arobogast augustino shayo and 2 others vs republic 2023 tzhc 16788 18 april 2023

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA MOSHI DISTRICT REGISTRY AT MOSHI CONSOLIDATED CRIMINAL APPEALS NO. 24 & 40 OF 2022 (Originating from Criminal Case No. 16 of 2020 of Moshi District Court at Moshi) AROBOGAST AUGUSTINO @ SHAYO……………… 1ST APPELLANT GEOFREY GABRIEL MUGWE @ MASAI……………. 2ND APPELLANT JULIUS LENGAI NGAO @ LENGAI…………………. 3RD APPELLANT VERSUS THE REPUBLIC …………………………………………… RESPONDENT JUDGMENT 23/03/2023 & 18/04/2023 SIMFUKWE, J. This judgment determines two consolidated appeals: Criminal Appeal No. 24 of 2022 filed by the Appellant Arobogast Augustino @ Shayo and Criminal Appeal No. 40 of 2022 filed by Geofrey Gabriel Mungwe @ Masai and Julius Lengai @ Lengai. All of them seek to impugn the decision of the District Court of Moshi at Moshi (the trial Court) in Criminal Case No. 16 0f 2020 as they were dissatisfied with the whole decision of the trial Court. In the former appeal three (3) grounds have been raised as follows: 1 1. That, the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact by deciding that the prosecution proved its case against the 1st accused - Appellant herein above beyond reasonable doubt. 2. That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact by proceeding to try the matter while the certificate and consent from the Director of Public Prosecution were not properly filed before the court. 3. That the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact by failure to evaluate properly the evidence on record and as a result convicted and sentenced the appellant. On part of the 2nd and 3rd appellants, they raised eight (8) grounds of appeal as follows: 1. That, the learned trial magistrate grossly erred both in law and fact when convicted and sentenced the Appellants despite the prosecution seriously flouted the mandatory provision of section 38(3) of the CPA. (sic) 2. That, the trial court grossly erred in both law and fact by denying the Appellants a constitutional right of fair trial as the 2nd and third (3rd) Accused persons were not accorded with an opportunity to cross-examine the 1st accused person. 3. That, the trial court grossly erred in both law and fact in making findings and holding that the 2nd and 3rd accused persons (now the Appellants) were found in possession of what the prosecution termed as the wild animals’ meat to wit giraffe and buffalo meat. 2 4. That, the Trial court grossly erred in both law and fact in holding that what was alleged to be seen by PW1 and PW6 to have had been carried on the motorcycles (exh. P2) allegedly were driven by the Appellants herein and later being unloaded were the wild animals’ meat despite there being no evidence from the identifying prosecution witnesses (i.e PW1 and PW6) to show that what was seen carried on the exh. P2 are (sic) the same as those allegedly being retrieved from the 1st accused’s house. (sic) 5. That, the trial court grossly erred in both law and fact in holding and relied on exhibit P6 (the inventory form) that indeed the alleged wild animals’ meat existed, despite the alleged exhibit being un procedurally acquired, tendered and admitted in evidence as exhibit. 6. That, the trial court grossly erred both in law and fact in failing to take into account the principles which have to be taken into consideration on chain of custody and preservation of exhibits. 7. That, the trial court grossly erred both in law and fact in failing to consider the defence put up by the 2nd accused (now the Appellant) further, she shifted the burden of proof to the 3rd Accused (now the Appellant) by stating that he has (sic) failed to call his wife to testify before the trial court. 8. That, the trial court grossly erred both in law and fact in convicting and sentencing the Appellants basing on a charge 3 which was not proved beyond reasonable doubt against the Appellants and to the required standards by the law. Since the two appeals were against the same decision, it was prayed and the court ordered the two appeals to be consolidated, so that they could be determined jointly. During the hearing of the appeals the appellants were represented by Mr. Willence Elisonguo Shayo, learned counsel while the respondent Republic was represented by Ms. Grace Kabu, the learned State Attorney. Before the trial court briefly, the appellants were charged, as follows: On the first count the appellants were jointly and together charged with an offence of Unlawful possession of government trophy contrary to section 86(1) (2) (c) (ii) of the Wildlife Conservation Act, No. 5 of 2009 read together with paragraph 14 of the 1st schedule to, and sections 57(1) and 60(2) of the Economic and Organized Crimes Control Act, [Cap.200 R.E 2019]. It was alleged by the prosecution that on 26th day of August 2019 at Kikelelwa Village within Rombo District in Kilimanjaro Region the appellants were found in unlawful possession of Government Trophy to wit Twenty (20) kilograms of Giraffe Meat which is equivalent to one killed Giraffe valued at USD 15000 which is equivalent to thirty-four Million and five hundred thousand Tanzanian Shillings (34,500,000/=) the property of the United Republic of Tanzania. 