Tegeta Exploration and Resources (Pty) Ltd and Others v Knoop and Others (035371/2023) [2024] ZAGPPHC 144 (20 February 2024)
- Citation
- [2024] ZAGPPHC 144
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Panel
- Phooko
- Case number
- 035371/2023
More details
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Panel
- Phooko
- Case number
- 035371/2023
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court found that, in light of the Supreme Court of Appeal's decision in Islandsite Investments (Pty) Ltd v The National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others, there is a reasonable prospect that another court will reach a different conclusion regarding the authority of directors to appoint attorneys during business rescue. The court also acknowledged the possibility of ambiguity in the previous cost order and exercised its discretion under Rule 42(1)(b) to vary the order, clarifying that the costs awarded in paragraph (f) pertain specifically to the relief granted in paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) of the judgment. Accordingly, leave to appeal was granted and the cost order was varied to remove any ambiguity.
Court disposition
Leave to appeal granted to the Supreme Court of Appeal against paragraph 78(c) of the judgment and order handed down on 20 November 2023. The cost order is varied to clarify its scope. Costs of the application for leave to appeal are costs in the appeal.
Orders
- Leave to appeal is granted to the Supreme Court of Appeal against paragraph 78(c) of the judgment and order handed down on 20 November 2023.
- The order of the court a quo on costs is varied to read: 'The First to Fourth Respondents are ordered to pay the applicant’s costs on a party and party scale including the costs of two counsels, these being costs granted in paragraph (f) in respect of relief granted in paragraphs (c), (d), and (e)'.
- Costs of the application for leave to appeal are costs in the appeal.
02
Material facts
Parties
Tegeta Exploration and Resources (Pty) Ltd
ApplicantKoornfontein Mines (Pty) Ltd
ApplicantOptimum Coal Mine (Pty) Ltd
ApplicantOptimum Coal Terminal (Pty) Ltd
ApplicantRonica Ragavan
ApplicantDhanasegaran Archery
ApplicantKurt Robert Knoop
RespondentJohan Louis Klopper
RespondentJuanito Martin Damons
RespondentKgashane Christopher Monyela
Respondent03
Procedural history
Posture
Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether leave to appeal should be granted against paragraph 78(c) of the judgment and order handed down on 20 November 2023.
- 02
Whether the cost order in paragraph (f) of the previous judgment is ambiguous and requires variation.
- 03
Whether the directors have authority to appoint attorneys to litigate on behalf of a company under business rescue.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The applicants argued that the Supreme Court of Appeal's decision in Islandsite Investments (Pty) Ltd v The National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others clarified that the distinction between powers of management and governance of companies is unhelpful in the present enquiry. They submitted that remedies exist for directors who seek to represent a company undergoing business rescue, and that the previous judgment failed to properly apply these principles.
- Respondent
- The respondents reiterated their arguments from the court a quo, maintaining that the directors possess the requisite authority to appoint attorneys to litigate on behalf of the company, even during business rescue. They contended that the previous judgment correctly found in their favour and that no ambiguity exists in the cost order.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act, Act 10 of 2013
Leave to appeal may only be granted where the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard.
- 02
The Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen & 18 Others 2014 JDR 2325 (LCC) at para 6
The threshold for granting leave to appeal has been raised; there must be a measure of certainty that another court will differ from the judgment sought to be appealed.
- 03
Rule 42(1)(b) Uniform Rules of Court
A court may rescind or vary an order or judgment in which there is an ambiguity, error, or omission.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court found that, in light of the Supreme Court of Appeal's decision in Islandsite Investments (Pty) Ltd v The National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others, there is a reasonable prospect that another court will reach a different conclusion regarding the authority of directors to appoint attorneys during business rescue. The court also acknowledged the possibility of ambiguity in the previous cost order and exercised its discretion under Rule 42(1)(b) to vary the order, clarifying that the costs awarded in paragraph (f) pertain specifically to the relief granted in paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) of the judgment. Accordingly, leave to appeal was granted and the cost order was varied to remove any ambiguity.
Obiter and limits
- The distinction between powers of management and governance of companies is not helpful in the context of business rescue proceedings.
- Remedies are available to interested parties such as directors who seek to represent a company under business rescue.
