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IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA TEMEKE HIGH COURT SUB REGISTRY AT ONE STOP JUDICIAL CENTER AT TEMEKE CIVIL APPEAL NO. 20285 OF 2024 ((An appeal originating from the decision of liaia District Court at Kinyerezi in Matrimonial cause No. 21/2021 delivered on the 19th July 2023 before Hon Nyenyema R.M) B. N............................................................................. APPELLANT VERSUS S. U. N...................................................................... RESPONDENT JUDGMENT Date of the last order 27/2/2025 I Date of the Judgment 28/02/2025 S.D. MWAIPOPO, J. This appeal arises from the decision of the District Court of Ilala at Kinyerezi in Matrimonial cause No. 21 delivered on the 19th of July 2023 by Hon. Nyenyema, Principal Resident Magistrate. The background of this case is that, the parties herein were husband and wife, who celebrated their Christian marriage on 26th May 2007 at Msimbazi Catholic Church, in Dar es salaam and they were blessed with three issues of marriage, who for purposes of ensuring their right to privacy, I shall not i disclose their names. The parties lived a peaceful life at Kinyerezi, Dar es salaam until sometime in 2017 when things turned sour. At the trial court, the Appellant claimed that his wife had started misbehaving by abusing and deserting him. Thus, in the year, 2017, he decided to move out of their matrimonial home to his stepmother at Ifakara, in Morogoro region for his safety, and when he returned to their matrimonial home towards the end of 2019, his wife was no longer respecting him and was committing acts of cruelty against him and adultery. Irked the actions of his wife, the Appellant decided to petition for divorce and the division of their matrimonial assets before the District Court of Ilala at Kinyerezi, whereby he prayed for the following reliefs; a) A declaration that the marriage has been broken down irreparably b) That the honorable court be pleased to grant divorce c) That the honourable court be pleased to distribute matrimonial properties as per the contribution in the acquisition of the said assets d) Maintenance of the issues of marriage be in the hands of the Respondent until when the Petitioner shall gain body strength and financial muscle e) Custody of the issues of marriage be at the discretion of the issues of marriage f) Any other reliefs this court may deem fit to grant Upon determination of the matter, the trial court found that their marriage had irretrievably broken down and went on to grant divorce and division of matrimonial properties and other subsequent orders. For the sake of clarity, the trial court issued the following orders; a) The marriage solemnized herein between the Petitioner and the Respondent on 26th day of May 2007, vide certificate number 0945166 solemnized at Msimbazi catholic church, Dar es salaam is hereby pronounced broken down irreparably and proceed to grant a decree of divorce b) That, custody of the three issues of the marriage between the Petitioner and the Respondent is hereby granted to the Respondent c) That the Petitioner is hereby granted liberty to the access of the three children at reasonable times d) An order is hereby given that the matrimonial house located at Kinyerezi, Dar es salaam be held by the Respondent for the beneficial interest of the children e) That following the health condition of the Petitioner, the Respondent is hereby ordered to allow the Petitioner to continue using one room as his place of living pending stabilization of his health f) Each party to bear its own costs Aggrieved by the Judgement and Decree of the District Court of Ilala at Kinyerezi, the Appellant herein filed an appeal before this court containing the following grounds; a) That, the trial court erred in law by not considering evidence tendered by the Appellant. b) That, the trial Court erred in law and fact by ordering the Appellant to reside in only one room in the Matrimonial House in Kinyerezi pending stabilization of his health. c) That, the trial court erred in law and in fact by ordering Matrimonial home in Kinyerezi be held by the Respondent. d) That the trial court erred in law and in fact by denying the Appellant a right to be heard. e) That, the trial Court erred in law and fact for not evaluating the evidence adduced by the Appellant herein above. Base on the above stated grounds of appeal, the Appellant has prayed for this court to issue the following orders; a) Allow his appeal b) Set aside the decision No. 21/2021 of Ilala District Court at Kinyerezi, delivered by Hon. Nyenyema, R.M on 19th day of July 2023. c) Grant him with 70% of the Matrimonial House. d) Any other reliefs and orders which this court deems fit and just to grant. The hearing of the appeal proceeded by way of written submissions based on the consensus of both parties and the time table drawn by the court. The Appellant received legal aid assistance from the Legal and Human Rights Centre-Kinondoni Legal Aid Clinic while the Respondent enlisted legal services from learned Advocate Ishengoma, Esq, from SA Law Chambers. Submitting in support of his appeal, the Appellant dwelt on the second ground of appeal which deals with the division of the matrimonial house which is located at Kinyerezi. He began by referring the court to 19th day of July 2023 when the District Court of Ilala, at Kinyerezi, (Hon. Nyenyema PRM) pronounced the Judgement in Matrimonial