4 On the second count the appellants were charged with an offence of unlawful possession of government trophy contrary to Sections 86(1) (2) (b) of the Wildlife Conservation Act, (supra) read together with paragraph 14 of the 1st Schedule and Sections 57(1) and 60(2) of the Economic and Organized Crimes Control Act (supra) It was alleged that on the same date, time and place, the appellants were found in unlawful possession of Government Trophy to wit twenty-five (25) kilograms of Buffalo meat which is equivalent to one killed Buffalo valued at USD 1900 which is equivalent to four million three hundred and seventy thousand Tanzanian shillings (4,370,000/=) the property of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania. The 3rd count for the 2nd and 3rd appellants was in respect of an offence of unlawful dealing in government trophies contrary to Section 84 (1) of the Wildlife Conservation Act, (supra) read together with Paragraph 14 of the First Schedule to, and Sections 57 (1) and 60 (2) of the Economic and Organized Crimes Control Act (supra). It was alleged that on the same date, time and place, the 2nd and 3rd appellants did unlawfully transfer government trophy to one Arbogast s/o Augustino @ Shayo (1st appellant herein) to wit, twenty-five (25) kilograms of Buffalo Meat which is equivalent to one killed Buffalo valued at USD 1900 equivalent to four Million three hundred and seventy thousand (4,370,000/=) the property of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania. 5 On the fourth count the 2nd and 3rd appellants were charged with an offence of unlawful dealing in government trophies contrary to section 84 (1) of the Wildlife Conservation Act (supra) read together with Paragraph 14 of the First Schedule to and Sections 57 (1) and 60 (2) of the Economic and Organized Crimes Control Act (supra). That on the same date, time and place, the 2nd and 3rd appellants did unlawfully transfer government trophy to one Arbogast s/o Augustino @ Shayo to wit, twenty-five (25) kilograms of Buffalo meat which is equivalent to one killed Buffalo valued at USD 1900 equivalent to four Million three hundred and seventy thousand (4,370,000/=) the property of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania. On the 5th and 6th counts the first accused was charged with an offence of unlawful dealing in trophies contrary to section 84(1) of the Wildlife Conservation Act (supra) read together with paragraph 14 of the First Schedule to and section 57(1) and section 60(2) of the Economic and Organized Crimes Control Act (supra). That, on the same date, time and place, the 1st appellant did unlawfully accept Government trophy from the 2nd and 3rd appellants herein to wit: twenty five (25) kilograms of Buffalo meat which is equivalent to one killed Buffalo valued at USD 1900 equivalent to four Million three hundred and seventy thousand (4,370,000/=); and twenty kilograms of giraffe meat which is equivalent to one killed giraffe valued at USD 15,000 equivalent to thirty four million and five hundred thousand (34,500,000/=) the property of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania. 6 After full trial, the trial magistrate was satisfied that all the counts were proved beyond reasonable doubts. Hence, each appellant was sentenced to serve twenty (20) years imprisonment. Aggrieved with both conviction and sentence, the appellants preferred the instant appeal. Before submitting on the grounds of appeal, the appellants’ counsel addressed the court on irregularity on point of law in respect of the Preliminary Hearing. He argued that, the trial court did not explain to the appellants the nature of the Preliminary Hearing as required under section 192(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Cap 20 R.E 2019. Also, the learned counsel faulted the proceedings of the trial court particularly at page 12 of the typed proceedings on the reason that the prosecutor did not sign the memorandum of the agreed facts and nowhere it is shown that the memorandum of the agreed facts was read over and explained to the appellants as per section 192(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act (supra). It was emphasized that the accused and the Public Prosecutor are required to agree on the facts which are disputed (sic) before the same are recorded as being undisputed. That, for this to be done the facts should have been read over and explained to the accused persons in accordance to section 192(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act (supra) and for it to be agreed, the accused and the prosecutor should have signed the same. Mr. Willence was of the view that failure to comply with this requirement is incurable irregularity. He referred to the case of Republic vs Abdallah Salum @Haji, Criminal Revision No.04 of 2019 (unreported) which held that: 7 “…It goes without saying that the Preliminary Hearing was not conducted properly and contravened mandatory Provisions that is section 192(3) of CPA, and that the discerned procedural irregularities are fatal and incurable.” Submitting on the first ground of appeal, the learned