BERNARD ANDREA WISSI

IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA DODOMA SUB - REGISTRY AT DODOMA MISC. LAND APPLICATION NO. 12 OF 2023 (Originating from Land Application No. 7 o f2021 o f District Land and Housing Tribunal for Dodoma at Dodoma) BERNARD ANDREA WISSI........................................................ APPLICANT VERSUS NYEMO COSMAS GANDAWEGA (as administratrix o f estate o f the late Cosmas Wissi Gandawega)........................................RESPONDENT RULING 12.06.2024 HASSAN, J.: In terms of section 41 (2) of the Written Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 2) Act, 2016 the applicant, one Bernard Andrea Wissi lodged an application for extension of time within which, to file an appeal out of time. In the affidavit deponed by himself, the applicant's reasoning for delay to file an appeal within time was due to the late supply to him of l the copy of proceedings and judgment as shown in the paragraph 4 and 7 of affidavit. Adding to that, he also succumbed that, in his effort to secure the same, the applicant at first wrote a request letter to the tribunal though R. K. Rweyongeza and Company, which was then followed by the reminder letter of 15th August, 2022 herein attached as B2 to form part of affidavit (see paragraph 4 and 5 of affidavit). Nevertheless, all previous efforts went in vain, and on 2nd February, 2023 the applicant as he depones under paragraph 7, for the first time received a copy of judgment which was served to him through an application for execution No. 24 of 2023. Only to realise that he was out of time to press his appeal, hence comes this application. Further to the reason above, more so, the applicant also protested that, the proceedings and decision from the trial tribunal have been tainted with serious illegalities and irregularities to wit: i. That, the trial tribunal was not properly composed as the law requires. 2 //. That the decision o f the trial tribunal based on the secondary tendered and admitted evidence contrary to the law. [sic] iii. That the secondary tendered and admitted evidence was not read out as the law requires. iv. That the trial chairman never gave reason for differing from the opinion o f assessors. v. That the trial chairman never gave reason for deciding in favour o f the respondent. In conclusion, the applicant pressed further that, he has an overwhelming chance of success in the appeal as per the contents of paragraph 8 of his affidavit. On the other hand, it appears that, in the counter affidavit sworn by the respondent, almost all contentious issues raised by the applicant have been vehemently denied and the applicant is put under strict proof of the same. Therefore, upon questioning the applicant's affidavit, the respondent furnished his reply and at paragraph 4 of his counter affidavit, he started by 3 disputing that, the applicant had never issued a letter to the tribunal through R. K. Rweyongeza and Company to request for a copy of proceedings. And that, he adds, if he has done so, he should have averred that in his application for stay of execution. Again, with respect to the fact raised by the applicant under paragraph 5 of his affidavit that he had also issued a reminder letter to the tribunal asking for a copy of proceedings, the respondent contended that the said letter was not a reminder letter but rather, it was the first letter of request issued by the applicant asking for a copy of proceedings. During hearing, the applicant enjoyed legal services from learned counsel Mr. Isaya E. Nchimbi, whereas on the other side, learned counsel Mr. Baraka Mbwilo appeared for the respondent. Hearing was conducted by the way of written submission. And, to their credit, parties were fully complied with the terms set forth in the scheduling order. In his submission, the applicant's counsel begged the court to adopt an affidavit sworn by the applicant to form part of his submission. And he further requested the court to consider that it was soon after the applicant came across the copy of the disputed judgment which was attached in the 4 Application for Execution No. 24 of 2023, and that was on 2nd February, 2023, he promptly filed this application on 3rd February, 2023. And to show that he promptly took diligent measure after judgment was pronounced to ensure that he can file his appeal within time, Mr. Nchimbi submitted that, the applicant wrote two letters to the tribunal of which, one dated 29th April, 2022 and another one dated 15th august, 2023, but all ended in vain. Stressing on this point, he complained that, had the applicant been supplied with a copy of judgment on time, he could have filed his appeal on time as the law dictates. For that note, Mr. Nchimbi avowed that the delay was not due to inadvertence by the applicant, but rather, it was due to the internal arrangement of the trial tribunal which for the best reason known to itself failed to furnish the applicant with the requested copy of judgment for appealing. On the other point, the applicant's counsel went on to submit that, the decision in the trial tribunal was tainted with a number of irregularities and illegalities as aforementioned in paragraph 7 of an affidavit in support of this application. Thus, giving more details of the irregularities noted, the 