CONSOLIDATED CRIMINAL APPEALS NO 190 218 OF 2021 NYAMHANGA MTIBA NYAHUCHO ANOTHER V REPUBLIC

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT MUSOMA f CO RAM: SEHEL, J.A.. KAIRO. J.A. And KHAMIS. J.A.l CONSOLIDATED CRIMINAL APPEALS NO. 190 & 218 OF 2021 NYAMHANGA MTIBA NYAHUCHO.................................. 1st APPELLANT STEVEN MTIBA NYAHUCHO.......................................... 2NDAPPELLANT VERSUS THE REPUBLIC..................................................................... RESPONDENT (Appeal from the Judgment of the High Court of Tanzania at Musoma) (Kahvoza J/) dated the 25th day of March, 2021 in Criminal Sessions Case No. 33 of 2020 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 10th & 18th February, 2025 SEHEL J.A.: The deceased in the present appeal, one Marwa s/o Daudi was the elder brother of James Daud Salima (PW2), key identifying witness for the prosecution. On 15th October, 2013 at around 18:00 hours PW2 was at his homeplace. He then heard a loud voice of people arguing. He went to see what was going on. At the scene, he saw the 1st appellant and 2nd appellant surrounding the deceased. The 1st appellant stood behind the deceased holding a machete while the 2nd appellant stood in front of the deceased and was also holding a machete. He was about 15 metres away and saw the 1st appellant cut the deceased with his machete on his neck, once. The deceased instantaneously fell down. He raised an alarm and neighbours gathered among them were Wambura Mkwabe, Mirango Mierengo and Mama Ghati. Thereafter, PW2 went to report the matter at Tarime police station and named the appellants as responsible for killing the deceased, Marwa s/o Daudi. He said, although it was 18:00 hours, the sun had not yet set. He also said that the appellants were very well familiar as were his village mate for about twenty years, and that, their houses were about 700 meters apart. PW2 further told the trial court that after the appellants had committed the offence they ran away. The next day, the police officers arrived at the scene of crime together with a medical doctor from Tarime District Hospital, one Samwel Isaya Obyero (PW1). PW1 examined the dead body and found blood stains and a cut wound on the posterior part of the neck. According to PW1, the cut wound was inflicted by a sharp object. Accordingly, he opined that the death of the deceased was caused by severe loss of blood due to cut wound. He prepared the Post Mortem Examination Report (PMER) that was admitted in evidence as exhibit PI. Two years later, that is, on 2nd September, 2017, a police officer with police force number E. 9351 Staff Sergent Frank (PW3) from Tarime Police Station was assigned by his Officer in Command in the Criminal Investigation Department (OC CID), Superintended of Police (SP) Kimasa to go to Nyakunguru village and arrest the appellants who were suspected to kill the deceased. He went to the village and arrested the appellants. It was also his evidence that the suspects were arrested in 2017 as they fled after the offence. The appellants were arraigned before the High Court of Tanzania at Musoma (the trial court) for the offence of murder contrary to sections 196 and 197 of the Penal Code. During trial, the appellants denied committing the offence and each raised a defence of alibi. The 1st appellant claimed that, on 15th October, 2013, he went to his farm and returned home at around 10:00 hours. At about 18:00 hours, he brought his cattle from the pastures, had his dinner and retired to bed till the next day. He also denied to have any boundary dispute with the deceased. However, he admitted to be arrested with the 2nd appellant on 2nd September, 2017 on allegation of being in possession of stolen cows. The 2nd appellant claimed that on the fateful day he travelled to Nyamakoleie village to attend his barber shop. He closed his business at about 21:00 hours and arrived home at about 22:00 hours. He took his bath, had dinner and went to bed. On 2nd September, 2017, four militiamen invaded his home and arrested him on allegation of being in possession of stolen goods. At the conclusion of trial, the three assessors who sat with the trial Judge unanimously returned a verdict of guilt against the appellants. In his judgment, the trial Judge concurred with the assessors and found the appellants guilty as charged and convicted each of them. The 1st appellant was sentenced to suffer death by hanging, whereas, the 2nd appellant who was fifteen years old, at the time of the commission of the offence, was detained in prison during the President's pleasure in terms of section 26 (2) of the Penal Code. Dissatisfied with the conviction and sentence, each of the appellants filed a separate notice of appeal that led to the filing of Criminal Appeals No. 190 and 218 of 2021. Subsequently, four sets of memoranda of appeal were filed; the first set was jointly filed by the appellants on 3rd August, 2021. The second and third sets were