Zoom conference.

In the matter between:

C.A. STARBUCK NO

First Applicant

M. ROUX NO

Second Applicant

and

H.W.

FRIEBUS

First Respondent

CHANGING TIDES (PTY)LTD

Second Respondent

THE MASTER OF THE HIGH

COURT

Third Respondent

JUDGMENT

1. In this application the applicants applied for an order terminating the joint ownership held by the first respondent in a certain property in Lilianton, Extension 1; for an order directing the first respondent to sign all the necessary transfer documents to effect transfer; and failing which the Sheriff of this Court would be authorised and directed to sign such documents on behalf of the first respondent.

2. The facts of this matter are briefly the following. On 6 December 2018 the estate of Mr Friebus, the husband of the first respondent and hereinafter referred to as "the insolvent", was accepted as insolvent and placed under sequestration. The applicants were appointed as provisional trustees of the insolvent estate.

3. The only asset in the estate of the insolvent was the aforesaid immovable property. The first respondent and the insolvent were co-owners of the aforesaid immovable property. The application for voluntary surrender was brought on the premise that the total value of the property could be taken into consideration as the first respondent, as the co-owner of the immovable property, consented, under oath, that her half ownership in the immovable property may be dealt with by the appointed trustees. This was confirmed by her in an affidavit which formed part of the application for voluntary surrender of the insolvent. Without renouncing her half undivided share in the property the insolvent could never have established a dividend to concurrent creditors and would not have been successful with the application to surrender his estate.

4. At the second meeting of creditors it was decided that the trustees were authorised to dispose of the immovable property by public auction, private treaty or a public tender in their absolute and sole discretion and that the mode of sale shall be determined by the trustees. The trustees consequently decided to follow a boardroom bid-out process in which the first respondent partook. The first respondent submitted the highest bid on the property and she was afforded the opportunity to submit proof of a deposit to secure the bid.

5. The first respondent, however, failed to secure proof of the deposit, notwithstanding due demand. The trustees consequently offered the property to the second highest offer received at the public tender process. This was a Mr Malinga and a Me Ntuli who then purchased the property for the purchase consideration of R450 000,00. The written sale agreement was entered into on 4 July 2019.

6. On 17 July 2019 the first respondent sought confirmation of the fact that the property was sold, enquired as to the selling price, when she was supposed to relinquish half of the bond, and whether she would be released from the bond. The aforesaid were responded to by the trustees on 18 July 2019 and she was requested to sign the necessary documents.

7. On 22 July 2019 the first respondent, however, informed the trustees that she would not be signing the special power of attorney to effect the transfer as it would not be in their interest to do so.

8. On 5 August 2019 the trustees received a counter offer from the first respondent's father-in-law. The first respondent was informed by the trustees that the property had already been sold and was in the process of being transferred to the purchasers. The offer of her father-in-law could therefore not be considered and could not prevent the transfer of the property into the names of the purchasers.

9. In respect of the present application the first respondent raised a point in limine of lis pendens. It concerns a similar application that was withdrawn by the applicants without, however, tendering the costs occasioned thereby.

10. The first respondent further submitted that as co-owner of the property she has not agreed to the sale nor signed any agreement and/or documents consenting to the sale. It seems that the first respondent is of the view that without her consent or a court order the applicants are unable to deal with her undivided share in the property.

11. Regarding the point in limine the applicant might be entitled to her costs of the withdrawn application, although I make no finding in respect thereof, but there is no pending dispute between the parties. Even if I were to be wrong in this finding, the present application should in my view not be dismissed for that reason and the present application should proceed.

12. The first respondent cannot claim her half undivided share to the extent that it may not be sold without her consent. The first respondent had renounced her rights to the property under oath in the voluntary surrender of her husband and submitted that to the authority of the trustees to be appointed in the insolvent estate. Given the first respondent's consent there is no room to argue that she ever regained any rights in respect of the property. On sequestration of the insolvent the property, including her one half share, vested in the Master and thereafter in the Trustees. There was consequently nothing that stood in the way of the Trustees to put the property up for sale as they did and to eventually sell the property to the aforesaid purchasers.

13. During the hearing before this court the first respondent argued a different point namely that the trustees did not have the authorisation to enter into the deed of sale. There is no merit in this argument. The deed of sale was subject to a suspensive condition namely that authority be granted at the second meeting of creditors. Such authority was given on 5 July 2019 and only thereafter, on 9 July 2019, was the deed of sale signed by the Trustees.

14. It was further submitted on behalf of the first respondent that her permission was required before the Trustees could enter into the deed of sale. There is no merit in this submission either. Her position was clearly the same as that of the insolvent and she could not object to the sale. She tried to exercise her right to purchase the property but her efforts were not successful. The Trustees were thereafter fully entitled to sell the property to the aforesaid purchasers.

15. Having regard to all the aforesaid the applicants have carried out their duties in accordance with the provisions of the Act, in line with the authority given to them by the second meeting of creditors, and in accordance with the consent granted to them by the first respondent. The applicants are accordingly entitled to the relief sought in the present application. As far as costs are concerned there is no reason why costs should not follow the event and consequently why the first respondent should not pay the applicants' cost of the application.

16. In the result, the following order is made:

1. It is ordered that the joint ownership in the property described as

Erf 462 Lilianton Extension 1 Township, Registration Division IR, Province of Gauteng, measuring 795 (seven hundred and ninety five) square metres, held by deed of transfer T 9935/2013, subject to the conditions therein contained or referred to ("the property"), be terminated.

2. The first respondent is ordered to sign any and all documentation

necessary to effect transfer within 20 days of service of this order on the first respondent, failing which the Sheriff of this Court is authorised and directed to sign all the above mentioned documentation on behalf of the first respondent.

3. The net proceeds of the sale of the property shall be paid to the

applicants who shall, if the net proceeds exceed the amount outstanding on the bond, administration costs and outstanding rates

and taxes, immediately settle the outstanding amount owed on the bond to the second respondent by virtue of the mortgage bond held over the property under Bond No. B 33306/2015 and if the net proceeds are equal to or less than the amount owing on the bonds, pay such proceeds, less outstanding rates and taxes, to the second respondent in the reduction of its claim.

4. The remainder (if any) of any net proceeds of the sale of the property after the payments stipulated in paragraph 3 above, shall be paid to the applicants in their capacities as duly appointed trustees

of the insolvent estate; and

4.1 the profits (if any) of the sale of the property after the payments stipulated in paragraph 3 above be paid to the first respondent, and to the applicants on behalf of the insolvent estate of Jacobus Alwyn Friebus.

5. The first respondent is ordered to pay the applicants' costs of the

application.

C.P. RABIE

JUDGE

OF THE HIGH COURT

Attorney for the Applicant: Velile Tinto and Ass.

melandry@tintolaw.co.za

Attorney for the First Respondent: MW Nothnagel Attorneys

martin@mwnlaw.co.za

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Starbuck N.O and Another v Friebus and Others (38540/20) [2021] ZAGPPHC 276

Case cited

Insolvency Act 24 of 1936

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