ngotelwa

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA [MOROGORO SUB- REGISTRY] AT MOROGORO PC CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 10645 OF 2023 (Arising from Criminal Appeal No. 04 of 2023/ in the District Court of Kilombero/ Originating from Criminal !Vo 102 of 2022 in the Primary Court of Mngeta) AHADI ANDREW NGOTELWA ....................................................... APPELLANT VERSUS SHIGEL.1. LU5.I\NGISA .................. .. ... .... ............ .. ........... .......... RESPONDENT JUDGEMENT 3O/07/2O,·l & (/:./Jf3/2O2 i KINYAKI\, J. : Before the P1 irnary Court of Malinyi at Malinyi hereinalter, the "trial court" v1de Criminal Case No. 172 of 2023, the appellant sued the respondent fo r Mclicious DamJge to Property and ThreJtcning Violence contrary to sections 326 and 89(2)( :1) of the renal Code Cap 16 R.E. 2020, hereinalter the "Penal Code". lt was allcgerl at thr:: Lrii:JI court t·),it on 28 th October 2023 at 10: 00 am, the re.,pond(:nt to(J ..:the1 \Vith olh~r persons invaded t he appellant's residence, took ot...t im,J :l!·aq;_icci his f,imi\· to the fr1rm where they grazed cattle which l the respondent threatened to kill the appellant wherever the former would have found the latter. The defence evidence was to the effect that t he respondent did not commit the offences by alleging that the cattle were owned by Masanja Lugedeja and the person who grazed _cattle was not the respondent but Daud Daud. The respondent testified that he did not go to the Village Executive Officer hereina~er the "VEO" on 28 th October 2023 but he went on 26 th October 2024 to give money to Masanja Lugedeja a~er he was informed that the cattle owned by Masanja Lugedeja were caught at the appellant's farm destroying the appellant's crops. On the conclusion of hearing, the trial court found the appellant to have failed to prove the offences against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted the respondent from the offences he was cha rged with. The tria l court found that the respondent did not cal l independent witnesses, the fishermen whom the appellant claimed to that they witnessed the incident in the next morning. The trial court added that the claims that it was the respondent who grazed cattle into the farm was disproved by SU3, the VEO who testified that the cattle were neither owned nor grazed into the farm by the respondent and that the respondent was not at the VEO office on the 2 date when the appellant alleged to have been threatened by the respondent at the VEO office. Dissatisfied, the appellant appealed aga inst the decision of the trial court to the District Court of Malinyi at Malinyi hereinalter the "first appellate cou rt" vide Criminal Appeal No. 7375 of 2024. Upon hearing both parties, the first appellate court upheld the decision of the trial court by holding that the prosecution case was compromised by t he testimony of SU3, the VEO; no witness apart from the appellant was cal led to testify on the words allegedly uttered by the respondents; the appellant was not present at the crime scene hence his evidence was based on suspicion; and no cogent evidence was adduced to prove that the farm al leged to have been destroyed belonged to the appellant. The first appellate court found the charges against the respondent were not proved beyond reasonable doubt to ground conviction and dismissed the appea l in its entirety. Aggrieved by the decision of the first appellate court, the appellant preferred an appeal to this Court with the following grounds of appeal: (i) That the trial court Magistrate erred in both law and fact by failure to re-evaluate the chain of evidence on record and 3 determine it effectively, thus led to uphold erroneous decision of Malinyi Primary Court; (ii) That the appell ate court Magistrate erred in law and fact for not giving the appel lant chance to prepare and argue the grounds of appeal by way of written su bmissions; (iii) That both subordinate courts erred in law and fact for fai lure to determine that the respondent is the owner of the cows who ate and destroyed the farm ri ce of the appellant; (iv) That both subordinate courts erred in law and fact to acquit the respondent while the prosecution case was proved beyond reasonable doubt; and (v) That the appellate Magistrate erred in law and fact by hearing the case in surprising and the appellant was not given sufficient time to argue the appeal. At the hearing of the appea l, the appellant appeared in person unrepresented. He prayed for disposition of the appeal by written submissions which I granled. As the respondent fa iled to appear twice despite service of summons upon him on 4th July 2024 and 17th July 2024, hearing of the appeal proceeded ex parte against him. II The appellant duly lodged his submissions in su pport of the appeal in wh ich he consolidated and argued together the ist and 4Lh ground s; and the 2nd and 5th grounds. He argued the 3rd