5 applicant's counsel averred that, there is contradiction in the assessors' opinion which contravene provision of section 23 (2) of the Land Disputes Court Act, Cap. 216 R.E. 2019 which requires assessors to give their opinion before the chairman reaches the verdict. To elaborate further, he contended that, an opinion of assessor which appears in the typed proceedings as at page 17 reads "umiliki wa kiwanja ni wa muombaji ambae ni msimamizi iva mirathi"whereas, an opinion of assessor reflected in the judgment as at page 10 reads "kutokana na maeiezo na vieieiezo umiliki iva kiwanja Na. 16 Msaiato ni wa muombaji ambae ni msimamizi wa mirathi". And in his respected view, these are two different sets of opinions. To bolster his argument, the applicant cited the case of Principal Secretary, Ministry of Defence and National Service v. Valambia (1992) TLR. 182 for court consideration which emanates on the effect of irregularities in the application of time enlargement. Finally, the applicant's counsel pressed hard that, he still intends to challenge the decision emanated from the tribunal by way of appeal and that, he believes to have overwhelming chance of success if the application will be granted. On the other hand, he also contended that, if the application 6 will be denied, it will be the applicant who will suffer an irreparable loss including demolition of residential house erected in the impugned sites and other properties thereof. Thus, to say the least, the applicant prayed the court to grant the application for the interest of justice. On the other hand, in opposing the application, the counsel for respondent Mr. Mbwilo meticulously submitted that, to grant application for an extension of time is purely at the court's discretion upon showing sufficient cause. He further elaborated that, what amounts to reasonable or sufficient cause has not been defined by the law although it is determined based on the circumstances of each case. And thus, he stressed that, the minimum grounds were laid down in the case of Lyamuya Construction Co. Ltd vs. Board of Registered of Young Women's Christian Association of Tanzania (Civil Application 2 of 2010) [2011] TZCA 4 ( 03 0ctober2011), which was cited with approval in the case of Mwanaisha Juma and 4 others vs. Abdallah Mohamed (As an Administrator of the Estate of the late Mohamed Mbarouk) Misc. Land Application No. 01/2021, HC at Arusha (Unreported). Where at page 6 of its judgment, the Court of Appeal has listed the following principles: a) The Applicant must account for all the period o f delay; 7 b) The delay should not be inordinate; c) The Applicant must show diligence, and not apathy, negligence or sloppiness in the prosecution o f the action that he intends to take; ana' if the court feels that there are other sufficient reasons, such as the existence o f a point o f law o f sufficiency; such as the illegality o f the decision sought to be challenged. Therefore, applying the above principles, the main reasons advanced by the applicant to justify his delay in filing an appeal for almost a year from the date of the decision of the trial tribunal to the date of filing this application, that is from 12/4/2022 to 07/03/2023) are: Firstly, that the applicant's claim is that the application has been brought promptly. On this point, the respondent's counsel contended that this argument has no merit because the judgment was delivered on 12 April, 2022 and since then, the applicant never wrote a letter of request but rather, he went to sleep until awakened by the application for execution filed on February 2023. The counsel for respondent further pressed that, the applicant cannot say that he came to know the judgment was readywhen he was served with an application for execution while he knows that, the 8 judgment and decree were ready for collection at the tribunal. So, if he had made physical follow-up he could have collected the copies on time. Secondly, on the point of diligent, that after the judgment has been delivered, he wrote a letter requesting for a copy of the judgment and decree. It is the respondent's contention that, the applicant's argument is not true, and that, the same was raised just to mislead the court due to the following reasons: One, after the judgment was delivered in the tribunal, the applicant failed to issue request letter for a copy of judgment and decree, and he waited up to the time when application for execution was filed. And thus, up to 16th January 2023, there was no letter in the tribunal's dossier as alleged by the applicant. Two, that the respondent was not served with a letter from the applicant and the reason for that is simple thus, the applicant had not written a letter on 29th April 2022. Therefore, there was nothing to serve to the respondent. Three, the applicant has not attached to the affidavit in support of this application, the first letter alleged to have been issued to the trial tribunal 9 requesting for a copy of proceedings and judgment as deponed by the applicant at paragraph 4 of his affidavit. And in fact, there is no such letter in the record. Additionally, the respondent's counsel further submitted that, this court was once faced with a similar circumstance and it was ruled that, a mere words in the affidavit without attaching