Cause No. 21 of 2021 granting divorce to the Parties herein. He submitted that among the reasons for reaching the said decision was cruelty done to the Appellant by the Respondent, as testified by the Appellant before the trial court and supported by the evidence of PW2, one Zahra Rashidi and PW3 one Kuzia Gidion. That the trial court, after evaluating the evidence tendered by the Appellant concluded that there were indeed persistent acts of cruelty in their marriage. The Appellant further contended that, as if that was not enough, the Trial Magistrate went on to order the Appellant to live in only one of the rooms of the matrimonial house pending 'stabilization of his health'. He argued that, the said decision left more questions than answers as to what would happen if his health were to stabilize. The Appellant further questioned as to what rights he would be entitled to in relation to the house which the Trial Magistrate conceded that it was registered in his name and which he managed to construct through hard work albeit with some little help from the Respondent, who is currently hiding the title in the Appellant's house. To bolster his submissions, the Appellant asserted that, in dividing the matrimonial properties, the trial court is required to follow the guideline enshrined in section. 114 (1) of the Law of Marriage Act Cap. 29 RE 2019 which states that; 114(1). "The court shall have power, when granting or subsequent to the grant of a decree of separation or divorce, to order the division between the parties of any assets acquired by them during the marriage by the joint efforts or to order the sale of any such asset and the division between the parties of the proceeds of sale". He went on submitting that; the court in applying the above provisions, i.e. section 114 (2)(b) of the Law of Marriage Act Cap. 29 RE 2019, is required to consider the contribution of each party in the acquisition of the said property. The said provision reads as follows; 114(2) In exercising the power conferred by subsection (1), the court shall have regard (a) N/A (b) to the extent of the contributions made by each party in money, property or work towards the acquisition of the assets; To solidify his submissions, he stated that; section 60(a) of the Law of Marriage Act states that when a property is registered in the name of one of the parties, the court shall presume that the property is owned by the one whose name appears therein to the exclusion of the other. The said section states as follows: S. 60; Presumptions as to property acquired during marriage Where during the subsistence of a marriage, any property is acquired- fa) in the name of the husband or of the wife, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the property belongs absolutely to that person, to the exclusion of his or her spouse; The Appellant thus prayed for the hon. court to set aside the trial court's decision which only guarantees the continuation of the cruelty endured by the Appellant who currently suffers from stroke and cannot speak or do anything to help himself, in only one room of his very own house. That the Appellant's stay in the house is only limited to his ill health and in case the Appellant's health stabilizes, he will be required to be relocated without anything after all his years of hard work and endurance of cruelty from the Respondent. To emphasize his point, he referred the court to the case of Mariam Tumbo vs Harold Tumbo 1983 TLR 293 (HC) whereby, Hon. Lugakingira J spoke on the issue of cruelty, which he prayed for this court to consider in this case; when reprehensible conduct or departure from the normal standards of conjugal kindness causes injury to health or an apprehension of it, it is cruelty if a reasonable person, after 7 taking due account of the temperament and all the other particular circumstances, would consider that the conduct complained of is such that this spouse should not be called on to tolerate it; In conclusion, he implored the court to correct this anomaly and order for a proper division of matrimonial properties so that the Appellant can have his fair share of the matrimonial properties and end this agony that he is currently enduring in the hands of the Respondent with no end in sight. Submitting in rebuttal, the learned counsel for the Respondent began by expressing his reservations on the modality adopted by the Appellant in presenting his written submissions. He submitted that; under normal circumstances, the Appellant ought in law to have submitted on each ground of appeal separately and or consolidate the two or three grounds of appeal and or make all the grounds consolidated as one ground of appeal for argument and submissions. He stated that, looking at the Appellant's submissions in chief filed in court on 9th September, 2024 from the first page to the last page, it is evident that he has submitted on one ground of appeal which is number (ii) above and left the rest which are grounds No.l, 3, 4 and 5. He contended that he would therefore follow, the Appellant's tune and or option. The learned counsel for the Respondent contended that; there is no any issue complained of to the trial court in granting divorce, therefore he would not discuss anything in this regard. In his submissions, the matter at issue is when the court ordered the matrimonial property at Kinyerezi to be under the Respondent's possession and at the same time ordering the Appellant to have access rights in one of