petro nyasa others vs simon domela others 2009 tzhc 271 9 july 2009

n IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA AT TABGRA CIVIL CASE NO. 4/2007 1. RETRO NYASA ' 2. JULIUS NSABI r ......... ............................ PLAINTIFFS. 3. PASI SENI VERSUS 1. SIMON DOM SLA 2. THE DISTRICT NATURAL RESOURCES , I OFFICER Li AM SO DISTRICT 'r ~~NDANT3 J. THE URAMBO ; DISTR1C ' 4. THE HOH. ATTORNEY GENERAL RULING A. K. MUJULIZI, J. The three plaintiffs in this suit, filed a representative suit in the i District Registry of this court, on their behalf and 223 others, against the Defendants, claiming for the following: A declaration that Ikongabalimi area Usangi Village in Urambo District is not within a forest reserve area. (ii) A declaration that the Defendants action o f setting fire to the plaintiffs homesteads was unlawful. (Hi) General damages (ivj Costs of and incidental to this suit (v) Any other relief(s) that the honourable court may deem fit to grand. " The plaintiffs base their claim on the allegation that: "the plaintiffs are peasants residing in Ikogabaiimi area Usangi Village Urambo District Their vHtivz is dully registered under the law registrator; M■; KIJ/452 Ur-rfo-? District, Tabora Region" It is claimed further that; the 1st Defendant being the Village Chairman, Usangi Village, and the 2nd Defendant as the officer responsible for Natural Resources within Urambo District, t o g e th e r with the 3rd Defendant the District Commissioner, Urambo District; had on diverse days, between 13th October and 26th October, 2006, jointly and together, set ablaze, the plaintiffs' homes, thereby burning to ashes all their houses and personal belongings on allegations that - the plaintiffs were trespassers on a forest reserve. In their joint written statement of Defence, filed by the Honourable Attorney General, (tne 4th Defendant), the Defendants assert among others, that: " Ikongabalim i area is part o f Ulyankuiu local authority forest reserve and any one who resides there is a trespasser as it was declared to be such reserve in 1962 vide Government Notice No. 54 published on 16/2/1962 The primary issue for determination in this case is; whether or not the land occupied by the plaintiffs is part of Ulyankuiu Local A u th o r;rv F o rest Reserve, as to render the . Plaintiffs, who are claim,.• -ider a ReQlsier^l village, trese s '•on that land. Although the Defendancs did not raise k as a preliminary objection r. :heir Written Statement of Deferr.= :hay have raisea objection a'c an advanced stage in the proceedings, chat; This Court has no jurisdiction to determine the matter filed in it. Mr. Mtaki, learned advocate for the Plaintiffs7 attempted to object to the "objection"being raised late, long after the Court had gone through all the preliminary stages. However, I am in agreement with Mr. Kakwaya, Learned State Attorney's submission on the issue. The issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings: RICHARD JULIUS LUKAMBURA V. ISACK MWAKANJILA & ANOTHER. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2 OF 1998 CAT (Unreported). However, lest it seem that this issue had escaped the attention of both the Court and Counsel on both sides, let me point out that, the issue was obviously and is, ipso facto a land dispute. Consequently, in terms of section 3 of the Courts (Land Disputes, Settlement) Act, Cap. 216 R.E. 2002; "3, (1) Subject to section 167 o f the Land Act, and section 62 o f the Viliage Land Act, every dispute or com plaint concerning land sh aii he instituted in the Court having jurisdiction to determ ine land disputes in a given area. (2) The Courts o f jurisdiction under subsection (1) include: (a) The Village Land Council; (b) The W ard Tribunal; (c) The D istrict Land Housing Tribunal; (d) The High Court ( Land Division); (e) The Court o f Appeal o f Tanzania" (Em phasis m ine) Section 62 of the Village Land Act, Cap. 114 R.E 2002, provides: "62 - (1) Where the parties or any o f them do not accept the conclusions o f any m ediation into a dispute or wish to cease to make use o f the services o f the Village Land Council, they m ay refer the dispute to a Court having jurisdiction over the subject m atter o f the dispute. (2) The follow ing courts are hereby vested with exclusive jurisdiction, subject to the provisions o f part X I U vv :ha Land A ct to hear and determ ine a il m anner o f disputes,, actions and proceedings concerning land, that is to say- (a) the Court o f Appeal; (b) the Land Division o f the High Court; (c) the D istrict Land and Housing Tribunal; (d) the Ward Tribunal and (e) the Village Land Council. Part XIII; "Dispute S e ttle m e n tof the Land Act, Cap. 113 2002, has only one section: Section 167. It provides: "167.