Tshedza Protective Services CC v North West Housing Corporation and Others (M146/2022) [2024] ZANWHC 192 (23 July 2024)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

NORTH WEST DIVISION – MAHIKENG

CASE NO: M146/2022

Reportable: NO

Circulate to Judges: NO

Circulate to Magistrates: NO

Circulate to Regional Magistrates: NO

In the matter between:

TSHEDZA PROTECTIVE SERVICES CC APPLICANT

and

THE NORTH WEST HOUSING

CORPORATION

FIRST RESPONDENT

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

OF THE NORTH WEST HOUSING

CORPORATION

SECOND RESPONDENT

KATSHE CONSTRUCTION

AND SECURITY SERVICES

THIRD RESPONDENT

Date of Hearing:

18 April 2024

Date Judgment Reserved:

18 April 2024

Judgment is handed down electronically by distribution to the parties’ legal representatives by e-mail. The date that the judgment is deemed to be handed down is 23 JULY 2024 at 10h00.

ORDER

(i) The decision to appoint the third respondent as service provider is reviewed and set aside.

(ii) The first and second respondents are to pay the costs, jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.

JUDGMENT

REDDY J

Introduction

[1] This is opposed application premised on the provisions of section 6 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (‘PAJA’) in which the decision of the first respondent to appoint the third respondent as a service provider is sought to be declared invalid alternatively reviewed and set aside. The applicant further seeks to have the decision by the first respondent, to terminate the contract entered with the applicant, be declared invalid and/or set aside.

The parties

[2] A proper description of the parties is necessary for the purposes of pragmatism. It also facilitates easy reading.

[3] The applicant is Tshedza Protective Services CC (“Tshedza”) a security company registered in accordance with the company laws of the Republic of South Africa as well as the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (‘PSIRA’).

[4] The first respondent is the North West Housing Corporation (“NWHC”), a state owned enterprise or a public entity established in terms of the North West Housing Corporation Act, 24 of 1982.

[5] The second respondent is the Chief Executive Officer, NWHC (‘CEO’), who is cited in his official capacity as the administrative head of the NWHC and is responsible for the day- to-day operational activities of the NWHC. The CEO is cited as a party who may have an interest in the matter.

[6] The third respondent is Katshe Construction and Security Services (‘Katshe’). Katshe is cited as it is alleged to have been appointed by the NWHC to render security services and which appointment is the subject matter of this review application. Tshedza does not seek any substantial relief against Katshe. In the event of opposition, however, Tshedza seeks a punitive costs order. Katshe has not filed any opposing papers.

Background

[7] The NWHC, in terms of its Supply Chain and Management Policy Procedure (“SCMP”), advertised a tender for the provision of security services at its premises under tender number NWHC 01/2020. Tshedza was one of the tenderers. On 08 February 2021, the NWHC issued a letter of award to Tshedza as the successful bidder to render security services at the NWHC sites for a period of thirty-six (36) months. On 10 February 2021 Tshedza accepted the appointment. The letter of award was followed by the signing of a service level agreement (‘SLA’) which inter alia delineated and defined the timelines applicable to contract, the terms and conditions and deliverables of the project.

[8] The salient terms of the SLA in broad determined the commencement date as 01 March 2021, with clause 25 of the SLA defining the termination prerequisites. Tshedza contends that it commenced with the rendering of security services without it being notified of any shortcomings in the security services rendered.

[9] Tshedza avows that during September 2021 two incidents of theft occurred within the precinct of the NWHC. Four laptops and a cell phone were removed unlawfully. These incidents were duly reported to the NWHC, which in turn was required to register criminal cases with the South African Police Services (‘SAPS’). The rationale underpinning the registering of criminal cases to SAPS was for a CAS Number to be secured for insurance purposes. To this end, the provision of a CAS Number was a sina qua non for the processing of an insurance claim. Tshedza acknowledges that the NWHC had not done so.

