Mabula Judgment Final

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA GEITA SUB-REGISTRY AT GEITA CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 6434 OF 2025 (Arising from Criminal Case No. 14618 of 2024 of the District Court of Bukombe) MABULA MATHIAS…………….………………………..…………………. 1ST APPELLANT MALINGANYA SAMWEL…………….….………………………………….2ND APPELLANT VERSUS REPUBLIC……………………………………………………………………..RESPONDENT JUDGEMENT Date of last Order: 26/03/2025 Date of Judgment: 04/04/2025 MWAKAPEJE, J.: The appellants herein are dissatisfied with the decision of the District Court of Bukombe in Criminal Case No. 14618 of 2024, whereby they were convicted of the offence of kidnapping a child with the intent to steal, contrary to Section 252 of the Penal Code, Cap. R.E. 2022, and sentenced to serve 5 years' imprisonment. This appeal arises from the alleged kidnapping of PW3, a five-year- old boy, on 15 January 2024, at Mzambarauni Village, Mbogwe District, Geita Region. The 1st and 2nd appellants reportedly kidnapped the child while he was playing and demanded a ransom of TZS 5 million from his Page 1 of 25 father via phone. The child was taken to Kigomanoma Guest House, where the 1st appellant stayed with him while the 2nd appellant maintained communication with the victim's family. Police arrested the 2nd appellant, who led them to the guest house, where the child was found with the 1st appellant on 16 January 2024. Both appellants later confessed but pleaded not guilty when charged. The prosecution presented 14 witnesses. PW1, Ester Paulo, testified that on the day of the abduction, she had briefly left home to deliver food to her husband. Upon returning, she found her son missing and was informed by other children that a motorcyclist had taken him, claiming he was sent by her. She stated that she immediately contacted her husband, and together they reported the matter to the village chairman and the police. PW2, Mhoja Kado, reported receiving a ransom call and threatening messages demanding TZS 5 million for his son's release. He stated that, being unable to pay the ransom, he informed the police, who began tracing the suspects. PW3, the victim, recalled that the 1st appellant had taken him on a motorcycle under the pretence of taking him to his mother. He identified the 2nd appellant, who is his uncle, as joining them during the journey. Page 2 of 25 PW4, (a minor), a sibling of the victim, testified that a motorcyclist, the 1st appellant, came to their home claiming to have been sent by their mother to take PW3 to Masumbwe. Later that evening, when their mother returned and asked for the victim, PW4 informed her, assuming she had sent for him. PW5, village chairman Joseph Mahila, stated that PW2 and others came to him reporting the abduction. He recalled that the 2nd appellant's suspicious behaviour, including frequent phone use, led him to alert the police. PW6, ASP Omary, testified that police investigations linked the ransom communications to the 2nd appellant, who led officers to the guest house where the 1st appellant and the child were found. PW7, DCPL Rashid, stated that he arrested the 2nd appellant after local leaders detained him. He reported that phone records implicated the 2nd appellant, leading to the discovery of the child and the arrest of the 1st appellant. PW8, WP DSGT Grace, testified that she recorded the caution statement of the 1st appellant, who admitted to kidnapping the child and detailed taking him to the guest house. Page 3 of 25 PW9, CPL Kei, reported receiving and storing exhibits, including the mobile phones and motorcycle used in the kidnapping. He confirmed that chain-of-custody documentation was maintained. PW10, WP DCPL Happy, stated that she documented the crime scene at the guest house, creating a sketch map that highlighted Room 18, where the child and the 1st appellant were found. PW11, guesthouse attendant Dorcas Lazaro, testified that the 1st appellant checked in with the child under the alias "Juma Jose." She reported witnessing the police intervention and the arrest of the 1st appellant. PW12, guesthouse owner David Charles, corroborated PW11's account, stating that he assisted the police in identifying the room where the 1st appellant and the child were located. PW13, Onesmo Kayombo, stated that he recorded extrajudicial statements from the appellants, in which they confessed to conspiring to kidnap the child and demand ransom. PW14, D/SSGT Orgenes, testified about recording Maliganya's caution statement (DW20, which confirmed his role in the kidnapping plan and detailed communication with the 1st appellant. On defence DW1, Mabula Mathias, testified that on 16 January 2024, he was stopped by police after watching football, arrested, and Page 4 of 25 detained in a cell. He stated that the next