Telsek Investments 1043 CC T/A Telsek People Society v National Credit regulator (NCT/742/2010/56(1)(P)NCA) [2014] ZANCT 52 (10 November 2014)

IN THE NATIONAL CONSUMER TRIBUNAL

HELD IN CENTURION

Case number: NCT/742/2010/56(1)(P)NCA

DATE: 10 NOVEMBER 2015

In the matter between:

TELSEK INVESTMENTS 1043 CC T/A TELSEK PEOPLE SOCIETY.....................APPLICANT

And

THE NATIONAL CREDIT REGULATOR.................................................................RESPONDENT

Coram:

Prof B Dumisa _ Presiding Member

X May _ Member

Ms P Beck – Member

Date of Hearing – 16 October 2014

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

APPLICANT

1.The Applicant in this matter is Telsek Investments 1043 CC, trading as Telsek People Society, a credit provider registered as such under the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (“NCA” or “the Act”). The Applicant represented itself at the hearing.

RESPONDENT

2.The Respondent in this matter is the National Credit Regulator (“the NCR” or “the Respondent”), a juristic person established in terms of section 12 of the Act.

3.The Respondent was represented by Ms Senyarelo, an employee of the Respondent.

APPLICATION

4.This is an application in terms of section 56(1) of the Act, for the review and setting aside of a compliance notice issued in terms of Section 55(1) of the Act.

BACKGROUND

5.On or about 17 March 2009, the Respondent received a letter of complaint from Professor Kelbrick, employed by the University of South Africa (“UNISA”) regarding loans issued by the Applicant, to Unisa employees.

6.The CEO of the Respondent, on 6 April 2009, approved investigation certificates for Inspectors Tlou and Whale to investigate the business operations of the Applicant.

7.On 25 May 2009, Tlou had a meeting with Professor Kelbrick wherein she queried, with Tlou, certain deductions made from the payslip of UNISA employee Mr T S Mkhomazi. On 1 June 2009, Ntshabele, an employee of UNISA, faxed to Tlou a list of names and telephone numbers of other complainants, employees at UNISA, whom Tlou telephoned to verify their complaints.

8.On 12 June 2009 the CEO of the Respondent approved the conducting of an investigation at the business premises of the Applicant in Muckleneuk, Pretoria. On 29 June 2009, Tlou and Whale visited the business premises of the Applicant where Faya Bands, (“Bands”), an employee of the Applicant was present. Bands could not explain all the questions posed to her, by Tlou, in particular the fees charged to the complainants and requested that the inspectors wait for the owner, Mr Theo Boshoff (“Boshoff)”). When Boshoff arrived he explained that he had a contract with Unisa authorising him make salary deductions from the complainants salaries in respect of loans granted to them and undertook to provide the inspectors with a copy of the Unisa contract.

9.During the course of the investigation, it was noted by Tlou that the files of the complainants were not in compliance with the NCA. The inspectors took the files away with them to make copies of the files because the photocopier of the Applicant was out of order. On 30 June 2009, Tlou returned the files to the Applicant and Bands acknowledged receipt of the files and provided the inspectors with a copy of the Unisa contract.

10.Tlou prepared a full report and a compliance notice issued in terms of Section 55(1) was published on the Respondent’s website on 24 June 2010, a year after the initial investigation.

11.The Compliance Notice was served on the Applicant on 1 July 2010. Section 55 states that the Regulator may issue a compliance notice in the prescribed form to a person or an association of persons whom the Regulator believes has failed to comply with a provision of the Act, or is engaging in an activity in a manner that is not consistent with the Act or a registrant whom the Regulator believes is not complying with his conditions of registration.

12. The compliance notice stated that the Applicant is in contravention of the Act as follows: -

(i) Contravention of section 92(m) read with Section 91 related to priority / preferential salary deductions;

(ii) Contravention of Section 81(2) – reckless credit granting;

(iii) Contravention of Section 92(1) read with Regulation 28(1)(b) – pre-agreement disclosure;

(iv) Contravention of Section 93(2) read with Regulation 30(1) – prescribed form of credit agreements;

(v) Contravention of Regulation 42(1) and Section 100(1)(c) - excessive interest;

(vi) Contravention of Section 64(1)(b) – plain language;

(vii) Contravention of Section 106(4)(a) – Credit Insurance;