ground separately. Submitting in support of the 1~t and 4th grounds, the appel lant contended that the prosecution proved the case without any doubt as per the evidence of the witnesses that the respondent and his colleagues grazed cattle to the farm and destroyed his paddy on 28 th October 2023 around 22:00 hours. He submitted that SM2, SM3 and SM4 saw the respondent and his colleagues grazing cattle to the farm and that the VEO witnessed the damaged paddy. He added Lhat the fishermen were passersby and it was impossible to get them testify in court. He argued that it was wrong for the tria l court to diminish the weight of evidence of the prosecution witnesses based on the fact tha t they are fam ily members. He all uded that the evidence of VEO was false. In the 2nd and 5th grounds of appea l, the appellant complained on the denial by the appellate magistrate to allow him file his written submissions instead he ordered parties to argue the appea l orally. He argued that he was denied his right of hearin g which underm ine the entire decision relying on Article 13(6)(a) of the Constitution of Lhe United Republic of Tanza nia of 1977 as 5 amended from time to time, hereina~er the "Constitution" and the case of Yahaya Selemani Mralya (Administrator of the Estate of the late Selemani Mralya) v. Stephano Sijia and 3 Others, Civi l Appea l No. 13 of 20 17. In support of the 3rd ground, the appellant contended that his paddy was eaten by cattle grazed by the respondent and that valuation was conducted which established the value of the damaged paddy below TZS 600,0000 which the appel lant thoug ht to be inappropriate. He added that it was the respondent who intimidated to kill him . Finally, the appellant prayed for imposition of excessive punishment to the respondent according to law and an order for compensation of TZS 600,000 in his favour. In determining the present appeal, I wi ll also consol idate the 1st and 4th grounds as well as the 2nd and 5ui grounds and determine them together. The 3rd ground will be determined separately. In doing so, I will start determining the 2nd and 5th grounds of appeal followed by the 3rd ground. The pt and 4 th grounds as consolidated, shall be determined in the end . At the onset, I wish to point out that in the present appeal, this Court is sitting as the second appellate court and as such, it is constrained from disturbing the concurrent findings of the lower courts unless it is evident that there has been misapprehension of evidence, a miscarriag e of justice or a violation of some principle of law. That has been the position in numerous court's decision including the case of Godfrey Elisalia Others v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 39 of 2022 [2023] TZCA 17325 (12 June 2023), Laureno Mseya v. Republic, Crim inal Appeal No. 430 of 2007 [2009] TZCA 50 (16 Septem ber 2009 ) and Menald W enela v. The Director of Public Prosecutions, Criminal Appeal No. 336 of 2018 [2021] TZCA 520 (24 Septembe r 2021) j ust to mention a few. For instance, in the case of Laureno Mseya v. Republic (Supra) on page 8 of the decision, the Court of Appeal stated: ''.Lis a second appellate court, our re view of factual issues is restricted by well settled principles of law. In the case of OPP vs Jafari Mfaume Kawawa (1981) TLR 149 at 153, this court held: "The next important point for consideration and decision in this case is whether it is proper for this court to evaluate the evidence afresh and con1e to it ., own conclusions on matters of fact This is a second appeal brought under S. 7 5 (7) of the Appellate Jurisdiction Acl 1979. The appeal therefore lies to this court only on a point or p oints of law.. .in cases where there are misdirections or non directions on the evidence, a court is entitled to look at the relevant evidence and make its own findings. " [Emphasis Added] Guided by the principles underlined in the above authorities, I now revert into the determination of the appeal at hand . The appellant's complaint in the 2nd and 5 Lh grounds is the denial by the appellate magist rate to order disposition of the appeal by written submissions which would allow him, being a lay person, to obtain assistance to prefer wri tten submissions. The record of the first appellate court clea rly reveals that both the appellant and the respondent were unrepresented . Disposition of the appeal by written su bmissions depends on the election of both parties to t he case in the circumsta nce where both parties are able to obtain advocates who can prepare the wri tten submission in support or in opposition to l he appeal. In case one party is unable to obtain such legal services, the Court is bou nd to requ ire parties to argue their case orally. Pa rti es to the case are t he owners of the dispute. They know the genesis of the dispute, the reason and manner it happened and their dissatisfaction of any decision of the court. Even in disputes involving legal int