KATEMI JUDGMENT

IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA (MWANZA SUB-REGISTRY) AT MWANZA CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 8369 OF 2024 (Originating from Criminal Case No. 75 of 2023 in the Kwimba District Court at Ngudu) YUSUPH MABULA @ KATEMI……………………………………………APPELLANT VERSUS THE REPUBLIC……………………………………………………………RESPONDENT JUDGMENT 7th & 21st October, 2024 KAMANA, J. Mr. Yusuph Mabula @ Katemi, the appellant was arraigned before the Kwimba District Court at Ngudu charged with armed robbery contrary to section 287A of the Penal Code, Cap. 16 [RE.2022]. Facts had it that on 21st August, 2023 at Kakora Street within Kwimba District in Mwanza, the appellant stole from Ms. Rosemary Damas various properties valued at Tshs.511,000/-. It was alleged that immediately after the stealing, the appellant used a saw to injure Ms. Damas. The stolen properties were alleged to be a handbag valued at Tshs.7,000/-; a mobile phone make TECNO with IMEI No. 356370119975990 and 35637011996006 valued at Tshs.30,000/-; a mobile phone make ITEL with IMEI No. 354532947381012 and 1 354532947381123 valued at Tshs.25,000/-; a mobile phone make VILLAON with IMEI No.355564736197282 and 355564736197290 valued at Tshs.25,000/-, a Smart Phone make TECNO POP 5 with IMEI No. 353625346274925 and 353625346274980 valued at Tshs. 200,000/-; two pieces of mobile charger valued ta Tshs.24,000/-; and cash money Tshs.200,000/-. The appellant flatly denied the charges. Such denial led the prosecution to field six witnesses and various exhibits. The first prosecution’s witness was F.758 Sgt. Mugaya (PW1). He testified that on 21st August, 2023 around 2100 Hrs while at his office at Ngudu Police Station was informed by the Officer Commanding-CID (OC- CID) that there was an incident of armed robbery at Kakora Street. He testified that he was assigned to investigate the alleged crime. When he arrived at the scene of the crime, he found Ms. Damas with injuries on her leg. According to PW1, Ms. Damas told him that while strolling to her home after closing his business, he was invaded by a person who emerged from the shop. The said person stole her property, including mobile phones and cut her leg using a saw before vanishing in thin air. 2 PWI testified that he seized the said saw. The witness tendered the certificate of seizure and the saw which were admitted respectively as Exh.PE1 and PE2 without objection. PW1 recounted that on 5th September, 2023 around 1320 Hrs, he received information that the appellant had been arrested at Kakora Street by wananchi. He and his colleagues went there and found the appellant with iron sheets and an iron door. The appellant was re- arrested and taken to the police station where they arrived at 1400 Hrs. According to PW1, on 7th September, 2023 the appellant led them to Mr. Mussa Sita whom he pawned a mobile phone make VILLAON for Tshs.3,000/-. The IMEI Number of the said phone was 355564736197282 and 355564736197290. The mobile phone was seized. PW1 stated that the appellant led them to another place where he kept a mobile phone make Techno with IMEI Numbers 356370119975990 and 35637011996006. The same was seized. The witness tendered without objections the certificates of seizure relating to mobile phones make VILLAON and TENO which were admitted as Exhibits PE3 and PE4 respectively. He further tendered mobile phones make VILLAON and TECNO which were admitted as Exhibits PE5 and PE 6 respectively, without objections. 3 According to the witness, Ms. Damas was able to identify the seized mobile phones as hers and managed to access them. He further testified that Ms. Damas read the IMEI Numbers to them and they were confirmed to be the same as those depicted in the mobile phones. Mr. Mussa Sita (PW2) narrated how the appellant on 24th August, 2024 around 1800 Hrs pawned a mobile phone make VILLAON to him for Tshs.3,000/-. He testified about how the appellant went with police officers and the local leader, Martine. He stated that the mobile phone was seized by the police officer, who told him that it had been stolen. The witness recognized the mobile phone before the trial court. Mr. Daniel Kephas David (PW3) testified how he responded to the alarm raised by Ms. Damas. He stated that he found Ms. Damas injured and she told her that she was ambushed by a bandit who stole four mobile phones, a handbag and Tshs.200,000/-. He added that police officers led by Afande Mugaya came to the scene of the crime and seized the saw. Ms. Damas (PW4) narrated how she was assailed by the appellant who took from her the said properties mentioned in the charge sheet. She testified how she was cut with a saw by the appellant after she was robbed of her properties. The witness stated how she was summoned by 4 the police to identify her stolen properties. She testified to having identified mobile phones make VILLAON with IMEI Numbers 355564736197282 and 355564736197290; Itel with IMEI Numbers 355564736197282 and 355564736197290 and TECNO with IMEI No. 356370119975990 and 35637011996006. She amplified that she managed to identify the phones as she kept IMEI Numbers from boxes in which mobile phones were packed. Dr. Mark James (PW5) testified how he received Mrs. Damas on 21st August, 2023 around 2130 Hrs at Ngudu Hospital with injuries on her right leg caused by a sharp object. He tendered PF3 which was admitted as Exh.PE7. Mr. Martine Sylivester Nyasanja (PW6), the Chairman of Kakora Street, testified that on 7th September, 2023 he was summoned by a police officer Christopher to the Police Station where he found the appellant. The appellant led him and the police officers to Iramba Street to a person known as Mussa. According to the witness, the appellant told them that he had pawned a mobile phone to him for Tshs.3,000/-. Thereat, the said mobile phone was seized. The witness recognized the certificate of seizure which he signed and the seized mobile phone. 