counsel for the appellants complained that there was violation of section 38(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act (supra) as there was no receipt acknowledging seizure issued to the appellants after seizure. It was explained that at page 16 of the typed proceedings, they conducted search in the house of the appellant and alleged to have found the said exhibits as per certificate of seizure, but no receipt was issued to the appellant. It was the opinion of Mr. Willence that the purpose of issuing receipts is to make sure that the property seized comes from no place other than the one shown. Reference was made to the case of Mustafa Darajani vs Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 277 of 2008 at page 10 to support such argument. Also, it was argued that certificate of seizure cannot be equated to the receipt as per the case of Andrea Augustino @ Msigara and Jesse Kajuna @ Mwemero, Criminal Appeal No. 365 of 2018 at page 22. It was further argued that during tendering of such exhibits when asked the appellants replied that they did not recognize them. On the same ground, it was Mr. Willence’s averment that there was no proof that the appellant was present and was heard by the Magistrate when he ordered disposal of the exhibit as per requirement of Paragraph 25 of PGO 229 and the case of Mohamed Juma @ Mpakama vs Republic, CA. 8 On the second ground of appeal, the learned counsel faulted the trial magistrate for denying the 2nd and 3rd appellants their constitutional right of fair trial as they were not accorded opportunity to cross examine the 1st appellant as seen at page 36 and 37 of the typed proceedings. That, after the 1st appellant had testified, the prosecution was given an opportunity to cross examine him while the 2nd and 3rd appellants were not availed with such opportunity. To cement the point, Mr. Willence cited the case of Albanus Aloyce and Another vs Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 283 of 2015, CAT at page 6. Also, he referred to the case of Charles Kidaha and 2 Others vs Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 395 of 2018 CAT and commented that since the 2nd and 3rd appellants were not given opportunity to cross examine the 1st appellant then, there is miscarriage of justice. Hence, the conviction and sentence should be nullified and set aside. On the 3rd ground which concerns analysis of evidence, the learned counsel criticized the trial court’s findings on the reason that the court did not properly analyze evidence on the record as a result convicted and sentenced the appellants. He elaborated that the trial magistrate failed to consider what the 1st appellant averred in his defence as a result she misinterpreted the appellant’s defence as alibi while it was not. Mr. Willence underlined the argument that the prosecution failed to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt. He prayed the court to quash and set aside both conviction and sentence of the trial court and order immediate release of the appellants. 9 Responding to the above submission, Ms. Grace Kabu started her submission by expressing that she was not supporting the appeal and that conviction and sentence imposed against the appellants should be upheld. Countering the allegation that the trial court did not comply with section 192(2) and (3) of the Criminal Procedure Act (supra), Ms. Grace was of the view that page 10 to 13 of the typed proceedings reveal that the Preliminary Hearing was conducted and at the end there were signatures of all accused persons now the appellants and the public prosecutor. Ms. Grace admitted that it is not indicated in the records whether the trial magistrate explained to the appellants about the nature and purpose of the preliminary hearing and whether the memorandum of undisputed facts was read and explained to the appellants in a language that they understood before signing the same as per section 192(3) of the CPA. Much as she admitted on those facts, the learned State Attorney opined that the appellants’ signatures suggest that they understood the contents of the Preliminary Hearing and in any case the omission if any did not occasion miscarriage of justice. She continued to elaborate that noncompliance of section 192(2) and (3) (supra) vitiates the Preliminary proceedings and not the trial proceedings. To support such argument, Ms. Grace referred the court to the case of Gallus Faustine Stanslaus @ Wasiwasi and Another vs Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 231 of 2007 CAT (Unreported) at page 5 where it was stated that: 10 “Failure to conduct preliminary hearing under section 192 of the Criminal Procedure Act, is an irregularity but it does not have the effect of rendering the trial proceedings a nullity.” It was insisted that although the memorandum of undisputed facts was not prepared, the judgment of the trial court was not based on the preliminary hearing. Responding to the first ground of appeal on the allegations of noncompliance of section 38(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act (supra), Ms. Grace was of the view that issuing a receipt after a certificate of seizure is