[10] On 08 January 2022 information was received that a newly appointed security provider would service the NWHC. On 10 January 2022 this information was verified by a communique from the Acting Chief Executive Officer who terminated the SLA between the NWHC and Tshedza with immediate effect. It was anticipated that Tshedza would vacate the premises of the NWHC by 14 January 2022. The nub of the cancellation of the SLA was attributed to the negligence of Tshedza in dealing with the theft of the laptops and cell phone.

[11] On 11 January 2022 the NWHC caused a meeting to be convened. At this meeting, the decision to cancel the SLA pertaining to Tshedza was reiterated. Notwithstanding vigorous objections from the representative of Tshedza, the NWHC stood firm on its decision.

[12] On 03 February 2022, the NWHC launched an urgent application in which it sought to interdict Tshedza from posting any of its security officers at various points within the NWHC strategic protection points and by implication continuing with Tshedza’s normal security detail. On 08 February 2022 this urgent application was removed by notice from the roll of the North Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria as there had been no invite on Caselines by 12h00 on 03 February 2022. On 17 February 2022 same was dismissed with costs, which costs included the costs of two counsel.

The version North West Housing Corporation

[13] On 10 January 2022, the NWHC communicated to Tshedza that it would be cancelling the SLA between the parties. This was due to Tshedza having allegedly materially and grossly breached the duties of the service provider provided for in clauses 9.1 to 9.37.

[14] As an automatic consequence, the NWHC placed much store on incidents of criminality. This related to instances of theft. The first theft allegedly was committed over a weekend when two laptops from the office of the Head of Legal Services was removed. The second related to the alleged theft of two laptops as well as a cell phone from same office during normal working hours.

[15] The NWHC averred that there existed a real risk of this repetitive criminal conduct escalating. Its concern being that it may escalate to a level where personnel may be physically harmed given the ease in which criminal elements had been able to access the NWHC premises. These incidents demonstrated a material and gross breach of clause 9 of the SLA, entitling NWHC to cancel or terminate same. Relying on the conditions of the SLA, the NWHC invoked clause 25 read with clause 23 which provided for the basis for termination of the SLA in instances of a breach by party.

[16] By virtue of the seriousness of the acts inherent in the breaches and the risks involved in retaining the services of Tshedza, the NWHC cancelled the SLA with immediate effect within the purview of the breach clauses. The NWHC stated that Tshedza did not retort to these allegations but elected to focus on the appointment of Katshe.

[17] On the same day, 10 January 2022, the NWHC issued a Request for Quotation (‘RFQ’) for the provision of temporary security services for a period of three (3) months. This would have made it permissible for the NWHC to process a tender pursuant to the termination of the SLA between the NWHC and Tshedza.

[18] Three (3) companies were identified on the supplier database of the NWHC to respond to the RFQ. Tshedza was not invited to submit a RFQ “due to the pending cancelling of the SLA…” Katshe was the successful bidder and was duly awarded the contract in accordance with the RFQ.

Submissions by Tshedza

[19] Advocate Ngwana underscores the chronology around the RFQ, which he avows closed on 13 January 2022. The RFQ limited the service provider to a three-month period. Advocate Ngwana asserts that the three-month period referred to in the RFQ was intentionally designed to circumvent proper procedure and aimed at advantaging Katshe to the prejudice of the Tshedza. The submission ran that the NWHC was implicitly aware that it would not be required to go for an open tender if the amount for the duration of the contract was less than R500 000.00 (five hundred thousand rand). A RFQ was not sent to Tshedza who would have provided an identical service to that of Katshe.

[20] Simply put, Advocate Ngwana emphasised that the RFQ was not executed openly and fairly. Given the manner of the various extensions of the RFQ by the NWHC, the RFQ was not limited to three-months and exceeded the R500 000.00, threshold. Advocate Ngwana contended that where a tender exceeds R500 000.00, the RFQ route would not be the appropriate method of appointing a service provider. In such circumstances, an open tender process is to be followed within the tenets of the Treasury Regulations. This purposeful avoidance of the Treasury Regulations was to create a preference for Katshe and unjustifiably appoint Katshe.

[21] Ultimately what stands out Advocate Ngwana continued, is that the NWHC has saturating funds that have not been budgeted for, which is inappropriate and irregular to the public sector and/or government or the NWHC.

