Tshabalala v City Council of Lekoa (337/90) [1992] ZASCA 54; [1992] 2 All SA 105 (A) (30 March 1992)

Tshabalala v City Council of Lekoa (337/90) [1992] ZASCA 54; [1992] 2 All SA 105 (A) (30 March 1992)

The Supreme Court of Appeal found that, on the balance of probabilities, Constable Kgabane was acting in his capacity as a municipal police officer when he shot the appellant. The evidence established that Kgabane intervened in a fight, fired a warning shot, threatened to arrest and detain individuals, used his official firearm, and reported the incident in accordance with police procedures. These actions were consistent with the performance of police duties, notwithstanding that Kgabane was off duty and in civilian clothes. The court held that the respondent is vicariously liable for the delict committed by its employee, as the shooting occurred within the course and scope of employment....

Citation
[1992] ZASCA 54
Parties
Appellant: Abel Tshabalala; Respondent: City Council of Lekoa
Court
Supreme Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction
South Africa
Judgment Date
30 March 1992
Case Number
337/90
Procedural Posture
Civil Appeal / Appeal From Order of Absolution From the Instance in the Court a Quo
Outcome
Appeal allowed; respondent found vicariously liable for the delict committed by its employee.
Judges
E M Grosskopf, Hoexter, Smalberger, F H Grosskopf, Goldstone
Legal Topics
Vicarious Liability, Municipal Police Powers, Course and Scope of Employment, Personal Injury, Quantum of Damages

Case Brief

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Parties

Abel Tshabalala

Appellant

City Council of Lekoa

Respondent

Procedural Posture

Civil Appeal / Appeal From Order of Absolution From the Instance in the Court a Quo

  1. 1 Whether Constable Kgabane acted within the course and scope of his employment as a municipal police officer when he shot the appellant.
  2. 2 Whether the respondent is vicariously liable for the unlawful shooting committed by its employee.
  3. 3 Whether the evidence supports the inference that the shooting was performed in the execution of police duties.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court of Appeal found that, on the balance of probabilities, Constable Kgabane was acting in his capacity as a municipal police officer when he shot the appellant. The evidence established that Kgabane intervened in a fight, fired a warning shot, threatened to arrest and detain individuals, used his official firearm, and reported the incident in accordance with police procedures. These actions were consistent with the performance of police duties, notwithstanding that Kgabane was off duty and in civilian clothes. The court held that the respondent is vicariously liable for the delict committed by its employee, as the shooting occurred within the course and scope of employment....

Court Disposition

Appeal allowed; respondent found vicariously liable for the delict committed by its employee.

Orders

  • The appeal is allowed with costs, including the costs of the petition dated 27 August 1991.
  • The order of the court a quo is set aside and substituted with a finding that the defendant is vicariously liable to compensate the plaintiff for the delict committed by Constable Kgabane.