the master bed rooms, while leaving the other two normal rooms to the Respondent and her three issues, one being the boy and the two twin sisters, pending the recovery of the Appellant. He stated that, in his humble view and understanding, the issue of the matrimonial property division was already settled by the court. He submitted that, the determination of the share by percentage and or monetary value if this is what is complained of ought to have been determined by the valuer upon the valuation process. It is the valuation report which would have specifically shown the value and or share of one room and two rooms in terms of monetary forms and or percentage wise. He submitted that, the Appellant's move of challenging the trial court's decision by this appeal was not a right move, since it is a premature remedy. The Appellant ought to have filed an application for review to the trial court to remedy this error had it been found that the judgment was not understandable and executable. He contended that from the record of the trial court decision, the Appellant clearly conceded that the Respondent made her contribution to the house as evidenced by the loans the Respondent was taking from her employer, the NMB Bank. Further that from 2011 to 2017, the Appellant was jobless after his resignation and since 2017 to date he is incapacitated and not able to produce income. That it is the Respondent who has been in charge of the house development and children's upkeep. It is on record that the Appellant sold two motor vehicles being matrimonial cars and squandered all the monies without sharing with the Respondent or apportioning her share in the said properties. He argued that, while the Appellant is pursuing his share in the matrimonial house, he ought to have also declared the Respondent's share on the sold cars, however, he has not done it and this is against the legal saying that 'whoever comes to justice must come with dean hands'. Submitting further in rebuttal, the learned counsel for the Respondent stated that, under the circumstances of the affairs of the Appellant that he was grounded since 2011 to date, it is evident that at any rate, the claim of 80% as a share on the matrimonial house by the Respondent, is fair and just and this is what is equated to the court order for one room, master bed room against two normal rooms for the Appellant and the Respondent respectively, and which I believe even after valuation the position will still be the same. He asserted further that, based on the above submissions, it is correct that, the order of the trial court did not offend section 114(1) of the Law of Marriage Act Cap 29 as revised in 2019 and rather it is consistent with subsection 2 of section 114 of the Law of Marriage Act. With regard to section 60 (a) of the Law of Marriage Act cited by the Appellant, to support his argument that since the title deed/ ''Hati ya Mauziano" is in the name of the Appellant, then it supports the point that the Appellant is the sole owner of the landed property, he contended that this argument is no longer a point to ponder as long as the matrimonial assets were acquired during the subsistence of the marriage, all the assets are and or deemed to be owned jointly and in case of a dispute what the court may be called upon to decide is the percentage of contribution each spouse has towards the property in dispute. He argued that, the available evidence and records may not be in a position to determine and to grant the prayers sought on appeal. There is no record suggesting that the Appellant is entitled to 70% as per his prayer and that this prayer is not reflected in the former pleadings of the Petition for divorce at the trial court not even pictured in the entire proceedings. He contended that, it is a cardinal principal that on appeal no new matters will be allowed. Any attempt to allow this appeal and set aside the trial court decision, will amount to assuming the role of the trial court. Hence, he prayed for the appeal to be dismissed with costs. Having digested the rival submissions of the parties, the broad question to be resolved is whether this appeal has merit. At the outset I must point out that, it is part of our jurisprudence that the first appellate court has the duty and discretion to re-valuate the entire evidence in an objective manner and arrive at its own findings of fact, if necessary. This is an established practice having roots in various precedents. See the case of Registered Trustees, of Joy in the 11 Harvest vs hamza K. sungura, Civil Appeal 149 of 2017 (2021) TZCA 139 TANZLII, Zuberi Bakari Mwachikitu Vs Selemani Bakari Mwachikitu PC Civil Appeal No. 91353 of 2023 HCT Moshi, Siza Patrice Vs Republic, criminal Appeal no. 19 of 2010 CAT (unreported), Kaimu Said vs Republic, Criminal appeal No.391 2019, Hassan Mohamed Maume vs Republic (1981) TL. 167 and Ashid Abiki Nguwa vs Ramadhani Hassan Kuteya and another, Civil appeal No. 21 o 2021 Having stated the above principle, I now turn to determine the appeal and I will begin with the issue raised by the Respondent to the effect that the Appellant has abandoned some of his grounds of appeal and has instead argued on one ground concerning the division of the matrimonial house. Having gone through the submissions in chief, I have observed that the Appellant filed five grounds of appeal, however in the course of submissions, he focused on the second ground of appeal, touching on the division of matrimonial house