Van Staden v Master of the High Court and Others (3114/04) [2005] ZAGPHC 29 (14 March 2005)

/SGIN THE HIGH COURT OFSOUTH AFRICA(TRANSVAALPROVINCIAL DIVISION)DATE:14/03/2005CASE NO:3114/2004REPORTABLEIn the matter between:JOHANNES CHRISTOFFEL VAN STADEN

APPLICANTAndTHE MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT

1STRESPONDENTJOACHIM HENDRIK BOTHA NO

2NDRESPONDENTBETHUEL BILLYBOY MAHLATSI NO

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, AJThe appellant, who is aunrehabilitated insolvent, applies for the setting aside of the first respondent’s decision to confirm the first and final liquidation and distribution account in the applicant’s insolvent estate.The applicant was provisionally sequestrated on16 January 2003and the final order of sequestration was issued on5 March 2003. Second and third respondents were appointed as provisional liquidators in the insolvent estate on30 June 2003by the first respondent. On7 November 2003, the first and second respondents placed advertisements in certain newspapers which stated that the first and final liquidation and distribution account will lie for inspection for a period of fourteen days from7 November 2003to21 November 2003. A copy of the liquidation and distribution account (which I shall refer to hereafter as “the account”) was also posted to the applicant. The applicant was unhappy aboutcertain items in the account and consulted his attorney whereaftera formal objection to the account was lodged with the first respondent on19 November 2003. The objections were listed in a letter dated19 November 2003addressed to the first respondent by the applicant’s attorneys. The relevant portion reads as follows:“Daar word beswaar gemaak teen die volgende:1.Die Kurator se fooiein die Beswaarde Baterekening ten bedrae van R230 961,18 plus BTW van R32 334.45 synde 10% van die opbrengs van die verkoping van dieonroerende eiendomasook die rente verdien. Die Kurator is geregtig op 10% op die rente in die bankrekening sowel as die rente op die beleggingsrekening, maar is met respek nie geregtig op 10% op die onroerende eiendom bloot omdat ditas’nlopende saak verkoop is nie. Volgens ons inligting is dit slegs die vaste eiendom wat verkoop is en alhoewel dit as lopende saak verkoop is, is die toepaslike tarief na ons mening 3% en nie 10% nie. Die Kurator het ook geen spesiale moete gehad met die verkoping nie en was die Koper deur Eli Stroh Agente voorgestel wie 6% kommissie ontvang het. Die Kuratorsfooi behoort dus met’nbedrag van R183 539.99 verminder te wees.2. Daar word verder beswaar gemaak teen Van’s Auctioneers se advertensiekostein die bedrag van R18 661.46. Hierdie advertensie het plaasgevind voordat Tweede Vergadering van skuldeisers plaasgevind het en kon die eiendom slegs verkoop word indien die nodige toestemming by die Meester in terme van Artikel 80(Bis) van die Insolvensiewet verkry word. sodanige toestemming, as dit verkry is, is dit onrelmatig verkry deurdat die Tweede Verbandhouer, wie’nversekerde skuldeiser is, nooit toegestem het tot die verkoping nie. Indien Artikel 80(Bis)- toestemming nie vooraf verkry is nie spreek dit vanself dat sodanige kostes na ons mening ontoelaatbaar is.3. Daar word verder beswaar gemaak teen die kostes van R15 158.66 wat in die Vrye Oorskotrekening aangetoon word asdie getakseerde rekening van LeRoux Prokureurs. Die Insolvent deel ons mee dat hy geen kennis dra van Le Roux Prokureurs nie. Hy het gedeel met Coetzer & De Beer Prokureurs wie klaarblyklik Le Roux Prokureurs opdrag gegee het. Hy het reeds’nbedrag van R15 000.00 inbetaal by die prokureursfirma en behoort daardie kostes dus met R15 000.00 verminder te word. Dit is klaarblyklik’naspek wat die Kurator nie nagegaan het nie ofversuimhet om na te gaan voordat die totale getakseerde rekening as’neis teen die boedel aanvaar is.4. Wat dieeise aanbetref is die Insolvent van mening dat Eisnommer 5, synde die van NTK Limpopo Agric Limited nie korrek is nie. Ten tye van sekwestrasie het die eis van NTK Limpopo Agric Limited ongeveer R106 000.00 beloop en dra die Insolvent nie kennis van hoe die bedrag van R444 015.23 saamgestel en bereken is nie. In die verband is die Kurator voorheen versoek om volledig’nuiteensetting te verkry van hierdie eis, wat nieverkry is nie alternatiewelik nie aan die Insolvent vir sy kommentaar voorgelis nie. Die Insolvent betwis op hierdie stadium hierdie eisbedrag en vra dat behoorlike ondersoek ingestel word ingevolge die bepalings van Artikel 45 van die Insolvensiewet.5. Daar word ook beswaar gemaak teen die samestelling van Eisnommer 6 in die bedrag van R42 538.55. Indie verband is die Kurator ook versoek om volledige besonderhede te verkry, wat verkry is en wel aan die Insolvent voorsien is. Dit blyk uit die besonderhede van die samestelling van die eisdat die eis duidelik verkeerd is. So byvoorbeeld, op 15 Augustus 2002 blyk volgens die belastingfaktuur vandie skuldeiser dat 29ure gewerk is met toerusting wat gehuur is teen R110.00 per uur. Intotaal beloop die bedrag R3 245.00 (Sien Aanhangsel “A2”). Volgens Aanhangsel “B”, die betrokke bewys van die huur van die toerusting wat deur ons klint onderteken is, was die huur slegs 9ure en nie 29ure nie. Die Insolvent beweer ook dat al die items wat as diesel teen hom gedebiteer is nie korrek is nie en dat dit onmoontlik was dat hy soveel diesel kon gebruik. In die verband word ook behoorlike bewys geverg, soortgelyk aan Aanhangsel “B” hierby aangeheg.”The letter was filed at the first respondent’s general office and, as aadditionalprecaution, also filed in the relevant section of the first respondent’s officewhich was dealing with the applicant’sinsolvency file. In spite of theseprecautions,the objection did not come before the first respondent and the account was confirmed without the objectionsof the applicant having been taken into account. On9 December 2003it came to the applicant’s attention that dividends were being paid out and it was then that he realised that the account had been approved. Heimmediately consulted his attorney, who informed the second respondent on12 December 2003that the first respondent had incorrectly confirmed the account. He also requested ofthe second respondent that he desist from paying out any further dividends. The applicant’s attorney had been informed that the second respondent would return from holiday on5 January 2004on which day the applicant’s attorney once again wrote to the second respondent and asked him whether he would be prepared to consider the objections without the necessity of launching an application to court. On12 January 2004the applicant’s attorney was informed by the second and third respondents that they are proceeding with the administration of the estate in accordance with the account. Thepresent application was then launched on5 February 2004. Therelief sought bythe applicant in terms of the notice of motion is:“1.Dat die laat indiening van die aansoek in terme van die bepalings van artikel 111 van Insolvensiewet,Wet 24 van 1936, gekondoneer word en dat verlof verleen word aan die Applikant om die aansoek te loods;2. Dat die bekragtiging van die likwidasie- en distribusierekening deur die Meester, in die insolvente boedel van JOHANNES CHRISTOFFEL VAN STADEN, verwysingsnommer T107/03, tersyde gestel word;3. Dat die koste van die aansoek koste in die gesekwestreerde boedel van JOHANNES CHRISTOFFEL VAN STADEN sal wees, uitgesonder die koste van oppossisie tot die aansoek;4. Verdere en/of alternatiewe regshulp.”The first respondenthas not opposed the application and it appears that he will abide the decision of this court. However, the second and third respondents have filed an opposing affidavitand it has been submitted by applicant’s counsel that the application can be determined on the abovementioned facts which are common cause between the parties.I turn then totheapplication for condonation. It was submitted by second and third respondents’ counsel that the applicant had to show that he had a reasonable prospect of success in respect of the objections that were raised against the account. It was further submitted that each of the grounds of objection lodged by the applicant were without merit and for that reason an application for condonation should notbe granted as it would have made no difference to the decision made by the first respondent whether the objection was before him or not. Furthermore,it was submitted that second and third respondents made payments in accordance with the account without being aware that the applicant’s objection had not come to the attention of the first respondent. Second and third respondents further argued that two creditorswho had already received dividends and who would be affected by the outcome of this application, should have been joined in these proceedings formally even though they had been informed of the application.I turn then to the first objection ie the trustee’s fees in respect of the sale of the immovable propertyand certain movables thereon. Therecommended tarifffor fees in terms of the Insolvency Act is 3% ofthe proceeds of the sale of immovable property and 10% in respect of the sale of movables as curator’s fees. It was submitted by the applicant that only the immovable property wassold and therefore the applicable tarifffor fees was 3% and not 10%. The second and third respondents point out that the applicant had consented to the auction of the property in a sworn affidavit wherein it is statedinter alia:“Ek bevestig dat ektoestem tot die verkoping