on it the alleged letter for the request or a copy of documents relied upon cannot be counted on by the court. See instance The Managing Director Absa Bank Tanzania Limited (Formerly known as Barclays Bank) vs Felician Muhandiki, Misc. Civil Application No. 231 of 2020, HC at DSM (Unreported) where at page 7 of the judgment it was ruled that: "It is the practice and procedure o f the Court that once a decision is delivered before the court, counsel representing a party is required to write a letter seeking for the proceedings andjudgment for records keeping or further use. The applicant stated to have not been availed with the above records o f the court even after a tremendous follow up. But going through the records looking for a proofas if there was any letter written to the Deputy Registrar seeking for such documents as a result 10 o f determination o f Misc. CivilApplication No. 225o f2016, attachment o f such letter is nowhere to be traced but only mere words." Four, on 29th March, 2023 the applicant filed an application for stay of execution (Misc. Application No. 52 of 2023) to the DLHT, and in the affidavit sworn by him in support of the chamber application, the applicant did not state that he wrote a letter requesting for proceedings, judgment and decree. Thus, the respondent pressed, if he had written a request letter on such circumstance, he could have stated in his affidavit. Five, the Judgment was ready for collection from 12th April 2022 and the applicant did not go to collect the said documents until when he was served with an application for execution. Six, If the applicant wrote a letter requesting for a copy of the judgment and decree, then there was no need to file an application for an extension of time because the time to appeal starts to run from the date of being supplied with copies of the judgment and decree. So, if he wrote a letter applying for those documents, why he then applied for an extension of time? The respondent's counsel therefore argued that, in this state of li affairs, the truth is that, the applicant did not apply for a copy of the judgment and decree as he submitted. Backing his assertion, Mr. Mbwilo referred the case of Alex Senkoro & others vs. Eiiambuya Lyino, Civil Appeal No. 16 of 2017 [2021] TZCA 104 (13 April 2021 Tanzlii) of which having cited section 19 (2) of the LIA the court said at page 12 that: "We entertain that the above sub-section expressly allows automatic exclusion o f the period o f time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree orjudgment appealed from the computation o f the prescribed limitation period. Such an exclusion need not to made upon an order o f the court in a formal application for extension o f time. Indeed, that stance was taken recently in Mohamed Sa/iminf vs. Jumanne Omary Mapesa, Civil Appeal No. 345 o f 2018 (unreported) where the court affirmed that section 19(2) o f the LLA obliges courts to exclude the period o f time requisite for obtaining a copy o f the decree appealed from. Furthermore, this court took a similar standpoint in two recent decisions where the provision o f section 379 (1) (b) o f the Criminal Procedure Act, Cap 20 RE 2002 [now RE 2019] an analogous exclusion stipulation; was considered: Director o f Public Prosecutions Vs. Mawazo Saiiboko @ Sagi & fifteen o th e rs Criminal Appeal No. 2017; and Samwei Emmanuel Fu/gence vs. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 4 o f 2018 (both unreported). To illustrate the point, we wish to extract what we said in Mawazo Sa/ibiko @ Shadi & fifteen others (supra) where the learned High Court Judge had decided that the exclusion was not automatic: 'The learned Judge was o f the view that, thought the appellant filed the appeal within 45 days after being served with the copy o f the proceedings, he ought to have applied for extension o f time to do so because he was time barred from the date o f the impugned decision. On our part we are o f the decided view that the intention o f the legislature under the proviso to section 379 (1) (b) o f the CPA was to avoid multiplicity o f and delay to the disposal o f cases. That is why it provided for automatic exclusion o f the time requisite to obtain a copy o f proceedings, judgment or 13 order appealed from, this is different where the intending appellant finds himself out o f 45 days to file an appeal after receipt o f the copy o f proceedings.'[ Emphasis added] We need to stress what we stated in the above case that exclusion is automatic as long as there is proof on the record o f the dates o f the critical events for the reckoning o f the prescribed limitation period. For the purpose o f section 19 (2) and (3) o f the LLA, these dates are the date of the impugned decision, the date on which a copy o f the decree orjudgment was requested and the date o f the supply of the requested documents." More so, based from the above authority, learned counsel for respondent submitted further that, to hold water, there must be proof on the record which shows sequence of events by excluding time for collecting a copy of judgment and decree. However, he added, in this application, the applicant has no proof that he wrote a letter requesting for a copy of judgment and decree, and if he truly issued it, time spent to wait for service will be automatically excluded. 