(viii) Contravention of Section 106(5)(b)(ii) read together with Regulation 33(1) – Insurance fees;

(ix) Contravention of Section 90(1) – Unlawful provisions;

(x) Contravention of section 90(2)(c) read with section 90(5) and regulation 32 – waiver of rights;

(xi) Contravention of Section 90(2)(b) – Overriding the Act;

(xii) Contravention of Section 68 – Confidentiality;

(xiii) Contravention of Section 125 – Right to settle;

(xiv) Contravention of Section 129 and 130 – debt enforcement procedures;

(xv) Contravention of Section 101(1) – Cost of credit

(xvi) Contravention of Section 110(1) – Fee statements;

(xvii) Contravention of section 108 and Regulation 35;

(xviii) Contravention of Section 102 (1)(a);

(xix) Contravention of Section 163.

13. The compliance notice required of the Applicant to take the following steps, with immediate effect, to address the non-compliance with the Act:

a. Perform affordability assessments as required by Section 81 of the Act before entering into credit agreements with consumers;

b. Provide consumers with pre-agreement statements and quotations that comply both in form and content with Form 20 under the Act before entering into small credit agreements;

c. Ensure that documents recording small credit agreements contain all the information as reflected in Form 20.2 under the Act;

d. Inform consumers of their right to wave the proposed credit insurance policies and disclose any fee, commission and benefit receivable by the Applicant;

e. Refrain from charging interest in excess of the maximum prescribed rate of interest in the Regulations;

f. Alter the provisions of the Applicant’s credit agreement to the extent required to render it lawful.

14. The Applicant objected to the compliance notice. In particular, the Applicant argued that the Compliance notice is not valid for various reasons. Further, by the time the Respondent issued the compliance notice to the Applicant and published the compliance notice on its website, one year after the initial investigation, the Applicant was already compliant. This factor, amongst others, according to the Applicant, rendered the issuing of the compliance notice superfluous which resulted in the Applicant bringing the current pplication before the Tribunal.

THE ISSUE TO BE DECIDED BY THE TRIBUNAL

15. The Applicant is applying in terms of section 56(1) of the Act for the review and setting aside of the compliance notice. Following the review, the Tribunal may confirm, modify or cancel all or part of the compliance notice. If the Tribunal modifies or confirms a compliance notice, section 101(2) of the Act states that the Applicant must comply with that notice as confirmed or modified within the time period specified in it. This section implies that when the Tribunal modifies or confirms a compliance notice, the Applicant will be given a certain period of time within which to comply with the compliance notice.

16. The central issue which the Tribunal must decide is whether the compliance notice has been issued in accordance with the law. If the compliance notice has not been issued in accordance with the law, it must be cancelled. If the compliance notice has been issued in accordance with the law, the Tribunal can decide to confirm or modify it.

THE HEARING

The Applicant, at the hearing, made the following submissions:-

17. The Applicant submitted that a third party cannot lay a complaint on behalf of another person without utilizing Form 29 and without the written consent of the complainant as required by Regulation 50 of the Act.

18. The Applicant made submissions that the Respondent was under the mistaken impression that the Applicant had a priority payment arrangement with Unisa, in contravention of the Act. This is based on section 1.6 of the Applicant’s agreement with Unisa which the Respondent alleges creates a preference for the Applicant on Unisa’s payroll over and above other debts of the consumer. The Applicant disputes this on the basis that the agreement with Unisa is not a credit agreement concluded with the consumer and thus the NCA does not apply to the agreement. Further, the agreement was drafted by Unisa and not the Applicant and thus the contra proferentem rule shall apply. In so far as this clause may be construed as giving the Applicant preference over other credit providers, the Applicant is willing to abandon its rights, in terms of this clause because it was never the intention or practice

of the Applicant that he be given preference over and above other credit providers and in any event the clause was amended after the initial investigation by Tlou and Whale.

