Ally Mbua

IN THE HIGH COURT OF UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA DODOMA SUB REGISTRY AT DODOMA LAND APPEAL NO. 66 OF 2023 (Arising from the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Singida in Land Application No. 75 of 2020) ALLY MBUA (Administrator of the estate of the late Mbua Kitu).......................................................... APPELLANT Versus MOHAMED ACKLAN GHALIBU (Administrator of the estate of the late Ismail Acklan)..... ................ 1st RESPONDENT JUMA MBUA......................................................... 2nd RESPONDENT MOHAMED SAID................................................. 3rd RESPONDENT JUDGMENT Date of Last Order: 14th June 2024. Date of Ruling: 5th July 2024. MASABO, J:- The appellant herein is aggrieved by the decision of the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Singida (the trial tribunal) in Land Application No. 75 of 2020 dated 2nd May 2023. According to the trial tribunal's record, in the said case, the parties were contending over five acres of land formerly owned by Mbua Kitu Kinanda (the appellant's and 2nd respondent's father) who died intestate on 28th April 1976. The appellant who was appointed in 2020 as administrator of the estate of Mbua Kitu Kinanda claimed that Page 1 of 19 his brother who is the second respondent herein unlawfully disposed of the land to the late Ismail Acklan. The second respondent did not dispute the disposition as he believed it was lawful. He averred that the suit land was given to him as a gift inter vivs by the deceased in 1975 and for all the period since the demise of their father in 1976, he was occupying and using it until 2012 when he sold it to Ismail Acklan Ghalibu, now deceased. Therefore, the disposition he made to the late Ismail Acklan Ghalibu was lawful. Unlike the appellant and the first two respondents, the third respondent claimed no interest in the suit land as he was merely the first respondent's foreman taking care of the suit land. The trial tribunal having assessed the evidence brought before it, decided in favour of the respondents. Aggrieved by the decision, on 6th June 2023, the Appellant knocked on the doors of this court armed with the following grounds of appeal. One, the trial chairman erred in law and fact to enter a decision in favour of the respondent without considering the evidence that the appellant was the only administrator of the estate of the late Mbua Kitu. Two, the trial chairman erred in law and fact by giving the second respondent the extra land of 4.7 acres unjustifiable. Three, the trial chairperson erred in law and fact by not considering the evidence adduced by the appellant. In addition, the appellant filed the following five supplementary grounds on 16th February 2023. One, the respondent did not prove their case on the balance of probabilities. Two, the trial tribunal erred in fact and law to decide in favour of the first and second respondents while ignoring the Page 2 of 19 fact that the disputed land belonged to the appellant's father and was never distributed to the heirs. Third, the tribunal erred in law and facts to decide in favour of the first and second respondents as it overlooked the fact the purported sale was illegal as the second respondent was not appointed as administrator of the estate of the late Mbua Kitu. Fourth, the purported sale was not proper as it does not show the length and boundaries of the land which was sold and it was wrongly attested by an unauthorised person. Lastly, the whole proceeding and judgment is marred by procedural irregularities. The appeal was disposed of by way of written submissions. The appellant's submission was drawn and filed by Mr. Godfrey Wasonga, learned counsel. The respondent's reply was drawn and filed by Mr. Godwel Lawrence, learned counsel as well. Submitting in support of the appeal, Mr. Wasonga silently abandoned the grounds of appeal set out in the petition of appeal and concentrated on the supplementary grounds. Submitting for the first, second, and third supplementary grounds of appeal, Mr. Wasonga argued that PW1, PW2, PW3 and PW4 proved that the land belonged to the late Mbua Kitu who died in 1976. As from 1976 to the date of disposition of the disputed land, no one was appointed as the administrator of the deceased's estate. Therefore, the second respondent had no locus to dispose of the disputed land. Mr. Wasonga argued further that the defence offered by the second respondent during the trial was not supported by any proof that the indeed land was given to him by his father during his lifetime. Page 3 of 19 Moreover, he submitted that there was a need to prove the said disposition by way of a written document and but there was none. The second respondent had no good title to pass to the late Ismail Acklan. He cited the provision of section 101 of the Probate and Administration of Estate Act which provides that one cannot act as administrator of the estate of the deceased unless and until he is appointed. Based on this provision, he submitted that the second respondent had no locus to dispose of the deceased land as he was not the administrator. In