day, he was brought to the investigation room, confronted with individuals he did not recognise, and denied knowing the child. DW1 alleged that he was beaten by the police and forced to sign a statement. He clarified that while PW14 recorded statements for Mabula Charles and Maliganya Samwel, he was not the same individual, identifying himself as Mabula Mathias. DW2, Maliganya Samwel, testified that on 15 January 2024, he visited his brother after being called by a neighbour. He claimed that the following morning, the police arrested him without explanation and accused him of kidnapping his brother's child on 17 January 2024. Denying the accusations, DW2 alleged that he was beaten by the police and compelled to comply out of fear. He stated that the allegations stemmed from a family land dispute and denied any involvement in the kidnapping or harm to the child. Following this evidence, the trial court found the prosecution's evidence convincing, leading to the conviction and sentencing of the appellant. Dissatisfied, the appellants appealed against both the conviction and sentence on the following grounds: (1) That the trial magistrate court erred in law and fact to convict the appellants to serve 5 years in jail, while the prosecution side Page 5 of 25 brought poor evidence which wasn't strong enough to convict the appellants for the offences alleged against them. (2) That the trial magistrate court erred in law and fact in convicting the appellants by using hearsay evidence given by the Prosecution. (3) That the trial magistrate court erred in law and fact in convicting the appellants by using only the statements given by witnesses, which were contradictory. (4) That the trial magistrate court erred in law and fact by using explanations of the prosecution's side, which said that the appellants admitted to committing the offences. (5) That the trial magistrate court erred in law and fact by convicting the appellants without considering their defences. At the appeal hearing, the appellants appeared in person without legal representation, while Mr. Njiliku Mabula, a State Attorney, represented the respondent, the Republic. The appellants adopted their grounds of appeal, allowing Mr. Mabula to respond. In his reply to the grounds of appeal, Mr. Mabula opposed the appeal, asserting it lacked merit and should be dismissed. He addressed the second and fifth grounds separately and combined the first, third and fourth grounds due to their similar nature. He further noted that the appeal contained seven grounds but skipped the third, while the seventh merely acknowledged the appellants' presence during the hearing, requiring no response, which this Court agreed with. Page 6 of 25 Regarding the fifth ground, Mr. Mabula argued that the trial court had considered the defence and summarised the evidence appropriately. He emphasised that the appellate court could independently evaluate evidence, citing Director of Public Prosecutions v. Josaphat Joseph Mushi & Another, Criminal Appeal No. 471 of 2019. However, he maintained that the defence evidence did not undermine the prosecution's case. The 1st appellant's alibi and the 2nd appellant's claim of a land dispute were insufficient to challenge the conviction. On the first, third and fifth grounds, Mr. Mabula contended that the prosecution's evidence established the case beyond a reasonable doubt. He recounted PW3's testimony, stating the 1st appellant lured her to Nyasogo, where the 2nd appellant joined. Police later arrested the 1st appellant and found the victim at a guest house. Testimonies from PW4, PW12, and PW6, as well as phone records, corroborated the prosecution's case, which was supported by the 1st appellant using a false name at the hotel. The 2nd appellant's phone was seized, and he led the police to the 1st appellant and the victim, with evidence admitted under section 31 of the Evidence Act. Mr. Mabula asserted that there were no material contradictions in the prosecution's testimonies, and the appellants' confessions were lawfully obtained, further corroborating the evidence. Page 7 of 25 Addressing the second ground, Mr. Mabula acknowledged that PW1 and PW2 did not witness the kidnapping but noted corroboration from other evidence. He highlighted testimony on the victim's age and phone records linking the 1st appellant to a ransom demand of TZS 5,000,000. He noted that the evidence from PW5 and PW6 further supported the case, demonstrating intent to gain unlawfully. In conclusion, Mr. Mabula argued that all grounds of appeal lacked merit and prayed for the dismissal of the appeal. The appellants offered no rejoinder. Having considered the grounds of appeal, the issue for determination is whether the appeal is meritorious. In doing so, I will consider the first, second, third, and