Van Der Merwe Du Plessis (J1045/98) [1999] ZALC 175 (1 January 1999)

Van Der Merwe Du Plessis (J1045/98) [1999] ZALC 175 (1 January 1999)

The application for leave to appeal is refused because there is no reasonable prospect that another court would reach a different conclusion regarding the rescission of the default judgment. The rescission was granted because the respondent was not properly notified of the hearing date, and justice required she be given an opportunity to defend the matter. Furthermore, the order rescinding the default judgment is interlocutory, not final, as it does not dispose of the principal issues between the parties but merely sets the matter down for a hearing on the merits. Therefore, it is not appealable under section 166 of the Labour Relations Act.

Citation
[1999] ZALC 175
Parties
Applicant: A C Van Der Merwe; Respondent: Hester Du Plessis
Court
Labour Court
Jurisdiction
South Africa
Judgment Date
1 January 1999
Case Number
J1045/98
Procedural Posture
Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal Following Rescission of Default Judgment
Outcome
Leave to appeal against the order of 18 December 1998 is refused.
Judges
Grogan
Legal Topics
Rescission of Judgment, Default Judgment, Leave to Appeal, Final Vs Interlocutory Order

Case Brief

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Parties

A C Van Der Merwe

Applicant

Hester Du Plessis

Respondent

Procedural Posture

Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal Following Rescission of Default Judgment

  1. 1 Whether the applicant has shown reasonable prospects that another court would reach a different conclusion regarding the rescission of the default judgment.
  2. 2 Whether the order rescinding the default judgment is final and appealable under section 166 of the Labour Relations Act.

Ratio Decidendi

The application for leave to appeal is refused because there is no reasonable prospect that another court would reach a different conclusion regarding the rescission of the default judgment. The rescission was granted because the respondent was not properly notified of the hearing date, and justice required she be given an opportunity to defend the matter. Furthermore, the order rescinding the default judgment is interlocutory, not final, as it does not dispose of the principal issues between the parties but merely sets the matter down for a hearing on the merits. Therefore, it is not appealable under section 166 of the Labour Relations Act.

Court Disposition

Leave to appeal against the order of 18 December 1998 is refused.

Orders

  • The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
  • The matter is to be set down for hearing on the merits after proper notification to the respondent.