[22] Advocate Ngwana further submitted that the appointment of Katshe as a service provider was not of an urgent or an interim nature. In fact, the RFQ and the tender award was concluded within less than three days. This truncated timeline is in contravention of the Public Management Finance Act 1 of 1999, which in broad requires that the securing of a service provider should be done within seven (7) days. For a period that falls shy of the seven-day (7) day requirement, an application for a deviation should be made to Treasury. An application for a deviation has not been made.

[23] Advocate Ngwana contended that the B-BBEE certificate that was provided by Katshe was not initially signed by the author or commissioned by a Commissioner of Oaths before the award was made. When this was raised as a concern, it appears to have been subsequently corrected. The Unemployment Insurance Fund Certificate of Compliance presented by Katshe had expired. To cure this, the NWHC attached an undated

document which purports to emanate from the Department of Employment and Labour. The document indicates that the issuing of the

Unemployment Insurance Fund Certificates of Compliance had been temporarily closed, and that the issue of the Unemployment Insurance

Fund Certificate of Compliance and Tender letters had been suspended. Premised on these deficiencies, Advocate Ngwana concluded that the decision to appoint Katshe as service provider should be reviewed and set aside.

Submissions by the North West Housing Corporation and Chief Executive Officer of the North West Housing Corporation

[24] Advocate Maisela submitted that on an examination of the replying affidavit of Tshedza, it unequivocally states that the NWHC failed to follow the arbitration mechanism when it terminated the SLA. This concession leads to the implosion of the relief that is sought by Tshedza in respect of the termination of the SLA that was concluded between it, and the NWHC. Consequently, this decision is not invalid and therefore not reviewable.

[25] In addressing the appointment of Katshe, Advocate Maisela submitted that the version of Tshedza is predicated on an ill-contrived understanding of the Supply Chain Management Policy (‘the SCM’). On termination of the SLA with Tshedza, the NWHC issued a RFQ premised on clauses 9, 17 and 18 of the SCM policy. To make short shrift of this contention, Advocate Maisela contended that Katshe was appointed within the threshold stipulated in the Treasury Regulations and the SCM policy.

[26] In dealing with the various peremptory documents that had to be annexed Advocate Maisela posits the following in his written heads of argument:

“18. Having realised that its case is hanging on a thin thread, the applicant sought to find a stronger thread to support its case. It did so by attacking the BEE certificate of the third respondent, UIF Compliance Certificate and confirmation of registration on the Security Sector Provident Fund. All of these are baseless and the first respondent answers sufficiently to the allegations in paragraphs 5.33, 5.34 and 5.38. Accordingly, it is submitted that these attacks are without merit and fall to be dismissed.

19. It is therefore, submitted that the applicant has not made any case to support their prayer and the appoint of the third respondent by the first respondent is invalid and falls to be reviewed.”

The law

[27] To give effect to s 33 of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, PAJA was enacted. In Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others [2004] ZACC 15; 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC); 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) paragraph 25, the Constitutional Court spelled out the framework for the application of PAJA, as follows:

“The cause of action for the judicial review of administrative action now ordinarily arises from PAJA, not from the common law as in the past. And the authority of PAJA to ground such causes of action rests squarely on the Constitution. It is not necessary to consider here causes of action for judicial review of administrative action that do not fall within the scope of PAJA. As PAJA gives effect to s 33 of the Constitution, matters relating to the interpretation and application of PAJA will of course be constitutional matters.”

[28] An applicant for a judicial review of administration action cannot circumvent extant legislation. Direct reliance on section 33(1) of the Constitution or the common law in the face of PAJA falls foul of the ethos of section 33(1) of the Constitution. In effect, an application founded exclusively on section 33(1) of the Constitution would be contrary to the purpose of s 33, which has been given effect to by the enactment of PAJA.

[29] Moreover, section 217 of the Constitution requires that when an organ of state in the national, provincial or local sphere of government, or any other institution identified in national legislation, contracts for goods or services, it must do so in accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective.