14 Moving ahead, in response to the applicant's submission about diligence, the respondent's counsel submitted that, the applicant was not diligent upon filing of this application. This is because, counting the days from 12th April 2022 when the Judgment was delivered to the date of filing the application which is February 2023, it is almost a year. He further stressed that, the claim that the applicant wrote a request letter is a lie in the daylight, and thus, the same is just the kicks of a dying horse after finding out that he has no valid reasons. Therefore, he decided to cook facts regarding a request letter which he never wrote. Cementing further on this point, he also submitted that, if at all, the applicant wrote a request letter of proceedings, then, the exclusion of time spent to wait become automatic and if that was the case, why did the applicant file this application? In the circumstance, the respondent's counsel argued that a simple reason is that he never wrote a letter as he made it, and instead, the only letter seen on record is that of 15th August 2022, which is purported to be as a reminder letter. But yet, as he still contended, that the same was written 4 months later after 45 days has lapsed. In furtherance, to support his argument, the counsel for respondent drew the attention on the position of law, that failure to take necessary steps 15 tantamount to fatal omission and the applicant should account for each day of delay after expiration of 45 days allowed by law. He therefore directed the court to draw inference in Mwanaisha Juma and 4 others vs. Abdallah Mohamed (as an Adm inistrator o f the Estate o f the late Mohamed Mbarouk), Misc. Land Application No. 01/2021, HC at Arusha (Unreported) page 6 where it was ruled that: "It is apt to note that the impugnedjudgment was delivered on 13/02/2020 by the trial tribunal. The letter requesting for requisite appeal documents was received by the trial tribunal on 17/06/2020. Time to appeal against the decision o f the trial tribunal according to section 41 (2) o f the LDCA is 45 days. Those days lapsed on 29/03/2020. The applicant said nothing about the period between 30/03/2020 and 16/06/2020 which is almost three months." Thus, he argued that, in the instant case, the applicant failed to account for each day of delay. That is, from 17/05/2020 when 45 days has expired to 15/08/2022 when he issued his first letter of request, for the copies of necessary documents supportive to file this application. 16 Arguing further, Mr. Mbwilo contended that, as to the instant application, the applicant has failed to account for each day of delay from 2nd February 2023 when he alleged to have come across a copy of judgment to 7th February 2023 when this Application was filed before the court. He thus pressed that, law is very clear on the point that, in order to succeed with alike application, the applicant should account for each day of delay thus, short of even a single day, the application will be dismissed. He emitted that this stand was held in the case of Bushiri Hassan vs Latifa Lukio Mashayo, Civil Application No. 3 of 2007 (unreported) TZCA which was cited in the case of Eveline J. Ndyetabula vs Star General Insuarance (T) Ltd, Consolidated Misc Civil Application Nos. 438 & 440 of 2022, HC at DSM (Unreported) it was emphasized that: "Delay o f even o f a single day has to be accounted for otherwise there would be no point o f having rules prescribing periods within certain steps have to be taken." Advancing on another point about illegality as raised by applicant in his submission, that the opinion of assessors reflected in the proceedings differ from the opinion reflected in the Judgment. On this point, the respondent's counsel submitted that, this is new issue which has not been 17 raised in paragraph 9 of the applicant affidavit. Adding to that, Mr. Mbwilo submitted that, failure to include it in the affidavit signifies that the points were abandoned and thus, he ignored to argue on those points because in his view, there was nothing argued by the Counsel for the applicant to warrant his reply. On the new point of illegality raised in the applicant's submission, the respondent's counsel protested them because the Counsel for the applicant raised them in his submission without obtaining leave of the court. To that end, he tagged the counsel for applicant as loosely picking up the grounds for extension of time. In that case, he argued that, it is a trite position of the law that submission is not evidence but rather, it generally meant to reflect the general features of a party's case. He went on detailing that; they are elaboration or explanation of evidence which has been already tendered. They are expected to contain argument on the applicable law. They are not intended to be a substitute for evidence. Therefore, he pressed, the applicant's Counsel was required to submit that through deponent's affidavit, but not to raise new ground during his submissions. In the circumstance, he prayed the court to disregard the same as it was the position in the case of Juliana Lujuo (Suing as the Administratrix of the estate of the late 18 Patrick Mahuna) vs Sabinus Mwanjombe and Another, Misc Land Application No. 89 of 2021 HCT