- (1) The follow ing courts are hereby vested with exclusive iurisdictionr subject to the provisions o f this part to hear and determine all manner of disputes, actions and proceedings concerning land, that is to say:- (a) the Court o f Appeal; (b) the Land Division o f the High Court, established in accordance with iaw for time being in force for establishing Courts divisions; f c) the D istrict Land and Housing Tribunals; \y. ■ Village Land Councils. ( Em phs sis mine) (2) N/A (3) A person aggrieved by a decision o f a ward tribunal m ay appeal to the court o f law having jurisdiction in the area o f the relevant district C ouncil." Based on the foregoing provisions, Mr. Kakwaya, learned State Attorney Counsel for the Defendants, argued that this Court, has no jurisdiction over this matter. To stress his point, he referred me to section 37 (e) of the Courts (Land Disputes Settlement) Act, Cap. 216. R.E. 2002. The Section confers the original jurisdiction to the High Court (Land Division). I will reproduce the entire section. It provides: "37. Subject to the provisions o f this Act, the High Court (Land Division) established shall have and exercise originalju risd iction :- (a) in proceedings for the recovery o f possession o f im m ovable property in which the value o f the property exceeds fifty m illion shillings; (b) in other proceedings where the subject m atter capable o f being estim ated a t a m oney value in which the value o f the subject m atter exceeds forty m illion shillings; (c) In a ll proceedings under the Tanzania Investm ent A ct and the Land Acquisition Act in respect o f proceedings involving the Governm ent; (d) In a ll proceedings involving Public Corporations Specified in the Rent Restriction (Exem ption) (Specified Parastatals) Order; and in such other disputes of national interests which the M inister m ay by notice published in the Gazette specify; and (e) In a ll such other proceedings relating to land under any written law in respect o f which jurisdiction is not lim ited to any particular court or tribunal." (em phasis m ine) Mr. Kakwaya,is of the view that; the dispute at hand is such other proceeding relating to land under any written law in respect of which jurisdiction is not limited to any particular courl: or tribunal. •*? submitted :?•:: che other law in this instance is Forest Act, Cap. 323 1002. On the face of it, ne has a point. However, Mr. MtaKi. learned Advocate for the Plaintiffs, thinks otherwise. Indeed. The issue is not as straight forward 3S suggested by Mr. Kakwaya. To start with he said, in case I am to sustain the objection, then the appropriate order in the interest of justice should be an order for transfer of the suit to the appropriate Register of this same Court. In his opinion, although the Land Act Cap. 113, and the Courts (Land Dispute Settlement) Act, Cap. 216 R.E 2002, seem to be creating a new High Court in the name of the "Land Division", that in fact, is not the existing position of the law. He argues that there is only one High Court established under Article 107 A of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, Cap. 2 R.E 2002. He argues further therefore that in principle, the suit is for declaratory orders, and not primarily a land dispute per se. I do not agree with this aspect of his argument. However, he argued, that on the basis that it is a land impute. in terms of Order VII Rule 10, of the Civil Procedure : : Cap. 33, where a plaint is filed if1 ti'-? wrong Court it shall be returned to be filed in the proper rsgis:ry. I will revert to "nis aspect later on. Before I outline the legal issues involved in this case, there is another dimension to this case which needs to be highlighted. The suit was filed under certificate of urgency, and, for the same reasons, the Plaintiffs were seeking for interlocutory remedies. The Defendant had at all material times admitted that they were going on with the operation of eviction, including demolition, and burning down residential houses belonging to the Plaintiffs. Now, indeed