[30] Section 217(1) of the Constitution and the legislative and regulatory framework promulgated pursuant to the provisions of that section, such as the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999, Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 and subordinate legislation like the Treasury Regulations, and other instruments like Supply Chain Management Policies provide in very clear and simple language how an organ of state in any of the three spheres of government, if authorised by law, needs to proceed when contracting for goods and services. See: Joubert Galpin Searle Inc v Road Accident Fund 2014 (4) SA 148 (ECP) at paragraph 57.

[31] An application for judicial review in terms of PAJA is sound only if the impugned decision (or failure to decide) constituted ‘administrative action’. The import of the term ‘administrative action’ is determined by the statutory definition contained in s 1 of PAJA:

‘“administrative action” means any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by- (a) an organ of state, when- (i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution; or (ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation; or (b) a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of an empowering provision, which adversely affects the rights of any person and which has a direct, external legal effect, but does not include-

(aa) the executive powers or functions of the National Executive, including the powers or functions referred to in sections 79 (1) and (4), 84 (2) (a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (g), (h), (i) and (k), 85 (2) (b), (c), (d) and (e), 91 (2), (3), (4) and (5), 92 (3), 93, 97, 98, 99 and 100 of the Constitution;

(bb) the executive powers or functions of the Provincial Executive, including the powers or functions referred to in sections 121 (1) and (2), 125 (2) (d), (e) and (f), 126, 127 (2), 132 (2), 133 (3) (b), 137, 138, 139 and 145 (1) of the Constitution;

(cc) the executive powers or functions of a municipal council;

(dd) the legislative functions of Parliament, a provincial legislature or a municipal council;

(ee) the judicial functions of a judicial officer of a court referred to in section 166 of the Constitution or of a Special Tribunal established under section 2 of the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act, 1996 (Act 74 of 1996), and the judicial functions of a traditional leader under customary law or any other law;

(ff) a decision to institute or continue a prosecution;

(gg) a decision relating to any aspect regarding the nomination, selection or appointment of a judicial officer or any other person, by the Judicial Service Commission in terms of any law;

(hh) any decision taken, or failure to take a decision, in terms of any provision of the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000; or (ii) (1).’ any decision taken, or failure to take a decision, in terms of section 4.”

[32] In adjudicating PAJA matters, a crucial legal finding is to be made at the onset. Simply put, does the matter before the Court fall within the definition of “administration action”. Whilst the determination of what constitutes administration action at times may become blurred, there can be no all-encompassing test. A case-by-case approach is best advocated. See: Calibre Clinical Consultants (Pty) Ltd v National Bargaining Council for the Road Freight Industry [2010] ZASCA 94 (19 July 2010); 2010 5 SA 457 (SCA); [2010] 4 All SA 561 at para 4, , President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others [1999] ZACC 11 (10 September 1999); 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC); 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 at paragraph 143.

[33] In Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and Others [2014] ZACC 18 (10 June 2014); 2014 (8) BCLR 930 (CC); 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC) at paragraph 33, the Constitutional Court closely analysed the meaning of ‘administrative action’ by an organ of state when exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any empowering legislation and determined that it was characterised by the concurrent incidence of all of the following seven elements:

“(a) a decision of an administrative nature;

(b) by an organ of state or a natural or juristic person;

(c) exercising a public power or performing a public function;

(d) in terms of any legislation or an empowering provision;

(e) that adversely affects rights;

(f) that has a direct, external legal effect; and

(g) that does not fall under any of the exclusions listed in the definition.”

[34] It is indubitable that a decision to award a tender is an administrative action as defined in PAJA. This holds true from the facts in casu. See: Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape [2006] ZACC 16; 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC); 2007 (3) BCLR 300 (CC) paragraph 21; Chairperson, Standing Tender Committee and Others v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd and Others [2005] ZASCA 90; 2008 (2) SA 638 (SCA) para 19; All Pay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency and Others [2013] ZACC 42; 2014 (1) SA 604 (CC); 2014 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) paragraph 45.

[35] Section 6 (the power to review administrative action) and section 8 (the grant of an appropriate remedy) are central to PAJA. Interspersed between section 6 and 8 of PAJA is section 7. Section 7 can appositely be described as a decisive provision in appropriate circumstances.