fourth grounds together, as well as the fifth ground separately. Starting with the fifth ground of appeal, I concur with the appellants' assertion that their defence was not adequately considered by the trial court. While Mr. Mabula contended in his submissions that the trial magistrate summarised the appellants' defence on page 3 of the judgment, it is imperative to distinguish between a mere summary of the defence evidence and a thorough analysis of its substance and weight. The former is simply a restatement of what was said, while the latter requires an evaluative process that engages with the credibility, Page 8 of 25 consistency, and probative value of the defence in relation to the prosecution's case. It is well established that a trial court has a legal duty to assess and analyse not only the evidence adduced by the prosecution but also that presented by the accused. In the case of Nyakwama s/o Ondare @ Okware vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 507 of 2019) [2021] TZCA 592 (21 October 2021), it was categorically stated that: “……………….we must state that as a matter of law, the trial court is bound to evaluate the evidence of both the prosecution and defence side before it arrives to the conclusion of the case for and against the issues framed for determination." Failure to do so constitutes a violation of the accused's fundamental right to be heard. See the cases of Abel Masikiti vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 24 of 2015) [2015] TZCA 8 (24 August 2015) and Leonard Mwanashoka vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 226 of 2014) [2015] TZCA 294 (24 February 2015). In the latter case, it was stated that: "It is universally established jurisprudence that failure to consider the defence is fatal and usually vitiates the conviction." In the present matter, since the trial court failed to discharge this duty, it falls upon me, as the first appellate court, and as prayed by Mr. Mabula, to assume that responsibility. I must therefore assess the appellants' defence in its entirety, weigh its merits against the Page 9 of 25 prosecution's case, and arrive at independent findings. See the cases of Director of Public Prosecutions v. Josephat Joseph Mushi & Another (supra), Julius Josephat v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 3 of 2017 [2020] TZCA 1729 (18 August 2020) and Nyakwama s/o Ondare @ Okware vs Republic (supra). In the latter case, it was stated that: “Indeed, if this task is not performed by the trial court, the first appellate court has an obligation to consider it and come to the conclusion; more so where failure to consider the appellant's defence is remarkably an issue in a given appeal." In the present case, the 1st appellant contended that he was arrested on the material date while watching television, thereby raising an alibi as his defence. However, upon a thorough examination of the record, it is evident that the appellant did not comply with the mandatory procedural requirement of giving notice of his intention to rely on an alibi. Specifically, he failed to furnish this notice before the commencement of the trial or before the prosecution closed its case, as stipulated under section 194(4) and (5) of the Criminal Procedure Act, [Cap. 20 R.E. 2022]. It is a settled principle of law that an accused person who intends to rely on an alibi must raise it at the earliest possible opportunity. This rule is designed to enable the prosecution to investigate and, if necessary, rebut the claim. Failure to observe this requirement entitles the court to Page 10 of 25 accord no weight to such a defence, unless good cause is shown for the delay, none of which was demonstrated in this case. Moreover, section 194(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act expressly provides that where an accused fails to comply with the requirement to give timely notice of alibi, the court may justifiably disregard such evidence. In the instant case, the 1st appellant raised the alibi for the first time during his defence, without having notified the prosecution prior to the commencement or closure of its case as required under section 194(4) and (5) of the CPA. While it is trite law that the accused bears no legal burden to prove an alibi, he, however, should at least demonstrate the alibi on the balance of probabilities if it is to cast reasonable doubt on the prosecution's version. See the cases of Makala Kiula vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 2 of 1983) [1985] TZCA 45 (21 March 1985), and Kubezya John vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 488 of 2015) [2019] TZCA 472 (12 December 2019). In the former, it was stated that: "If a person charged with a serious offence alleges that at the time when it was committed, he