final judgment AKIBA COMMERCIAL BANK TZ

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA MOSHI SUB - REGISTRY AT MOSHI LAND APPEAL NO. 2809 OF 2024 (Appeal from the Judgment the District Land and Housing Tribunal of Moshi at Moshi dated 20th October, 2023 in Land Application No. 23 of 2019) AKIBA COMMERCIAL BANK …………..............................APPELLANT VERSUS PATRICK JOSEPH KIMARO……………………………1st RESPONDENT ANNA JAMES MUSHI……..……………………….......2nd RESPONDENT AMEDEUS J. MUSHI……………………………………..3rd RESPONDENT REAL MASTER CO. LTD………………………………...4th RESPONDENT JUDGMENT 26th Sept & 10th Oct. 2024 A.P.KILIMI, J.: The first respondent in this appeal one PATRICK JOSEPH KIMARO sued the appellant and second, third and fourth respondent named above respectively at the District Land and Housing Tribunal of Moshi at Moshi (‘the tribunal’) praying to be awarded thirteen reliefs, inter alia; Declaration order that the unsurveyed land situated at Msaranga Ward within Moshi Municipality. (‘the suit property’) belong to him, An order that the act of evicting him in his house by appellant and 4th respondent was illegal, an order that the appellant through his agent 4th respondent to return the said 1 suit property to the appellant otherwise the appellant to pay him Tshs. 250,000,000/= being the value of the suit property. At the trial, the 1st respondent herein who was the applicant at the tribunal, told the tribunal that the land in dispute belong to him and that he had bought the same in the year 2006 from one Bertha James Mushi. He further stated that in the year 2007 he built two houses on the disputed land. On 28/11/2018 while he was traveling, he was informed by his tenant that his house was being auctioned by the 4th respondent who was acting under the instruction of the appellant. According to the 1st respondent therein, the 4th respondent did forcefully enter in the suit land and removed him and the tenants. On the other hand, the appellant told the tribunal that the suit land belonged to the 2nd and 3th respondents who by virtue of their ownership mortgaged it to the appellant. After hearing of the entire evidence, the tribunal decided in favour of the 1st respondent by declaring that the suit land belonged to him. Aggrieved with the decision the appellant preferred this appeal advancing six grounds of appeal as follows; 2 1. That the trial tribunal erred both in law and fact for proceeding ex-parte against the 4th respondent while there was no tribunal’s order to proceed ex-parte against the 4th respondent. 2. That the trial tribunal erred both in law and in fact for denying the 4th respondent right to be heard without any justifiable cause. 3. That the trial tribunal erred in law and in fact for admitting and determine the incompetent application in that the buyer of the suit property was not joined as the party thereto as the law requires. 4. That the trial tribunal erred both in law and in fact for failure to consider and evaluate evidence adduced by the parties. 5. That the trial tribunal erred in law and in fact for delivering a contradictory judgment. 6. That the trial tribunal erred in law and in fact for deviating from the assessor’s opinion without any justifiable grounds. When the appeal was set for hearing following parties request, this court ordered for the appeal to be argued by way of written submission. In that exercise, Appellant’s submission was drawn and filed by Mr. Edwin Silayo learned advocate, the 1st respondent’s submission was drawn and filed by Mr. Caessar Shayo, while the 2nd and 3rd respondents did not file any submission. The 4th respondent’s submission was prepared and filed by Mr. Isaack Lyimo, the company’s director. 3 Submitting in support of the grounds of appeal, Mr. Silayo consolidated the first and second grounds of appeal and submitted that the basis of these two grounds of appeal is the denial of the 4th respondent’s right to testify on the case against him. The learned counsel argued that the defence of the 4th respondent who had instruction to act for the 3rd respondent was so crucial in determining the case therefore irregular denial of the 4th respondent to testify directly infringed the 3rd respondent’s right or justice in the case subject of this appeal. He contended that had the tribunal entered and issued ex-parte order other reliefs like setting aside ex-parte order would have been prayed by the 4th Respondent from the very beginning. He was of the view that in the absence of such order or an order for judgment in admission, the 4th respondent was badly denied right to defend himself and close all the doors to pursue that right. On the third ground of appeal the appellant is challenging the tribunal that it erred by admitting and determining an incompetent application since the buyer of the suit property was not joined as a party. It was Mr. Silayo’s submission that the buyer of the suit property was a necessary party because determining the case without the said purchaser is fatal as it renders the decree ineffective. He further argued that the 4 decision against the purchaser who was not made a party to the case would be denying the purchaser of her right to be heard hence illegal decision. To support his