filed by the 2nd appellant on 8th December, 2021 and on 27th June, 2024 respectively. The fourth set was filed by Mr. Cosmas Tuthuru, learned counsel from Butiama Partners & Advocates on behalf of the appellants in terms of rule 73 (2) of the Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules (the Rules). The grounds of appeal filed by the learned counsel are: ”i. That, the evidence o f prosecution witnesses particularly PW2 James Daud Salima was not credible to ground conviction against the appellants on the information o f murder: 2. That, failure for prosecution to call investigator as a witness coupled with unexplained delay o f arresting the appellant casts doubts to the prosecution evidence that the appellants were seen at the scene o f the crime, 3. That, the trial Judge erred in law to dismiss the possibility of the death being occurred in the cause o f fight between the deceased and the appellant and hence the appellant were wrongly convicted o f the offence o f murder." At the hearing of the appeals, Mr. Tuthuru who appeared for the appellants prayed to consolidate the Criminal Appeal No. 190 of 2021 with Criminal Appeal No. 218 of 2021. Ms. Shose Naiman, learned Senior State Attorney, together with Ms. Janeth Kisibo and Mr. Charles Kagirwa, learned Senior State Attorneys, who appeared for the respondent/ Republic, did not have any objection to the prayer for consolidation of the appeals. On our part, we have gone through the two records of appeal and observed that they both arose from the same proceedings and judgment of the High Court in Criminal Sessions No. 33 of 2020. Accordingly, we acceded to an unchallenged prayer and invoked rule 69 (1) of the Rules by consolidating Criminal Appeals Nos. 190 of 2021 and 218 of 2021 to be one appeal. When Mr. Tuthuru took the floor to submit on the appeal, he informed the Court that, he consulted with his clients and they agreed to abandon all grounds of appeal filed by the appellants and the third ground of appeal in the supplementary memorandum of appeal filed by the counsel. The two remaining grounds of appeal were jointly argued. The thrust of the submission by Mr. Tuthuru on the combined two grounds of appeal was on the credibility of PW2. He contended that the trial Judge found PW2 a credible witness and identification done by him was watertight but, in his view, the evidence of PW2 was incredible. In trying to impress upon the Court to find that PW2 unreliable and incredible witness, he pin pointed a number of areas. One, while PW2 tried to describe the attire worn by the appellants on the fateful day, he failed to meet all the conditions for proper identification. Relying on the case of Ibrahim Eston v. The Republic, (Criminal Appeal No. 75 of 2021) [2024] TZCA 516 (5 July 2024; TANZLII), Mr. Tuthuru argued that PW2 did not mention names of the appellants to the first persons who responded to the alarm, namely; Wambura Mkwabe, Mirango Mierengo and Mama Ghati as appearing at page 13 of the record of appeal. He submitted that it is inconceivable for PW2 to go to the police to name the appellants instead of naming them to persons who responded to his alarm. Two, Mr. Tuthuru submitted that PW2 said he went to report the incident at Tarime Police Station and named the appellants as persons responsible for killing but no police officer was called by the prosecution to validate the evidence of PW2. He added that, the evidence of PW3 only proved that, after the lapse of four years after the alleged murder, PW3 was directed by the OC CID to go to Nyakunguru village to arrest the appellants, and that, PW3 was only informed by the said OC CID that the appellants had run away after the incident. He contended that the OC CID, and, or investigator of the case were material witnesses who were not paraded to unveil the truth given that both appellants denied to have fled the village. Three, if truly the appellants were at large, pursuant to the Police General Order (P.G.O.) No. 238, the Missing and Wanted Persons Register (P.F. 179) ought to have been brought before the trial court. He argued that, in absence of such register, the prosecution failed to explain the delay in arresting the appellants, thus, casts doubt on the evidence of PW2 who claimed to have identified the appellants at the scene of crime. To fortify his submission, he referred us to the case of James Ryoba Waing'ari v. The Republic (Criminal Appeal No 475 of 2015) [2018] TZCA 558 (12 December 2018; TANZLII). Four, Mr. Tuthuru stressed that the evidence of the investigator was necessary because he would shade light on the unexplained delay by the prosecution in arresting the appellants. To bolster his argument, he cited the case of Shukuru Moshi @ Elimringi v. The Republic, (Criminal Appeal No. 29 of 2021) [2024] TZCA 1022 (1 November 2024; TANZLII) where the Court cited the Ugandan case of Bwaneka v. Uganda (1967) E.A. 768. Five, Mr. Tuthuru pointed out that even the trial Judge doubted