van die plaas Vischgat 490, Registrasie Afdeling LR, Noordelike Provinsie (Groot 1823, 4638 hektaar) tesame met alle oeste, implemente en alle ander roerende bates vir’nbedrag van R2 300 000.00 (twee miljoen drie honderd duisend rand) aan Agter die Berg (Edms) Beperk as’nlopende saak.”The conditions ofsale in terms of which the immovable property was sold containedinter alia, the following condition:“Die plaas Vischgat, Mogalakwena, Registrasie Afdeling LR, Noordelike Provinsie (Limpopo) gehou onder Akte van Transport nommer: T88653/1992, Groot: 1823, 4639 hektaar.Asook alle roerende bates, alle oeste, voertuie en implemente wat deel uitmaak van die boedel sodat hierdie verkoping as ’n lopende saak geskied.”It bears mentioning thatthe immovable property had originally beensold in a sale in execution for R700 000.00. With the intervention of the second and third respondents the property was later sold for R2 300 000.00 as a result of whicha surplus was paid into the guardian’s fund at the Master’s office for the benefit of the applicant. Itis clear that the second and third respondents sold not only the immovable property but also certain movables with it and the question that arises is whether the Master correctly allowed a fee of 10% on the total price instead of separating these fees in respect of movables and immovables. Section 63(1) of the Act provides:“Every trustee orcurator bonisshall be entitledto a reasonable remuneration for his services, to betaxedbythe Master according to tariff B in the Second schedule to this Act: Provided that the Master may, for good cause, reduce or increase his remuneration, or may disallow his remuneration either wholly or in part on account of any failure of or delay in the discharge of his duties or on account of any improper performance of his duties. Tariff B of the second schedule to the Act provides: remuneration of trustee (section 63)(1) On the gross proceeds of movable property (other than shares or similar securities) sold, or on the gross amount collected under promissory notes or book debts, or as rent, interest or other income 10 per cent.(2) On the gross proceeds of immovable property, shares or similar securities sold, life insurance policies and mortgage bonds recovered and the balance recovered in respect of immovable property sold prior to sequestration 3 per cent....Remuneration ofcurator bonisand provisionaltrustee.A reasonable remuneration to be determined by the Master, not to exceed the rate of remuneration ofa trustee under this tariff.”From the aforegoing it is clearthat the Master isvested with the power to determine the fees within the parameters laid down in the tariff. In my view, the Master exercised his discretion and it is not for this court to interfere unless the discretion had been exercised improperly which is notthe casehere. Even though the applicant’s objection was not before the Master it does not appear that the Master was unhappy with the tariff that was applied by the second and third respondents.The second ground of objection: the disbursements and costs of the auctioneer:In my view this objection is without merit as the auctioneer’s disbursements and costs were properly approved at the second meeting of creditors and thefirstrespondentaccepted it as such.The third ground of objection relates to the costs ofR15 158.56 ofcertain LeRoux Attorneys. These attorneysactedfor the petitioning creditor to sequestrate the applicant. The applicant’s objection seems to be based on the fact that he hadpaidanamount of R15 000.00 to another firm of attorneys for launching a so-called “friendly sequestration”, whichfailed. However, section 14(2)to the Act provides that the trustee shall pay the costs of the petitioningcreditor“out of the first funds of the estate available for the purpose under section 97 his costs, taxed according to the tariff applicable ...”.The fourth ground of objectionrelatesto the claimofNoordelikeTransvaalse Koperasie(“NTK”). The applicant states thatthe NTK’s claimshould have been in the amount of approximately R106 000.00based on a judgment obtained bythe NTKagainst the applicant in the magistrate’s court for the district of Potgietersrus. However, the applicant fails to mention a second judgment obtained by theNTK against himin the amount of R302 182.52 plus interest and costs. This is set out in detail by theNTK’Sattorney,who obtained the second judgment onitsbehalf,namely MrHurterof the firm Van Zyl Le Roux and HurterIncorporated. There is accordingly no merit in this ground of objection either.The last ground of objection relates to the claimbyPlaas Weltevrede 508 (Edms) Beperk. The applicant doubts thenumberofhours charged for, for certain equipment hired by the applicant from this creditor. The creditor had submitted documents in support of its claim tothe trustees and the trustees statethat they had properly investigated the claim andweresatisfied that it wasa valid claim. Theclaim was proved at the meeting of creditors where the applicant himself was present and he did not lodge any objection to the admission of the claim. This ground of objectioncannottherefore,in myview,besustained. Counsel for second and third respondents made a further submission to the effect that there is a difference between an account that has merely been confirmed and where an account has been confirmedand dividends have been paid in accordance with the confirmed account. Inthelatter case the confirmation of the account is absolutely final unless the applicant can show that a fraud had been perpetrated. In this regard it is apposite to quote the learned author MESKIN, the Law of Insolvency, at 11.17, par 11.6.1 where it is submitted that:“The confirmation of an account is final unless,before any dividend is paid under it, the Court allows it to be reopened. The confirmation being final (or, in the language of the Companies Act, having ‘the effect of a final judgment’), does not mean that each item in the confirmed account has the quality of a judgment of the Court; it means merely that effect must be given to the account as confirmed unless the Court permits it to be reopened. Such effect, indeed, may be modified subsequently in a further account.The assignment of relative finality to a confirmed account before a dividend is paid thereunder, ie, subject to the Court’s allowing it to be reopened, and, subject to the qualificationinfra,of absolute finality after such payment, is for the purpose of achieving a completion of the administration of the estate which is expeditious.Subject to the qualification mentionedinfra, once the trustee actually makes payment to any creditor in terms thereof, any reopening of a confirmed account is precluded. But thepayment must be actual:reopening is not precluded where a cheque for the amount thereof has been delivered but not yet paid.In order to succeed in an application to reopen a confirmed account,prior to any payment thereunder, the applicant must establish a ground forrestitutio in integrum, such as fraud orjustus error. In addition, he must show that ‘there is merit in the reopening of the account.A Courtwill not reopen an account if it cannot be shown that the applicant has some prospect of success of having the account varied or corrected ... No purpose would obviouslybeserved in merely reopening the account if it is merely to remain in the same form as originally drawn. The applicant must establish at leastprima faciethat the account is incorrect and would have to be amended.’Negligence on the part of the applicant will preclude any error beingjustus, unless the applicant is the State.InGilbey Distillers & Vintners (Pty) Ltd and Others v Morris NO and another1990 (2) SA 217(SEC) it was held that notwithstanding payment of any dividend thereunder, however, the Court remains empowered to reopen a confirmed account where the confirmation thereof is impeachable on the ground of fraud orjustus error. In the subsequent appeal[1990] ZASCA 134;[1991 (1) SA648(AD)] some doubt regarding this was expressed by NESTADT, JA,(who gave the judgment of the Court) at 658-659. The learned author then says that it is respectfully submitted that reopening on the ground ofjustus erroris precluded but that reopening on the ground of fraud is not.”Itisthus clear that it is only in exceptional circumstances that a court will set aside a confirmed account. In the matter before me there has been no allegationoffraud.Even if the groundsof objection had merit the payment of the dividends in my view precludes in the instant case the reopening of the account.Seein this regardWispeco (Pty) Ltd v Herrigel NO and Another1983 2 SA 20(CPD) whereTEBBUTT,Jcame to the conclusion that“the payment of a dividendto any one or more creditors would be sufficient to preclude the reopening of an account” at 26E-F. However, in my view the applicant has failed to make out aprima faciecase forthereopening of the accountand the application must accordingly fail.I accordingly make the following order:1. The application be and is hereby dismissed;2. The costs of opposition to the application are to form part of the administration costsin the insolvent estate of Johannes Christoffel Van Staden.NRANCHODACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT3114/2004Heard on: 07/09/2004For theApplicant: Adv C HarmInstructed by: Messrs Maartens, Le Roux & Louw,PretoriaFor the 1stRespondent: No AppearanceFor the 2ndand 3rdRespondents: Adv M P Van der MerweInstructed by: Tingtingers INC,PretoriaDate of Judgment: 14/03/2005