[36] In Dengetenge Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sphere Mining and Development Company Ltd (2014 (3) BCLR 265 (CC); 2014 (5) SA 138 (CC)) [2013] ZACC 52; [2013] ZACC 48, the apex Court elaborated on the duty in terms of PAJA to exhaust internal remedies, stating that:

‘[119] In clear and peremptory terms, section 7(2) prohibits courts from reviewing "an administrative action in terms of this Act unless any internal remedy provided for in any other law has first been exhausted”. Where, as in this case, there is a provision for internal remedies, the section imposes an obligation on the court to satisfy itself that such remedies have been exhausted. If the court is not satisfied, it must decline to adjudicate the matter until the applicant has either exhausted internal remedies or is granted an exemption. Since PAJA applies to every administrative action, this means that there can be no review of an administrative action by any court where internal remedies have not been exhausted, unless an exemption has been granted in terms of section 7(2)(c).’

[37] In Reed v Master of the High Court [2005] ZAECHC 5; [2005] 2 All SA 429 (E), it was pointed out that section 7(2) applies to remedies and not to other forms of potential extra-curial redress. In this regard the following was postulated:

‘A remedy, in this context, is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as a "means of counteracting or removing

something undesirable, redress, relief; legal redress”. Inherent in this concept as it is used in its legal context is the

idea that a remedy, in order to qualify to be regarded as such, must be capable, as a matter of law, of providing what the Constitution

terms appropriate relief: it must be an effective remedy. Section 7(2) does not, in other words, place an obligation on a person

aggrieved by a decision to exhaust all possible avenues of redress provided for in the political or administrative system – such as approaching a parliamentary committee or a Member of Parliament, or writing to complain to the superiors of the decision-maker.

Similarly, it is not required of an aggrieved person that he or she approach one or more of the Chapter 9 institutions – such as the Public Protector or the Human Rights Commission – prior to resorting to judicial review.’

[38] Plasket J (as he then was) went on to state that:

‘The word "internal” qualifies the word "remedy” in s7(2) of the PAJA. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines internal (in this context) to mean "intrinsic”, "of or pertaining to or interior of something; within the limits of something” and "used or applying within an organisation”.’

What then is the meaning of the composite expression internal remedy? In this regard, Plasket J said (at para [25] (footnotes omitted) that –

‘The dictionary definitions of the words "internal” and "remedy” that I have cited are in harmony with the way the composite term "internal remedy” is understood in the more specialised context with which this matter is concerned: when the term is used in administrative law, it is used to connote an administrative appeal – an appeal, usually on the merits, to an official or tribunal within the same administrative hierarchy as the initial decision-maker – or, less common, an internal review. Often the appellate body will be more senior than the initial decision-maker, either administratively or politically, or possess greater expertise. Inevitably, the appellate body is given the power to confirm, substitute or vary the decision of the initial decision-maker on the merits. In South Africa there is no system of administrative appeals. Instead internal appeal tribunals are created by statute on an ad hoc basis.’

...

‘A distinctive feature of internal remedies is that they are extra-curial (or domestic). In Golube v Oosthuizen 1955 (3) SA 1 (T) for instance, De Wet J, in the context of deciding whether the applicant was under a duty to exhaust internal remedies, observed that the "mere fact that the Legislature has provided an extra-judicial right of review or appeal is not sufficient to imply an intention that recourse to a Court of law should be barred until the aggrieved person has exhausted his statutory remedies”.

Discussion

[39] Tshedza has persisted with the relief as set out in the Notice of motion. For purposes of brevity, I deal with each form of relief ad seriatum. The first part of the relief that Tshedza pursues specifically against the NWHC is to have the decision by NWHC to terminate the contract between itself and the NWHC be declared invalid and/or set aside. Tshedza has committed a glaring and obvious procedural error. Tshedza has simply parachuted itself into court, without due consideration of the tenet’s attendant in section 7 of PAJA and observing the strict character of this provision. It has bypassed the trite legal reasoning suggested in Dengetenge Holdings.