prepared is not necessary. She supported her argument with the case of Papaa Olesikaladai @ Lemundu and Another vs Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 47 of 2020 (unreported) where the Court of Appeal had this to say: “We agree with Ms Madikenya that the complaint of non- issuance of a receipt will have no place in cases where a certificate of seizure is issued… to underscore the point that where, like here, a certificate of seizure is issued and is signed by the accused person, the same constitutes evidence even without a receipt.” Responding to the 2nd ground of appeal on the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain an economic case, it was replied that at page 8 and 9 of the trial court typed proceedings, the prosecutor submitted the consent and a certificate of the DPP before the trial court so as to confer jurisdiction to the District Court of Moshi at Moshi to try this economic case as directed under section 12(3) of the Economic and Organized 11 Crimes Control Act (supra). Thus, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the case. Contesting the complaint that the appellants were not given right to cross examine their co-accused, Ms. Grace submitted that this ground is unfounded as at page 41,43 and 44 of the typed proceedings, when the 2nd and 3rd appellants testified, their co-accused was given chance to cross examine them. Retorting to the allegation that the evidence was not properly analyzed by the trial court, the learned State Attorney on the outset said that the evidence was watertight against the appellants. She stated that it was proved that the said government trophies were found in the 1st appellant’s possession as per the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW6. That the 1st appellant’s house was searched in front of independent witness and the said government trophies were retrieved therein. That, oral evidence of witnesses was very credent and precise to prove that none but the appellants were in unlawful possession of the said government trophies. Furthermore, Ms. Grace submitted that the procedure of disposal of the government trophies was done as per section 101 of the Wildlife Conservation Act (supra) and section 353(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act (supra) which govern the procedure of disposition of perishable and fast decaying exhibits. That, the record shows that the appellants were given the opportunity to see the actual trophies and the right to raise objection if any, before the said trophies were admitted as exhibits. Forthwith, the exhibits destroyed were indicated in the inventory form which 12 was signed by the appellants, the magistrate, the officer who sought the disposition order for proving that the exercise of disposition involved the appellants. She referred the court to page 28 of the proceedings to support her submission. Ms. Grace also addressed the court on the issue of chain of custody. She stated that evidence adduced by PW1, PW5 and PW6 clearly show how the exhibit was kept from the time it was seized from the 1st appellant’s house to the point when it was tendered before the court and disposed according to the law. That, chain of custody was proved through chronological documentation of movement of exhibit through exhibit P1 (the chain of custody movement form) exhibit P3 (‘Hati ya makabidhiano’), exhibit P4 (Trophy Valuation Certificate) and exhibit P5 (Exhibit Register Book). Also, the prosecution paraded witnesses who came into possession of trophies at one point in time. Basing on the above submission, it was Ms. Grace’s opinion that the case against the appellants was established to sustain proper conviction. She prayed the court to uphold the findings of the trial court and confirm the conviction and sentence imposed thereto. In his rejoinder, Mr. Willence noted from Ms. Grace’s submission that she did not object the fact that the trial court denied the 2nd and 3rd appellants’ constitutional right of fair trial as Ms. Grace submitted on cross examination against the 2nd and 3rd accused persons only. He was of the view that since such error is not disputed by the respondent, then the court should allow this appeal by quashing and setting aside both conviction and sentence. 13 Similarly, the learned counsel for the appellants maintained that the Preliminary Hearing was not properly conducted. Responding to the argument that the omission does not vitiate the proceedings, Mr. Willence was of the opinion that it is fatal since the same had impact to the final judgment of the court. He added that since the law used the word shall then the said requirement is compulsory and should be adhered. Therefore, the circumstances of the case cited by the respondent are distinguishable to the present case. In conclusion, he insisted that the prosecution did not prove their case beyond reasonable doubt. He reiterated his prayer of this appeal being allowed. Having carefully considered the submissions of the parties and the trial court record, the issue for determination is whether this appeal has merit. Since the learned advocate for the appellants adopted the two memorandums of appeal to form