credibility of PW2 who testified that the appellants and the deceased had a long-standing dispute over a farm boundary. He referred us to page 62 of the record of appeal where the trial Judge concurred with the two assessors that there was no evidence of a fight or actual confrontation. Mr. Tuthuru faulted the trial Judge that he erred in law as he decided not to give weight on the appellants' defence of alibi simply because they did not comply with section 194 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act (the CPA), and that, the defence was an afterthought. On this, he referred us to page 59 of the record of appeal. With that submission, Mr. Tuthuru prayed to the Court to quash the conviction, set aside the sentence and release the appellants from prison. Mr. Kagirwa opposed the appeal contending that the prosecution proved the offence of murder against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. He argued that PW2 who was at the scene of crime and the only eye witness for the prosecution was credible and reliable witness as found by the trial court because conditions for identification were favourable. Mr. Kagirwa listed the conditions that; one, the incident occurred at the time when the sun had not yet set, hence, it was still during the daylight as rightly held by the trial court at page 57 of the record of appeal. Two, the identifying witness stood fifteen paces away from where the appellants were assaulting the deceased. Three, PW2 and the appellants were familiar to each other as they all resided in the same village of Nyakunguru for the past twenty years. Four, PW2 mentioned the appellants' names at the earliest opportunity at Tarime Police Station when he went to report the murder case on that same day. Ffve, PW2 gave detailed description of each of the appellants' attire. Six, PW2 managed to explain the role each appellant played at the scene. In that respect, Mr. Kagirwa contended that the conditions for proper identification listed in the celebrated case of Waziri Amani v. The Republic [1980] T.L.R. 250 were met, as such, there was no possibility of a mistaken identity. As regards to alleged failure to mention names of the appellants to the people who responded to the alarm, Mr. Kagirwa responded that the argument is an afterthought because, when PW2 was testifying, he was not cross examined on the issue. He added that, in any event, the witness went to report the incident at the police station on the same day, and that, the police promptly acted on the information by visiting the crime scene the following morning in the company of PW1. Relying on authority in the case of Chacha Jeremiah Murimi & 3 Others v. The Republic (Criminal Appeal 551 of 2015) [2019] TZCA 52 (4 April 2019; TANZLII), he contended that the ability of PW2 to mention the appellants at the police station at the earliest opportunity was an assurance of his reliability. Stressing that PW2 was a credible witness, Mr. Kagirwa cited to us the case of Goodluck Kyando v. The Republic [2006] T.L.R 363 where the Court held that, generally, each witness is entitled to credence unless there is a compelling reason not to do so. Responding to alleged failure to call the OC CID and the investigator, Mr. Kagirwa argued that the complaint has no merit. In his view, the prosecution ably proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through PW1, PW2 and PW3, hence, no need to call any more witnesses. Citing section 143 of the Tanzania Evidence Act (the Evidence Act), he argued that there is no particular number of witnesses required to prove any fact. In response to the issue of Missing and Wanted Persons Register (P.F. 179), Mr. Kagirwa argued that the oral account of PW3 and PW2 was sufficient to establish that the appellants fled from the scene and returned to village in 2017, thus, there was no need to prove it through documentation as it was held in the case Abbas Kondo Gede v. The Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 472 of 2017) [2020] TZCA 391 (12 August 2020; TANZLII). He added that both PW2 and PW3 were found to be credible witnesses, and therefore, there was no need to call the investigator or tender P.F. No. 179. He pointed out that the evidence of PW3 that the appellants were arrested on 2nd September, 2017 was corroborated by the appellants (DW1 and DW2) in their defence. The learned Senior State Attorney admitted that the trial Judge rejected the evidence of fight given by PW2. Nonetheless, he contended that, in totality, the trial Judge found PW2 to be credible witness and his recognition evidence was watertight. Responding to the notice of alibi, Mr. Kagirwa supported the findings of the trial Judge that the appellants failed to comply with the requirement of section 194 (4) of the CPA, hence, their defence was rightly accorded no weight. At the end, he impressed upon us to find ii that the prosecution proved the offence of murder against the appellants. At the end of Mr. Kagirwa's