bolstering his argument, he cited the case of Lujuna Shubi Balonzi vs. The Registered Trustees of Chama cha Mapinduzi [1996] TLR 203 and the case of Gregory and AN vs. London Land Borough of Camden [1967] 2 ALL E.R. On the fourth supplementary ground, it was submitted that the contract for the sale of the suit land as purportedly concluded by the second respondent and the late Ismail Acklan was not legal as it bears no stamp duty contrary to section 47(1) of the Stamp Duty Act Cap. 189 R.E 2019. Also, it was not registered and was attested by Village Executive Officer who is not authorised to attest any document. On the last supplementary ground, it was submitted that all exhibits were received without being cleared for admission. Citing the case of Robinson Mwanjisi and 3 others vs. Republic [2003] TLR 218, the counsel prayed that the exhibits be expunged from the record. He further argued that the suit was heard by two chairpersons but the reasons for that change were not assigned. Page 4 of 19 In reply, Mr. Lawrence submitted on both, the original and supplementary grounds of appeal. Concerning the first ground of appeal, he submitted and argued that the second respondent proved that he was given the disputed land by his father during his lifetime a fact which was supported by DW3. To the contrary, the appellant's evidence contradicted the pleadings. Thus, it remained uncertain whether he inherited the suit land from his father hence, his own property, or whether the said land is still part of his father's estate. It was argued further that the contradiction is fatal and offended the cardinal law that the parties are bound by their pleadings. In fortification, he referred to the case of Sarrchem International Tanzania Limited vs. Wande Printing and Packaging Company Ltd, Commercial Case No. 31/2020. On the second ground, as regards the extra land of 4.7 acres, it was argued that it belonged to the 2nd respondent. It is part of the land allocated to him by his father, of which, five acres were sold to the second respondent. Submitting on the third ground of appeal, he argued that the appellant's evidence was considered but due to its contradictions the trial tribunal decided in favour of the respondents whose evidence was heavier than the appellant's. Replying to the supplementary grounds, Mr. Lawrence consolidated the first, second and third supplementary grounds of appeal and reiterated that the respondents proved their case on the balance of probabilities. The second respondent ably demonstrated how he acquired the land and that the disposition he made was legal. The title was passed to him orally Page 5 of 19 and since he had acquired the title, he was not obliged to consult the heirs of the late Mbua Kitu before disposing of the suit land to Ismail Acklam. On the legality of the contract of disposition of the suit land to Ismail Acklam, he submitted that only the parties to it can challenge its legality. The appellant being a third party to the disposition agreement has no right to challenge its legality. On the last supplementary ground, it was submitted that the admission of all the exhibits was in good order and the proceedings were free from procedural irregularities. The documents were identified and cleared before admission. In rejoinder, the appellant argued that the respondents' submission is without merit as it is incomprehensible that, the 2nd respondent was given the land in 1975 when he was just a boy aged 11 years. It was rejoined further that at the family meeting which culminated in the appellant's appointment as an administrator of the estate of the late Mbua Kitu, the suit land was listed as one of the properties under the estate. The appellant who was there, did not object which shows that the land belonged to the deceased. On the issue of irregularities, it was rejoined that, there are multiple irregularities. I have carefully considered the grounds of appeal in the light of the records of the trial tribunal which I have thoroughly read alongside the submissions by the parties. As Mr. Wasonga silently abandoned the original grounds of appeal, I will determine the appeal based on the supplementary grounds which, as the submission above demonstrates, are closely related to the original grounds of appeal. I will proceed mindful Page 6 of 19 that this court being the first appellate court is required to re-evaluate the evidence on record and to arrive at a conclusion that need not necessarily be similar to the findings of the trial tribunal. As stated by the Court of Appeal in Future Century Ltd v. TANESCO, Civil Appeal No. 5 of 2009 (unreported):- "It is part of our jurisprudence that a first appellate court is entitled to re-evaluate the entire evidence adduced at the trial and subject it to critical scrutiny and arrive at its independent decision." I will further be mindful of the law on the burden of proof and the standard of proof in civil cases as stipulated under section 110 of the Evidence Act, Cap 6 R. E. 2019 and in numerous authorities which I need not reproduce. Suffice it to just state that, it is a trite law that in civil proceedings the burden