Court disposition
Leave to appeal granted to the Supreme Court of Appeal against paragraph 78(c) of the judgment and order handed down on 20 November 2023. The cost order is varied to clarify its scope. Costs of the application for leave to appeal are costs in the appeal.
- Leave to appeal is granted to the Supreme Court of Appeal against paragraph 78(c) of the judgment and order handed down on 20 November 2023.
- The order of the court a quo on costs is varied to read: 'The First to Fourth Respondents are ordered to pay the applicant’s costs on a party and party scale including the costs of two counsels, these being costs granted in paragraph (f) in respect of relief granted in paragraphs (c), (d), and (e)'.
- Costs of the application for leave to appeal are costs in the appeal.
Source and reliance status
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
Judgment
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
Case No: 035371/2023
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED
DATE: 20/02/2024
SIGNATURE
In the matter between:
TEGETA
EXPLORATION AND RESOURCES
(PTY)
LTD
First Applicant
KOORNFONTEIN MINES (PTY) LTD Second Applicant
OPTIMUM COAL MINE (PTY) LTD
Third Applicant
OPTIMUM COAL TERMINAL (PTY) LTD Fourth Applicant
RONICA
RAGAVAN
Fifth Applicant
DHANASEGARAN
ARCHERY
Sixth Applicant
and
KURT
ROBERT
KNOOP
First Respondent
JOHAN
LOUIS
KLOPPER Second Respondent
JUANITO
MARTIN DAMONS
Third Respondent
KGASHANE
CHRISTOPHER MONYELA Fourth Respondent
In re:
TEGETA
EXPLORATION AND RESOURCES
First Applicant
(PTY)
LTD
KOORNFONTEIN MINES (PTY) LTD
Second Applicant
OPTIMUM COAL MINE (PTY) LTD
Third Applicant
OPTIMUM COAL TERMINAL (PTY)
LTD
Fourth Applicant
RONICA
RAGAVAN
Fifth Applicant
DHANASEGARAN
ARCHERY
Sixth Applicant
RAYMOND
PETER VAN ROOYEN
Seventh Applicant
KURT
ROBERT
KNOOP
First Respondent
JOHAN
LOUIS
KLOPPER
Second Respondent
JUANITO
MARTIN
DAMONS
Third Respondent
KGASHANE
CHRISTOPHER MONYELA
Fourth Respondent
PETRUS FRANCOIS VAN DEN STEEN N.O.
Fifth Respondent
ALL
AFFECTED PARTIES OF TEGETA
Sixth Respondent
EXPLORATION AND RESOURCES (PTY) LTD
AS REFLECTED IN “A”
ALL
AFFECTED PARTIES OF KOORNFONTEIN
Seventh Respondent
MINES (PTY) LTD AS REFLECTED IN “B”
ALL
AFFECTED PARTIES OF OPTIMUM COAL Eighth Respondent
MINE (PTY) LTD AS REFLECTED IN “C”
ALL
AFFECTED PARTIES OF OPTIMUM COAL Ninth Respondent
TERMINAL (PTY) LTD AS REFLECTED IN “D”
THE
COMPANIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Tenth Respondent
COMMISSION
Delivered: This judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to the Parties/their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on CaseLines. The date for hand-down is deemed to be 20 February 2024.
JUDGMENT: APPLICATION
FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
PHOOKO
AJ
INTRODUCTION
[1] This is an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal against my judgment granted on 20 November 2023.
[2] Section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act, Act 10 of 2013 ("the Superior Courts Act"), regulates applications for leave to appeal and provides:
‘(1) Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned are of the opinion that-
(a) (i) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or
(ii) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, including conflicting judgments on the matter under consideration;
(b) the decision sought on appeal does not fall within the ambit of section
16(2)(a); and (c) where the decision sought to be appealed does not dispose of all the issues in the case, the appeal would lead to a just and prompt resolution of the real issues between the parties.’
[3] The test in an application for leave to appeal before the promulgation of the Superior Courts Act was whether there were reasonable prospects that another court may come to a different conclusion. However, this is no longer the position. Section 17(1)(1) of the Superior Courts Act has raised the bar. In The Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen & 18 Others[1] it was held that:
'It is clear that the threshold for granting leave to appeal against a judgment of a High Court has been raised in the new Act. The former test whether leave to appeal should be granted was a reasonable prospect that another court might come to a different conclusion, see Van Heerden v Cornwright & Others 1985 (2) SA 342 (T) at 343H. The use of the word "would" in the new statute indicates a measure of certainty that another court will differ from the court whose judgment is sought to be appealed against.'