submission, we requested him to address us on whether there was any evidence suggesting the existence of a fight between the deceased and the appellants. At first, he was hesitant but after drawing his attention to various pieces of evidence on the record of appeal, he relented and urged the Court to find that the appellants killed the deceased without malice aforethought. He urged us to impose a harsh sentence on the 1st appellant on the ground that, the Tanzania Sentencing Manual for Judicial Officers categorized the offence of manslaughter involving the use of weapons, like the present one, as of a high degree attracting a minimum sentence of ten years and the maximum life imprisonment. Mr. Tuthuru briefly rejoined that P.F. 179 is part of the investigative process which cannot be accounted by oral evidence as P.G.O. No. 238 ought to be fully complied with. That, the earliest opportunity to report the murder on part of PW2 was to the people who responded to the alarm and not at the police station. He reiterated that PW2 was not credible and reliable witness for this Court to uphold the conviction and sentence. In the alternative, he beseeched the Court to sentence the 1st appellant to a lesser sentence of fifteen years imprisonment as it was done in the case of Chipukizi Chondi v. The Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 466 of 2022) [2024] TZCA 503 (28 June 2024; TANZLII). We have duly considered the submissions of both parties and reviewed the record of appeal. At the outset, we wish to state that this is a first appeal, therefore, the Court is entitled to re-evaluate and reconsider the entire evidence in the record of appeal, and if appropriate, arrive at its own decision. In line with the foregoing, we find that it was not in dispute that Marwa s/p Daudi died on the 15th October, 2013 at around 18:00 hrs. and his death was due to an unnatural cause. In that respect, the issues before us are two; one, whether the appellants are the ones who killed the deceased, and two, whether they killed him with malice aforethought. Starting with the first issue, according to the findings of the trial court, the conviction of the appellants was based on the identification of the appellants by PW2. That means, as rightly observed by the counsel for both parties, the only eye witness in the present appeal was PW2. Mr. Tuthuru questioned the credibility of this witness and invited us to reassess his evidence. It is a cardinal principle of the law that credibility is the sole domain of the trial court in so far as the demeanour of a witness is concerned. We held so in the case of Benedict Buyobe @ 13 Bene v. The Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 354 of 2016 [2018] TZCA 338 (18 September, 2018; TANZLII) that: "... it is often said that the credibility o f any given witness is the monopoly o f the trial court whose presiding officer had the advantage o f seeing and observing the demeanour o f the witness in the course o f testimony. Thus, for one, a trial court's finding on the credibility of a witness is binding on the first appellate court unless there are circumstances which call for a re­ assessment of the witnesses' testimony. For another, on a second appeal, the Court will not reverse the concurrent findings o f fact o f the two courts below it, unless both courts completely misapprehended the substance, nature and quality of the evidence before it." [Emphasis added] See also the case of Shabani Daudi vs Republic, Criminal Appeal No.28 of 2000 (unreported). As invited by the counsel for the appellant, we now embark in re- evaluation of the evidence of PW2 on which the trial court found conviction of the appellants. According to PW2, on the fateful day at round 18:00 hours, he was at home. He then heard people arguing in loud voice. He went to see what was going on. At a distance of about 15 meters away, he saw the 1st appellant standing behind the deceased while the 2nd appellant stood in front of the deceased. Each of them were holding a machete. Unexpectedly, he saw the 1st appellant cutting the deceased, once, on his neck and the deceased fell down. He raised an alarm and neighbours responded to it. From the crime scene, PW2 went straight to Tarime Police Station and reported, thus, mentioning the names of the appellants. The identifying witness explained that the conditions which enabled him to identify the appellants, were that; the appellants were familiar to him as they grew up together in the same village of Nyakunguru for about twenty years and their houses were about seven hundred meters apart. He also said that the sun had not yet, and therefore, there was enough light to make him recognize the deceased's assaulters from where he stood. Given the circumstances, we entirely agree with Mr. Kagirwa that the appellants were recognized and not identified by PW2 who was very familiar with them. Such evidence is considered to be more reliable than identification of a stranger. Our