argument, he cited the case of Anatolia J. Mjengi v. Njocoba & 3 others, CAT Iringa, Civil Appeal No. 291 of 2021. On the fourth ground of appeal the appellant faulted the trial tribunal for failure to consider and evaluate the evidence adduced by parties. Mr. Silayo submitted that had the trial tribunal considered both documentary and oral evidence brought by the 3rd respondent during trial could have arrived into a just decision. The counsel was of the view that according to the record, DW1 did notify the tribunal about the process and efforts made to make sure the mortgaged property was well identified and attested by the local leaders before the loan was disbursed and mortgage been affected. The counsel for appellant further stated that if the trial tribunal had properly analysed the evidence before it would have established that the person whom the 1st respondent allegedly brought the suit land from was the 2nd respondent’s mother, hence it could have revealed that the alleged contract by the applicant was concocted to rescue that suit land which was 5 mortgaged by the 2nd respondent from being auctioned. He thus prayed for the court to find merit in this ground and uphold it. On the fifth ground challenging the judgment of the tribunal for being contradictory, it was Mr. Silayo’s submission that the contradiction is found in the trial tribunal proceedings where the trial tribunal is recorded to have framed issues for determination in two times. he said firstly was on 8th October 2020 and the second time on 13th January 2021. The learned counsel argued that it is therefore contradictory as there is no basis within which the trial chairman used to choose the issue for determination as well as justification to abandon the issues that were earlier framed. He further contended that there was no reason for the tribunal to demand reframing of issues while previous one was in the record. According to him, this is an irregularity of the highest level. Still submitting on the issue of contradiction the learned counsel stated that when the trial tribunal visited the locus it only allowed the 1st and 2nd respondents there in to address the chairman. He was of the view that the fact that the chairman availed chance to address the facts in the locus in quo to only those two parties rendered the tribunal into contradiction and confusion as it failed to get the point on what was a real property in dispute. Based on his submission Mr. Silayo 6 urged this court to find merit in the appeal and allow it with cost while quashing and setting aside the decision and orders of the trial tribunal. Responding to the appellant’s submission Mr. Shayo learned advocate for the 1st respondent submitted on the 1st and 2nd grounds of appeal that the tribunal did not deny the 4th respondent their right to be heard. He submitted that the 4th Respondent was served with the summons to appear and application and that on the reasons known to herself they refused to file their defence. He further submitted that on 22nd August 2019 the advocate for the 1st respondent prayed the tribunal to issue ex-parte order against the Appellant and the 4th respondent and that the tribunal granted the same as reflected on the records. He argued further that the 4th respondent never made any application before the tribunal to set aside the said ex-parte order but only the appellant through the service of her advocate Mr. Peter Njau on 28th October 2019 appeared. He thus submitted that the submission by the appellant’s advocate intends to mislead the court on the point that there was no ex-parte order from the tribunal. Submitting further Mr. Shayo stated that they raised an objection on point of law that the 4th respondent did not file his defence and that the law allows for the same to be raised at any point before 7 judgment. He contended that after they informed the tribunal on the failure of the 4th respondent to file her defence the tribunal chairman expunged all the proceedings which they were involved and that this was agreed by both parties including the appellant’s counsel. The learned counsel was also of the view that the cited case by the appellant of Abbas Sherally & 7 Others vs. Abdul Sultan Haji Mohamed Fazalboy Civil Application No. 133 of 2002 CAT does not fall in the ambit of this case because the 4th respondent slept on her right by failing to file the written statement of defence and even when it was raised by parties they didn’t take any initiative to make an order of setting aside the ex-parte order which has already been issued by the tribunal. Responding on the third ground of appeal Mr. Shayo submitted that the said ground of appeal is baseless and lacks merit for the reason that according to their application before the tribunal fact creating cause of action was that the 4th respondent had evicted the tenants of the 1st respondent from the dispute property and closed it and that they did not conduct auction in accordance with the law on the procedure for public auction. This he said was so stated on paragraph 6(a)(v) and (vi) of the application. 