part and parcel of his submissions, then I will discuss all the grounds of appeal in both appeals. On the first ground of appeal, the appellants’ counsel faulted the exercise of search and seizure. He argued that the same contravened section 38(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act (supra) as no receipt was produced, issued and tendered in evidence as exhibit to substantiate the prosecution evidence that the appellants were found in possession of the said government trophy. On the other hand, Ms. Grace for the respondent had different opinion. She stated that issuing a receipt is not necessary where a certificate of seizure is 14 issued. She supported her argument with the case of Papaa Olesikaladai @Lemundu and Another (supra). The requirement of issuing a receipt is provided for under section 38(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act (supra) which reads: “Where anything is seized in pursuance of the powers conferred by subsection (1) the officer seizing the thing shall issue a receipt acknowledging the seizure of that thing, bearing the signature of the owner or occupier of the premises or his near relative or other person for the time being in possession or control of the premises, and the signature of witnesses to the search, if any.” It is true that in the instant matter, the receipt was not issued thus there was noncompliance of the above provision of the law. However, as rightly submitted by the learned State Attorney, where there is certificate of seizure, there is no requirement of issuing receipt. If I may add, each case should be determined based on its circumstances. The circumstances of this case impel me to support the learned State Attorney’s argument that there was no need of issuing a receipt since there was certificate of seizure. Nevertheless, the appellants’ counsel did not tell this court how the appellants were prejudiced by such omission of issuing a receipt. At page 14 of the case of Papaa Olesikaladai @Lendemu and Another (supra) while discussing this issue, the Court of Appeal held that: 15 “…we find and hold that the omission to issue a receipt in terms of section 38(3) of the CPA or 22(3) of Cap. 200 was not fatal. The ailment is curable under the provisions of section 388 of the CPA.” Having established as such, I am of the opinion that the complaint under the 1st ground has no merit and I hereby dismiss it. On the same vein, the learned counsel alleged that there was no proof that the appellant was present and heard by the magistrate while ordering disposal of the alleged trophy as per Paragraph 25 of PGO 229. Ms. Grace stated that the procedures of disposing government trophies were done in accordance to section 101 of the Wildlife Conservation Act (supra) and section 353(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act (supra). That, the appellant was given chance to see the actual trophies and to raise objection. Also, the inventory was signed by the appellant, magistrate and officer who sought the disposal order. The issue of disposing government trophies was discussed in details in the case of Mohamed Juma @ Mpakama vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 385 of 2017) [2019] TZCA 518 from page 20-23. In the cited case, the mandatory right of an accused to be present before the Magistrate and be heard was emphasized. At page 22 it was specified that: “Concerning the way the Police are required to handle perishable exhibits when still at the stage of criminal investigation, paragraph 25 of PGO No. 229 (INVESTIGATION 16 - EXHIBITS) applies, and states: 25. Perishable exhibits which cannot easily be preserved until the case is heard, shall be brought before the Magistrate, together with the prisoner if any so that the Magistrate may note the exhibits and order immediate disposal. Where possible, such exhibits should be photographed before disposal.… The above paragraph 25 envisages any nearest Magistrate, who may issue an order to dispose of perishable exhibit. This paragraph 25 in addition emphasizes the mandatory right of an accused (if he is in custody or out on police bail) to be present before the Magistrate and be heard.’’ I keenly read the entire prosecution evidence; PW5 in his evidence established that the appellant was taken to the magistrate. However, he did not establish the involvement of the 1st appellant during disposition of the said trophies and whether he was heard apart from saying that they only showed the magistrate the said trophies. Despite the fact that the Inventory form (exhibit P6) contain the signature of the 1st appellant, it cannot be concluded that the 1st appellant was fully involved in the process and that he was heard. When the said inventory form was tendered, the 1st appellant raised an objection to the effect that he did not sign the inventory in court. This takes me to the 5th ground of appeal where Mr. Willence challenged the procedures of tendering and admitting such inventory form (Exhibit P6). 