was in some other place where he is well known and yet he makes no effort to prove that fact, which if true, could easily be proved, the court must necessarily attach little weight to his allegations." In Kubezya John's case, it was further stated that: Page 11 of 25 "We wish to interject here that we are alive to the position of the law that an accused person is under no legal duty to prove his innocence. But in situations where, like here, the accused person is depending on the defence of alibi, it is his duty to demonstrate his alibi, albeit on a balance of probabilities." The 1st appellant in the present case did not call any witnesses to corroborate his claim, such as the individual with whom he allegedly watched television. This failure further diminishes the evidentiary weight of the defence. In view of the procedural non-compliance and the absence of supporting testimony, this Court finds the alibi defence factually unconvincing. Accordingly, it is rejected and accorded no weight pursuant to section 194(6) of the CPA. Notwithstanding the procedural shortcomings of the appellant's alibi defence, and arguendo, even if the alibi were to be entertained, the prosecution adduced compelling and corroborated evidence that substantially undermines the appellant's version of events. In particular, PW3 gave direct and consistent testimony that the 1st appellant lured him from his home under the false pretense of taking him to see his mother in Masumbwe. This deception marks the inception of the offence and reveals the calculated nature of the appellant's conduct. Crucially, PW3's testimony was corroborated by PW4, who interacted with PW3 shortly Page 12 of 25 before his disappearance and confirmed that PW3 was in the company of the 1st appellant. Furthermore, PW3 affirmed that he was physically present at the Kigomanoma Guest House with the 1st appellant on the date of the latter's arrest. This factual assertion is consistent with the testimony of other prosecution witnesses, including PW7, PW11, and PW12. PW7, a police officer, testified that he arrested the 1st on 16 January 2024 at Kigomanoma Guest House, where he was found with the victim. This testimony was corroborated by PW11, the guesthouse attendant, and PW12, the guesthouse owner, both of whom witnessed the appellant's arrest between 08:00 and 09:00 P.M. inside Room No. 18. Additionally, the timing of events contradicts his assertion, by 10:00 P.M., he contends he was watching TV, but he was already in police custody. The absence of any substantive challenge to the testimony of key prosecution witnesses, coupled with inconsistencies in his own defense, renders his claim not only implausible but also devoid of merit. In the cases of Paul Yustus Nchia vs National Executive Secretary Chama cha Mapinduzi and Another (Civil Appeal No. 85 of 2005) [2006] TZCA 266 (12 October 2006), and Nyerere Nyague vs Republic (Criminal Appeal Case No. 67 of 2010) [2012] TZCA 103 (21 May 2012), the Court of Appeal emphasised that where a person fails to cross- Page 13 of 25 examine a witness on a point, it can be taken as an admission of the truth of that evidence. Applying this principle, the 1st appellant's failure to challenge the prosecution's crucial testimonies further solidifies the case against him. Accordingly, the totality of the evidence overwhelmingly supports the prosecution's case, and the defense of the 1st appellant remains unpersuasive. The 2nd appellant, on the other hand, contended that the case against him was fabricated due to a land dispute with PW2, the victim's father. However, this claim lacks evidentiary support and remains unsubstantiated by the record. Fabrication of charges is a serious allegation that requires compelling proof, yet the 2nd appellant has failed to provide any credible evidence to support this assertion. Notably, PW3 testified that after being taken from home by the 1st appellant, they were later joined by the 2nd appellant on a motorcycle along the tar-marked road before proceeding together to Kigomanoma Guest House. Upon arrival, PW3 was left at the guest house with the 1st appellant, while the 2nd appellant departed. Furthermore, considering that he sent PW7 to where the first accused was with the victim, it defeats his claim that there was any land dispute between him and his brother, PW2, the father of the victim. This sequence of events directly implicates the Page 14 of 25 2nd appellant in the commission of the offence and contradicts his claim of fabrication. Also, during the cross-examination of PW2, the 2nd appellant never raised the alleged land dispute as a motive for the purported fabrication. The omission of this defence at the earliest opportunity raises doubts about its credibility, as it suggests that the claim is merely an