ricacies such as interpretation of a particu lar provision of the law where assistance of an advocate is important, pa rties who do not have lega l representat ion will be led by courts to state their dispute and the court will finally decide on the correct application of the law in such disputes. It means that if parties or any of them Is unable to obtain legal representation or an advocate to draw submission for any of t hem, the courts are bound to ask pa rties to state their dispute or dissatisfaction of the decision of the trial or appellate court. As the part ies were given right to state their respective positions in relation to the decision of the t ria l court, the appellant was not denied his right to be hea rd . I t fol lows that the Honourable trial Magistrate did nol err to lead pa rties to state their respective positions orally especially in the matter before it where the first appellate court sat Lo determine whether the d1~cision of the trial court was correct or not. I find the provision of Article 13(6)(a) of lhe Constitution and t he case of Ya haya Selemani Mralya (Administrator of t he Estate of the late Selemani Mralya) (supra) inapplicable in the circumstance of the present 9 appea l as the appellant was not denied his right to be heard. The pt and 5th grounds of appeal are dismissed for lack of merit. The 3rd ground is the appellant's complain t that both the trial court and the first appellate failed to find the respondent as the owner of the cows which destroyed the paddy of the appella nt. I do not have reason to fault the trial court and the first appellate court in their holdings that there was no proof by the prosecution that the cattle which invaded the paddy farm were owned by the respondent. All the prosecution witnesses testified that the respondent together with his colleagues entered in the farm, dragged the appellant's family members and grazed cattle in the paddy farm . No any of the witnesses stated that the cattle were owned by the responden t. Further, both SUl, SU2 and SU3 testified that the cattle were owned by Masanja Lugedeja and not the respondent, the fact t hat was made available to the appel lant before institution of the suit at the trial court. I also do not find merit in the appellant's com pliant that the amount of compensation of TZS 294,000 established by the Valuer as per Exhibit A was on the lower side. The amount was awarded upon the Valuer conduct of 10 valuation . The valuation report or the amount of compensation was not amended even a~er the dissatisfaction by the appellant. The Court ca nnot act outside Exhibit A unless there were other cogent evidence such as another subsequent valuation report showing the damage to the extent of TZS 600,000 cla imed by t he appel lant. Based on the above observations, I do not find merit in the third ground and I dismiss the same. I now turn to the 1st and 4th grounds in which the appel lant faults the first appellant court for its fa ilure Lo re-evaluate the evidence on record which led to erroneous decision; and the error by the subordin ate courts to acquit the respondent despite the prosecution's proof of the offences aga inst the respondent beyond reasonable doubt. The first appellate court upheld the decision of the tria l court on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the offence aga inst the respondent beyond reasonable doubt. The bases of the decision were that t he prosecution case was compromised by the testimony of SU3, the VEO; no witness apart from the appellant was ca lled to testify on the words allegedly uttered by the respondents; the appellant was not present at the crime scene 11 hence his evidence was based on suspicion; and no cogent evidence was adduced to prove that the farm alleged to have been destroyed belonged to the appellant. Regarding the Offence of Threateni ng Violence, it is not correct that no witness apart from the appellant was called to testify on the words allegedly uttered by the respondent. I have read the handwriting proceedings of the trial court. I have found that apart from the appellant (SMl) testifying that the respondent uttered words "popote utakapopatlkana tutakuua tLI', SM4, Excelent Ahadi Mwasiwanga also testified that the morning following the 28 th October 2023, they went to the VEO office where he heard SU 1 saying "wewe popote tutapokukuta tutakuua". It is therefore not true that the appellant did not present another witness to testify on the intimidating words uttered by the respondent. Despite the above testimonies from SM 1 and SM4, the evidence reveal that the utterance was made at the VEO office in public. Apart from SM4 who was the appellant's son, it was expected of SMl to call any other person who was at the crime scene to prove such allegations especially in this case that the exact content of the alleged utterance between SM l and SM4 differ. I therefore find that both the trial court and the appellate court