in terms of the High Court Registries, Rules, 2003, GN. No. 96 published on 15/4/2005, the Land Division of this Court had at all material time been established, with twelve (12) District Registries including, Tabora. However, since its inception the said Division has only been manned by a few judges, all based at the Dar es Salaam Registry of the Division. The clear resuit of that status quo is that; land cases filed in the District Registries of thar Division, have remained un attended to, and as I will sooi *demonstrate contrary to express provisions of the iaw, prescribing :ime limits for certain actions. The practical question which mis Court hac to deai with, in this and many similar cases, is, whether; it would be sensible for an injured party, seeking to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the High Court, to issue interlocutory orders, in a case, where; unless the Court were to issue such order, filing suit wouid remain superfluous! This is the practical dilemma brought about by the otherwise clear and well intentioned provisions of the current Land Law regime- which, while purporting to fast track resolution of land disputes, seems to have lead to the exact opposite. Should practitioners, and this court continue to wring their hands, in a helpless gesture and let peoples' rights be trampled down by the mighty and greedy, because that is what the Land Law Regime seems to have sanctioned? Yes. The letter of the law may seemingly be clear, but how about its spirit? Did parliament intend, and should the Courts simply look-on, and continue with lamentations over the latent absurdities and injustice brought upon by this law to the ■:i!;L;ens of this country? With that in mind, I now turn to the issues to be resolved. The basic issue is; whether, the new land iaws have stripped this Court of all its jurisdiction in all land (civil) matters so as to render any suit filed in it, liable to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. In my considered opinion, the Legislature did not intend that result. n In relation to the original jurisdiction of the Land Division of this Court, Sections, 3 and 37 of the Courts (Land Disputes Settlement) Act, Cap. 216, Section 6 of the Village Lands Act, Cap 114, Sections 67, and 167 of the Land Act. Cap. 113, must for purposes of practical application be read together with the High Court Registries Rules - GN. No. 96 (supra), as well as the Civil Procedure Code, Cap. 33 R.E 2002. I will start with the Court Registries Rules. By Rule 2 thereof "the Court' means the High Court. " Original proceedingsV mean all proceedings in the Court, not being a ppe 11ate proceed i ng s. The Land Division is established by Ruie 5E ;r the following terms; "5E. There sh a ll he a land division o f the High Court within the Registry a t O ar es salaam and a t any other registry or sub-registry as m ay be determ ined by the Chief Justice in which, subject to the provisions o f any relevant law , appellate proceedings or original proceedings concerning land m ay be instituted." (Em phasis m ine) In relation to original proceedings Rule 7 (1) thereof provides: "7- (1) O riginal proceedings in the court may be instituted either in the Registry a t D ar es Salaam or in the D istrict Registry ( if any) for the area in which the cause o f action arose or where the D efendant resides", Sub Rule (4) of this rule provides: "(4) The Court may at any time on application or of its own m otion transfer any proceedings from one Registry to ^her and any proceedings transr-i^red, and a il d o c i j-v sh all be filed accordingly. Provided m at where original proceeding;? in a com m ercial case are instituted in a D istrict or Sub- Registry, such proceedings shall as soon as practicable be transferred to the com m ercial Division before further steps are taken in the proceedings, except where a il parties agree to have the com m ercial case determ ined by the High Court a t such D istrict or Sub-registry o f the High Court."