located at Kinyerezi. The law is clear that whenever one abandons some grounds of appeal, it may not be automatically "fatal" to the appeal, however it can significantly weaken the Appellant's position and could lead to the dismissal of the appeal if the remaining grounds are not strong enough to overturn the original decision, particularly if the abandoned grounds were considered crucial to the case; however, at the end of the day each case will be determined based on its own circumstances. Coming back to the grounds of appeal, I have considered the order given by the trial court with regard to the matrimonial house whereby it was ordered that the matrimonial house located at Kinyerezi Dar es salaam be held by the Respondent for the beneficial interest of the children and that following the health condition of the Petitioner, the Respondent should allow the Petitioner to continue using one room as his place of living pending stabilization of his health. I have also paid due regard to the second ground of appeal filed by the Appellant which relate to the division of the matrimonial house whereby the Appellant has argued that, the trial court erred in law and fact by ordering him to reside in only one room in the matrimonial house at Kinyerezi pending stabilization of his health. The Appellant has argued in his submissions that the trial court was wrong to confine him in one room pending stabilization of his health instead of dividing the matrimonial house as per section 114 of the Law of Marriage Act, so that he could also benefit from the fruits of his labour. He contended that the trial court ought to have awarded him 70% of the share of the House since he contributed greatly in its acquisition and that that the property documents are in his name hence the property should be presumed to be his as per section 60 of the Law of the Marriage Act. On the other hand, the Respondent has contended that she should be awarded 80% of the share of the house following valuation since she also contributed in its acquisition and has also effected some developments. To bolster her submissions on the contribution towards acquisition of the property, she submitted that she was working at NMB and had taken various loans for improving the house. Further, the Respondent also added that she has been taking care of the children and the house as well, since the Appellant has been jobless for a long time and ill. It is trite law under section 114 of the Law of Marriage Act Cap 29 RE 2019 that the court, when granting or subsequent to the grant of a decree of separation or divorce, shall have power to order the division of properties between the parties, of any assets acquired by them during the marriage, by the joint efforts or to order the sale of any such asset and the division between the parties of the proceeds sale". The court in applying the above provisions, i.e. section 114 (2)(b) of the Law of Marriage Act Cap. 29 RE 2019, is required to consider the contribution of each party in the acquisition of the said property, regard being paid to the extent of contributions made by each party in money, property or work towards acquisition of the assets. Furthermore, section 114(2)(d) of the LMA requires courts to consider the needs of infant children if any. I now turn to determine the issue of the division of the matrimonial property based on the percentage of the share of the house, each one is entitled to. The Appellant in his submissions has claimed to be awarded 70% of the share while the Respondent has in turn argued for the case of 80%. It is crystal clear that under section 114(2) the court is empowered to consider the contributions of parties, in terms of money, property or work. According to the evidence tendered before the trial court, the Appellant who was PWI testified to the effect that, during the pendency of their marriage, him and the Respondent acquired one matrimonial house located at Kinyerezi and that the said property is in his name. The Appellant also did not dispute the fact that the Respondent contributed to the acquisition of the said property, however not to the extent done by himself. The trial court in its Judgement is recorded to have stated as follows; Indeed, the said property though registered in the name of the Petitioner it is a matrimonial in nature(sic) as it was acquired and developed, through contribution, monetary and non-monetary of both the Petitioner and Respondent during the pendency of their marriage and that the property ought to be shared. The Petitioner does not refute the contribution of the Respondent towards purchasing of the said property, his only contention is that the contribution by the Respondent does not amount to the share of percentage she is claiming. In his Witness Statement dated 9th November 2022, the Appellant stated as follows; The house situated at Kinyerezi is my house I built it alone except the Respondent contributed when it needs(sic) electricity. Further, in the Proceedings dated 15th November 2022, the Appellant is recorded to have testified as follows when he was cross examined: I came to Dar es salaam in 2010 I build the house for(sic) taking loan at bank. The title of the house is in the name of Bernard Ngurumi. I don't have any other property than the house The Respondent on her side testified to the effect that; during the pendency of their marriage, they managed to acquire one matrimonial house located at Kinyerezi Dar es salaam. She also prayed to be