position is fortified by our earlier decision in the case of Athumani Hamis @ Athuman v. The Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 288 of 2009 (unreported). In that appeal, we said: "Under the circumstances where the appellant recognised the appellant because o f knowing him before, and given the conditions which made the complainant to recognise the appellant, it is safe to say that there was no mistaken identity o f the appellant. In the Kenyan case o f Kenga Chea Thoye v. The Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 375 o f2006 (unreported), the Court o f Appeal o f Kenya held that: "Recognition is more satisfactory, more assuring and more reliable than identification o f a stranger. Furthermore, since PW2 and the appellants knew each other very well, as such, any further description, like their attire, body built, complexion, size or any peculiar feature, was unnecessary - see the case of Fadhili Gumbo Malota & 3 Others v. The Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 52 of 2003 (unreported). We think, with respect, that the fact that the trial judge did not accept the evidence of PW2 that there was a fight between the deceased and the appellants does not make the witness unreliable or a liar. And this fact takes us to the second issue whether the appellants had malice aforethought. Our re-assessment of evidence shows that there was indeed a fight. Here, we wish to let the record of appeal speaks itself. At page 3 of the record of appeal, part of the excerpt of the facts read by prosecution during the conduct of the preliminary hearing are: "On the fateful day, the accused persons, who were siblings met the deceased person in the shamba. They started to argue on the boundaries of the shamba." At page 12 of the record of appeal, part of PW2's testimony reads: "I am peasant. On 15/10/2013 at 06:30 pm, I was at my homepiace. I heard people arguing at a loud voice. There were people arguing." When cross examined by the counsel for the 1st appellant, PW2 repeatedly responded that: "Yes, two or more people were quarrelling. I found them fighting. My brother's death was due fighting. The quarrels were over the boundary on that day. The deceased and the accused persons quarrelled over boundary." From the above pieces of evidence, we hasten to find that there was strong evidence to establish the deceased's death occurred in the course of a fight, and therefore, the trial court ought not to have casually ignored this aspect. There is a range of cases in which we held that death resulting from a fight unless there are very exceptional circumstances, the person who causes death is guilty of manslaughter and not murder. This was the position we stated in the cases of Jackson Mwakatika & 2 Others v. The Republic [1990] T.L.R. 17 and Chipukizi Chonde v. The Republic (supra). Again, Mr. Tuthuru wondered why PW2 did not name the murderers to the people who responded to the alarm. Much as we agree with him that the delay in naming a suspect at the earliest opportunity dents a witness's credibility, especially where the identification of the suspect is in issue - see the cases of Marwa Wangiti Mitwa & Another v. The Republic (supra) and Jaribu Abdalla v. The Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 220 of 1994 (unreported), we are settled in our mind that the act of PW2 to name the appellants to the police officers suffices to give assurance of his credibility. We say so because, the evidence on record of appeal shows that, immediately after receipt of the information, the police officers visited the scene of crime in company of the doctor. This is gathered from the testimony of PW2 appearing at page 13 of the record of appeal that: "On 16/10/2013 police came with a doctor ... and came at the scene, at Nyakunguru village. The doctor came at that area and examined the deceased's (body)." The evidence of PW2 is corroborated by the evidence of Samwel Isaya Obyero (PW1), a medical doctor who stated that, on 16th October, 18 2013, he went to Nyakunguru village to examine a dead body. The body was identified to him by James Daud Salima and Suzan Marwa as being that of Marwa Daudi. Further, Exhibit PI shows that when PW1 was conducting an autopsy, a police officer with Police Force No. 9551, Detective Staff Sergent Frank (PW3) was also present. Accordingly, we are satisfied that this complaint is without merit. Furthermore, the disappearance of the appellants after the commission of the offence was well established by PW2 and PW3. In that respect, we find that the investigative officer was not a material witness as he would have nothing more to add to the evidence of PW2 and PW3. Besides, the issue of Missing and Wanted Persons Register (P.F. 179) is all together an afterthought. It was neither raised nor cross examined to the prosecution witnesses at the time of trial. In that respect, we agree with the learned Senior State Attorney that the alleged failure to call either the people