/SG

IN THE HIGH COURT OFSOUTH AFRICA(TRANSVAALPROVINCIAL DIVISION)DATE:14/03/2005

IN THE HIGH COURT OF

SOUTH AFRICA

(

TRANSVAAL

PROVINCIAL DIVISION)

DATE:

14/03/2005

CASE NO:3114/2004

CASE NO:

3114/2004

REPORTABLE

In the matter between:

JOHANNES CHRISTOFFEL VAN STADEN

APPLICANT

AndTHE MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT

1

ST

RESPONDENTJOACHIM HENDRIK BOTHA NO

2

ND

RESPONDENTBETHUEL BILLYBOY MAHLATSI NO

3

RD

RESPONDENT

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JUDGMENT

RANCHOD, AJ

The appellant, who is aunrehabilitated insolvent, applies for the setting aside of the first respondent’s decision to confirm the first and final liquidation and distribution account in the applicant’s insolvent estate.The applicant was provisionally sequestrated on16 January 2003and the final order of sequestration was issued on5 March 2003. Second and third respondents were appointed as provisional liquidators in the insolvent estate on30 June 2003by the first respondent. On7 November 2003, the first and second respondents placed advertisements in certain newspapers which stated that the first and final liquidation and distribution account will lie for inspection for a period of fourteen days from7 November 2003to21 November 2003. A copy of the liquidation and distribution account (which I shall refer to hereafter as “the account”) was also posted to the applicant. The applicant was unhappy aboutcertain items in the account and consulted his attorney whereaftera formal objection to the account was lodged with the first respondent on19 November 2003. The objections were listed in a letter dated19 November 2003addressed to the first respondent by the applicant’s attorneys. The relevant portion reads as follows:“Daar word beswaar gemaak teen die volgende:

The appellant, who is a

unrehabilitated insolvent, applies for the setting aside of the first respondent’s decision to confirm the first and final liquidation and distribution account in the applicant’s insolvent estate.The applicant was provisionally sequestrated on