19. Further submissions were made by the Applicant that the Respondent conducted an investigation and searched the premises of the Applicant without a search warrant in contravention of Section 153 of the Act. According to the Applicant, neither Tlou nor Whale possessed certificates of appointment, as inspectors, when they performed their functions on 29 June 2009. Further, neither Tlou nor Whale produced their certificates to the Applicant when they performed their functions on 29 June 2009, nor did they post facto deliver their certificates to the Applicant as contemplated by section 25 of the Act. Thus, neither Tlou nor Whale w authorised under the NCA more particularly Section 153 when they acted in terms of Section 154 of the Act. In the event that they were authorised to act in terms of the NCA, neither complied with section 153 by providing identification to the Applicant or handing a copy of the warrant to the Applicant. Therefore the failure to produce such certificates on the first day of the investigation renders the entire investigation irregular and hence making the subsequent issuing of the compliance notice invalid and unenforceable. The Applicant also submitted that it is a violation of the Applicant’s constitutional rights for the Respondent to allege that the Applicant has pre-authorised an inspection of the Applicant’s business premises based on the wording of Part 6 of

the Applicant’s application for registration form.

20. The compliance notice was issued and published a year after the investigation. The Applicant argued that the Respondent did not afford the Applicant an opportunity to make representations pertaining to the allegations of non-compliance prior to the compliance notice being issued and published on the Respondents website. The Applicant submits that had this been done, the Applicant would have informed the Respondent that it was already compliant on its own initiative, flowing out of the investigation by Tlou and Whale. The notice published on the Respondent’s website was therefore misleading and refers to a state of affairs that does not exist and thus impacts the Applicants dignitas, fama and goodwill. The Applicant submits that the Respondents actions were pre-mature, ultra vires and a breach of the audi alteram partem rule and thus is procedurally unfair.

21. In so far as the alleged contraventions are concerned the Applicant disputes the allegations and has offered an explanation to the Respondent in an attempt to settle the matter, alternatively the Applicant has disputed the allegations as being without valid grounds. In respect of the balance of the alleged contraventions, conceded by the Applicant, the Applicant submits that he has remedied his business practices flowing out of the investigation and was compliant at the time of the issue and publication of the compliance notice.

22. A year has elapsed since the investigation and the decision to issue a compliance notice to the Applicant. This the Applicant submits is an unreasonably long delay during which period the Applicant became compliant, some 10 months before the issuing and publication of the compliance notice. Thus the allegations of contraventions of the Act in the compliance notice are moot. The Applicant also submitted that he co-operated with the Respondent and corrected issues immediately once he was made aware of being in contravention of the Act.

23. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the Applicant requires an order from the Tribunal that the compliance notice, issued against the Applicant, be set aside.

The Respondent made the following submissions at the hearing:

24. The Respondent made submissions at the hearing that the CEO of the Respondent could accept complaints from any person, based on the Act and that Form 29 of the Regulations need not be complied with in the lodging of the complaint.

25. The Respondent submits that the agreement between the Applicant and Unisa gives the Applicant priority (first right) to payments to the Applicant over any other credit provider, and that this is unlawful. For the Applicant to argue that this is not a credit agreement on the basis that it is not an agreement between a credit provider and a consumer is according to the Respondent avoiding the issue because such conduct is precluded by Section 91(c) of the Act. In so far as the Applicant has revised the old agreement and now has a “new agreement” it is the submission of the Respondent that both the old and new agreement fall foul of the provisions of Section 90(2). The argument that clause 1.6 of the Unisa agreement provides for a priority “but a priority

over the employee, and not a priority over other credit providers” is not supported by the language of the clause. It is the submission of the Respondent that “first right” gives the Applicant priority over all other deductions, credit providers, employer deductions and the rights of the employee. It is clear from the Applicant’s conduct that the Applicant has conceded the correctness of the complaint and thus the correctness of the compliance notice in this regard.

26. It is the submission of the Respondent that both Tlou and Whale had certificates which comply with Section 25 of the Act issued on 6 April 2009 in respect of the Applicant’s premises in Sinoville, Pretoria and dated 10 June 2009 in respect of the Applicant’s premises in Muckleneuk, Pretoria. On the day of the investigation the inspectors were issued with and were in possession of certificates appointing them and authorizing the inspection. The Applicant complains that the certificates were not presented to the Applicant. The submission of the Respondent is that the certificates were indeed presented to the Applicant and to Bands. If on the Applicant’s version the certificates were not presented to the Applicant, it is the submission of the Respondent that non-compliance with section 25 does not render the compliance notice invalid.