of proof lies on the party who desires a court to believe him and pronounce judgment in his favour. And, the standard required is proof on the balance of probabilities which simply means that "the Court will sustain such evidence which is more credible than the other on a particular fact to be proved' (see Hemedi Said vs Mohamed Mbilu [1984] TLR 113; Antony M. Masanga vs. Penina (Mama Mgesi) and Lucia (Mama Anna), Civil Appeal No. 118 of 2014 [2015] TZCA 556 (TanzLII) and Paulina Samson Ndawavya vs Theresia Thomasi Madaha, (Civil Appeal 45 of 2017) [2019] TZCA 453, TanzLII. Since the appellant was the one claiming that Ismail Acklam unlawfully bought the disputed land from the second respondent who had no locus to dispose of the same, he had the legal burden to prove that the disposition was, indeed, illegal. From the record, the appellant paraded 5 Page 7 of 19 witnesses in support of his claim. Testifying as PW1 he told the tribunal that the suit land belonged to his father who died intestate on 28th April 1976. As of 2020, it had not been distributed as there was no administrator of the estate. The family continued to use it until when the respondent sold it. PW2, PW3, PW4 also told the court that the suit land belonged to the late Mbua Kitu. After his death, it remained under the possession of his family until when the appellant sold it. For the respondent, the first respondent testifying as DW1 told the court that Ismail Acklan bought the suit land measuring 5 acres from the second respondent and he tendered the sale agreement (Exhibit D2) in substantiation. The 2nd respondent testifying as DW2, stated that he was given the suit land by his father in 1975. After his father died in 1976, he continued with occupation the suit land until 2012 when he sold part of it (5 acres) to Ismail Acklan. DW3, the widow of Mbua Kitu, stated that the 2nd respondent and his brother were shown the land by their father but when asked if they were allocated the same, she said she did not know. DW4 was a witness to the sale agreement. The ultimate question to be answered from this evidence is whether, in light of the principles above, the appellant discharged this duty. The trial tribunal answered this question in the negative after it observed that the appellant's evidence and pleadings were contradictory such that, it was not clear whether he owned the land or was claiming it in a representative capacity. In his first to third supplementary grounds, the appellant has attacked this finding for being erroneous. I will revert to them later after I have resolved the alleged procedural irregularities. Page 8 of 19 The appellant has alleged that the proceedings and the judgment were marred by multiple irregularities. First, he has argued that the exhibits were not cleared for admission hence, offensive of the principle in Ribinson Mwanjisi & 3 others vs R (supra). It is indeed correct that for a documentary exhibit to attract weight and to be relied upon in deciding a suit, its admission must have been compliant with the law regulating the admission of documentary exhibits as propounded in Robinson Mwanjisi & Three Others vs Republic (supra) and applied in a plethora of other cases such as Frenk Onesmo vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 476 of 2020) [2024] TZCA 41 (14 February 2024) TanzLII; and Mapinduzi Mgalla vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 406 of 2020) [2024] TZCA 21 (6 February 2024) TanzLII. In the latter case, the Court of Appeal instructively held that: "It is trite principle that when a document is sought to be introduced in evidence three crucial steps must be performed by the trial court; first, clearing the document for admission; second, actual admission and finally, to ensure that the same is read out in court. This principle was underscored in Robinson Mwanjisi and Three Others v. Republic [2003] T.L.R 218 where the Court held: - "Whenever it is intended to introduce any document in evidence, it should first be cleared for admission, and be actually admitted before it can be read out, otherwise It is difficult for the Court to be seen not to have been influenced by the same." Noncompliance with the procedural steps above is a fatal irregularity with dire consequences to the case as it warrants the expungement of the irregularly admitted exhibit from the record (Also see Shomari Page 9 of 19 Athumani @ Mwanja & Another vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 650 of 2021) [2024] TZCA 46 TanzLIL The appellant has made a blanket complaint. His grounds of appeal and the submission thereto, do not specify the irregularly admitted exhibit. Thus, I had to go through all the documentary exhibits to ascertain which of them was irregularly admitted and this is what I observed. For the applicant, now appellant, there was only one documentary exhibit, namely the letter for the administration of the estate (Exhibit Pl) and, for the respondents, there were two exhibits, that is the letter of administration (Exhibit DI) and the disposition contract (Exhibit D2). None of these three documents appear to have been irregularly admitted. As vividly shown