16 January 2003

and the final order of sequestration was issued on

5 March 2003

. Second and third respondents were appointed as provisional liquidators in the insolvent estate on

30 June 2003

by the first respondent. On

7 November 2003

, the first and second respondents placed advertisements in certain newspapers which stated that the first and final liquidation and distribution account will lie for inspection for a period of fourteen days from

to

21 November 2003

. A copy of the liquidation and distribution account (which I shall refer to hereafter as “the account”) was also posted to the applicant. The applicant was unhappy about

certain items in the account and consulted his attorney whereafter

a formal objection to the account was lodged with the first respondent on

19 November 2003

. The objections were listed in a letter dated

addressed to the first respondent by the applicant’s attorneys. The relevant portion reads as follows:“

Daar word beswaar gemaak teen die volgende:

1.Die Kurator se fooiein die Beswaarde Baterekening ten bedrae van R230 961,18 plus BTW van R32 334.45 synde 10% van die opbrengs van die verkoping van dieonroerende eiendomasook die rente verdien. Die Kurator is geregtig op 10% op die rente in die bankrekening sowel as die rente op die beleggingsrekening, maar is met respek nie geregtig op 10% op die onroerende eiendom bloot omdat ditas’nlopende saak verkoop is nie. Volgens ons inligting is dit slegs die vaste eiendom wat verkoop is en alhoewel dit as lopende saak verkoop is, is die toepaslike tarief na ons mening 3% en nie 10% nie. Die Kurator het ook geen spesiale moete gehad met die verkoping nie en was die Koper deur Eli Stroh Agente voorgestel wie 6% kommissie ontvang het. Die Kuratorsfooi behoort dus met’nbedrag van R183 539.99 verminder te wees.

1.

Die Kurator se fooie

in die Beswaarde Baterekening ten bedrae van R230 961,18 plus BTW van R32 334.45 synde 10% van die opbrengs van die verkoping van die

onroerende eiendom

asook die rente verdien. Die Kurator is geregtig op 10% op die rente in die bankrekening sowel as die rente op die beleggingsrekening, maar is met respek nie geregtig op 10% op die onroerende eiendom bloot omdat dit

as

’n

lopende saak verkoop is nie. Volgens ons inligting is dit slegs die vaste eiendom wat verkoop is en alhoewel dit as lopende saak verkoop is, is die toepaslike tarief na ons mening 3% en nie 10% nie. Die Kurator het ook geen spesiale moete gehad met die verkoping nie en was die Koper deur Eli Stroh Agente voorgestel wie 6% kommissie ontvang het. Die Kuratorsfooi behoort dus met

bedrag van R183 539.99 verminder te wees.

2. Daar word verder beswaar gemaak teen Van’s Auctioneers se advertensiekostein die bedrag van R18 661.46. Hierdie advertensie het plaasgevind voordat Tweede Vergadering van skuldeisers plaasgevind het en kon die eiendom slegs verkoop word indien die nodige toestemming by die Meester in terme van Artikel 80(Bis) van die Insolvensiewet verkry word. sodanige toestemming, as dit verkry is, is dit onrelmatig verkry deurdat die Tweede Verbandhouer, wie’nversekerde skuldeiser is, nooit toegestem het tot die verkoping nie. Indien Artikel 80(Bis)- toestemming nie vooraf verkry is nie spreek dit vanself dat sodanige kostes na ons mening ontoelaatbaar is.

2. Daar word verder beswaar gemaak teen Van’s Auctioneers se advertensiekoste

in die bedrag van R18 661.46. Hierdie advertensie het plaasgevind voordat Tweede Vergadering van skuldeisers plaasgevind het en kon die eiendom slegs verkoop word indien die nodige toestemming by die Meester in terme van Artikel 80(Bis) van die Insolvensiewet verkry word. sodanige toestemming, as dit verkry is, is dit onrelmatig verkry deurdat die Tweede Verbandhouer, wie

versekerde skuldeiser is, nooit toegestem het tot die verkoping nie. Indien Artikel 80(Bis)- toestemming nie vooraf verkry is nie spreek dit vanself dat sodanige kostes na ons mening ontoelaatbaar is.

3. Daar word verder beswaar gemaak teen die kostes van R15 158.66 wat in die Vrye Oorskotrekening aangetoon word asdie getakseerde rekening van LeRoux Prokureurs. Die Insolvent deel ons mee dat hy geen kennis dra van Le Roux Prokureurs nie. Hy het gedeel met Coetzer & De Beer Prokureurs wie klaarblyklik Le Roux Prokureurs opdrag gegee het. Hy het reeds’nbedrag van R15 000.00 inbetaal by die prokureursfirma en behoort daardie kostes dus met R15 000.00 verminder te word. Dit is klaarblyklik’naspek wat die Kurator nie nagegaan het nie ofversuimhet om na te gaan voordat die totale getakseerde rekening as’neis teen die boedel aanvaar is.

3. Daar word verder beswaar gemaak teen die kostes van R15 158.66 wat in die Vrye Oorskotrekening aangetoon word as

die getakseerde rekening van Le

Roux Prokureurs. Die Insolvent deel ons mee dat hy geen kennis dra van Le Roux Prokureurs nie. Hy het gedeel met Coetzer & De Beer Prokureurs wie klaarblyklik Le Roux Prokureurs opdrag gegee het. Hy het reeds

bedrag van R15 000.00 inbetaal by die prokureursfirma en behoort daardie kostes dus met R15 000.00 verminder te word. Dit is klaarblyklik

aspek wat die Kurator nie nagegaan het nie of

versuim

het om na te gaan voordat die totale getakseerde rekening as

eis teen die boedel aanvaar is.

4. Wat dieeise aanbetref is die Insolvent van mening dat Eisnommer 5, synde die van NTK Limpopo Agric Limited nie korrek is nie. Ten tye van sekwestrasie het die eis van NTK Limpopo Agric Limited ongeveer R106 000.00 beloop en dra die Insolvent nie kennis van hoe die bedrag van R444 015.23 saamgestel en bereken is nie. In die verband is die Kurator voorheen versoek om volledig’nuiteensetting te verkry van hierdie eis, wat nieverkry is nie alternatiewelik nie aan die Insolvent vir sy kommentaar voorgelis nie. Die Insolvent betwis op hierdie stadium hierdie eisbedrag en vra dat behoorlike ondersoek ingestel word ingevolge die bepalings van Artikel 45 van die Insolvensiewet.