8 As regard to the issue of not joining the person who purchased the suit premise, Mr. Shayo submitted that the issue was not pleaded in the appellant’s written statement of defence. He argued that the issue of the purchaser known as Leyla Charles Munuo is an afterthought, because all the time the 3rd respondent failed to prove that there was sale between the appellant and the alleged person. He contended that the appellant is only alleging to have sold the dispute premise to that person without documentary evidence and that during cross examination they had agreed that it was true that the appellant had no sale agreement with the said person. He questioned the fact that the appellant failed to call the said purchaser as their witness to prove their case. In respect to the fourth ground of appeal, Mr. Shayo submitted that on the issue of identification of the purported mortgaged property which is known to the appellant as per the records, the tribunal chairman did properly elaborate in his judgment that the boundaries between the property mortgaged and that of the appellant was different. He further submitted that as per record the 1st respondent gave evidence and left no doubt that he is the owner and that the 4th respondent under the instruction of the 3rd respondent mistakenly evicted the 1st respondent from 9 the dispute land which was not subject to mortgage issued the 2nd respondent by the appellant. It was his further submission that also the 2nd and the 3rd respondents did cement the testimony of the 1st respondent by saying that those were two different properties. He also submitted that exhibit D5 was an application filed by the 2nd respondent concerning their mortgaged property of which he said the property in dispute was not the subject of the said application. He said the description of the suit premise and the location in that exhibit D5 is different from the one in the present case. Thus, he concluded that, the property in dispute was quite different from the property which was used as a security to the loan advanced to the 2nd respondent. Finally responding on the fifth ground of appeal regarding the claim that the judgment was contradictory, Mr. Shayo submitted that as per tribunal records there was no doubt that all parties were involved in framing of the issues on 13 January 2021 and that the same was reflected in the judgment of the tribunal. He argued that if there was an issue that parties did not agree on the said issues then it could be contradictory judgment but, in their circumstance, he said all parties agreed on the issues framed. It was his argument that framing of new issues by consensus 10 suggests that parties did agree to abandon the issues framed in the beginning. As regards the issue of visiting the locus in quo, it was Mr. Shayo’s submission that the chairman had liberty to ask any party a question for clarification. He argued that logically as per evidence on record for any reasonable person when there is a dispute involving two different properties, parties involved would be the correct people to be questioned. He thus contended that the doubt the appellant’s counsel wanted to rise was baseless. On their part, the 4th respondent conceded and acknowledged the appellant’s submission, since the tribunal records are clear on how the 4th respondent was allowed at first instance to proceed without filing WSD but later on during her defence, she was denied her crucial rights following the objection raised by the 1st respondent. He argued that it was a well-known principle that no one should be condemned unheard and that worth more it is well established under our constitution that everybody deserves a right to fair trial hence he said under the circumstance it is clear that the principle was not adhered at all following the irregularities which appear on the tribunal record. 11 It was his further submission that if the 4th respondent was not allowed to enter appearance in absence of her WSD, then he questioned the reason as to why she was allowed to frame issues and cross examine all applicants’ witnesses. He contended that if the tribunal expunged the 4th respondent from the record why they didn’t proceed receiving assessors’ opinion instead of starting afresh in absence of the 4th respondent. It was his submission that this was a serious irregularity which goes to the root of this matter hence prayed for the appeal to be allowed. Regarding the third ground of appeal, he submitted that they also concede with the appellant’s contention that it is a requirement of the law that the buyer be joined as a necessary party and be given a chance to be heard in order to avoid multiplicity of suits. Responding on the fourth and fifth grounds he submitted that they also concede and support the appellant’s contention in these grounds to the effect that had the tribunal done thorough evaluation of evidence on record as well as proper address of issues and proper visiting procedures, it could have reached a proper decision that the property sold was in fact the same which was mortgaged to secure loan advanced to the 2nd respondent. He 12 thus argued that the trial chairman erred to that point hence prayed for the appeal to be allowed. Now, in determining the merits or demerits of this appeal, I will be responding on grounds as submitted by the appellant. I wish to start with the first and second grounds of appeal in consolidation as argued by the appellant’s counsel. where the appellant is faulting the tribunal’s decision on the ground that it denied the 4th appellant right to be heard without any justifiable cause by proceeding ex-parte without an order to that respect. In this regard, the law is very clear on the consequence of failure by a party to file written statement of defence. This is provided for under Order VIII Rule 14(1) of the Civil Procedure Code, [Cap 33 R.E 2019] the law states and I quote for ease of reference; 14.