afterthought designed to create reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case. Additionally, during his defence, the 2nd appellant stated that the alleged land dispute was widely known among his relatives, yet he failed to summon any witnesses to corroborate this claim. His failure to produce supporting testimony further weakens his defence. Consequently, the 2nd appellant's defence is rejected. The first, second, third, and fourth grounds of appeal, that the appellants were convicted based on weak evidence from the prosecution, which included hearsay, contradictory statements, and repudiated confessions. On confessions, it is on record that PW8 and PW14 established that they recorded the caution statements of the 1st and 2nd appellants (Exhibits PEX 2 and PEX 8, respectively), in which the appellants confessed to having committed the alleged offence. However, both appellants repudiated the said confessions. Page 15 of 25 After considering and critically analysing the said statements, I found that the admissibility of these statements is questionable. The statement by the 1st appellant was recorded under section 57, while that of the 2nd appellant was recorded under section 58. Under these sections, specifically sections 57(3) and (4) and 58(1), (2), (3), (4) and (6) the recording officer is required to indicate in the authentication part that the statement was shown to the accused, and he was asked to read, make alteration or correction or add anything to it amended. Furthermore, the said recording officer must indicate what is in accordance with the respective sections. In essence, these sections, i.e., sections 57 and 58 of the CPA, are designed to protect the rights of an accused person during police interrogation. They serve as procedural safeguards to ensure that any confession obtained is voluntary and free from coercion. Failure to comply with these provisions, as established in the cases of Chamuriho Kirenge @Chamuriho Julius vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 597 of 2017) [2022] TZCA 98 (7 March 2022) which cited the cases of Musa Mustapha Kusa and Another v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 51 of 2010; and Bulabo Kabelele and Mashaka Felician v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 224 of 2011 [both unreported], renders the statement inadmissible. Page 16 of 25 In the present case, the authentication section of the 1st appellant's caution statement reads as follows: “Mimi MABULA s/o MATHIAS nathibitisha kuwa hayo ndiyo maelezo yangu ambayo nimeyasoma/nimesomewa na kuona ni sahihi” “Mimi XYZ nathibitisha kuwa maelezo haya ya onyo ya Mabula s/o Mathias nimeyaandika kwa usahihi na uaminifu chini ya kifungu cha 57 cha sheria ya Mwenendo wa Makosa ya Jinai [Cap 20. R.E 2022] Similarly, the authentication of the 2nd appellant's caution statement states: “UTHIBITISHO WA MTUHUMIWA: Mimi Maringanya Samwel kwa mujibu wa kifungu cha 58(6)(b) cha sheria ya Mwenendo wa Makosa ya Jinai Sura ya 20...................................................nathibitisha kwamba nimesoma/nimesomewa maelezo yangu na afisa aliyeandika na natamka kwamba maelezo haya yameandikwa kwa usahihi kama nilivyotoa bila kuongezwa wala kupunguzwa neno lolote” “UTHIBITISHO WA AFISA ALIYEANDIKA MAELEZO: Mimi ABC kwa mujibu wa kifungu cha 58 cha sheria ya Mwenendo wa Makosa ya Jinai Sura ya 20................................................nathibitisha kwamba kwa uaminifu na usahihi nimeandika maelezo ya Maringanya S/o Samwel na nimempa asome/nimemsomea ili aweze kufanya masahihisho kwa kuongeza au kupunguza neno lolote kama apendavyo” A careful examination of these authentication statements reveals significant procedural defects that render them legally deficient. Under Sections 57 and 58 of the Criminal Procedure Act [Cap. 20 R.E. 2022], strict procedural safeguards govern the recording of caution statements Page 17 of 25 to ensure that they are obtained voluntarily and accurately reflect the accused person's account. These provisions aim to safeguard the constitutional right to a fair trial and protect against self-incrimination. With regard to the 1st appellant's statement, the authentication does not indicate whether the statement was read to him or whether he personally read it, as required under Section 57(3) or (4) of the CPA. This omission contravenes the requirement that an accused must explicitly confirm that he has read or been read his statement before authenticating it. Further, it did not indicate whether the appellant was given an opportunity to make corrections, alterations, or additions before signing. It is mandatory that the recording officer must record whether the accused wishes to modify or amend any part of the statement. Lastly, there is no indication in the statement