5 The witness testified further that the appellant led them to his house where they found a mobile phone make TECNO. The phone was seized. The witness recognized the phone and the certificate of seizure he signed. Cpl. Christopher (PW7) testified on how he recorded the cautioned statement of the appellant on 5th September, 2023. According to him, the appellant confessed to having committed the offence and told him that he had two mobile phones. He averred that the accused led police officers to where the two mobile phones were and the same were seized. He tendered, without objection, the cautioned statement of the appellant which was admitted as Exh.8. Based on the evidence adduced, the trial court found the appellant with the case to answer. In his evidence in chief, the appellant categorically denied having a hand in the commission of the alleged offence. He evidenced that he was forced to confess the offence which he did not commit. He asserted that Ms. Damas did not recognize him as a person who robbed her. When cross-examined, the appellant testified that he signed the certificates of seizure. He stated that he pawned a phone to PW2 for Tshs.3,000/-. The appellant further testified to having led the police to 6 PW2 and to his place where phones were seized. He admitted that the seized phones were not his property but Ms. Damas’ property. After weighing the evidence adduced by the prosecution’s witnesses and the appellant, the trial court convicted the latter and sentenced him to imprisonment for a term of thirty years. The conviction was premised on the doctrine of recent possession since the appellant was found with the stolen property. The conviction and sentence did not amuse the appellant who preferred this appeal which is premised on five initial grounds of appeal as follows: 1. That the trial court erred in law by convicting him while the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt so far as the doctrine of recent possession is concerned and non- disclosure of the particulars of seized phones in terms of colour. 2. That the trial court erred in law by contravening section 210(1) (a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Cap. 20 [RE.2022] (CPA) as the trial Magistrate did not sign after taking the evidence of PW1 and PW2. 3. That the certificate of seizure (Exh.PE1) was wrongly admitted without being loudly read over to the Appellant. 7 4. That the trial court wrongly acted on an equivocal defence to convict and sentence the appellant. 5. That the trial court erred in amending the appellant’s name on the front page of the typed judgment. On 7th September, 2024 when the matter was set for a hearing, the appellant informed this Court that he had filed additional grounds of appeal as follows: 1. That the kind of lights and intensity was not proved to the required standard. 2. That the prosecution’s evidence did not state the appellant’s appearance at the time of the alleged offence hence there is a possibility of mistaken identification. 3. That the prosecution’s witnesses failed to prove ownership of the alleged stolen properties by tendering receipts. 4. That the doctrine of recent possession was not proved. 5. That the trial court erred in law by admitting a cautioned statement that contravened section 50(1) of the CPA. 6. That the trial court erred in law and fact to convict and sentence him without giving him the right to mitigate. 8 7. That the case against him was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. At the hearing, the appellant appeared in person. The respondent was represented by Mr. Benedicto Ruguge, learned State Attorney. Being a layperson, the appellant had nothing to argue other than beseeching this Court to consider his grounds of appeal and set him free. Mr. Ruguge responded by supporting the conviction and sentence meted out against the appellant. On the first ground of appeal and on the fourth and seventh additional grounds of appeal, Mr. Ruguge dismissed them as devoid of merits. He argued that in proving the offence of armed robbery under section 287A of the Penal Code, Cap. 16, the prosecution is under the obligation to prove that the accused was armed; the accused threatened the victim; and that there was stealing. He amplified that there was evidence that the appellant was armed with a saw which was admitted as Exh.PE2 without objection. Further, he asserted that the victim (PW4) testified that the appellant carried a saw in his hands. He cemented his argument that by contending that