-(1) where any party required to file a written statement of defence fails to do so within the specified period or where such period has been extended in accordance with sub rule 3 of rule 1, within the period of such extension, the court shall, upon proof of service and on oral application by the plaintiff to proceed ex parte, fix the date for hearing the plaintiff’s evidence on the claim . 13 [Emphasis added] The import of the law above, give the tribunal mandatory guidance to assure itself on the proof of service to the called party to the case, then if the service is proved, then said defendant has failed to file written statement of defence. Thus, the consequence is for the tribunal/court to proceed hearing ex-parte against that party. In his arguments above Mr. Caesar said on 22nd August 2019 the advocate for the 1st respondent prayed the tribunal to issue ex-parte order against the Appellant and the 4th respondent and that the tribunal granted the same. I have scanned the tribunal record it seems the said prayer appeared twice that is where Mr. Caesar had misapprehension, and for purpose of reference on what transpired I find apposite to quote the said incidents at the tribunal. The first as said above was on 22nd August 2019 and the proceedings reveals as follows; “28/ 8/ 2019 Coram : P.S. Makwandi – Chairman Assessors: 1. S. Lukindo 14 2. S. Mchau Applicant – Present For Applicant – Adv. Kaizer Shayo 1 st R espondent- present 2 nd R espondent - present 3 rd R espondent-absent 4 th R espondent – Absent T/ C: - Advocate Sizya: We have received a reply for first and second respondents, it seems the 3rd and 4th respondents have neglected to file defence. I request hearing date. Order – Hearing on 3/10/2019.” Then on the above day scheduled for hearing Mr. Caesar prayed the tribunal to vacate the order of proceeding ex-parte and requested for reservice to the respondents, the tribunal granted the prayer, thus vacated its order of proceeding ex-parte and order re-service to be done. The second time was on 2/4/2020, in this day Mr. Ceasar Shayo prayed for the second time before the tribunal, and the following is what transpired before P.S. Makwandi, Learned Chairman; “2/ 4/ 2020 15 Coram : P.S. Makwandi – Chairman Assessors: 1. S. Lukindo 2. S. Mchau Applicant – Present For Applicant – Adv. Kaizer Shayo 1 st R espondent- present 2 nd R espondent- present 3 rd R espondent - present 4 th R espondent – Absent T/ C: Justina Mganga Advocate K aizer Shayo: We have been served with defence, the 4th Respondent did not make any appearance though we served on 25/7/2019. He has refused to defend himself. We shall request ex-parte hearing against him. Adv. P eter Njau: I have no objection Order – Hearing on 22/4/2020 at 11:00 hours.” Now, examining the provision of the law in relation to the proceedings as above quoted, I have the following observation, first, the tribunal did not ascertain or certify that there was prove of service by evidence as per requirement of the law, second; the tribunal did not issue/deliver an order to proceed ex-perte against the 4th respondent. In my view by saying the words “hearing on” alone as above is ambiguous or 16 is not an order which is certain to mean it was order to proceed ex-parte, it may infer multiple meaning, for instance; it may amount to hearing both parties inclusive the 4th respondent, because of the absence of the word ex- parte as an exclusion word to him. Be as that it may, for anyone who has to seek an order set aside the said order, has to move the court to set aside hearing and not ex-parte order as envisaged by the law above. For the foregoing, I am of the considered view the procedure adopted by the tribunal to proceed with the case ex-parte quoted above was not abided for, therefore I am settled the above order vitiated the proceeding which prejudiced the fourth respondent. Another anomaly I have grasped in respect to what transpired in the tribunal, as argued by Mr. Silayo is the denial of the right to be heard to the 4th respondent as raised on ground number two. I am saying this because, despite the said order above, the fourth respondent appeared represented by Mr. Benjamin Daniel Mbise to defend his case and participated fully in framing issues which was on 13/5/2021. Then the hearing started on 8/06/2021, the fourth respondent was represented by Mr. Isack Lyimo. The record further reveals that this gentleman was present throughout the plaintiff’s case and some of defendants as witnesses when testified, all the 17 said time he was recorded in the corum and allowed to cross examined those witnesses. It was on 25/7/2023 when it was his time to make