27. The Respondent submits that the Applicant’s reliance on section 153 of the Act is misplaced because section 153 and 154 legislate for the entering and searching of premises of unregistered credit providers. The Respondent does not purport to rely on section 153 because this was not a search in terms of section 154 but an enquiry in terms of section 50(2)(a). It is the submission of the Respondent that no search was conducted of the premises and that the Respondent’s application form for registration, part 6 thereof, in any event grants the Respondent permission to enter the registered premises and to conduct reasonable enquiries for compliance purposes. All information and documentation were further provided by the Applicant and Bands.

28. In so far as the Applicant was not given an opportunity to make representations prior to the compliance notice being published, the Respondent submits that it is not necessary for the Respondent to accept representations subject to the issuing of the compliance notice in terms of section 55(1), but prior to the publication. The Applicant was fully involved in the investigations and made all the representations at the time. Further the Respondent has the obligation in terms of section 15(c) of the Act to monitor the market and the industry to ensure that prohibited conduct is prevented or detected and prosecuted and publication of the notice is an effective tool to achieve this purpose.

29. The Respondent made submissions related to the various contraventions as they appear in the compliance notice and the investigators’ report. The Respondent argued that these contraventions are clear from the evidence led and from the conduct of the Applicant, who on the Applicant’s own admission “corrected” its practices. Thus there is no basis for the compliance notice to be set aside and the compliance notice stands to be upheld by the Tribunal.

CONSIDERATION OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW

30. The following four principal issues were argued before the Tribunal and requires decisions:

Complaint laid by a third party not by the complainant

31. In the Act, the definition of a “complainant” is a person who has filed a complaint in terms of Section 136 (1) of the Act. Section 136 (1) provides as follows:” Any person may submit a complaint concerning an alleged contravention of this Act to the National Credit Regulator in the prescribed manner and form.”

32. In the matter before the Tribunal the initial complaint was lodged with the Regulator by Unisa, the employer of various consumers. The complaint was lodged in the form of a letter addressed to the Respondent by Unisa and in a meeting with the Respondent and Professor Kelbrick, from Unisa. Form 29, a requirement in terms of the Act, was not utilised by Unisa, nor was Regulation 50 complied with which requires the written consent of a consumer for a third party to lodge complaint on behalf of a consumer. In fact, the contrary is true where at least one consumer made an affidavit in which he states, under oath, that he did not consent to complaints being lodged against the Respondent, on his behalf.

33. As a starting point it is clear from a reading of Section 136 (1) of the Act that the complainant need not be the actual consumer to whom a loan was granted but in the words of the Act could be “any person”. The Tribunal also finds, based on Section 136 of the Act, that Unisa a competent party to lodge a complaint and .

34. The record reflects and the Tribunal finds however that Regulation 50 was not complied with nor was an official form 29 lodged by Unisa in compliance with the Act.

Priority Payment arrangement

35. Section 90(2) provides as follows:

“A provision in a credit agreement is unlawful if-

…(b) it directly or indirectly purports to –

(i) waive or deprive a consumer of a right set out in this Act;

(ii) (avoid a credit provider’s obligation or duty in terms of this Act;

(iii) set aside or override the effect of any provision of this Act;

(iv) authorise the credit provider to

(aa) do anything that is unlawful in terms of this Act; or

(bb) fail to do anything that is required in terms of this Act,”

…(m) it purports to direct or authorise any person engaged in processing payments to give priority to payments for the credit provider over any other credit provider;...

Section 91 states:

“... A credit provider must not-

(a) directly or indirectly require or induce a consumer to enter into a supplementary agreement, or sign a document, that contains a provision that would be unlawful if it were included in a credit agreement.

(b) request or demand a consumer to –

(i) give the credit provider temporary or permanent possession of an instrument referred to in section 90(2)(l)(i) other than for the purpose of identification, or to make a copy of the instrument; (ii) reveal any personal identification code or number contemplated in section 90(2)(l)(ii); or

(c) direct, or knowingly permit, any other person to do anything referred to in this section on behalf or for the benefit of the credit provider.”

36. Clause 1.6 of the memorandum of agreement between the Applicant and Unisa provides as follows : “the employee undertakes to allow Telsek People’s Society CC ... the first right to any monies owing to employees by the employer be it, accrued leave pay, or whatever.”