PW7 tendered a cautioned statement of the appellant 9 which was admitted without objection. In the said cautioned statement, according to the learned State Attorney, the appellant admitted to having committed the offence. Assailing the three grounds of appeal, Mr. Ruguge contended that there was sufficient evidence from PW4 that she was threatened by the appellant who pushed her into the side ditch. He added that stealing was proved through the evidence of PW4 and certificates of seizure Exh. PE3 and PE4) and seized phones (Exh.PE5 and PE) which were admitted without objection as stolen properties. Concerning the doctrine of recent possession, Mr. Ruguge argued the same was proved. Amplifying, the learned State Attorney contended that the appellant confessed to possessing a mobile phone and to having pawned another mobile phone. He added that due to his confession, one of the seized phones was found in his possession. As regards the second ground which is about contravention of section 210(1)(a) of the CPA, Mr. Ruguge considered it as baseless. He contended that according to the records, after recording the evidence of PW1 and PW2, the presiding Magistrate appended his signature. On the third ground in the original petition, Mr. Ruguge contended that Exh.PE1 was read to the appellant as reflected on page 9 of the 10 proceedings. That being the case, he urged this Court to dismiss the ground. On the fourth ground, Mr. Ruguge submitted that the appellant was afforded an opportunity to defend himself and did so under oath. He added further that according to the impugned judgment, the appellant’s defence was evaluated before convicting him. The learned State Attorney asked this Court to consider the ground as baseless. On the fifth ground in the original petition, Mr. Ruguge conceded to the fact that the appellant’s name was mistakenly written as he was referred to as Yusuph Mbula Katemi instead of Yusuph Mabula Katemi. However, he asserted that in all records, the appellant has been referred to as Yusuph Mabula Katemi. Hence, he held the view that the error in the typed judgment was a typing error that did not occasion any injustice as the appellant knew that the judgment was about him. He further prayed that the typing error be cured under section 388 of the CPA. On the additional first and second grounds of appeal, Mr. Ruguge contended that as per the records, PW4 stated that the incident took place on 21st August, 2023 around 0800 AM. Given that, he held the 11 view that the incident took place when there was enough light which enabled her to identify the appellant. The learned State Attorney argued that since the appellant confessed himself to committing the offence against PW4, the issue of identification becomes redundant. He relied on the case of Mohamed Haruna Mtopeni v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 259 of 2007-CAT (Unreported) to assert that the very best witness in any criminal trial is an accused who freely confesses his guilt. On the additional third ground, Mr. Ruguge argued that the mobile phones that were stolen from the victim by the appellant which were seized from the appellant and PW2 were the same as per the evidence adduced. Further, he argued that as per the records, the appellant, during cross-examination, stated the seized properties were not his but of the victim and that the latter recognized the stolen properties. On the additional fifth ground, he submitted that the cautioned statement when recorded did not contravene section 50 of the CPA. He explained that according to PW1, the appellant was rearrested on 5th September, 2023 at 1345 Hrs. He added that according to PW7, his cautioned statement was recorded on the same day at 1500 Hrs. In that case, he held the view that section 50 was complied with. 12 Regarding the additional sixth ground, Mr. Ruguge contended that the appellant mitigated his case after being convicted. Based on those arguments, the learned State Attorney urged this Court to dismiss the appeal. In determining the appeal, I think it relevant to start with the second ground concerning the alleged contravention of section 210(1)(a) of the CPA. The section reads: ‘210.- (1) In trials, other than trials under section 213, by or before a magistrate, the evidence of the witnesses shall be recorded in the following manner— (a) the evidence of each witness shall be taken down in writing in the language of the court by the magistrate or in his presence and hearing and under his personal direction and superintendence and shall be signed by him and shall form part of the record;’ From that section, the presiding magistrate must append his signature after recording the evidence of every witness. Short of that, the recorded evidence forms no part of the record. In this appeal, the appellant contended that the presiding magistrate did not sign after recording the evidence of PW1 and PW2. 