4. Wat die

eise aanbetref is die Insolvent van mening dat Eisnommer 5, synde die van NTK Limpopo Agric Limited nie korrek is nie. Ten tye van sekwestrasie het die eis van NTK Limpopo Agric Limited ongeveer R106 000.00 beloop en dra die Insolvent nie kennis van hoe die bedrag van R444 015.23 saamgestel en bereken is nie. In die verband is die Kurator voorheen versoek om volledig

uiteensetting te verkry van hierdie eis, wat nie

verkry is nie alternatiewelik nie aan die Insolvent vir sy kommentaar voorgelis nie. Die Insolvent betwis op hierdie stadium hierdie eisbedrag en vra dat behoorlike ondersoek ingestel word ingevolge die bepalings van Artikel 45 van die Insolvensiewet.

5. Daar word ook beswaar gemaak teen die samestelling van Eisnommer 6 in die bedrag van R42 538.55. Indie verband is die Kurator ook versoek om volledige besonderhede te verkry, wat verkry is en wel aan die Insolvent voorsien is. Dit blyk uit die besonderhede van die samestelling van die eisdat die eis duidelik verkeerd is. So byvoorbeeld, op 15 Augustus 2002 blyk volgens die belastingfaktuur vandie skuldeiser dat 29ure gewerk is met toerusting wat gehuur is teen R110.00 per uur. Intotaal beloop die bedrag R3 245.00 (Sien Aanhangsel “A2”). Volgens Aanhangsel “B”, die betrokke bewys van die huur van die toerusting wat deur ons klint onderteken is, was die huur slegs 9ure en nie 29ure nie. Die Insolvent beweer ook dat al die items wat as diesel teen hom gedebiteer is nie korrek is nie en dat dit onmoontlik was dat hy soveel diesel kon gebruik. In die verband word ook behoorlike bewys geverg, soortgelyk aan Aanhangsel “B” hierby aangeheg.”

5. Daar word ook beswaar gemaak teen die samestelling van Eisnommer 6 in die bedrag van R42 538.55. In

die verband is die Kurator ook versoek om volledige besonderhede te verkry, wat verkry is en wel aan die Insolvent voorsien is. Dit blyk uit die besonderhede van die samestelling van die eis

dat die eis duidelik verkeerd is. So byvoorbeeld, op 15 Augustus 2002 blyk volgens die belastingfaktuur van

die skuldeiser dat 29ure gewerk is met toerusting wat gehuur is teen R110.00 per uur. In

totaal beloop die bedrag R3 245.00 (Sien Aanhangsel “A2”). Volgens Aanhangsel “B”, die betrokke bewys van die huur van die toerusting wat deur ons klint onderteken is, was die huur slegs 9ure en nie 29ure nie. Die Insolvent beweer ook dat al die items wat as diesel teen hom gedebiteer is nie korrek is nie en dat dit onmoontlik was dat hy soveel diesel kon gebruik. In die verband word ook behoorlike bewys geverg, soortgelyk aan Aanhangsel “B” hierby aangeheg.”

The letter was filed at the first respondent’s general office and, as aadditionalprecaution, also filed in the relevant section of the first respondent’s officewhich was dealing with the applicant’sinsolvency file. In spite of theseprecautions,the objection did not come before the first respondent and the account was confirmed without the objectionsof the applicant having been taken into account. On9 December 2003it came to the applicant’s attention that dividends were being paid out and it was then that he realised that the account had been approved. Heimmediately consulted his attorney, who informed the second respondent on12 December 2003that the first respondent had incorrectly confirmed the account. He also requested ofthe second respondent that he desist from paying out any further dividends. The applicant’s attorney had been informed that the second respondent would return from holiday on5 January 2004on which day the applicant’s attorney once again wrote to the second respondent and asked him whether he would be prepared to consider the objections without the necessity of launching an application to court. On12 January 2004the applicant’s attorney was informed by the second and third respondents that they are proceeding with the administration of the estate in accordance with the account. Thepresent application was then launched on5 February 2004. Therelief sought bythe applicant in terms of the notice of motion is:

The letter was filed at the first respondent’s general office and, as a

additional

precaution, also filed in the relevant section of the first respondent’s office

which was dealing with the applicant’s

insolvency file. In spite of these

precautions,

the objection did not come before the first respondent and the account was confirmed without the objection

s

of the applicant having been taken into account. On

9 December 2003

it came to the applicant’s attention that dividends were being paid out and it was then that he realised that the account had been approved. He

immediately consulted his attorney, who informed the second respondent on

12 December 2003

that the first respondent had incorrectly confirmed the account. He also requested of

the second respondent that he d

esist from paying out any further dividends. The applicant’s attorney had been informed that the second respondent would return from holiday on

5 January 2004

on which day the applicant’s attorney once again wrote to the second respondent and asked him whether he would be prepared to consider the objections without the necess

ity of launching an application to court. On

12 January 2004

the applicant’s attorney was informed by the second and third respondents that they are proceeding with the administration of the estate in accordance with the account. The

present application was then launched on

5 February 2004

. The

relief sought by

the applicant in terms of the notice of motion is:

“1.Dat die laat indiening van die aansoek in terme van die bepalings van artikel 111 van Insolvensiewet,Wet 24 van 1936, gekondoneer word en dat verlof verleen word aan die Applikant om die aansoek te loods;2. Dat die bekragtiging van die likwidasie- en distribusierekening deur die Meester, in die insolvente boedel van JOHANNES CHRISTOFFEL VAN STADEN, verwysingsnommer T107/03, tersyde gestel word;3. Dat die koste van die aansoek koste in die gesekwestreerde boedel van JOHANNES CHRISTOFFEL VAN STADEN sal wees, uitgesonder die koste van oppossisie tot die aansoek;4. Verdere en/of alternatiewe regshulp.”

“

Dat die laat indiening van die aansoek in terme van die bepalings van artikel 111 van Insolvensiewet,

Wet 24 van 1936, gekondoneer word en dat verlof verleen word aan die Applikant om die aansoek te loods;2. Dat die bekragtiging van die likwidasie- en distribusierekening deur die Meester, in die insolvente boedel van JOHANNES CHRISTOFFEL VAN STADEN, verwysingsnommer T107/03, tersyde gestel word;3. Dat die koste van die aansoek koste in die gesekwestreerde boedel van JOHANNES CHRISTOFFEL VAN STADEN sal wees, uitgesonder die koste van oppossisie tot die aansoek;4. Verdere en/of alternatiewe regshulp.”