37. A plain reading of this clause purports to direct Unisa to give priority to the Applicant (first right) to any monies due to the employee (consumer) over any other credit provider. The ‘new agreement’ provides as follows: “as a precondition of this loan, the consumer herewith submits himself / herself to the salary deduction agreement between People’s Society and his / her employer, and herewith irrevocably authorises and grants Peoples’ Society full proxy to arrange salary deductions with his / her employer for as long as he / she owes money to People’s Society.”

38. these clauses purport to direct or authorise any person engaged in processing payments to give priority to payments for a particular credit provider over any other credit provider. This is in contravention of the NCA and thus unlawful.

Were inspectors Whale and Tlou duly authorised to conduct the inspection and were the inspectors Tlou and Whale in possession of certificates to authorise the investigation.

39. Section 25(2) of the Act reads as follows: “When an inspector performs a function in terms of Section 139 or Chapter 8, the inspector must (a) be in possession of a certificate of appointment issued to that inspector in terms of subsection (1); and (b) show that certificate to any person who – (i) is affected by the inspectors’ actions in terms of this act; and (ii) requests to see the certificate.”

40. It is necessary for the Tribunal to make a definitive finding on how section 25(2) should be interpreted. The Respondent argues that when Tlou and Wale visited the Respondent’s premises they were not in possession of certificates. The certificates were further not shown to the Respondent as required by Section 25(2) on the date of the visit and those produced later were undated. Both Tlou and Whale gave evidence under oath in this regard. Whale maintained that he was both in possession of a certificate and that he showed the certificate to the Respondent. Tlou gave evidence that he was in possession of the certificate, showed it to Bands but only handed a copy over to the Respondent later on the day of the inspection because the photocopy machine of the Respondent was out of order on the day of the inspection. Tlou therefore made a copy at the Respondent’s premises and handed over the copy later on the day after the inspection.

41. At the hearing a discrepancy arose as to the copy of the certificate itself. The date space on the Applicant’s copy was blank. The date space on the Respondent’s copy was 9 June 2009 and this is the copy the Respondent handed over to the Applicant the day after the inspection. Notwithstanding this aspect the Respondent maintained that the Respondent was duly authorised to conduct the inspection and a failure to hand over the certificate, on the Applicant’s version cannot render the compliance notice invalid. This is disputed by the Applicant.

42. It is not disputed that certificates were handed over to the Applicant but rather the date on the certificates were handed over and the date of issue of the certificates to render the inspection lawful. On being questioned as to the undated certificate, Tlou conceded that it may have been an “oversight” on the part of the office. The wording of the Act is however peremptory not discretionary.

43. Section 25(1)(b) states as follows: The Chief Executive Officer – (b) must issue each inspector with a certificate in the prescribed form stating that the person has been appointed as an inspector in terms of the act.” It therefore follows that the date of the certificate must pre-date the inspection to render the inspection lawful. The documentary evidence before the Tribunal is that a copy of an undated certificate which the Applicant states was handed to him the day after the inspection

and a dated certificate which the Tlou states under oath was handed to the Applicant the day after the inspection. These are two

conflicting versions but considered with the concession of Tlou sways the Tribunal, on a balance of probability, to accept and find that on the day of the inspection a certificate was not handed over to the Respondent and that the certificate handed over to the Respondent the day after the inspection may well have been undated. In the view of the Tribunal, this would render the inspection invalid and it flows that it is not necessary for the Tribunal to make a finding with regard to sections 153, 154 and 50(2)(a).

44. The Applicant made submissions that it was a violation of the Applicant’s constitutional rights to grant permission for an inspection of the registered premises based on Part 6 of the Applicant’s application for registration as a credit provider.

45. Although the Tribunal is of the view that on the basis of this procedural irregularity as set out in paragraph 17 and 34 the matter could be dispensed with on this ground alone, and the compliance notice should be set aside, the Tribunal has decided to deal with the merits of the matter because it is in the interests of justice that the matter be dispensed with without further delay.

Opportunity for the Applicant to make representations before a Compliance Notice is issued

46. Whether the Regulator must first give the Applicant an opportunity to respond to the Compliance Notice before issuing the compliance notice is considered in the light of PAJA.

47. The actions of the Respondent qualify as administrative action. That being so the issuing of a compliance notice is governed by the Promotion of Administrative Justice (PAJA) Act 3 of 2000. Therefore the issuing of a compliance notice must be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. In order to decide whether the compliance notices are legally valid it is necessary to consider -

(1) The procedure to be followed prior to the serving of the compliance notices; and

(2) The compliance notice.