13 That was opposed by Mr. Ruguge. I have gone through the records and it is my finding that the ground is devoid of merits. The presiding magistrate appended his signature after recording PW1’s and PW2’s evidence. Turning to the third ground that Exh.PE1 was not read loudly to the appellant, without much ado, I hasten to state that the ground is baseless as the records show clearly that the same was read out loudly. Coming to the fourth ground, the appellant contended that the trial court erred in relying on his unequivocal evidence to convict him. On his part, Mr. Ruguge held the view that the appellant’s evidence was not unequivocal. He added that the appellant testified under oath. In this, I am of the considered view that the appellant was afforded an opportunity to present his case under oath. Further, it is my view that despite denying committing the offence, the appellant, during cross-examination, confessed to leading police officers to the places where the mobile phones were seized. Apart from that, the appellant testified to have signed the certificate of seizure (Exh.PE4) concerning the phone found in his possession. That being the case, it is my holding that the ground is baseless. 14 Concerning the fifth ground of appeal, I hasten to state that the mistake in terms of the appellant’s name did not cause any injustice to him. As rightly put by Mr. Ruguge, all records reflect his name, and what is reflected in the typed judgment is a typing error. The ground is devoid of merits. On the additional first and second grounds, the appellant believed there was no evidence concerning proper identification as the alleged incident occurred at night. Mr. Ruguge vehemently opposed this, and contended that the incident took place in the morning hours, hence PW4 recognized the appellant as the armed robber. In this, I hasten to state that the incident occurred at night hours and not in the morning hours as contended by Mr. Ruguge. It is true that from the evidence adduced by PW1, the time recorded by the trial Magistrate suggests that the incident occurred in the morning hours. In my view that was a slip of the pen. According to PW3, he heard screams in the night hours. The witness stated further that after the arrival of the police officers, PW4 was taken to hospital. Dr. James testified that he received PW4 at Ngudu Hospital at 2130 Hrs. With this evidence, I am convinced that the incident occurred in the night hours. 15 I have gone through PW4’s evidence and I am satisfied that despite testifying that the assailant did not cover his face, she did not mention the appellant’s name, description or the clothes he wore when the alleged armed robbery took place. Further, PW4 did not mention the appellant’s name, description or the clothes he wore to any soul including PW3 who was amongst the first persons to respond to the alarm she raised. Likewise, in her evidence, she did not state the intensity of the lights that enabled her to recognize the appellant. In this, it is my considered view that the ground is founded on the hypothetical case. This is because the appellant was not convicted based on identification. In essence, the appellant was convicted on the doctrine of recent possession. Had the conviction of the appellant based on identification, indeed the ground of appeal would have merits. Otherwise, the ground is devoid of merits. Coming to the additional third ground, the appellant contended that PW4 did not prove ownership of the seized mobile phones as she did not tender receipts. On his part, Mr. Ruguge contended that the phones in question were seized from the appellant’s house and from PW2 who testified that the said phone was pawned to him by the appellant. He asserted further that the appellant, during cross- 16 examination, confessed to having had the phones which were not his property. The established principle is that when there is an offence involving stealing, the prosecution must prove that the alleged stolen property is legally owned or possessed by the person complaining. From PW4’s evidence, she testified that on the material date, she had the phones that were alleged to have been stolen by the appellant. When cross- examined, she testified that the phones are hers and she does not have receipts. She testified that she recognized the phones after comparing the IMEI numbers that were in the phones with the IMEI Numbers that were in the boxes in which the phones were packed. This was also supported by PW1. In this regard, I wish to state that PW4 did not adduce any documentary proof that she owned the phones in question as contended by the appellant. However, considering other facts as evidenced by the prosecution’s witnesses and the appellant himself, I entertain no doubt that the stolen phones belonged to Ms. Damas. This is due to the following reasons. One, as alluded to, PW4 managed to recognize the stolen phones after comparing the IMEI Numbers she had and the IMEI Numbers that 17 were in the seized phones. Further, according to PW1, Ms. Damas managed to access the phones. The appellant did not cross-examine this evidence. Principally, when the party fails to cross-examine the witness on any matter testified by such witness, that connotes that what was testified by the witness is the truth. In such a situation, the party is estopped from asking the court to disbelieve the witness on the aspect in question. See: Nyerere Nyague v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 2010-CAT (Unreported). Two, in his cautioned statement which was admitted