The first respondenthas not opposed the application and it appears that he will abide the decision of this court. However, the second and third respondents have filed an opposing affidavitand it has been submitted by applicant’s counsel that the application can be determined on the abovementioned facts which are common cause between the parties.I turn then totheapplication for condonation. It was submitted by second and third respondents’ counsel that the applicant had to show that he had a reasonable prospect of success in respect of the objections that were raised against the account. It was further submitted that each of the grounds of objection lodged by the applicant were without merit and for that reason an application for condonation should notbe granted as it would have made no difference to the decision made by the first respondent whether the objection was before him or not. Furthermore,it was submitted that second and third respondents made payments in accordance with the account without being aware that the applicant’s objection had not come to the attention of the first respondent. Second and third respondents further argued that two creditorswho had already received dividends and who would be affected by the outcome of this application, should have been joined in these proceedings formally even though they had been informed of the application.I turn then to the first objection ie the trustee’s fees in respect of the sale of the immovable propertyand certain movables thereon. Therecommended tarifffor fees in terms of the Insolvency Act is 3% ofthe proceeds of the sale of immovable property and 10% in respect of the sale of movables as curator’s fees. It was submitted by the applicant that only the immovable property wassold and therefore the applicable tarifffor fees was 3% and not 10%. The second and third respondents point out that the applicant had consented to the auction of the property in a sworn affidavit wherein it is statedinter alia:

The first respondent

has not opposed the application and it appears that he will abide the decision of this court. However, the second and third respondents have filed an opposing affidavit

and it has been submitted by applicant’s counsel that the application can be determined on the abovementioned facts which are common cause between the parties.I turn then to

the

application for condonation. It was submitted by second and third respondents’ counsel that the applicant had to show that he had a reasonable prospect of success in respect of the objections that were raised against the account. It was further submitted that each of the grounds of objection lodged by the applicant were without merit and for that reason an application for condonation should not

be granted as it would have mad

e no difference to the decision made by the first respondent whether the objection was before him or not. Furthermore,

it was submitted that second and third respondents made payments in accordance with the account without being aware that the applicant’s objection had not come to the attention of the first respondent. Second and third respondents further argued that two creditors

who ha

d already received dividends and who would be affected by the outcome of this application, should have been joined in these proceedings form

al

ly even though they had been informed of the application.

I turn then to the first objection ie the trustee’s fees in respect of the sale of the immovable property

and certain movables thereon. The

recommended tariff

for fees in terms of the Insolvency Act is 3% of

t

he proceeds of the sale of immovable property and 10% in respect of the sal

e of movables as curator’s fees. It was submitted by the applicant that only the immovable property w

sold and therefore the applicable t

a

r

iff

for fees was 3% and not 10%. The second and third respondents point out that the applicant had consented to the auction of the property in a sworn affidavit wherein it is stated

inter alia

:

“Ek bevestig dat ektoestem tot die verkoping van die plaas Vischgat 490, Registrasie Afdeling LR, Noordelike Provinsie (Groot 1823, 4638 hektaar) tesame met alle oeste, implemente en alle ander roerende bates vir’nbedrag van R2 300 000.00 (twee miljoen drie honderd duisend rand) aan Agter die Berg (Edms) Beperk as’nlopende saak.”

Ek bevestig dat ek

toestem tot die verkoping van die plaas Vischgat 490, Registrasie Afdeling LR, Noordelike Provinsie (Groot 1823, 4638 hektaar) tesame met alle oeste, implemente en alle ander roerende bates vir

bedrag van R2 300 000.00 (twee miljoen drie honderd duisend rand) aan Agter die Berg (Edms) Beperk as

lopende saak.”

The conditions ofsale in terms of which the immovable property was sold containedinter alia, the following condition:

The conditions of

sale in terms of which the immovable property was sold contained

, the following condition

“Die plaas Vischgat, Mogalakwena, Registrasie Afdeling LR, Noordelike Provinsie (Limpopo) gehou onder Akte van Transport nommer: T88653/1992, Groot: 1823, 4639 hektaar.Asook alle roerende bates, alle oeste, voertuie en implemente wat deel uitmaak van die boedel sodat hierdie verkoping as ’n lopende saak geskied.”

Die plaas Vischgat, Mogalakwena, Registrasie Afdeling LR, Noordelike Provinsie (

Limpopo

) gehou onder Akte van Transport nommer: T88653/1992, Groot: 1823, 4639 hektaar.Asook alle roerende bates, alle oeste, voertuie en implemente wat deel uitmaak van die boedel sodat hierdie verkoping as ’n lopende saak geskied.”

It bears mentioning thatthe immovable property had originally beensold in a sale in execution for R700 000.00. With the intervention of the second and third respondents the property was later sold for R2 300 000.00 as a result of whicha surplus was paid into the guardian’s fund at the Master’s office for the benefit of the applicant. Itis clear that the second and third respondents sold not only the immovable property but also certain movables with it and the question that arises is whether the Master correctly allowed a fee of 10% on the total price instead of separating these fees in respect of movables and immovables. Section 63(1) of the Act provides:

It bears mentioning that

the immovable property had originally been

sold in a sale in execution for R700 000.00

. With the intervention of the second and third respondents the property was later sold for R2 300 000.00 as a result of which

a surplus was paid into the guardian’s fund at the Master’s office for the benefit of the applicant. It

is clear that the second and third respondents sold not only the immovable property but also certain movables with it and the question that arises is whether the Master correctly allowed a fee of 10% on the total price instead of separating these fees in respect of movables and immovable

. Section 63(1) of the Act provides:

“Every trustee orcurator bonisshall be entitledto a reasonable remuneration for his services, to betaxedbythe Master according to tariff B in the Second schedule to this Act: Provided that the Master may, for good cause, reduce or increase his remuneration, or may disallow his remuneration either wholly or in part on account of any failure of or delay in the discharge of his duties or on account of any improper performance of his duties. Tariff B of the second schedule to the Act provides: remuneration of trustee (section 63)

Every trustee or

curator bon

i

shall be entitle

d

to a reasonable remuneration for his services, to be

taxed

by

the Master according to tariff B in the Second schedule to this Act: Provided that the Master may, for good cause, reduce or increase his remuneration, or may disallow his remuneration either wholly or in part on account of any failure of or delay in the discharge of his duties or on account of any improper performance of his duties. Tariff B of the second schedule to the Act provides: remuneration of trustee (section 63)

(1) On the gross proceeds of movable property (other than shares or similar securities) sold, or on the gross amount collected under promissory notes or book debts, or as rent, interest or other income 10 per cent.

