AISHA ALLY SADIKI

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA IN THE SUB- REGISTRY OF MWANZA

AT MWANZA MISC. CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 29780 OF 2024 (Arising from Civil Appeal No. 33 of 2023 at Nyamagana District Court, originating from Civil Case No. 53 of 2023 Mwanza Urban Primary Court) AISHA ALLY SADIKI ..…………………………….……....….………… APPLICANT

VERSUS SHAKILA SELESTINE HENRY ……….……..……….……………….. RESPONDENT

RULING 14.03.2025 & 21.03.2025 ROBERT, J. This is an application for an extension of time within which the applicant may lodge an appeal before this Court against the decision of the District Court of Nyamagana in Civil Appeal No. 33 of 2023. The application has been brought by way of chamber summons under the relevant provisions of the law and is supported by the sworn affidavit of the applicant, setting forth the grounds upon which the application is premised. The respondent filed a counter-affidavit in opposition to the application. At the hearing of this application, the applicant was represented by Mr. Arsein Molland, learned Advocate, while the respondent enjoyed the legal services of Mr. Dennis Pauline, learned Advocate. When invited to argue in support of the application, learned counsel for the applicant prayed to adopt the contents of the affidavit filed in 1 support of the application. He submitted that the applicant successfully and within time lodged her appeal electronically before this Court, and it was assigned Admission No. 81053/2024. However, on 2nd November 2024, the Registrar recommended that the appeal be filed at the District Court. Acting promptly, the applicant lodged the appeal at the District Court on the same day and awaited further instructions. It was not until 8th November 2024 that it was discovered that the District Court erroneously directed

the applicant to file the appeal at the High Court Registry, resulting in a delay of eight (8) days. Mr. Molland contended that the applicant has demonstrated sufficient cause to justify the grant of an extension of time. He submitted that the applicant exercised due diligence in prosecuting her appeal and that the delay was occasioned by procedural misdirection rather than any negligence on her part. To support his argument, he relied on the authority of Uchaguzi Greyson Mwakabana & 3 Others v. The Registered Trustees of the Redeemed Assemblies of God in Tanzania (RAGT), Civil Appeal No. 87 of 2022 (unreported), where the Court of Appeal considered a delay of eight (8) days to be non-inordinate. In reply, learned counsel for the respondent, Mr. Pauline, argued that the application is misconceived as the statutory period for lodging an appeal against a decision originating from a Primary Court is thirty (30) 2 days from the date of judgment, as prescribed under section 25(1)(b) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act. He pointed out that Civil Appeal No. 33 of 2023 was decided on 30th September 2024, making the deadline for appeal 29th October 2024. He contended that the applicant took no steps to appeal within the statutory period and was already time-barred by 30th October 2024. In fortifying his argument, Mr. Pauline relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Exim Bank Tanzania

Limited v. Jacqueline A. Kweka, Civil Application No. 348/2018 of 2020 (unreported), which outlined factors to be considered in granting an extension of time, including the length of delay, reasons for the delay, diligence of the applicant, existence of important legal points, and prejudice to the respondent. He maintained that the applicant failed to provide justification for not filing the appeal within the prescribed time and only explained the events that transpired after the statutory period had lapsed. Further, he argued that no important legal point was raised, and the applicant's negligence should not be excused. He asserted that the respondent would suffer prejudice if the application were granted, as she would incur litigation costs and face undue delay in realizing her rights under the impugned decision. 3 In rejoinder, Mr. Molland reiterated that the applicant filed her appeal within time and consistently pursued the matter with due diligence. He contended that the issue of prejudice raised by the respondent was unfounded, as the right of appeal is fundamental to both parties. As for the costs of the case, he submitted that the Court retains discretion in awarding costs. He, therefore, urged the Court to grant the application. Having carefully considered the parties’ submissions, the sole issue for determination is whether the applicant has demonstrated good

cause to warrant the extension of time sought. It is well settled that the grant of an extension of time is a discretionary power of the Court, which must be exercised judiciously and upon the demonstration of sufficient cause by the applicant. The guiding principles were aptly stated in Osward Masatu Mwizarubi v. Tanzania Fish Processing Ltd, Civil Application No. 13 of 2010 (unreported), where the Court of Appeal observed that: “What constitutes good cause cannot be laid down by any hard and fast rules. The term ‘good cause’ is relative and dependent upon the applicant providing relevant material to move the Court to exercise its discretion.” In the present matter, the facts indicate that the judgment sought to be appealed against was delivered on 30th September 2024. The applicant asserts that she lodged her appeal electronically on 30th 4 October 2024, which was within the prescribed period. However, procedural directives from the Court resulted in the applicant being required to refile the appeal at the District Court, and later, the District Court erroneously recommended that the appeal be filed before this Court. This sequence of events led to the delay of eight (8) days. That Court finds that, the applicant has demonstrated sufficient cause for the delay. The records reveal that the appeal was initially filed within time but encountered procedural hurdles that were

beyond the applicant’s control. The respondent’s argument that the applicant’s initial appeal was out of time does not hold water in light of section 19(1) of the Law of Limitation Act, which provides that in computing the period of limitation, the day from which such period is to be computed shall be excluded. Consequently, the filing date of 30th October 2024 was within the permissible statutory period. Further, the applicant acted diligently in rectifying the procedural anomaly and has not exhibited any indolence or inaction. The delay of eight (8) days is not inordinate, and no substantial prejudice has been demonstrated by the respondent that would override the applicant’s right to be heard on appeal. For the foregoing reasons, I am satisfied that the applicant has advanced sufficient cause to justify the grant of the extension sought. 5 Accordingly, this application is hereby allowed. The applicant is granted seven (7) days from the date of this ruling to file her appeal. I make no order as to costs. It is so ordered. DATED at MWANZA this 21st day of March, 2025. K.N. ROBERT

JUDGE 6