at Arusha (unreported) on page 5. In the alternative to what counsel for the rapplicant has submitted that there was contradiction of an opinion of assessor as it appears from the proceedings and judgment, in spite of being a new issue, the same has no merit. He contended that, this is because, what the learned counsel for the applicant is challenging was just failure of the chairman to repeat the same words used by assessor in his opinion from the typed proceedings to the Judgment, but in fact there is no contradiction since it yields the same content that the disputed land is the property of the Respondent herein. Thus, the Chairman had not differed with the opinion set forth by assessor in the proceedings as he also declared the respondent herein victorious. Adding to that, the counsel for respondent submitted further that, in his submission, the counsel for the applicant had not cited any law, if any, which requires assessors' opinion be quoted in the judgment with same wordings as it appears in the proceedings. He therefore reiterated that, what is important is that opinion should not contradict from each other. Moving forward, counsel for respondent submitted further that law requires that to justify extension of time under the umbrella of illegality, then 19 the alleged illegality has to be on the face of records. See for instance in the case of Managing Director Absa Bank Tanzania Limited (Formerly Known as Barclays Bank) vs. Felician Muhandiki (Supra) page 10 which cited with approval the case of Lyamuya Construction Company Limited vs Trustees of Young Womens Christian Association of Tanzania, Civil Application No. 02 of 2010 made the observation that: "Since every party who intend to appeal seeks to challenge a decision either on points o f law or facts, it cannot in my view, be said that in Valambias case, the Court meant to draw a general rule that every Applicant who demonstrates that his intended appeal raised point o f law should, as o f right, be granted extension o f time if he applies for one. The court there emphasized that such point o f law must be that o f sufficient importance and, I would add that, it must also be apparent on the face o f the record, such as the question o fjurisdiction; not one that would be discovered by a long-drawn argument or process. "[Emphasis supplied]. 20 He added that, the same position of law was insisted by the Court of Appeal in the case of Fatma Hussein Sharif vs Alikhan Abdallah, Civil Application No. 536/17 of 2017, CAT at DSM (Unreported) at page 13. Therefore, based on the authorities above, the respondent's counsel argued further that, in the instant application, the alleged illegalities have not met the above minimum requirements stipulated by the law to justify grant of the extension of time because it needs long process of argument which is why the Counsel for the applicant used more effort to find way to submit on this point. At this juncture, he directed the court on the case of Mic Tanzania Ltd vs Juliano Charles Mikongomi (administrator of the estate of the late Charles Mikongomi) and Others, Misc. Land Application No. 20/2020 HCT at Iringa (unreported). Where the court was faced with similar facts, it dismissed the application because the applicant had failed to show good cause. That being the case, Mr. Mbwilo finally contended that the applicant's delay was inordinate and that he was negligent for not making follow up of the documents. He also averred that, there is no valid explanation or reason for delay in each day of delay contrary to the above cited authorities. He further pressed that, in fact, when the applicant came to realise that the 21 respondent herein had filed an application for execution of decree thus, it is when he emerged with this application in order to deny the respondent from enjoying the fruits of the trial tribunal's decree. In the end, Mr. Mbwilo maintained that, based on what he has submitted, it is indistinctive that the applicant has failed to meet the above minimum requirements of the law for this application to be granted. Therefore, he prayed for this application be dismissed with costs for want of merit. Now, having thoroughly gone through the application, and subsequently, offering a careful consideration of the submissions adjoined by the parties in dispute, it seems clear to me in the language of the statutes and available authorities in our jurisdiction that, based on the facts, this court is obliged to ascertain whether or not the time available to the applicant to file an appeal had elapsed when he lodged this application. And if the answer is in negative, then, the following question for court determination will be whether or not reasonable cause for delay was demonstrated by the applicant for the court to enlarge such time? 22 Therefore, to deliberate on the first issue as to whether or not time available to file an appeal had elapsed when this application was lodged? To take off from here, as famous as it may stand, I believe it is well known from the outset that, time available for appealing the decision of the DLHT to the high court is 45 days as provided under section 41 (1) and (2) of the Land Disputes Courts Act, Cap. 216 R.E. 2019, which reads: "41 (1) Subject to the provisions o f any law for the time