who responded to the alarm, the OC CID or investigator officer as witnesses did not dent the prosecution's case because section 143 of the Evidence Act is clear that no specific number of witnesses is required to prove any fact - see also the case of Aziz Abdallah v. The Republic [1991] T.L.R. 71. We now turn to the complaint that the defence of alibi was unreasonably disregarded. We entirely agree with the learned Senior 19 State Attorney that the appellant did not issue prior notice of his intention to rely on the defence of alibi. It is the position of the law that where an accused person intends to rely on the defence of alibi he is required to give notice of that intention to the trial court and the prosecution before the hearing of the case commenced (see section 194 (4) of the CPA). If the notice could not be given at that early stage, the accused person is required to furnish the prosecution with the particulars of alibi at a later stage but before the prosecution closes its case (see section 194 (5) of the CPA). If the accused person raised it during hearing of his defence case, as was the case herein, the trial court has to take cognizance of that defence and in exercise of its discretion, may accord no weight to it. In Mwita Mhere & Another v. The Republic [2005] T.L.R. 107, we considered the import of subsection (6) of section 194 of the CPA and laid down a procedure to be adopted by the trial court when faced with an accused person who had belatedly raised his defence of alibi, thus: "Where a defence o f alibi is given after the prosecution has dosed its case, and without any prior notice that such a defence would be relied upon, at least three things are important under the provisions o f section 194(6) o f the Criminal Procedure Act 1985 [now the CPA]: (a) the trial court is not authorized by the provision to treat the defence o f alibi like it was never made, (b) the trial court has to take cognizance o f that defence, and (c) it may exercise its discretion to accord no weight to the defence." In the instant appeal, the record shows, at page 59 that the trial Judge accorded no weight to the appellants' defence of alibi and he reasoned that: "In the instant case, the accused persons did not give notice that they will rely on the defence o f alibi. They raised the defence belatedly during their defence. I accord the accused persons' defence no weight; firstly, on the ground that it was raised after the prosecution had dosed its case, thus an afterthought; secondly If one considers the prosecution's recognition evidence o f James Daudi Salima (PW2) there was no chance o f mistaken identity." However, we gathered from the record of appeal, specifically at page 57 that the trial Judge took cognizant of the appellants' defence of a//b/when he said: "It is important to determine if James Daudi Salima (PW2) saw and clearly recognized the accused persons at the scene o f the crime. Steven s/o Mtiba Nyahucho (DW2) deposed that he was not at the scene o f the crime on the material time as he was grazing his heards o f cattle and that he returned home at 07:00pm and went ..on bed. Nyamhanga s/o Mtiba Nyahucho (DW1) like the first accused person stated that on the material day and time he was at Nyamakolele village running his business o f a barber shop. He left his business premises at 09:00pm and arrived to his home village at around 10:00pm.... It is upon this court to find which part of the story is more reliable than the other." In the light of the above, we are satisfied that the trial Judge took note and considered the appellants' defence of alibi and rightly rejected it on the ground that the evidence of PW2 squarely placed the appellants at the scene of the crime. In the end, we partly allow the appeal by quashing the conviction of murder and substitute it with the conviction of manslaughter. Subsequently, we set aside the sentence of death by hanging imposed by the trial court to the 1st appellant. Given the circumstances of the appeal before us, we sentence the 1st appellant to imprisonment term of 22 twenty (25) years to be counted from the date when he was put in incarceration. For the 2nd appellant who was serving his sentence at the President's pleasure because he was under eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offence, we find that the time he spent in custody while awaiting the review of his sentence was sufficient for him. Consequently, we make an order that Steven Mtiba Nyahucho be released from prison forthwith, unless he is otherwise lawfully held. DATED at MUSOMA this 17th day of February, 2025. B. M. A. SEHEL JUSTICE OF APPEAL L. G. KAIRO JUSTICE OF APPEAL A. S. KHAMIS JUSTICE OF APPEAL The Judgment delivered this 18th day of February, 2025 in the presence of the 1st & 2nd appellants in person via virtual Court from Musoma Prison and Mr. Nico Malekela, learned State Attorney for the ; is hereby certified as a true copy of the original. DEPUTY REGISTRAR COURT OF APPEAL