without objection, the appellant admitted to committing the offence against Ms. Damas, including stealing the said phones from her. Further, he was the one who led the police to where he kept the said phones which were seized by the police. From this evidence, indeed the appellant confessed to having committed the offence against Ms. Damas. Given that, the requirement to prove ownership or possession of the phones is diluted by the appellant’s evidence. In the case of Mohamed Haruna Mtupeni and Another v. Republic (Supra), the Court of Appeal held that an accused who freely confessed his guilt is the best witness. Fortified by that, since I am convinced that the cautioned statement was made voluntarily and it led to the discovery of where 18 the stolen phones were, the appellant was the best witness. The ground fails. Coming to the additional fifth ground, the appellant wanted this Court to believe that his cautioned statement was recorded beyond the period of four hours since he was restrained contrary to section 50(1) of the CPA. Mr. Ruguge had the opposite view. According to section 50(1), the period set for interrogating an accused is within four hours from the time of restraint, unless such period is extended under section 51 of the CPA. The section reads: ’50.- (1) For the purpose of this Act, the period available for interviewing a person who is in restraint in respect of an offence is— (a) subject to paragraph (b), the basic period available for interviewing the person, that is to say, the period of four hours commencing at the time when he was taken under restraint in respect of the offence; (b) if the basic period available for interviewing the person is extended under section 51, the basic period as so extended.’ 19 In my view, the ground is hopelessly devoid of any merits. According to PW1 who arrested the appellant, the re-arrest of the appellant by police officers was made at 1340 Hrs. The witness stated that the appellant was brought to the police station at 1400 Hrs. This fact was not cross-examined by the appellant. Further, PW7 testified that he recorded the appellant’s cautioned statement from 1505 Hrs to 1702 Hrs. This was also reflected in the cautioned statement (Exh.PE8). This was also not cross-examined by the appellant. From such evidence, it is obvious that the appellant was interrogated within four hours from when he was brought to the police station, hence no contravention of section 50(1) of the CPA. On the additional sixth ground, without much ado, the appellant was allowed to mitigate before sentencing. According to the records, the appellant prayed for leniency as he was suffering from chest problems and had a family that depended on him. Further, in sentencing, the Court considered his mitigating factors. The ground fails. I now turn to determine the first ground and additional fourth and seventh ground. Essentially on these grounds, the appellant contended that the case against him was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Ruguge held an opposite view. 20 As I hinted above, in convicting the accused, the trial court relied on the doctrine of recent possession. Under this doctrine, where a person is found in possession of a property recently stolen or unlawfully obtained, there is a rebuttable presumption that the person stole the property. In our jurisdiction, settled law as to the doctrine of recent possession was restated in the case of Emmanuel Mgembe and 2 Others v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 262,263 and 264 of 2012-CAT (Unreported) in which the Court of Appeal held: ‘In Joseph Mkumbwa and Another (supra) the Court of Appeal set the following elements for the doctrine of recent possession. ‘First, that the property is positively the property of the complainant. Second, that the property was found with the suspect. Third, that the property was recently stolen from the complainant. Fourth, that the stolen thing in possession of the accused constitutes the subject of a charge against the accused. It must be the one that was stolen /obtained during the commission of the offence charged.’ 21 As to whether the phones (Exh.PE5 and PE6) were the property of PW4, as I held when determining the additional third ground of appeal, the said phones were proved to be the property of PW4. The reason are the facts that PW4 managed to identify the alleged stolen phones through IMEI Numbers she had and those found in the phones. The evidence was supported by PW1 and not cross-examined by the appellant. Further, according to PW1, Ms. Damas managed to access the phone. The fact was not cross-examined by the Appellant. Additionally, the appellant confessed to having attacked and robbed PW4 of the phones, among other property. Based on that, I am satisfied that the stolen phones were the property of PW4. On whether the property was found with the suspect, I wish to comment on the appellant’s cautioned statement. In his cautioned statement the appellant, apart from confessing to having stolen phones from PW4, informed the police whereabouts of one of the mobile phones. He stated that after three days from the date when he committed the offence, he pawned one of the phones to a person for Tshs.3,000/-. The