(2) On the gross proceeds of immovable property, shares or similar securities sold, life insurance policies and mortgage bonds recovered and the balance recovered in respect of immovable property sold prior to sequestration 3 per cent.

...

Remuneration ofcurator bonisand provisionaltrustee.

Remuneration of

curator bonis

and provision

trustee.

A reasonable remuneration to be determined by the Master, not to exceed the rate of remuneration ofa trustee under this tariff.”

A reasonable remuneration to be determined by the Master, not to exceed the rate of remuneration of

a trustee under this tariff.”

From the aforegoing it is clearthat the Master isvested with the power to determine the fees within the parameters laid down in the tariff. In my view, the Master exercised his discretion and it is not for this court to interfere unless the discretion had been exercised improperly which is notthe casehere. Even though the applicant’s objection was not before the Master it does not appear that the Master was unhappy with the tariff that was applied by the second and third respondents.

From the aforegoing it is clear

that the Master is

v

ested with the power to determine the fees within the parameters laid down in the tariff. In my view, the Master exercised his discretion and it is not for this court to interfere unless the discretion had been exercised improperly which is not

the case

here. Even though the applicant’s objection was not before the Master it does not appear that the Master was unhappy with the tariff that was applied by the second and third respondents.

The second ground of objection: the disbursements and costs of the auctioneer:In my view this objection is without merit as the auctioneer’s disbursements and costs were properly approved at the second meeting of creditors and thefirstrespondentaccepted it as such.The third ground of objection relates to the costs ofR15 158.56 ofcertain LeRoux Attorneys. These attorneysactedfor the petitioning creditor to sequestrate the applicant. The applicant’s objection seems to be based on the fact that he hadpaidanamount of R15 000.00 to another firm of attorneys for launching a so-called “friendly sequestration”, whichfailed. However, section 14(2)to the Act provides that the trustee shall pay the costs of the petitioningcreditor“out of the first funds of the estate available for the purpose under section 97 his costs, taxed according to the tariff applicable ...”.

The second ground of objection: the disbursements and costs of the auctioneer:

I

n my view this objection is without merit as the auctioneer’s disbursements and costs were properly approved at the second meeting of creditors and the

first

respondent

accepted it as such.

The third ground of objection relates to the costs of

R15 158.56 of

certain Le

Roux Attorneys. These attorneys

acted

for the petitioning creditor to sequestrate the applicant. The applicant’s objection seems to be based on the fact that he had

paid

an

amount of R15 000.00 to another firm of attorneys for launching a so-called “friendly sequestration”, which

failed. However, section 14(2)

to the Act provides that the trustee shall pay the costs of the petitioning

creditor

“out of the first funds of the estate available for the purpose under section 97 his costs, taxed according to the tariff applicable ...”

.

The fourth ground of objectionrelatesto the claimofNoordelikeTransvaalse Koperasie(“NTK”). The applicant states thatthe NTK’s claimshould have been in the amount of approximately R106 000.00based on a judgment obtained bythe NTKagainst the applicant in the magistrate’s court for the district of Potgietersrus. However, the applicant fails to mention a second judgment obtained by theNTK against himin the amount of R302 182.52 plus interest and costs. This is set out in detail by theNTK’Sattorney,who obtained the second judgment onitsbehalf,namely MrHurterof the firm Van Zyl Le Roux and HurterIncorporated. There is accordingly no merit in this ground of objection either.The last ground of objection relates to the claimbyPlaas Weltevrede 508 (Edms) Beperk. The applicant doubts thenumberofhours charged for, for certain equipment hired by the applicant from this creditor. The creditor had submitted documents in support of its claim tothe trustees and the trustees statethat they had properly investigated the claim andweresatisfied that it wasa valid claim. Theclaim was proved at the meeting of creditors where the applicant himself was present and he did not lodge any objection to the admission of the claim. This ground of objectioncannottherefore,in myview,besustained. Counsel for second and third respondents made a further submission to the effect that there is a difference between an account that has merely been confirmed and where an account has been confirmedand dividends have been paid in accordance with the confirmed account. Inthelatter case the confirmation of the account is absolutely final unless the applicant can show that a fraud had been perpetrated. In this regard it is apposite to quote the learned author MESKIN, the Law of Insolvency, at 11.17, par 11.6.1 where it is submitted that:

T

he fourth ground of objection

relates

to the claim

of

Noordelike

Transvaalse Koperasie

(“

NTK”

). The applicant states that

the NTK’s claim

should have been in the amount of approximately R

106 000.00

based on a judgment obtained by

the NTK

against the applicant in the magistrate’s court for the district of Potgietersrus. However, the applicant fails to mention a second judgment obtained by the

NTK against him

in the amount of R302 182.52 plus interest and costs. This is set out in detail by the

NTK’S

attorney

,

who obtained the second judgment on

its

behalf

n

amely Mr

Hur

te

of the firm Van Z

yl Le Roux and Hur

er

Incorporated. There is accordingly no merit in this ground of objection either.The last ground of objection relates to the claim

Plaas Weltevrede 508 (Edms) Beperk

. The applicant doubts the

number

hours charged for, for certain equipment hired by the applicant from this creditor

. The creditor had submitted documents in support of its claim to

the trustees and the trustees state

that they had properly investigated the claim and

were

satisfied that it w

a valid claim. The

claim was proved at the meeting of creditors where the applicant himself was present and he did not lodge any objection to the admission of the claim. This ground of objection

cannot

therefore,

in my

view

be

sustained

. Counsel for second and third respondents made a further submission to the effect that there is a difference between an account that has merely been confirmed and where an account has been confirmed

and dividends have been paid in accordance with the confirmed account. In

latter case the confirmation of the account is absolutely final unless the applicant can show that a fraud had been perpetrated. In this regard it is apposite to quote the learned author MESKIN, the Law of Insolvency, at 11.17, par 11.6.1 where it is submitted that:

“The confirmation of an account is final unless,before any dividend is paid under it, the Court allows it to be reopened. The confirmation being final (or, in the language of the Companies Act, having ‘the effect of a final judgment’), does not mean that each item in the confirmed account has the quality of a judgment of the Court; it means merely that effect must be given to the account as confirmed unless the Court permits it to be reopened. Such effect, indeed, may be modified subsequently in a further account.The assignment of relative finality to a confirmed account before a dividend is paid thereunder, ie, subject to the Court’s allowing it to be reopened, and, subject to the qualificationinfra,of absolute finality after such payment, is for the purpose of achieving a completion of the administration of the estate which is expeditious.Subject to the qualification mentionedinfra, once the trustee actually makes payment to any creditor in terms thereof, any reopening of a confirmed account is precluded. But thepayment must be actual:reopening is not precluded where a cheque for the amount thereof has been delivered but not yet paid.