whether the appellant was capable of reading and writing or whether special arrangements were made to ensure he understood the contents of the statement before signing. See the case of Republic vs Fikiri Kapala & Another (Criminal Session Case No. 27802 of 2024) [2024] TZHC 10171 (13 December 2024). Regarding the statement of the 2nd appellant, although he acknowledges that he read or was read his statement, there is no indication that the recording officer documented his response or ensured that he fully understood the contents. Additionally, the authentication Page 18 of 25 does not include a provision allowing the accused to correct, amend, or add to the statement, a critical requirement under the CPA. Additionally, the recording officer failed to record the appellant's response regarding his authentication. Further scrutiny of the appellants' extrajudicial statements (Exhibits PE7 and PE8) reveals that they were recorded in violation of the Chief Justice's Guide for Justice of the Peace on Recording Extrajudicial Statements. This Guide, which is incorporated under Section 62(2) of the Magistrates' Courts Act, establishes mandatory procedural standards that must be followed when recording confessions. In the case of Chamuriho Kirenge @ Chamuriho Julius vs Republic (supra), it was stated that: "There is no gainsaying that the requirements as stipulated in the Guide, being part of our law imported by section 62(2) of the Magistrate Court's Act Cap 11 R.E. 2019, have to be followed by the Justice of Peace when recording the accused's statement. The importance of the instructions or guidelines contained in the Guide was restated in Peter Charles Makupila @ Askofu, Criminal Appeal No. 21 of 2019, quoting the case of Japhet Thadei Msigwa v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 367 of 2008, wherein the Court stated: "So, when Justices of the Peace are recording confessions of persons in custody of the police, they must follow the Chief Justice's Instructions to the letter. The section is couched in mandatory terms." It was further stated in the case above that: Page 19 of 25 "We think the need to observe the Chief Justice's instructions is two-fold. One, if the suspect decided to give such a statement, he should be aware of the implications involved. Two, it will enable the trial court to know the surrounding circumstances under which the statement was made, taken, and decide whether or not it was given voluntarily." In the said statements of the present appeal, the recording officer who recorded both statements, failed to properly document the appellant's responses to questions asked in paragraphs 7(b) and 8 of the Guide, which require the officer to inquire where the accused was taken after the arrest, where the accused was detained before being brought before him and whether any threats, promises, or inducements were made to obtain the confession. In response to these critical questions, the only recorded answer was "Kituo cha polisi" (Police Station), which is vague and does not satisfy the requirement of specificity. Concerning the question of coercion, the response was merely "sijalazimishwa” (I was not forced), which lacks substantive detail. Finally, the appellant's affirmation of their willingness to give a statement was simply "nipo tayari" (I am ready), which fails to demonstrate a full appreciation of the legal implications of making a confession. The omission of clear responses makes it difficult to ascertain whether the accused fully understood their rights, and the recording officer's failure to Page 20 of 25 ensure that the accused comprehended the legal significance of their statement further undermines the integrity of the confessions. Given these procedural irregularities, the caution statements and extrajudicial statements fail to meet the admissibility threshold under Sections 57 and 58 of the CPA and the Chief Justice's Guide for Justice of the Peace on Recording the Extrajudicial Statements. In light of the foregoing, I find that the caution and extrajudicial statements of both appellants were improperly recorded and do not meet the legal threshold for admissibility. Consequently, I hereby expunge them from the record and proceed to consider other available evidence. Secondly, the appellants in this appeal argue that their conviction was based on weak evidence and that it relied on hearsay. At this point, I wish to state that the evidence of the victim (PW3) was clear, coherent, and consistent. He testified that he was taken from his home by DW1, who deceived him by claiming that he was taking him to his mother. Instead, he was taken to the Kigomanoma Guest House, where he was eventually found. Additionally, PW3 stated that DW2 joined them en route to the guest house, a fact corroborated by PW4, who