defence at the tribunal, Mr. Caesar Shayo objected him to testify because he did not file his written statement of defence, Mr. Shayo relied on the provision quoted above which provide the case to proceed ex-perte against him. In his defence the 4th respondent fended that he was allowed to proceed by former learned chairman that he will be represented by an advocate for the Bank. The learned chairman after considering the arguments conceded with Mr. Shayo and disallowed him to tender evidence and consequently all proceeding upon the 4th respondent stated were expunged. Now, my question which follows is whether the above denied the right to be heard as Mr. Silayo argued above on ground number two. I have considered that it is true the fourth respondent as a defendant at the trial did not file a written statement of defence, Thus, according to the law above is not allowed to enter defence. But as revealed and observed above, there was no legal order to proceed ex-parte against him, therefore in my thinking, that is why the learned chairman from the framing of issues allowed him to participate and defend his case throughout. Thus, in my 18 opinion, taking regard the circumstances where the tribunal itself condoned his appearance despite the fact he did not file WSD, therefore denial him to defend, in my view prejudiced him and the tribunal did not exercise a fair trial. The requirement of abiding by the principles of a fair trial has been emphasized in a number of decisions of the Court, and any decision emanated from that matter cannot remain firm, since the same amounts to breach of Constitutional Right as enshrined under Article 13 (6) (a) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania which read as follows; - “When the right and duties of any person are being determine by the court or any other agency the person shall be entitled to a fair hearing ..............” (See for example, ECO-TECH (Zanzibar) Limited vs Government of Zanzibar, ZNZ Civil Application No. 1 of 2007 (unreported), Mbeya- Rukwa Auto Parts & Transport Limited vs Jestina George Mwakyoma- Civil Appeal No. 45 of 2000 (unreported), D. P. P. vs Sabina Tesha & Others [1992] T. L. R. 237, Dishon John Mtaita vs D. P. P.- Criminal Appeal No. 132 of 2004 (unreported) to mention just a few. 19 I am aware, the spirit of the act governing land disputes is inferred in the provision of section 45 of the Land Dispute Act Cap. Cap. 216, R.E. 2019 entails that errors or omission if does not occasioned failure of justice ought to be disregarded. The same provides; “No decision or order of a Ward Tribunal or District Land and Housing Tribunal shall be reversed or altered on appeal or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the proceedings before or during the hearing or in such decision or order or on account of the improper admission or rejection of any evidence unless such error, om ission or irregularity or im proper adm ission or rejection of evidence has in fact occasioned a failure of justice” [ Emphasis added] Having observed as above endeavours, I am settled the tribunal error stated above caused unfair trial against the 4th respondent, thus occasioned failure of justice. Henceforth, I find the first and the second ground of appeal meritorious and thus upheld and sustained. 20 On the third ground of appeal the appellant contends that the application before the tribunal was incompetent for failure by the applicant to join the buyer of the suit property. According to the appellant the buyer of the suit land was a necessary party as determining the suit without involving the said purchaser was fatal and it rendered the decree ineffective as the property was currently owned by another person who was not party to the case. The 1st respondent on the other hand contends that the issue is an afterthought since the same was not pleaded and that the applicant never proved that there was sale between him and the alleged person. Having considered the trial tribunal’s record and the parties’ submissions, I find the issue for determination of this ground is whether the purchaser of the suit land was a necessary party to be joined in the application which was filed before the Trial Tribunal. In the outset, much as I don’t agree with the learned counsel for the 1st respondent when he said this is a new issue as it was not pleaded in the appellant written statement of defence before the tribunal nor was it discussed at any point during trial thus it ought not to be discussed at this stage of appeal. 