given a higher share on the matrimonial property based on the reason that she contributed much to the acquisition of the matrimonial property and she is the one responsible for the maintenance of the children. DW3 also testified briefly that she was the one who sold the matrimonial property to the parties herein. Based on the testimonies of the parties; the following things can be deduced as far acquisition of the house at Kinyerezi is concerned; Firstly, it is not in dispute that the house at Kinyerezi was acquired during the subsistence of their marriage since it was purchased in 2010, that is; after their marriage in 2007. The said house is also registered in the name of the Appellant. This fact has been proved by both parties as well as DW3 who have both stated that the said house was acquired during the pendency of their marriage. Secondly, there is also no doubt that both parties were employed by NMB and have both contributed in developing the said property, with the Respondent taking various loans from NMB to do the necessary improvements. This fact has also been affirmed by the trial court in its Judgement in the following manner: Indeed, the said property though registered in the name of the Petitioner it is a matrimonial(sic) in nature as it was acquired and developed, through contribution, monetary and non-monetary of both the Petitioner and Respondent during the pendency of their marriage and that the property ought to be shared. The court went on to state that; The evidence is clear that both the Respondent and the Petitioner were gained(sic) employees of the National Micro Finance Bank (NMB), evidence also shows that the Respondent on different occasions obtained loans from her employer and that this money was utilized to develop the said matrimonial house. Based on the analysis of evidence above, in the present matter, the trial court after evaluating the evidence of both parties, reached a conclusion that the alleged house was a matrimonial house and that each party contributed towards the construction of the said house. However, considering the health condition of the deceased person, the trial court proceeded to order that the matrimonial house located at Kinyerezi Dar es salaam be held by the Respondent for the beneficial interest of the children and that following the health condition of the Petitioner, the Respondent should allow the Petitioner to continue using one room as his place of living pending stabilization of his health. It is my firm position that the trial court erred in not dividing the matrimonial house between the parties, based on their contributions, as per the requirement of the law as stated above. It was indeed incorrect for the court to rely on the criteria of health or the health status of the Appellant to withhold the division of matrimonial property, and ordering the Appellant to continue using one bedroom which he was using before the court issued an order for divorce, pending stabilization of his health. The criteria and the principle enshrined under section 114 of the Law of Marriage Act Cap 29 only requires the court to consider one's contribution in terms of money, work or property and not health. While I agree that the interest of infant children needs also to be considered when determining an order for division of matrimonial properties, I am also alive to the fact that, the principle of division of matrimonial properties is a principle well-built in our laws and that it is not supposed to be compromised or circumvented or diluted. See the case of Benedict Joseph vs Magdalena Hosea PC Civil Appeal no 15 of 2022 HCT Arusha, where it was stated as follows: As with regard to the children, the law only requires the court to consider the welfare of children but does not impose the liability to divide the matrimonial property to the children In this regard, I entirely agree with the question put forth by the Appellant that; what would be his fate if his health condition stabilizes? Will he have to continue staying in the single room speaking to himself, in a house occupied by his divorced wife and in a situation where the parties herein are no longer in good terms. What if he passes on without having been able to enjoy the fruits of his own labour. Why would the trial court keep the issue of division of the house pending while knowing that it would be rendered functus officio after issuing the decree of divorce. Certainly, the question posed by the Appellant makes a lot of sense and is worth to be addressed by this court, by way of an appeal, since this court, as the second appellate court, as stated herein above, is empowered to re­ evaluate the evidence tendered before the trial court and come up with its own findings. See the case of Harvest vs Hamza K. Sungura, Civil Appeal 149 of 2017 (2021) TZCA 139 TANZLII, It is my settled position that, when the law empowers the court to discharge its duty on a certain aspect, then that duty must be discharged without fear or favor, ill will or affection, and I would add that without suspicion or speculation of any worst-case scenario that could possibly or impossibly happen. The role of the court is not to abdicate from its duty and shy away from its powers. Thus the District court, as the trial court, after ruling out that the marriage between the parties had irretrievably broken down, it ought to have proceeded to divide the matrimonial property/ house at Kinyerezi between the parties herein, pursuant to section 114 of the