were correct 17 ~ to hold that the prosecution failed to prove the offence of Threatening Violence contrary to sections 89(2)(a) of the Penal Code. Regarding the offence of Malicious Damage to Property, the first appellate court reasoned t hat the testimony of SU3 compromised the prosecution case and that the prosecution failed to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. Section 326 of the Penal Code which charges the offence of Malicious Damage to Pr·operty provides: 326 Any person who wilfully and unlawfully destroys or damages any property is gwlty ofan offence, and except as otherwise provided in this section, is liable to imprisonment for seven years. I disagree with the first appellate court in its holding that no cogent evidence was adduced to prove that the farm alleged to have been destroyed belonged lo the appellant. First and foremost, the issue over the appellant's ownership of the farm was neither raised nor determined by the trial court. Even if the same was ra ised and determined, which was not, it is clear from the record that what was damaged was not a farm but paddy. There was cogent evidence through the testimonies of all prosecution witnesses, all defence witnesses and the valuation report admitted in evidence as Exh ibit 13 A that the paddy that was destroyed belonged to the appel lant. Exhibit A is ti tled "TAARIFA YA TA TH/l1INI YA SHAMBA AINA YA MPUNGA WA AHADI NGETELWA ." I find the reasoning of the fi rst appellate court in this respect incorrect. I also disagree with the first appellate court's holding that the prosecution failed to prove the offence of Malicious Damage to Property based on the reason that the appellant was not present at the crime scene hence his evidence was based on suspicion . My disagreement is based on the fact that in attempt to prove the offence, the appellant was not t he on ly prosecution's witness. The evidence of SM2, SM3 and SM4 who were the eye witnesses and present at the crime scene, witnessed the respondent and his two colleagues, dragging SM2, Wisdom Ahadi Ngotelwa, the appellant's son, and SM3, Beatrice Kelembe, the appellant's wife to the farm and in front of them, grazed cattle who ate the paddy belonging to the appellant. Again, the holding of the first appellate court in this respect is incorrect. I now move lo determine on the holding of the first appellate court t hat the testimony of SU3 compromised the evidence of the prosecution. The version of the prosecution evidence is that on 28 th October 2023 at 22 :00 hours, the respondent and his colleagues invaded the farm in which the appellant 14 ~ cultivated paddy and where he was residing with his fa mily. The respondent and his col leag ues who were pastoralists dragged SM2 and SM3 while SM4 run away to hide in maize farm but was able to see what was going on. SM2, SM3 and SM4 testified that the respondent and his colleagues dragged SM2 and SM3 to the farm where they witnessed the herd of cattle eating paddy. The testimony of both SMl and SM3 was that SM3 telephoned SMl and informed him that they were surrounded by the pastoralists who were armed. The respondent did not cross examine SM3 which according to the holding In the case of Nyerere Nyague v. R., Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 2010, the respondent admitted the testimony of PW2. T he respondent did not cross examine SM2 and SM4 on their testimony that they saw the respondent at the crime scene on 28 th October 2024 at 22:00 hours dragging SM 2 and SM3 to the farm and grazed cattle to eat paddy. Reading Lhe testimony of SU3, the VEO, as reflected in the handwriting proceedings of the trial court, it reveals that on 26 th October 2023, she received from the appell;:rnt 27 cows which destroyed the appellant's crops in his farm . She added that subsequent to the previous invasion, the appellant's farm was again invaded at night, his crops were destroyed and 17 cows which deslroyed th2 c-rops were handed to her office. She stated 15 ~ that she was called at the District Commissioner's Office for valuation of the appellant's damaged crops but the appellant was dissatisfied with the amount as a result of valuation. But SU3 did not state lhe subsequent date of the invasion and destruction. During cross examination, SU3 testified that SU1, the respondent was not involved in that incident and was not lhere. It is also unknown which incident between the two that the respondent was not involved and which location between the VEO office and the scene of crime t he respondent was not present. ln her· entire testimony, SU3 dicl not inform the trial court that the respondent went to her office on 26 th October 2023 or on 14th October 2023 as alleged by SU 1 and SU2. Fu rther, SU3 was not at lhe scene of crime on 28 th October 2023 at 22:00 hours to testify on the absence of the respondent at the place and the presence of Daud Daud whom she alleged to be the shepherd of the cattle. Her testimony was that Daud Daud went Lo the VEO office where he was given l he cattle. Considering that the respondent did not cross examine SM2 and SM4 on their testimonic-:.; that they saw the respondent at the crime scene commitling t he misdeeds, I do not find SU3's testimony comprom ised the prosecution's evidence . 