The confirmation of an account is final unless,

before any dividend is paid under it

, the Court allows it to be reopened. The confirmation being final (or, in the language of the Companies Act, having ‘the effect of a final judgment’), does not mean that each item in the confirmed account has the quality of a judgment of the Court; it means merely that effect must be given to the account as confirmed unless the Court permits it to be reopened. Such effect, indeed, may be modified subsequently in a further account.

The assignment of relative finality to a confirmed account before a dividend is paid thereunder, ie, subject to the Court’s allowing it to be reopened, and, subject to the qualification

infra

of absolute finality after such payment

, is for the purpose of achieving a completion of the administration of the estate which is expeditious.Subject to the qualification mentioned

, once the trustee actually makes payment to any creditor in terms thereof, any reopening of a confirmed account is precluded. But the

payment must be actual:

reopening is not precluded where a cheque for the amount thereof has been delivered but not yet paid.

In order to succeed in an application to reopen a confirmed account,prior to any payment thereunder, the applicant must establish a ground forrestitutio in integrum, such as fraud orjustus error. In addition, he must show that ‘there is merit in the reopening of the account.A Courtwill not reopen an account if it cannot be shown that the applicant has some prospect of success of having the account varied or corrected ... No purpose would obviouslybeserved in merely reopening the account if it is merely to remain in the same form as originally drawn. The applicant must establish at leastprima faciethat the account is incorrect and would have to be amended.’Negligence on the part of the applicant will preclude any error beingjustus, unless the applicant is the State.InGilbey Distillers & Vintners (Pty) Ltd and Others v Morris NO and another1990 (2) SA 217(SEC) it was held that notwithstanding payment of any dividend thereunder, however, the Court remains empowered to reopen a confirmed account where the confirmation thereof is impeachable on the ground of fraud orjustus error. In the subsequent appeal[1990] ZASCA 134;[1991 (1) SA648(AD)] some doubt regarding this was expressed by NESTADT, JA,(who gave the judgment of the Court) at 658-659. The learned author then says that it is respectfully submitted that reopening on the ground ofjustus erroris precluded but that reopening on the ground of fraud is not.”

In order to succeed in an application to reopen a confirmed account,

prior to any payment t

hereunder

, the applicant must establish a ground for

restitutio in integrum

, such as fraud or

justus error

. In addition, he must show that ‘there is merit in the reopening of the account.

A Court

will not reopen an account if it cannot be shown that the applicant has some prospect of success of having the account varied or corrected ... No purpose would obviously

served in merely reopening the account if it is merely to remain in the same form as originally drawn. The applicant must establish at least

prima facie

that the account is incorrect and would have to be amended.

’

Negligence on the part of the applicant will preclude any error being

justus

, unless the applicant is the State.In

Gilbey Distillers & Vintners (Pty) Ltd and Others v Morris NO and another

1990 (2) SA 217(SEC) it was held that notwithstanding payment of any dividend thereunder, however, the Court remains empowered to reopen a confirmed account where the confirmation thereof is impeachable on the ground of fraud or

1990 (2) SA 217

. In the subsequent appeal[1990] ZASCA 134;[1991 (1) SA

[1990] ZASCA 134

[1991 (1) SA

648(AD)] some doubt regarding this was expressed by NESTADT, JA

(who gave the judgment of the Court) at 658-659. The learned author then says that it is respectfully submitted that reopening on the ground of

is precluded but that reopening on the ground of fraud is not.”

Itisthus clear that it is only in exceptional circumstances that a court will set aside a confirmed account. In the matter before me there has been no allegationoffraud.Even if the groundsof objection had merit the payment of the dividends in my view precludes in the instant case the reopening of the account.Seein this regardWispeco (Pty) Ltd v Herrigel NO and Another1983 2 SA 20(CPD) whereTEBBUTT,Jcame to the conclusion that“the payment of a dividendto any one or more creditors would be sufficient to preclude the reopening of an account” at 26E-F. However, in my view the applicant has failed to make out aprima faciecase forthereopening of the accountand the application must accordingly fail.I accordingly make the following order:

It

is

thus clear that it is only in exceptional circumstances that a court will set aside a confirmed account. In the matter before me there has been no allegation

fraud.Even if the grounds

of objection had merit the payment of the dividends in my view precludes in the instant case the reopening of the account.

S

ee

in this regard

Wispeco (Pty) Ltd v Herrigel NO and Another

1983 2 SA 20(CPD) where

1983 2 SA 20

TEBBUTT,

J

came to the conclusion that

“the payment of a dividend

to any one or more creditors would be sufficient to preclude the reopening of an account” at 26E-F. However, in my view the applicant has failed to make out a

case f

or

reopening of the account

and the application must accordingly fail.I accor

dingly make the following order:

1. The application be and is hereby dismissed;

2. The costs of opposition to the application are to form part of the administration costsin the insolvent estate of Johannes Christoffel Van Staden.

2. The costs of opposition to the application are to form part of the administration costs

n the insolvent estate of Johannes Christoffel Van Staden.

NRANCHODACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT3114/2004

N

RANCHOD

ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

Heard on

: 07/09/2004

For the

Applicant

: Adv C Harm

Instructed by

: Messrs Maartens, Le Roux & Louw,

Pretoria

For the 1

st

Respondent

: No Appearance

For the 2

nd

and 3

rd

Respondents

: Adv M P Van der Merwe

: Tingtingers INC,

Date of Judgment

: 14/03/2005