in the proceedings, before the admission of each of these three documents, it was cleared for admission and after its admission, its substance was read over. The appellant's complaint in this regard is serious wanting in merit. The second irregularity constituting the appellant's discontentment revolves around the competency of the sale agreement (Exhibit D2). He has lamented that there are two illegalities in Exhibit D2. First, the person who attested it had no such capacity/jurisdiction to attest the same, and second, it bears no stamp duty. Starting with the issue of attestation, the essential ingredients of a valid contract are stipulated under section 10 of the Law of Contract Act, Cap 345 R.E. 2019. As per this provision, a contract is valid if it was made out of the free consent of the parties; the parties making it have the capacity to contract; it is for a lawful consideration and with the lawful object. It categorically states that:- 10. All agreements are contract if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are Page 10 of 19 not hereby expressly declared to be void. Provided that nothing herein contained shall affect any law inforce, and not hereby expressly repealed or disapplied, by which any contract is required to be made in writing or in electronic form or in the presence of witnesses, or in any law relating to registration of the document. Looking at Exhibit D2, I find it to have encompassed all the above ingredients. The appellant's argument is far-fetched because, as the provision above demonstrates, there is no specification as to who should serve as a witness to a contract meaning that, any person can be a witness. Mr. Wasonga's argument seems to have overlooked that what is before the court is an agreement and not an affidavit which would require a commission for oath to attest. I am fortified that no irregularity was occasioned when the Village Executive Officer stood as a witness to the agreement between the second respondent and the late Ismail Acklan. The next alleged irregularity, concern stamp duty. The appellant has challenged the admissibility of exhibit D2 arguing that it offends sections 47(1) and 5(1) of the Stamp Duty Act Cap. 189 R.E 2019 that sets a requirement for certain instruments not to be admitted in court unless the payment of stamp duty in respect of such documents has been effected. Section 5(1) (a) provides that every instrument specified in the schedule to the Act and which is executed in Tanzania shall be charged with the duty at the rate specified in the schedule to the Act. Section 47(1) provides thus:- No instrument chargeable with stamp duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties to receive the Page 11 of 19 evidence or shall be acted upon, registered in evidence authenticated by any such flyperson or by any public officer unless such instrument is only stamped. The immediate issue for consideration is whether exhibit D2 is chargeable with stamp duty. As per the Schedule to the Stamp Duty Act, the instruments chargeable with stamp duty include a conveyancing agreement with a consideration exceeding 20,000/=. Since the consideration prince in Exhibit D2 wasTshs 1,000,000/=, it is obvious that it is chargeable with stamp duty. However, it bears no stamp duty meaning that, it did not comply with the law. This anomaly ought to have been raised at the admission stage but it was and the agreement was admitted unobjected. I have observed further that, although the appellant had a chance to raise this anomaly in the course of cross-examination, he forfeited the opportunity and kept mute waiting to raise it belatedly on appeal. The law as deciphered from numerous precedents dealing with this issue leans towards lenience. In cases where the objection is raised at the admission stage and the court is satisfied that the document is chargeable with stamp duty, it would invariably not outrightly reject the document. Normally, the party tendering it would be given an opportunity to rectify the anomaly by paying the required duty and the penalty if any. The failure by the party to utilize the opportunity so granted would then render the instrument inadmissible in evidence as stated in Zakaria Barie Bura vs. Theresia Maria John Mubiru [1995] TLR 211. In that case, the court cited with approval the case of Sunderji Nanji Limited vs. Page 12 of 19 Mohamedali Kassam Ali Kassam Bhalloo (1958) 1EA 762, where it was held that:- As was held in Bagahat Ram vs. Rattan Chand(2)(1930), A.LR Lah 854), before holding a document in admissible in evidence on the sole ground that it is not being properly stamped the court ought to give an opportunity to a party producing it to pay the stamp duty and penalty. The position in this case is exactly the same. The appellant has never been given the opportunity of paying the requisite stamp duty and prescribed penalty on the unstamped letter of guarantee on which he sought to rely in support of his claim against the second defendant or respondent and he must be given such opportunity. Dealing with a similar issue in Mohamed Abood vs D.F.S Express Lines Ltd (Civil Appeal No. 282 of 2019) [2023] TZCA 57, the Court of Appeal cementing its previous decision held as follows:- Luckily, this Court in the case of Elibariki Mboya v. Amina Abeid, Civil Appeal No. 54 of 1996 (unreported) was faced with almost similar scenario. In that appeal, the Court was invited to consider whether the High Court was right in law to have allowed the appeal on the ground that exhibit A, the contract of sale, having not been duly stamped with stamp duty, was not valid and should not have been admitted in evidence. The Court held that the High Court erred in law because nonstamping of the instrument did not constitute a basis for faulting the decision of the lower court as per the provisions of section 73 of the Civil Procedure Code, Cap. 33 R.E. 2019 (the CPC). Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal and made an order that the respondent to pay the chargeable duty on the contract of sale. The same applies in the present appeal. Rule 115 of the Rules which is pari materia with section 73 of the CPC requires the Court Page 13 of 19 to do substantial justice, it should not reverse or vary any decree nor remanded any case on account of among others, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the court. In that regard, we find that failure by the appellant to pay the chargeable stamp duty at the time the lease agreement was admitted in evidence cannot be a basis for this Court to vary or reverse the decision of the High Court. Let say, if, at the time of the hearing of the appeal, the appellant would not have paid the chargeable stamp duty, what we could have done was to order him to pay the same before proceeding with the hearing of the appeal. I subscribe to this instructive wisdom of the apex court considering also that section 5 of the Land Disputes Courts Act, Cap 216 categorically states that: ”45. No decision or order of a Ward Tribunal or District Land and Housing Tribunal shall be reversed or altered on appeal or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the proceedings before or during the hearing or in such decision or order or on account of the improper admission or rejection of any evidence unless such error, omission or irregularity or improper admission or rejection of evidence has infact occasioned a failure of justice." (Emphasis added) The next alleged irregularity is nondisclosure of the reasons for the change of trial chairmen. From the submissions by both parties, it is not disputed that the suit was adjudicated by more than one chairman. As per the record, at the initial stages, it was before Hon. B. Shuma who presided over it from 3rd September 2020 to 15th November 2022 and from 2nd December 2021, it was before Hon. B. Colex. Thereafter, it did not change hands. On 27th September 2022 when the issues were framed, it was still Page 14 of 19 before Hon. B. Colex and it was this chairman who presided over it during the hearing of all witnesses and upon completion, he composed and delivered the judgment. Undeniably, the law expects that when a judicial officer is assigned a case, he should preside over it to its finality unless he is otherwise prevented by a good cause from continuing with it in which case, his successor must assign the reasons for taking over the case. The principle is summarized in the case of M/S. Georges Centre Limited vs. The Honourable Attorney General, Civil Appeal No. 29 of 2016 where the Court of Appeal held thus: The general premise that can be gathered from the above provision is that once the trial of a case has begun before one judicial officer that judicial officer has to bring it to completion unless for some reason he/she is unable to do that. The provision cited above imposes upon a successor judge or magistrate an obligation to put on record why he/she has to take up a case that is partly heard by another. There are a number of reasons why it is important that a trial started by one judicial officer be completed by the same judicial officer unless it is not practicable to do so. For one thing, ...the one who sees and hears the witness is in the best position to assess the witness's credibility. Credibility of witnesses which has to be assessed is very crucial in the determination of any case before a court of law. Furthermore, integrity of judicial proceedings hinges on transparency. Where there is no transparency justice may be compromised. Also see Priscus Kimaro v. Republic, Criminal Appeal no. 301 of 2013 Page 15 of 19 The importance of assigning the reasons for transfer cannot, therefore, be underrated especially where the hearing of the case has commenced. The omission is a fatal irregularity with serious consequences as it vitiates the proceedings. Luckily, in this case, the changes took place way before the framing of the issues for determination and before the commencement of the hearing. Thus, the danger anticipated above had no room and the appellant has not demonstrated how, in the circumstances of this case, he was prejudiced by the change. Accordingly, his complaint is assigned no weight and is discounted. This brings us to the end of the alleged multiple illegalities. Now, reverting to the first to the third