(Em phasis mine). It may be convenient for the proper flow of my reasoning, to interpose the provisions of Order VII Rule 10, of the CPC Cap. 33 R.E 2002, cited by Mr. Mtaki for the Plaintiffs, as pointed out earlier on. The Rule provides: "O rder VII R. 10 (1) The p lain t shall, a t any state o f the suit, be returned to be presented to the court in which the su it should have been instituted. (2) On returning a plaint, the judge or m agistrate, shall endorse thereon the data o f its presentation and sturn, the nam e o f the party presenting it and a b rief statement o f the reasons fo r returning i t " In my considered opinion, properly construed in the context of other procedural laws and Rules, the totality of these provisions do not lead to the effect put to them, by Mr. Kakwaya, learned State Attorney. The legislature has, were it intended a specific exclusion of jurisdiction of a certain Court in certain matters done so expressly. Note that there are no similar provisions in reference to the Land Division in land matters in the proviso to sub-rule 4 of Rule 7 of the Court Registries Rules. Apart, from the proviso in Rule 7 (4) above, Rule 10 thereof provides; "10 AH form al and prelim inary steps and a ll i interlocutory applications in proceedings entered a t a D istrict Registry shall be taken or made either before a judge or the D istrict R egistrar." I am of the firm view that, this Rule was meant to remove any doubt as to whether a judge of this Court, (other than a Judge sitting in the Land Division) has any powers to deal with; any matter or essential step, of an interlocutory or immediate intervention in a matter filed in a Distrct Registry which otherwise needs to be dealt with by the Land Division or in other matters ought to be filed in another Registry. The above provisions properly construed lead to a position whereby the current regime of Land Disputes Settlement, was calculated to allow for a faster and more efficient system of disposal of land cases and matters within the High Court. It does not put in place a jurisdictional exclusivity to Judges of this Court sitting in the Land Division, at le a st, as far as interlocutory applications are concerned. There is however, or do administrative bottleneck which the above cited Rules did not address, thus leading to the current dilemma, in which both parties and the Court find themselves in. There is literally no movement at all in the long que of cases, pending before the Land Division of this Court. The High Court at its District Registries, operates separate Registers for Land Disputes, which would be titled and designated as such. The Judge in Charge at the District Registries, has no administrative powers over such cases. He or she therefore, would not be able to assign or call for a file from such register, for purposes of attending to any urgent '•natter as Rule 10 (op cit) seems to provide. That is the domain of the Judge In-charge of the Land Division of this Court. He or she in-turn has no powers to assign such file to a judge outside his or her division. Proceedings relating to Land disputes of a civil nature, are still governed by the Civil Procedure Code, Cap. 33 R.E 2002. It is the controlling Act, for Civil proceedings in this Court. Order IV Rule 3, thereof imposes a mandatory duty on the Judge In-charge relating to a suit filed in the court in the following terms: A Judge or M agistrate in charge o f the Court shall within four days after the institution o f a suit, cause it so be assigned to a specific Judge or magistrate." (Emphasis mine) As co how the Honourable Judge In-charge of the Land Division causes, suits in his or her division through the District Registry, to bs ^signed to a specific Judge in the absence of Resident Judges at the Zone level, specifically assigned to that division, is 3 matter I would not venture into. As to whether, in the present circumstances, the requirements of that clear Rule are met in matters filed in the Land Division, is also beyond my purview. But, what is clear, both Order IV Rule 3 above, and Rule 10 of the High Court Registries Rules (Supra) would be meaningless in practical terms, with respect to land cases filed in the District Registries. AA The current practice of the Land Division, is for the cases filed in it, to be handled by judges stationed at Dar es Salaam, who hold periodical sessions in the Zones. It would therefore be futile for any party in the regions other than Dar es Salaam, who has a matter requiring urgent attention or intervention of the Court, to seek remedy through the Register of the Land Division. Consequently, in the absence of a law specifically prohibiting filing of land matters in the Civil Register of this Court, it would oniv be just and even sensible that a party asking