saw DW1 at their home and even gave him drinking water before he left with the victim. The presence of DW1 at the guest house was further confirmed by PW11 and PW12, who stated that DW1 had rented Room No. 18. The fact that Page 21 of 25 DW2 led the police (PW6) to the guest house, where both DW1 and the victim were found, further reinforces the prosecution's case. Moreover, DW2 was arrested after suspicious mobile phone transactions, insisting that the payment be made so that the child could be returned. Such conduct is inconsistent with innocence and corroborates the prosecution's case. Therefore, despite the fact that PW1 and PW2 were not at home when PW3 was kidnapped, their evidence is corroborated by other pieces of evidence. Furthermore, the victim's evidence, which was not shaken during his testimony, was not only direct but also corroborated by other witnesses. The appellants contend that the prosecution's testimony, particularly that of PW1, PW6, PW7, and PW11, contained contradictions regarding who concealed the victim at Kigomanoma Guest House and the exact date of the events in question. However, upon reviewing the evidence on record, no material contradictions arise that would significantly undermine the prosecution's case. PW1 was not present at Kigomanoma Guest House when the victim was recovered but testified that her child was kidnapped on 15 January 2024. She further stated that the 2nd appellant was suspected due to his unsettled behaviour and other circumstantial evidence linking him to the crime. PW6 confirmed that the report of the victim's kidnapping was Page 22 of 25 received on 15 January 2024. PW7 testified that on 16 January 2024, the 2nd appellant led the police to Kigomanoma Guest House, where the 1st appellant was found with the victim. His arrest followed suspicion raised by PW5 regarding his conduct and phone communications. PW11, the guest house attendant, corroborated this testimony, stating that the 1st appellant had rented room No. 18 under the fictitious name "Juma Joseph," as evidenced in the hotel register (Exhibit PEX 6). She further confirmed that the 1st appellant was apprehended between 8:00 and 9:00 P.M. while inside the room with the victim, something which was supported by the testimony of PW12. From this evidence, the sequence of events is consistent: the victim was abducted on 15 January 2024, and the appellants were arrested the following day, 16 January 2024, after the 2nd appellant led police officers to the location where the 1st appellant was hiding with the victim. The appellants have failed to establish any material contradictions in the prosecution's case. Minor inconsistencies, if any, do not go to the root of the matter or discredit the reliability of the witnesses. It is well established in case law that contradictions must be material and capable of affecting the credibility of the evidence as a whole to warrant an acquittal. See the case of Dickson Elia Nsamba Shapwata and Another vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 92 of 2007) [2008] TZCA 17 (30 May 2008), where Page 23 of 25 the Court of Appeal held that minor inconsistencies that do not affect the substance of the prosecution's case should not be given undue weight. Discrepancies, therefore, must be significant enough to create doubt as to the accused's guilt. In view of the above, the alleged contradictions in the prosecution's testimony are inconsequential, and the evidence remains coherent, credible, and sufficient to establish the appellants' culpability. The standard set out in Goodluck Kyando v. Republic [2006] TLR 363, that every witness is entitled to credence unless there are cogent reasons to disbelieve them, also applies in this case. Therefore, in light of the foregoing, the appellants' assertion that they were convicted solely on the basis of their confessions is unfounded. Even after excluding the confessions, the remaining evidence, particularly the direct, corroborated, and unchallenged testimonies of PW3, PW4, PW5, PW6, PW7, PW11, and PW12, strongly establishes that the appellants were involved in the crime. Additionally, their claim of contradictions in the prosecution's case, as stated, lacks substantive evidence to support it. Accordingly, the first, second, third and fourth grounds of appeal are found to be without merit and are dismissed accordingly. From the foregoing discussion, and after a thorough evaluation of the trial court's record, I have no hesitation in concluding that the Page 24 of 25 prosecution indeed proved the case beyond a reasonable doubt against the appellants. Consequently, I dismiss this appeal in its entirety for lack of merit. It is so ordered. Right to appeal explained. DATED at GEITA this 04th day of April 2025. G.V. MWAKAPEJE JUDGE Page 25 of 25