1G Even the respondent (SU 1) and Jilya Masunzu (SU2) did not testify that they went to the VEO on 25u, October 2023. To the contrary, SUl and SU2 testified that they went to the VEO office on 14th October 2023 in order to give TZS 200,000 to Masanja Lugcdela, the alleged owner of the cattle, alter the said Lugcdeja was arrested for destruction of the appellant's paddy occasioned by the gazing of his cattle into the farm. There was no testimony given on the purpose of TZS 200,000 that SUl and SU2 gave Masanja Lugedeja at the VEO office. It is clear to me that the defence witnesses' testimonies were disassociated and incapable of compromising Lhe prosecution case or casting doubt to the same. While there was sufficient proof from all defence witnesses that the appellant's paddy was destroyed by cattle owned by Masanja Lugedeja, SUl and SU2 version was that the same happened before 14th October 2023 that led them to give TZS 200,000 Lo Masanja Lugedeja on 14th October 2023 when lhe latter was held at the VEO office. To the contrary, SU3 testifi ed that 22 and 17 cows were presented to her office on 26 th October 2023 and on a subsequent unknown date, respectively, after they destroyed the appellant's paddy in the appellant's farm. She did not state whether in both occasions, the shepherd of the cattle was Daud Daud. 17 I understand that in criminc1I cases, cou rts are only concerned on the strength of the prosecution evidence as opposed to any weakness of the defence evidence, and that the defence's duty is only to cast doubt on the prosecution case . My analysis of the above evidence was not to require the defence to prove that the respondent was not the one who comm itted the offence, but to find out whether the prosecution evidence was undermined by the defence, and whether there was any doubt casted on the prosecution evidence as held by the subordinate courts. Based on the analysis of the evidence of the prosecution and the defence, I hesitate to agree with the first appellate court that the testimony of SU3 compromised or undermined the evidence of the prosecution. There is no doubt casted on the prosecution evidence in terms of the defence witnesses' testimonies that there was destruction of the appellant's paddy, where Masanja Lugedeja wus arrested and that SUl and SU2 provided TZS 200,000 to him while in custody at the VEO office. One would ask, if the respondent was not involved at all in the incident, how would it be possible for him to c;ct. involved in the taking TZS 200,000 to the VEO office lo give to Masanja Lugedeja who was arrested alter his cattle destroyed the appellant's oaddy, especially considering failure by the respondent to cross examine SM2 and SM4 on their testimony that they saw the respond ent grazing catlle cJt the farm? It is clear to me that no any testimony of the defence witnesses casted doubt on or diminished the prosecution case. Contrary to the decision of the first appellate court, I find that the testimony of SU3 did not compromise the prosecution evidence. Even the testimony of SUl and SU2 did not cast doubt on the prosecution case that on 28 th October 2023 at 22 :00 hours, the respondent together with other persons invaded and grazed cattle in the farm and destroyed the appel lant's paddy contrary to section 326 of the Pena l Code. Again , it was incorrect for the first trial court to uphold the decision of the trial court that accorded lesser weight to the prosecution witnesses' evidence and required proof of independent witnesses including the fishermen. At the trial, SM 1 and SM3 testified thcJt the fishermen were passing by the farm where they witnessed the damage and advised the appellant and his family to take the catties to the VEO office. It was impossible for the appellant to find the fishermen who were unknown to him in terms of their residences and whereabouts in order to testify at lhe tria l. 19 The above notwithstanding, the prosecution witnesses were com petent to testify on the incident as they were knowledgeable of the facts constituting the offence. The law does not f)rcvent family members to adduce evidence in court. All prosecution witnesses qualified as competent witnesses under section 127(1) of the Evidence Act Cap. 6 R.E. 2022 which provide: Every person shall be competent to testify unless the court considers that he is incapable of understanding the questions put to him or ofgiving rational answers to those questions by reason of tender age/ extreme old age/ disease (whether of body or mind) or any other sirmlar cause. [See also the case of Birahi Nyankongo Another v. Republic, Cri minal Appeal No. 182 of 2010 (2012] TZCA 151 (19 September 2012) on page 7 through to 10] I also find the reasoning of both the trial court and the first appellate court that the respondent was not the owner of the cattle incorrect. Section 326 of the Pena l Code reproduced above clea 1ly provides that "any person who willfully and unlawfully destroys or damages any property is guilty of an offence." The provision does not require a person who destroys property to be the owner of the destructing object. 