protac-' = of the law, seeks shelter, albeit cem-x^iily, sn the w idir, and unlimited, umbrella of the :'1ginal jurisdiction of this Court. In the premises, I will interpret sections; 167 (1) of the Land Act, Cap. 113, together with section 37 (e) of the Courts ( Land Disputes Settlements) Act, Cap 216 R.E. 2002, to the extent that they tend to import the meaning that they confer exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings described there under, by adopting a "purposive" approach in interpreting the statutory provisions. This approach was endorsed by the Court of Appeal of Tanzania, while construing section 114 of the Elections Act, in the case of JOSEPH WARIOBA V. STEPHEN W ASS IRA and ANOTHER (1997) TLR, 272, and later restated in GOODLUCK KYANDO V. THE REPUBLIC, CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 118 OF 2003 - CAT @ MBEYA (Unreported.) In Joseph Warioba V. Stephen Wassira - the Court of Appeal quoted with approval what Lord Denning, MR. stated in the case of Nothrnan v, London B orough of E arn est (1 9 7 S i I ALL ER 1243 ac page 1246 as follows; Hterai ,*r ; - now out of . iV .... > .oeen re f - the appyr-^cr which Dipiock described as txe "purposive" approach. He satq so m Kamunis Sai?r:^;.::.j Co. Ltd V. Zemih Investments (Tcrguag) Ltd and :: -vas recommended by Sir David Renton and his colleagues in their vaiuabie reporz entitled "The Preparation o f Legislation. " In a ll cases now in the interpretation o f statutes we adopt such construction as w ill "promote the generaI legislative purpose underlying the provision. It is no longer necessary for the judges to wring their hands and sa v .r/ There is nothing we can do about it; whenever the strict interpretation o f a statute gives rise to an absurd and unjust situationr the judges can and shouid use their good sense to rem edy it by reading words in, if necessary - so as to do w hat parliam ent would have done had they situation in m ind." In Goodluck Kyando V. The Republic, their Lordships in Appeal were dealing with a glaring injustice that would be brought upon boys of under 18 years of age, in case of being convicted of the offence attempted rape contrary to section 132 (1) of the Penal Code, Cap. 16. R. E. 2002. According to the literal construction of that section, any person, (including a boy of iZ or below*? would be liable !:c- suffer life imprisonment and in ay any case to a term of not less than thirty years with or without corporal punishment. However by Section 131 (2) of the same Penal Code a boy of similar age convicted of committing rape would be liable to a far lesser punishment it provides; 131 (2) Notwithstanding the provisions of any law, where the offence is committed by a boy who is of the age of eighteen years or less, he shall (a) if a first o ffe n d e rb e sentenced to corporai punishm ent only; (b) if a second time offender be sentenced to im prisonm ent for a term o f twelve months with corporal punishm ent; (c) if a third time and recidivist offender, he shall be sentenced to life im prisonm ent pursuant to subsection (1)." Ackc^.r- the "puna approach the'-r '.ordships resolved :?nsaiy in cho \ ,'jng terms; -.^KC-la/ JA at page IS. nIn Che result, vve have decided to adopt a purposive approach in interpreting section 1?2 (1) so as to remove the anom aly referred to earlier, To achieve this result, the provisions o f section 131 (2) (a); (b); and (c) should be inserted im m ediately below section 131 (1) so that they are equally applicable to boys o f the age o f eighteen years or less who attem pt to com mit rape, In view o f the glaringly unjust situation, and m any such boys may be suffering from the inadvertent lacuna in the law and we think this is the only way to prom ptly arrest the situation while aw aiting parliam ent to am end A ct No. 4 o f 1998 as appropriate." Thus guided, I am of the firm view that parliament., in the promulgation of the land law reforms ushered in by the Land Act, Cap. 113, the Village Lands Act, Cap. 114 and the Courts (Land Disputes Settlement) Act, Cap. 216, did not intend to take away the unlimited original jurisdiction of this Court, and to confine it to the narrower window of the Land Division of the Court, to the contrary, it intended to give more efficacy, and timely resolution and determination of Land disputes of a Civii rr I say so because; (a) In PART II of Cap. 216, the "Establishment and Jurisdiction of Land Courts'. chi jurisdiction of Magistrates' Courts, in all land disputes of a Civii nature was expressly removed: beccion: "4. — (1) U n less o th e rw ise p ro v id e d by the Land Act, no m agistrates' Court established by the M agistrates' Court sh all have jurisdiction in any m atter under the land A ct and the village Land Act. (2) M agistrates' Courts established unaer the M agistrates' Courts A ct sh a ll have and exercise jurisdiction in a il proceedings o f a crim inal nature under the Land A ct and the village Land A c t" In my opinion, if it had been intended by parliament to take away the wide and unlimited original jurisdiction of this Court they would have done so expressly in the same manner as was the case for Magistrate's Courts. (b) Section 3- (1) of the same Act provides: "3-1 (1) Subject to Section 167 o f the Land Act, and action 62 o f the village Land Act, every dispute or ■ iplaint concerning land j.'vj/i j-e instituted in the having jurisdiction to determ ine land disputes in j liven a rea." Section 167 of the Land Act, Cap. 113, cited earlier on, subject to which the jurisdiction of the land courts is established provides; "167 - (1) The follow ing courts are hereby vested with exclusive jurisdiction, subject to the provisions o f this part, to hear and determ ine a il m anner o f disputes, actions and proceedings concerning land, that is to say- (a) the Court o f Appeal (b) the Land Division of the High Court established in accordance with iaw for time being in force for establishing courts divisions; (Under lining m ine) . Properly construed, even on the literal interpretation, the exclusivity of the Jurisdiction of the Land Division is subject to fitting-in within the existing structures. I have already outlined the current structural framework within which the Land Division has been fitin. ( c) in terms of Article 107A (2) (b) (d; and (e); of'the Constitution of the United Republic, Cap. 2 R.E 2002; "(2) Katika kutoa uamzi wa mashauri ya madai na jinai kwa kuzingatia sheria, Mahakama zitafuata kanuni zifuatazo, yaani: (b) kutocheiewesha haki bila sababu ya kirnsingi; (d) kukuza na kuendeleza usuluhishi baina ya wanohusika katika m igogoro, na (e) kutenda haki biia kufungwa kupita kiasi na m asharti ya kiufundi yanayow eza kukwam isha haki kutendeka." : The Courts by that article of the constitution, are enjoined to enhance speedy and fast resolution of disputes, without being unduly bound by procedural niceties of the law. To this end, deliberate measures were taken by the legislature by amending the Civil Procedure Code, Cap. 33. R.E 2002, which introduced the individual calendar system, Order VI Rule 3, (Scheduling system) to fix specific time limits within which to complete a matter, Orders VIII A, B, & C. The legislature did not stop there. Amendments were made to the relevant provisions, to remove appeals against -•••v ' jutory orders ;ijt in place ur- - -‘^its for interlocutor orders, and even cimc limits w i t ! • ••••;ch to hand i. judgments and decisions of the Courts from the time of completion of the trial, to mention, but a few. The common intention underpinning all those measures was the perceived undue delay in the delivery of judicial services in the country. The land law reforms were also enacted with this mischief It is therefore my considered opinion that, the laws, and Ruies under our immediate focus, must be interpreted to give practical meaning to the underlying purpose of the legislature. For that reason, I have serious reservations as to whether, the current conventional practice whereby cases filed in the Land Registry in District Registries, are only attended to by visiting judges of the Land Division on occasional sessions, especially in view of Order IV Rule 3, together with orders V Rule 10, which imposes the duty on the Court to sen/e summons " within twenty - one days after it has been received", and, >:o certain time based steps thereafter in .t-rcordance with; < ^ss, the Land of this Co-w; been exempted under Orders VIII A Rule 2, VIIIB Rule 2, from the application of any rule or rules under those Orders, which I am not aware of) Order VIII A Rule 3, Order VIII B Rule 3, of the Civil Procedure Code, Cap. 33 R. E. 2002. The import of all these Rules, is to put a clear time frame, binding on the courts and the parties, within which to take certain steps geared at having a reasonable approximation of the time within which, cases, once filed, may be expected either, to be settled through mediation, and, or completed in case of trial. the rules referred to above has been exempted in relation to matters filed in the Land Register of the District Registry, where there are no resident Judges assigned to attend to such files, then, I hazard to say, the system would be in serious breach of the very law it is entrusted to enforce. Moreover, the current position, and as propounded by the learned State Attorney, pauses a serious issue as to whether; it is not close to violation of Articles 13.