21 According to the WSD of the appellant filed at the tribunal on 2n March 2020, at paragraph 12 he averred that; “ …. The aforesaid sale was part of the loan agreement between the 1st respondent and 2nd respondent versus the 3rd respondent hence this application is taken by events since is already auctioned to som eone else w ho is now in possession and ow nership of the said disputed property.” The extract above is the pleading presented at the trial tribunal, thus is not a new matter as endeavours by Mr. Shayo above, Moreover, it is a settled principle of law that, a legal point may be raised at any time, even at the appellate stage. This means that the law allows for an issue to be entertained on appeal only if it involves a point of law see the case of Ex- Police No. E. 5812 Pc Renatus Itanisa vs. The Inspector General of Police & Another (Civil Appeal No. 147 OF 2018) 2022 TZCA 493 and another case of Sadick Japhary @ Masunzu vs Republic (Criminal Appeal 44 of 2019) [2022] TZCA 675 (7 November 2022). A point of law can be raised and entertained at any stage even on appeal. The issue of 22 non-joinder of a necessary party is a point of law therefore worth to be determined for the interest of justice. On the question of joining a party to a proceeding, the law has clearly provided on the procedure under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Code Cap. 33 R.E. 2019 “CPC” which provides that; “The court may, at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or w ithout the application of either party and on such terms as may appear to the court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, w hether as plaintiff or defendant, or w hose presence before the court m ay be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and com pletely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.” [Emphasis added] 23 The above provision speaks loudly that either party to the case may apply for the court to join necessary party whose presence in the case is necessary. The question as to who is a necessary party is also explained in this provision to include a person whose presence in the suit is necessary for effectual and complete settlement of all questions involved in a suit. In determining this question, one has to examine the application in order to see if the orders sought by the claimant in the suit would legally affect the interests of that person. The essence behind joinder of a necessary party is to avoid multiplicity of suits since this person will be forced to open another suit to defend his interest in the property, but also the decree issued will be non-effective normally. In Abdulatif Mohamed Hamis vs Mehboob Yusuf Othman & Another (Civil Revision No. 6 of 2017) [2018] TZCA 25 (TANZLII) the court at page 27 observed that; “Upon reason and prudence, there is no gainsaying the fact that the presence of a necessary party is, just as well, imperatively required in our jurisprudence to enable the courts to adjudicate and pass effective and complete decrees. Viewed from that perspective, we take the position that Rule 9 of 24 Order 1 only holds good with respect to the misjoinder and non- joinder of non-necessary parties. On the contrary, in the absence of necessary parties, the court m ay fail to deal w ith the suit, as it shall, eventually, not be able to pass an effective decree. It would be idle for a court, so to say, to pass a decree which would be of no practical utility to the plaintiff.” [Emphasis added] Now, having examined the tribunal’s record specifically the application I noted that the applicant who is the 1st respondent herein claimed among other reliefs to be declared the owner of the suit property. Now since the appellant here in claimed that the suit property had already been sold to another party as allude above, then the person who is in possession of the suit property was a necessary party to the proceedings as the orders sought would legally affect his interest. I therefore think it was necessary to join the buyer of the suit property so as to give him an opportunity of being heard which is the constitution right as observed above. 25 In view thereof, I am settled the said buyer was a necessary party to be joined, if was not the law says determination of a suit without joining a necessary party is a fatal irregularity which renders the decision and proceedings thereof a nullity. (See for instance, Abdulatif Mohamed vs Mehboob Yusuf Othman & Another (supra) and Gapco Tanzania Limited & Another vs. Ramzan D. Walji Company Ltd (Civil Appeal No. 381 of 2020) [2024] TZCA 558 ( TANZLII). For the stated reasons, I find merit in this ground of appeal, having consider it together with the two grounds above sustained, I see no reason to discuss the remaining grounds as these are enough to dispose the appeal entirely. That said and done, the appeal is hereby allowed. Consequently, I invoke revisional powers of this court under section 43 (1) (b) of the Land Disputes Courts Act, Cap 216 R:E 2019 and thus I hereby nullify the proceedings of the tribunal, quash and set aside the judgment and decree in above said Application no. 23 of 2019. Furthermore, having considered the circumstances of this matter, in the interests of justice requires that I should order retrial to remedy the above uncertainties, thus I hereby order expedited retrial of this matter by another Tribunal Chairman after the 1st respondent amend his previous 26 application and include the buyer of the alleged mortgaged property. Since the anomalies were not caused by the parties, each party shall bear its own costs. It is so ordered. DATED at MOSHI this 10th day of October, 2024. X JUDGE Signed by: A. P. KILIMI Court: Judgment delivered today on 10th day of October, 2024 in the presence of first respondent and fourth respondent, others absent. Sgd; A. P. KILIMI JUDGE 10/10/2024 Court: Right of Appeal explained. Sgd; A. P. KILIMI JUDGE 10/10/2024 27