supplementary grounds, the appellant has argued that his case was stronger compared to the respondent's. Hence, the trial tribunal erred in holding in the respondent's favour. Specifically, it has been argued that the 2nd respondent unlawfully sold the land as he had no title over it. The suit land belonged to his deceased father and the respondent was not the administrator. Also, the sale was illegal as it did not specify the boundaries of the land sold to the 1st respondent's father. As held by the trial tribunal, deciding these issues would require first to establish who was the owner of the suit land and as already stated, the appellant being the applicant was duty bound to prove his ownership. After interrogating the trial tribunal's judgment, the evidence on record and the appellant's application, I see no reason to fault the finding of the trial tribunal as the contradiction is glaring. As correctly held by the trial chairman and submitted by the respondent's counsel, it is uncertain Page 16 of 19 whether the appellant was seeking the recovery of the suit land in his personal capacity or as a representative of his late father. In paragraph 6(iii) of the amended application, he expressly stated that he owned the suit land having acquired it 'by transmission or inheritance from his late father who died in 1976' and in paragraph 6(iv) he stated that after inheriting the land he owned it and depended on it 'solemnly for running his life and his family'. In paragraph 6(v) he stated that he is an administrator of the estate of the late Mbua Kitu who died interstate on 28/4/1976 and 'the disputed land remained under the control of the second defendant while he (the appellant) and his family settled in Tanga. The owner of "the disputed suit" stated in paragraph 6(v) is not expressly disclosed. Thus, it cannot be said with certainty that it was the late Mbua Kitu. As correctly held by the trial tribunal, these three paragraphs exhibit serious confusion on the position of the appellant as paragraphs 6(iii) and 6(iv) suggest that he was suing in his personal capacity whilst paragraph 6(v) implicitly suggests that he was suing in a representative capacity. It would appear that the appellant was riding two horses at the same time and later on, he abandoned one and exclusively led evidence in support of his representative capacity. This was materially wrong and offensive to the cardinal principle against departure from pleadings as articulated in numerous decisions of the apex court and this court. For instance, in the case of Barclays Bank T. Ltd vs Jacob Muro (Civil Appeal 357 of 2019) [2020] TZCA 1875 TanzLII, the Court of Appeal observed that: We feel compelled, at this point, to restate the time- honoured principle of law that parties are bound by their own pleadings and that any evidence produced by any of the parties which does not support the pleaded facts or is at variance with the pleaded facts must be ignored- see Page 17 of 19 James Funke Ngwagilo v. Attorney General [2004] TLR 161. See also Lawrence Surumbu Tara v. The Hon. Attorney General and 2 Others, Civil Appeal No. 56 of 2012; and Charles Richard Kombe t/a Building v. Evarani Mtungi and 3 Others, Civil Appeal No. 38 of 2012 (both unreported). Cementing this position in Agatha Mshote vs Edson Emmanuel & Others (Civil Appeal 121 of 2019) [2021] TZCA 323 (20 July 2021), it held that: It is settled law that parties are bound by their own pleadings and that a party shall not be allowed to depart from his pleadings to change its case from what was originally pleaded. This entails a party parading the evidence to prove or support what he has pleaded bearing in mind, as earlier stated that, he who alleges has a burden of proof as stipulated in section 110 of the Evidence Act [CAP 6 RE2002]. The question to be addressed is if the appellant did prove to be the lawful owner of the disputed land at the required standard, (also see Charles Richard Kombe t/a Building vs Evarani Mtungi & Others (Civil Appeal 38 of 2012) [2017] TZCA 153 TanzLII) Accordingly, the trial tribunal was correct in dismissing the suit for want of proof. The first to third supplementary grounds are therefore without merit. I may also add here that, even if the pleadings were free from confusion, the appellant's claim would still have failed because, from his evidence, after the demise of his father in 1976, the second respondent and his brother, Mwandike, now deceased, remained in occupation and use of the suit land until 17th December 2012 when he disposed it by way of sale to Page 18 of 19 Ismail Acklam meaning that he had an uninterrupted occupation of the same for 36 years. The longevity of his uninterrupted possession undoubtedly earned him the protection of the law as an adverse possessor. In the totality of the above, this appeal fails in entirety for want of merit and it is dismissed. The judgment and decree of the trial tribunal are upheld. In the interest of peace and harmony between the appellant and the 2nd respondent who are half-brothers, I refrain from awarding costs. DATED and DELIVERED at DODOMA this 5th day of July 2024. J.L. MASABO JUDGE Page 19 of 19