70 ,. As there was proof by the prosecution that it was t he respondent together with his colleagues who dragged cattle into the farm and destroyed the appellant's paddy, the physical act, t he ' actus reus of the offence was proven. SU3's testimony that it was Daud Daud who was the shepherd of the cattle did not disprove or cast doubt that the respondent was at the crime scene and committed the misdeeds. With regard to the ingredient of malice, the 'mens rea', I find that the damage of the appe llant's paddy was actuated with criminal intent considering the manner in which the crime was com mitted. SM2, SM3 and SM4 all testified that t he respondent and his colleagues went to their residence, dragged SM2 and SM3 to the farm to witness the cattle damaging t he rice for the whole night of 2gtn October 2023 from 22 :00 hours. They testified that it was in the following morning when fishermen who were passing by and who found caltlc damaging the paddy in t he farm advised them to drag the cattle to the VEO office which the appellant did. I And no justification on part of the respond ent to commit such awful acts of torturing the appellant's fam ily physically ,md psychologically. It would have been different if the cattle without being grazed or led by any one passed through the farm and destroyed paddy. But the circumstances 21 ~ ,, of the incident is quite exceptional which clearly prove malice aforethought on part of Lhe respondent to enter into the appellant's residence, drag his family members to witness cattle who were led by him and his colleagues, eat the paddy for the whole night. In view of the above findings, it is my considered position that the prosecution managed to prove the offence of Malicious Damage to Property contrary to section 326 of the Penal Code beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court's acqllittal which was upheld the fi rst arJpellate court was contrary to the established evidence at the tria l and the law. Consequently, I allow the appeal and set aside the acquittal of the respondent in respect of the offence of Malicious Damage to Property contrary to section 326 of the Pena l Code. ,W,~;:vi~ JUDGE 09 / 08 / 2024 AGGRAVATING FACTORS: Ahadi Ngotelwa, the Appel lant: l did not know Shigela before. I have no any history about him. I have nolhing to add. MITIGATING FACTORS: Court: As the appeal proceeded ex parteand the appellant has not appeared today for judgement, no mitigation was recorded. Since the respondent's appearance in this appea l has not been procured to date, the court proceeds to sentence him in absentia. SENTENCE Section 326 of the Penal Code provides that upon conviction, the offender is liable to 7 years' imprisonment. According to the interpretation in various cases of the courts in this jurisdiction, including the case of Nyamhang a s/o Magesa v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 470 of 2015 [20 17] TZCA 232 ( 12 December 2017) on rage 8, Lhc term liable has been construed to mean that the sentencing court has discretion to pass a sentence which it deems to be appropriate in the circumstances of the particular case. In view of the above, although the respondent has not appeared to defend the appeal and has not appeared today for judgement, and despite him not been able to offer his mitigations, the testimonies of the prosecution has not indicated lhat he is a habitual offender. For that reason, I find a sentence of seven years' imprisonment in j dil will be too high . However, considering the ( • circumstances in which the crime was committed which involved dragging SM2 and SM3 from the house to the farm for them to witness the cattle grazed by the respondent and his colleagues damaging the paddy for the whole night, I find that there was an intention by the respondent to inflict physical and psychological torture upon the appellant's family. Based on the above finding, I sentence the respondent to serve imprisonment in jail for a term of three years pursuant Lo section 326 of the Penal Code. I order the respondent to start serving the sentence a~er he is apprehended or upon his surrender. A warrant of arrest be issued for that purpose. I also order Lhe respondent to pay the appellant TZS 294,000 being compensation for damage of the latter's paddy as per Exhibit A, the valuation report. It is so ordered. Right of appeal fully explaineJ. DATED at MOROGORO Lhis gui day of August 2024. ·<1 1t.f~~,I~ ~~ ': ~h~,":\ j JUDGE --~ ·· 09/08 / 2024