[4] Consequently, in considering the application for leave to appeal this Court must remain cognizant of the higher threshold that needs to be met before leave to appeal may be granted.[2] There must exist more than just a mere possibility that another court will, and/or not might, find differently on both facts and law.[3]
[5] In so far as the leave to appeal against my judgment, I have carefully considered the written and oral submissions of the parties including the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Islandsite Investments (Pty) Ltd v The National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others[4] (“Islandsite”) which was delivered approximately two weeks post my judgment.
[6] I am of the view that on one hand, the respondent rehashed its arguments as made in the court a quo to the effect that the directors have the requisite authority to appoint attorneys to litigate on behalf of the company. On the other hand, I have noted the applicant’s submission in that the decision in Islandsite is clear in that the “distinction sought to be drawn between powers of management and governance of companies [is] unhelpful in the present enquiry”[5], and that “there are remedies available to interested parties such as directors”[6] where they seek to represent a company that is undergoing through the business rescue process.
[7] In light of the above observation, I am of the view that another court will come to a different conclusion.
[8] Rule 42(1) provides that a court may mero motu or on application, rescind or vary;
‘(a) …
(b) An order or judgment in which there is an ambiguity, error or
omission;
(c) …’
[9] Concerning the order about costs, it is important to reproduce the order I granted as is below:
‘(a) The application for condonation is refused.
(b) The application in respect of prayers 1, 3, and 4 is dismissed with costs on party and party scale including the costs of two counsel, one being senior counsel.
(c) It is declared that the authority of Van der Merwe and Van der Merwe attorneys have been established and that Van der Merwe and Van der Merwe attorneys are authorized to represent the Second Applicant in the removal application.
(d) It is declared that the authority of Van der Merwe and Van der Merwe attorneys have been established and that Van der Merwe and Van der Merwe attorneys are authorized to represent the Fifth Applicant in the removal application.
(e) It is declared that the authority of Van der Merwe and Van der Merwe attorneys have been established and that Van der Merwe and Van der Merwe attorneys are authorized to represent the Sixth Applicant in the removal application.
(f) The First to Fourth Respondents are ordered to pay the applicant’s costs on party and party scale including the costs of two counsel’.[7]
[10] Although I struggled to follow the applicant’s submissions about the ambiguity of the cost order concerning paragraph (f) as outlined in paragraph 9 above, I have nonetheless noted that there exists a possibility of ambiguity depending on how one reads the aforesaid paragraph 9. I accordingly vary that portion of my judgment in terms of Rule 42 (1) (b) and rectify it to read to the effect that the costs referred to in paragraph (f) are in respect of the relief granted in paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) of the judgment of the court a quo.
[11] In the result:
(a) Leave to appeal is granted to the Supreme Court of Appeal against paragraph 78(c) of the judgment and order handed down on 20 November 2023.
(b) The order of the court a quo on costs is varied to read “The First to Fourth Respondents are ordered to pay the applicant’s costs on a party and party scale including the costs of two counsels, these being costs granted in paragraph (f) in respect of relief granted in paragraphs (c), (d), and (e)”.
(c) Costs of the application for leave to appeal are costs in the appeal.
PHOOKO AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT,
APPEARANCES:
Counsel for Fifth to Fourth: Adv GD Wickins SC and Adv LVR van Tonde Applicants: Instructed by: Smith Sewgoolam Incorporated Counsel for the Respondents: Adv L Van Gass Instructed by: Instructed by VDM Attorney Date of Hearing: 8 February 2024 Date of Judgment: 20 February 2024
[1] 2014 JDR 2325 (LCC) at para 6.
[2] See Fair-Trade Independent Tobacco Association v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another [2020] ZAGPPHC at para 6.
[3] Ibid.
[4] [2023] ZASCA 166 (1 December 2023).
[5] Ibid at para 21.
[6] Ibid at para 22.
[7] Judgment of the court a quo at para 78.
Case-aware research
Ask AI about this case
The judgment and available research above are public. New questions open in a separate private conversation grounded in this case.