being in force, all appeals, revisions and similar proceeding from or in respect o f any proceeding in a District Land and Housing Tribunal in the exercise o f its originaljurisdiction shall be heard by the High Court. (2) An appeal under subsection (1) may be lodged within forty-five days after the date o f the decision or order: Provided that, the High Court may, for the good cause, extend the time for filing an appeal either before or after the expiration o f such period o f forty-five days." I also understand that it might be unnecessary, though it sounds helpful to reproduce the decision in The Managing Director Absa Bank 23 Tanzania Limited (Formerly known as Barclays Bank) vs Felician Muhandiki, Misc. Civil Application No. 231 of 2020, HC at DSM (Unreported) where at page 7 of the judgment this court held that: "It is the practice and procedure o f the Court that, once decision is delivered before the court, counsel representing a party is required to write a letter seeking for the proceedings andjudgment for records keeping or further use." In the similar footings, I find it supportive to lay foundation by repeating to dictate what was decided by Court of Appeal in the case of Bushiri Hassan vs Latifa Lukio Mashayo (supra) which was cited in the case of Eveline J. Ndyetabula vs Star General Insuarance (T) Ltd, (supra) where it was emphasized that: "Delay o f even o f a single day has to be accounted for otherwise there would be no point o f having rules prescribing periods within certain steps have to be taken. ” That being so, now by applying the above legal disposition to the facts at hand, the circumstances under which this court can grant an application 24 for extension of time is strongly disputed. In the respondent's eyes, this application was filed beyond the time paged by the law but unlike wise, looking on the applicant's assertion, it is as though the same was filed within time. Thus, perusing on the records, it is apparent that in DLHT the judgment was delivered on 12th April 2022, the fact which has never been disputed. Whereas, this application was filed on 3rd February, 2023, again the fact which has not been disputed. Therefore, literally, to count the days from 12th April, 2022 to 3rd February, 2023 it is almost 10 months which is beyond 45 days available for appealing. However, relying from the applicant's version from his submission, his line of argument reveals that such delay was caused by the late supply of a copy of proceedings, judgment and decree from the DLHT. To testify on the diligence he undertook, the applicant at paragraphs4 and 5 of his affidavit submitted that he wrote two letters to the tribunal asking for the copy of proceedings. In my view, as I suspect, the applicant took this measure in order to satisfy the requirement imposed in the decision of The Managing Director Absa Bank Tanzania Limited (Formerly known as Barclays Bank) vs Felician Muhandiki (supra). In his affidavit, the applicant 25 deponed that the first letter was issued on 29th April, 2022, which has been merely identified without being made a part of an affidavit. And another letter which served as a reminder letter, was issued on 15th August, 2023 and annexed in the affidavit as B2. In his undertaking, counsel for the respondent has vehemently disputed existence of the first letter. On that, he accused the applicant to have made up a story but in reality, it does not exist. More so, he argued, that if it exists, the applicant should have attached it to the affidavit in support of this application or in his application for stay of execution. Thus, failure to enclose that first letter of request in both ventures indicate that he submits a sham fact. In my endeavour, I have critically detected the said letters of request and I observed, indeed, as it was rightly submitted by the respondent's counsel that, nowhere in the record of this application the first letter of request is invisible. That means, the fact sworn and argued was just a mere word which lacks evidence. Therefore, to sail out of this corner, I am couched from decision of Alex Senkoro & others vs. Eiiambuya Lyino (supra) where it was held that: 26 " We need to stress what we stated in the [this] case that exclusion is automatic as long as there is proof on the record o f the dates o f the critical events for the reckoning o f the prescribed limitation period. For the purpose o f section 19 (2) and (3) o f the LLA, these dates are the date o f the impugned decision; the date on which a copy o f the decree or judgment was requested and the date o f the supply o f the requested documents." In the circumstance, based on the above authority, I have no doubt in my mind that the applicant had no proof of the first letter of request of proceeding which he alleged. And therefore, to this extent his point is weightless. By observing the second letter as branded by the applicant to be the reminder letter, be it as it may, that letter was issued on 15th August, 2023, which is almost 4 months later after judgment was delivered. And thus, it was well beyond 45 days'time limit for the applicant to file his appeal. In my view, even if I have to consider the second letter as a reminder letter followed by the alleged first request letter, the same cannot stand since the purported first letter has not been proved to be alive. 