LMA and not to throw away the towel by confining the Appellant in one of the bedrooms of the house, which is also being resided by his divorced wife, whom they are not in good speaking terms and whom the trial court found that she was committing acts of cruelty to him. I refer to the trial court's Judgement where this fact was affirmed as follows; What happens when one spouse who is grounded for illness is left without any help from the other for over five years without any justifiable cause? Often when this occurs the affected spouse becomes emotionally tortured. Regarding the allegation of cruelty.... I find that there is sufficient evidence produced before the court to prove cruelty. Therefore, I find that by confining the Appellant in one bedroom of the matrimonial property in Kinyerezi, pending stabilization of his health, the trial court erred in law and in fact since it rendered the Appellant as a guest in his own house, waiting for his recovery and or demise. Thus, the trial court ought to have divided the property pursuant to section 114 of the Law of Marriage Act Cap 29 Re 2019. As for the percentage of the share each one is entitled to, I rely in the case of Gabriel Nimrod Kurwijila v. Theresia Hassani Malongo, Civil Appeal No. 102 of 2018 CAT (unreported) where the CAT stated that; "The extent of contribution is of utmost importance to be determined when the court is faced with a predicament of division of matrimonial property.... It is clear therefore clear, that, the extent of contribution by a party in a matrimonial proceeding is a question of evidence as analyzed hereinabove. It is obvious from the record that both parties contributed towards the acquisition of the said house and also the development of the same. I have considered the fact that apart from the matrimonial house being the matrimonial property acquired in the name of the Appellant, the Respondent has also contributed in developing the said property, as an employee of NMB, earning her own income, as a mother and wife who contributed to the welfare of the family as well as taking care of children, before and way after the Appellant fell ill. See the case of Bibie Maurid vs Mohamed Ibrahim 1989 TLR 162HC and the case of Benedict Joseph vs Magdalena Hosea (supra) where the High Court held as follows: There is ample evidence a shown above proving that the Respondent contributed in the construction of the said house in two ways: one, she was working and the Appellant admitted that she made some contribution to the construction of the house, two, she was a wife and mother of the children to the Appellant, thus she cannot be regarded as an empty shell Further, It is my settled view that the issue of inclining towards the equality of division as envisaged under section 114 (2) of LMA cannot be escaped as there is evidence to prove the extent of contribution made by both parties as stated by the trial court, i.e. the matrimonial property must be shared. In this regard, the arguments put forth by the Appellant under section 60 of the LMA, are dismissed in this regard. In determining the shares to be awarded, the learned counsel for the Respondent implored this court to consider the valuation to be carried out first on one bedroom occupied by the Appellant and the two rooms occupied by the Respondent and the children, then the Report should inform the division. I disagree with this view since it is still footed on the wrong premise that the Appellant is only entitled to a share of one bedroom. Besides, it is the role of the court to divide the matrimonial property first based on the contributions each one has and then other issues of carrying out valuation would normally follow afterwards. Therefore, based on the analysis above, I agree with the second ground of appeal to the extent stated herein above. I shall not dwell on the remaining grounds since the Appellant never specifically submitted on them. In view of the foregoing, and based on the extent of contribution of each party in the acquisition of the matrimonial property or house located at Kinyerezi Dar es salaam, I proceed to issue the following orders: a) The appeal is partly allowed based on the 2nd ground of appeal advanced by the Appellant. b) The decision no. 21/2021 of Ilala District Court at Kinyerezi, delivered by Hon. Nyenyema, R.M on 19th day of July 2023, is hereby set aside to the extent allowed herein above. c) The Appellant and Respondent are each awarded a 50% share of division for the matrimonial house located at Kinyerezi. Therefore, the prayer by the Appellant to be awarded 70% is hereby dismissed. d) Either of the parties is given an option to compensate the other party to the extent awarded herein. However, considering the needs of the three children who are still below 18 years and the fact that the order for custody of the children has been placed to the Respondent, the order for sale of the matrimonial property shall be a matter of last resort, when all means of compensation have failed and it must be preceded by a valuation report to be carried out at the expense of both parties. e) This being a matrimonial matter, I make no order as to costs. The right of appeal is fully explained. Dated at Temeke this 28th day of February 2025 S.D. MWAIPOPO JUDGE 28/02/2025 The Judgement is delivered in the presence of the learned counsel for the Appellant Esther Nyalada and in the absence of the Respondent, having been notified and provided with a link to appear virtually.