said cautioned statement was not objected to. Further, despite claiming during his evidence that he was forced to make the statement, 22 the appellant did not explain how he was forced to make the statement. In my view, the allegation that he was forced to make the statement is a mere afterthought. As shown earlier, PW2 testified to having received a phone from the appellant after the latter pawned it to him for Tshs.3,000/-. According to PW2, the transaction was made on 24th August, 2024, being three days after the incident as stated by the appellant. According to PW1 and PW7, the appellant took them to PW2 where they seized one of the mobile phones through the certificate of seizure (Exh.PE3). The seizure was witnessed by PW6, the Chairman of Kakora Street who accompanied PW1 and PW7 to PW2’s place led by the appellant. Further, according to PW1, it was the appellant who led them to their home where another mobile phone was seized through the certificate of seizure (Exh.PE4). The certificate was not objected to during its admission. Further, the appellant did not cross-examine the exhibit. Likewise, in his defence, he admitted to having signed the certificate when the phone was seized from his place. With such evidence, I am inclined to conclude that the stolen properties were found in the appellant’s possession. There is no way 23 police officers could know that one of the phones was pawned by the appellant to PW2 who did not deny having received the phone from the appellant. That knowledge was facilitated by the appellant himself through his cautioned statement. Further, from the evidence, it is not in dispute that there was a stolen phone that was found in his possession. Whether the appellant was found with a recently stolen property of PW4 is a question of fact and the circumstances of each case. There is no precise time that is considered conventionally to constitute a recently stolen. Factors such as the length of time that passed between the possession and the actual offence, the distinctiveness of the property and the readiness with which the property can or is likely to pass to another person are to be considered. From the evidence, the offence was committed on 21st August, 2023. The stolen phones were found on 7th September, 2023. That is about 18 days. Mobile phones are common properties used by persons from all walks of life. That being the case, it is the fast-moving product that exchanges hands fast. It can be argued that within 18 days, a mobile phone can pass through various hands in terms of purchasers. However, in the circumstances of this case, I hold that the phones that were found in the possession of the appellant and constructively, in 24 his possession, though in the hands of PW2, were recently stolen. This is because, within three days, the appellant pawned one of the stolen phones to PW2. Further, the appellant was found in possession of another stolen phone without any explanation on how he came in possession of the said phone and the one seized from PW2. I am of the view that, in the absence of any explanation from the appellant as to how he came into possession of the mobile phones allegedly to have been stolen from PW4 which rebuts the presumption under the doctrine, it is obvious that he stole them from PW4. The three grounds fail. Before I pen off, I wish to state that the offence of armed robbery is proved when it is established by the prosecution that there was stealing; and before, during or after the said stealing, the complainant was threatened by the accused person to facilitate the stealing. Section 287A of the Penal Code provides: ‘287A. A person who steals anything, and at or immediately before or after stealing is armed with any dangerous or offensive weapon or instrument and at or immediately before or after stealing uses or threatens to use violence to any person in order to obtain or retain the 25 stolen property, commits an offence of armed robbery and shall, on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a term of not less than thirty years with or without corporal punishment.’ In the case at hand, there is no direct evidence that it was the appellant who robbed PW4. However, there is cogent evidence that PW4 was robbed and a saw was used to attack him. PW5 testified how he received PW4 at Ngudu Hospital with injuries causes by a sharp object. Further, as depicted above, there is evidence that the stolen properties including the phones were Ms. Damas’ properties. Likewise, there is ample evidence that the appellant was found with some of the stolen properties. It is on record that the appellant admitted to commit the offence of armed robbery against PW4 and led to the discovery of some of the stolen property in his possession. He offered no explanation as to how he came into possession of the stolen phones which would negate what he stated in the cautioned statement. This evidence coupled with the appellant’s confession and the fact that the recently stolen property was found in his possession proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the alleged offence. 26 Appeal dismissed. Right To Appeal Explained. Order accordingly. DATED at MWANZA this 21st of October, 2024. KS KAMANA JUDGE 27