27 At this end, I am certain to rule that, the applicant was out of time to lodge his appeal from the decision of the DLHT thus, the correct route was to file an application for extension of time like what he correctly did. That means, he cannot be the beneficiary of what was decided in the case of Alex Senkoro & others vs. Eiiambuya Lyino (supra) of which having cited section 19 (2) of the LLA the court said at page 12 that: "We entertain that the above sub-section expressly allows automatic exclusion o f the period o f time requisite for obtaining a copy o f the decree orjudgment appealed from the computation o f the prescribed limitation period. Such an exclusion need not to made upon an order o f the court in a formal application for extension o f time." Moving forward on another issue, the applicant challenged the proceedings and decision from the trial tribunal have been tainted with serious illegalities and irregularities. Therefore, in spite of adopting the irregularities raised under paragraph 7 of the applicant's affidavit to be part of his submission, the applicant's counsel had not added any detailed information to support his allegation. 28 Seeing that, counsel for the respondent also abandoned what was alleged under paragraph 7 of the applicant's affidavit. Therefore, he left them untouched. Equally, going though paragraph 7 of the applicant's affidavit, indeed there are five issues raised from item (i) to (v) respectively. And, as aforementioned, both parties seem to ignore them in their submissions. However, to give a brief insight of the same, after perusing the record, I find it necessary to lay the foundation on what was observed in the case of Lyamuya Construction Company Limited vs Trustees of Young Womens Christian Association of Tanzania (supra) it provides: "Since every party who intend to appeal seeks to challenge a decision either on points o f law or facts, it cannot in my view, be said that in Valambias case, the Court meant to draw a general rule that every Applicant who demonstrates that his intended appeal raised point o f law should, as o f right, be granted extension o f time if he applies for one. The court there emphasized that such point o f law must be that o f sufficient importance and, I would add that, it must also be apparent on the face o f the record, such as the question o fjurisdiction; not one that would be discovered by a long-drawn argument or process. "[Emphasis supplied]. Now, going from the above, to start with item (i), the trial tribunal was well composed and no fault was detected. Trial started with a chairman and two assessors and it ended with chairman and one assessor after second assessor has been withdrawn on 24/01/2022 due to sickness. Therefore, section 23 (1) of the Land Disputes Courts Act, was fully complied with. Thus, for item (ii) and (iii), the assertions are unfounded as it does not reflect the truth on the records. For instance, looking at page 5 and 6, of the typed proceedings exhibit PI and P2 were read out to the parties, and thereafter considered in the judgment. And the applicant had neither objected nor criticised them during trial. Moving to item (iv) and (v), looking on the judgment, the chairman had signposted reasons for his decision and he did not depart with assessor's opinion. Thus, the allegation raised by the applicant in his affidavit are unfunded and, in my view, that might be the reason he decided to back pedal. Other issue to be determined is whether there was contradiction of assessor's opinion which contravene provision of section 23 (2) of the Land 30 disputes Court Act, Cap. 216 R.E. 2019 which requires assessors to give their opinion before the chairman reaches verdict. Going through the parties' submissions, I am of the same view with the counsel for the respondent that there is no contradiction in the opinion of assessor. In this case, I am alive that the wording of an impugned opinion as recorded in the proceedings varies with what was quoted in the judgment (stylistic nature of the text). But fairly speaking, based on its semantics application, the impugned text bears the same meaning, that the disputed land should be found to belong to the respondent herein. For clarity, I will reproduce the said versions as hereunder: "An opinion o f assessor which appears in the typed proceedings as at page 17- reads "umiliki wa kiwanja ni wa muombaji ambae ni msimamizi wa mirathi" whereas, an opinion o f assessor reflected in thejudgment as at page 10 reads "kutokana na maelezo na vieleiezo umiliki wa kiwanja Na. 16 Msaiato ni wa muombaji ambae ni msimamizi wa mirathi". 31 Therefore, in my considered view, these are two sets of texts which only differ in its wording, but yield same semantics content and there is no contradiction observed. To that note, this point of illegality is also unfounded. In the end, basing on what I have conversed above, I am of a firm view that this application for extension of time lacks merit, and thus, the same is dismissed with costs. Ordered accordingly. DATED at DODOMA this 12th day of June, 2024. JUDGE 12/06/2024 This Judgment delivered this 12th day of June, 2024 in the presence of the parties and the matter was ordered to start afresh under new panels.