48. PAJA provides as follows:

“3. Procedurally fair administrative action affecting any person

(1) Administrative action which materially and adversely affects the rights or legitimate expectations of any person must be procedurally fair.

(2) (a) A fair administrative procedure depends on the circumstances of each case; In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, an administrator, subject to subsection (4) must give a person referred to in subsection (1) –

(i) adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed administrative action;

(ii) a reasonable opportunity to make representations;

(iii) a clear statement of the administrative action;

(iv) adequate notice of any right of review or internal appeal where applicable; and

(v) adequate notice of the right to request reasons.”

49. This aspect was fully ventilated in City of Johannesburg v NCC where it was decided by the Tribunal that a person under investigation is entitled to be informed of the nature of the investigation and is entitled to make representations. Respondent argued that the Applicant was fully involved in the investigations and made all the representations at the time and that it is not necessary for the Respondent to seek or accept representations subject to the issuing of the compliance notice in terms of Section 55(1) but prior to its publication. The Applicant’s rights are fully protected under Section 56 in that the Applicant has a right to apply for the review of a compliance notice.

50. The record reflects that the parties had discussions prior to the issuing and publication of the compliance notice and in any event that the Applicant had a year to make any representations, should he so wish in the period before the issuing and publication of the compliance notice. The Applicant cannot therefore argue that it did not have a full opportunity to make any such representations. The long delay between the initial investigation and the issuing and publication of the compliance notice favoured the Applicant and gave the Applicant full opportunity to make such representations. Thus the Tribunal finds that the Applicant is the author of its own demise and that this point should fail.

The merits of the matter

51. Section 55 states as follows: (1) Subject to subsection (2), the National Credit Regulator may issue a compliance notice in the prescribed form to – (a) a person or association of persons whom the National Credit Regulator on reasonable grounds believes – (i) has failed to comply with a provision of the Act’ or (ii) is engaging in an activity in a manner that is inconsistent with this Act; or (b) a registrant whom the National Credit Regulator believes has failed to comply with a condition of its registration.”

52. The Tribunal finds it rather odd that the compliance notice was issued a year after the investigation. In this period the evidence reveals that the Applicant attempted to settle the matter and changed its business practices, whilst disputing the allegation of contraventions of the Act. The investigators report and the evidence led supports the fact that in some respects the Applicant was in contravention of the Act and in some respects the Applicant was not. This matter is complicated by the undue long delay in the issuing of the compliance notice.

53. In considering this matter the Tribunal is concerned about the prejudice to consumers and whether consumers suffered loss as a result of the conduct of the Applicant. No evidence was placed before the Tribunal, by the Respondent, for the Tribunal to establish the loss suffered by consumers. A follow up report would have assisted the Tribunal if the Tribunal has regard to the date of the investigation in June 2009, the issuing of the compliance notice in July 2010 and the hearing in 2014, some five years after the investigation.

54. These contraventions occurred in the early days of the Act when the Respondent should have been vigilant and acted swiftly against transgressors of the Act and credit providers were still trying to find their feet. There is no evidence before the Tribunal that the Applicant was in contravention of the Act a year after the investigation and that the Regulator on reasonable grounds believes this to be the case to the extent as stated in the compliance notice. No explanation has been provided by the Respondent, to the Tribunal, for the undue delay in the issuing of the compliance notice.

55. Accordingly, there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that the Respondent was in contravention of the Act and its conditions of registration to the extent as stated in the compliance notice. It is therefore extremely difficult for the Tribunal to make a finding on each and every contravention in favour of the Respondent.

CONCLUSION

56. The Tribunal is mindful of the fact that this matter has been pending for a considerable period of time and that it is important to bring the matter to finality. The Tribunal has also considered that consumers’ files have been with the Applicant for the past 5 years and that there has been no follow up investigation to confirm the current state of affairs. Thus to this extent the Tribunal must arrive at a decision that is just, fair and equitable.

ORDER

57. Accordingly, the Tribunal makes the following order-

(1) The Compliance notice is set aside;

(2) No order as to costs.

Dated at Johannesburg on the 10th day of November 2014.

[Signed]

Ms PA Beck

Member

Prof B Dumisa (Presiding Member) and Mr X May (Member) concurring.