17 I have examined the trial court’s records particularly at page 28 of the typed proceedings; it is on record that when the Inventory form was tendered, the 1st appellant raised an objection to the effect that he did not sign the inventory in court. However, the trial magistrate proceeded to admit the said exhibit regardless of such objection. At this juncture, I wish to make it clear that the procedures for admitting documentary evidence are well elaborated under Exhibits Management Guidelines, published by the Judiciary of Tanzania in September,2020 which I recommend all magistrates to read and comprehend. At page 10 the Guidelines elaborates the principles for admitting or rejecting exhibits in Court as follows: “2.4.3. Steps in Tendering Exhibits Step 1: Ensure a witness has laid foundation evidence for tendering an exhibit, (i.e., witness explains how the exhibit is connected to the case and how it came in his possession). Step 2: Ensure the exhibit is shown to the opposing party for comment. Step 3: Whether or not there is an objection, the exhibit will be shown to a magistrate or judge to see and inspect. Step 4: Where there is an objection, the party who seeks to tender that exhibit has to be accorded an opportunity to respond; in case a new point is raised by a party proposing to tender it, then the party objecting will re-join. 18 Step 5(i): Where there is no objection, the judge or magistrate may admit the exhibit provided it has passed the admissibility test. Step 5(ii): Where there is an objection, the presiding judge or magistrate will rule on the admissibility of the exhibit. Step 6(i): When the exhibit is rejected it will be returned to the party who proposed to tender it. Step 6(ii): When the exhibit is admitted the judge or magistrate will mark and endorse it. Step 7: Once the exhibit is admitted, a person tendering the exhibit shall read out its contents in court….” [Emphasis added] In the instant matter, the trial magistrate did not comply with the procedures of admitting the Inventory form as laid down herein above. After the 1st appellant had raised the objection, the trial magistrate did not conduct inquiry by giving him right to submit on his objection and allow the prosecution to reply on such objection. Instead, the trial magistrate jumped to the stage of admitting it. I am of considered opinion that the 1st appellant was curtailed fair trial. This prejudiced him since the same touches the root of the case. Worse enough, the trial magistrate did not say anything in respect of the said objection in her judgment. Following the anomaly as noted under the 1st and 5th grounds of appeal in respect of Inventory form (exhibit P6), I hereby expunge such exhibit from the record. Since the inventory form suffers the fate of being expunged, there is no subject matter to warrant conviction. 19 On the second ground, it was the appellants’ complaint that they were curtailed right to cross examine their co-accused (1st appellant). The learned State Attorney disputed this fact; however, she stated that when the 2nd and 3rd appellants testified, their co-accused was given chance to cross examine them. With due respect to the learned State Attorney, the appellants’ grievances are that the 2nd and 3rd appellants were curtailed right to cross examine the 1st appellant. Right to cross examine co-accused has been emphasised in the case of Gift Mariki and Others vs Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 283 of 2015 (CAT) which held that: “As clearly depicted by the record, first, the appellants were denied the right to cross-examine each other to test the veracity of the testimony or shake the credibility of the witness, adverse or otherwise…. Third, even with such serious non-direction, which also went undetected at the High court, the trial court proceeded to erroneously consider that the appellant had properly made their defence according to law and that each of the appellants’ defence case was complete. So long as the appellants were denied their basic and essential right to cross- examination and to a fair trial, their defence to the charge could not have been fully accorded, heard or be complete.” 20 Having examined the typed proceedings; indeed, I have noted the alleged omission. At page 37 of the typed proceedings, after the 1st appellant had testified, the 2nd and 3rd appellant were not given chance to cross examine him. This curtailed their constitutional right on the reason that the prosecution particularly PW1 testified that the 1st appellant also told them that the 2nd and 3rd appellants brought the said wild meat to his house. On the basis of the above findings on the noted irregularities, as a matter of cardinal principle, I hereby resolve them in favour of the appellant. I am of considered view that the above irregularities suffice to dispose of this appeal. I accordingly refrain from engaging into an academic exercise of discussing the rest grounds of appeal in respect of evaluation of evidence. Consequently, I hereby quash the appellants’ conviction and set aside the sentence imposed against them and allow the appeal accordingly. The appellants should be released from custody immediately, unless held for other lawful reasons. Order accordingly. Dated and delivered at Moshi this 18th day of April 2023. X S. H. SIMFUKWE JUDGE Signed by: S. H. SIMFUKWE 21 22