[40] It is not Tshedza’s version that the saving provision as demonstrated by section 7(2)(c) of PAJA comes to its rescue. In broad strokes section 7(2) of PAJA entrenches the concept of exceptional circumstances and on application by the person concerned, exempts such person from the obligation to exhaust any internal remedy if the court or tribunal deems it in the interest of justice. In my view, Tshedza has failed cohere with the provisions of section 7 of PAJA either in the main or it terms of the escape clause. Therefore, the first part of the relief sought by Tshedza must fail.

[41] In terms of the second part of the relief sought, the RFQ required the following peremptory returnable documents and schedules had to accompany the RFQ. These included the following:

(i) Certified B-BBEE Rating Certificate/ Affidavit

(ii) Valid original Tax Clearance Certificate / Copy with SARS pin.

(iii) CDS Master Registration report/ Master Registration Number.

(iv) Valid company PSIRA Certificate (Private Security industry Regulatory Authority)

(v) Valid director of PSIRA Certificate

(vi) Valid certificate of Police Clearance

(vii) Valid UIF: certificate if compliance

(viii) Valid workman’s compensation letter of good standing

(ix) Company profile

(x) CVs of all personnel indicating relevant experience

(xi) Copies of qualification

(xii) Proof of relevant experience (Company Profile)

[42] There is no underscoring that the delineated documents supra were mandatory. The NWHC contends that all the relevant documents were annexed. Whilst a convincing argument may be made for the consideration of associated relevant legislation namely the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999, Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 and subordinate legislation like the Treasury Regulations, and other instruments, the contract between the NWHC and Katshe falls to be reviewed and set aside on a more elementary ground. This relates to the documents that form part of the checklist. The NWHC discovered the review record via Rule 53, which was subsequently amended. Forming part of same was several annexes. It is here that the version of the NWHC is implausible.

[43] Firstly, the annexed B-BBEE certificate of Katshe was not signed by the deponent, although a signature of the Commissioner of Oaths has been inscribed in manuscript. When this point was taken by Tshedza, the NWHC produced an amended record. In the latter, the signature of the deponent appears. This raises grave concerns, neither of which favour the NWHC. The probability that the signature of the deponent appeared on the original document is excluded for the following reasons:

(i) The original B-BBEE certificate was not presented to address the issue of the deponent’s signature.

(ii) There is no plausible explanation for the existence of the unsigned B-BBEE certificate.

(iii) It defies logic that a signed B-BBEE certificate is opportunely presented on issue being taken with it. The conclusion is inescapable that the B-BBEE certificate was incomplete when Katshe submitted it.

[44] Secondly, the UIF certificate that formed part of Katshe’s documents expired on 21 July 2021. Documents that are attached ex post facto in this regard are of no moment.

[45] Thirdly, the police clearance certificate Katshe provided is dated 12 December 2022. This is wholly inadequate and defeats the object and purpose of the security clearance.

[46] Fourthly, the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority issued a certificate on 26 November 2021, which expired on 24 February 2022, confirming that Katshe has no registered and active employees. This probably explains the absence of curriculum vitae of all personnel and the qualifications. It serves no meaningful purpose to ventilate further deficiencies in Katshe’s documents. Conjunctively or disjunctively, Katshe should have been eliminated from being considered as a security service provider. It follows axiomatically that the appointment of Katshe was not fair and equitable.

Costs

[47] The general rule in matters of costs is that the successful party should be given their costs, and this rule should not be departed from except where there are good grounds for doing so. See: Myers v Abramson 1951(3) SA 438 (C) at 455. There are no grounds to depart from the ordinary rule that costs should follow the result.

Order

[48] In the premises, I make the following order:

A REDDY

JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

OF SOUTH AFRICA

NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG

APPEARANCES

For the Applicant Advocate T.I Ngwana Instructed By Mokhetle Attorneys Inc 18 Havenga Street Goldview Info@Mokhetleinc.co.za For the First & Second Respondents: Advocate L. A. Maisela Instructed By Kgomo Attorneys Motheo House 56 Shippard Street Mahikeng For The Third Respondent: No Appearance