- (1) and (2) of the Constitution which provide: 13 -(1) w atu wote n i saw a m heie ya iheria, na wanayo h a k i b iia ya ubaguzi wowozd- ' -iindwa h a k i saw * •-ih eie ya sheria. (2) N i m arufuku kw a vheria yoyote iliyotungw a na mamfaka yoyote katika 'vm huri ya Munga.no kuweka sh arti loiote am baio n i ki ubaguzi am a wa d hahiri au kw a taathira yake," Now, if I uphold the preliminary objection, 1 would be saying that, since the State has, under our current framework, not yet been able to appoint sufficient judges, to allow for the availability of Judges of the Division at the High Court Zones (District) Registries, then any person who has a land dispute, can not seek remedy through the Civil Registry of the Court, but can only do so through the Land Registry, and hope that; one day a Judge Could be assigned to the matter. But, then, the same person should look on as other matters of a Civil nature, for which this Court has jurisdiction are proceeded on, even when they are filed long after he or she had filed his matter in the Court. Wither the equitable principle and practice of our courts, that " / f w iii be attended first that which came in first", It is common knowledge, that apart from air and water, Land, in is the largest factor of production to which every d tiz :.... --untitled, almost for free and ulx.:u ..implication, and, many - more than 80%, depend on land for their livelihood. For this reason it is at the centre of the majority of civil disputa: either to file in this and the Magistrate Courts. The complaints flooding my desk, the look of disappointment often expressed when litigants are told that there is no judge to attend to their matters, the Costs incurred in traveling long distances to the Court, only for their matters to be mentioned before a harpless District Registrar, are sufficient to warrant a pragmatic approach to this matter. The legislature court not have intended such to happen. the firm view that the Legislature did no intend to relegate, land disputes to levels whereby, Citizens concerned, would have to wait ad-ifinentum before their matters; (a) get to be assigned to a trial judge, and or, (b) urgent applications are rendered merely nugatory. I am of the firm view and I so hold, that: The original, and unlimited jurisdiction of this Court on, and in matters and proceedings concerning land disputes of a Civil nature ■ not taken away by either the Land Act, Cap. 113, the Village w riu mci, 114 or oy the Courts (Lan*J Disputes Act, Cap. 215, R.E 2002. For that reason, save for appellate matters arising from the District Land and Housing Tribunals, for which the Law is expressly clear, where there are no resident judges assigned to deal with land matters, as is the .case for most District Registries, suits can be filed in the Civii Registry of the Court, and Judges of this Court, can proceed to hear and determine such matters to finality, in the ordinary course. For those reasons, an order for transfer a matter filed in the Civil Registry, would not only be not necessary, but, would be counter to the underlying spirit of the legislative provision in question. To first track land d isp u te to- the welfare and economic oeveiopment of our citizeniy. Lane r*routes include, disputes over burial sites and graveyards! The Land Division of this Court, as long as it continues to be manned by a few juqlges resident at Dar es Salaam, should be left to handle the appeai cases, which continue to flood-in on a daily basis, so as not to leave room for any reasonable attention being given to original matters filed in the Dist?i*„t Registries, which ^re aiso in pienty. ConsciQ',1'-.:-:' . ; overrule th. Order accordingly. A. K. M U J U L I z i * ^ JUDGE. 9th 3uly, 2009