Criminal Appeal No
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA IN THE SUB-REGISTRY OF MTWARA AT MTWARA CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 33109 OF 2024 (Originating from the decision of the District Court of Nanyumbu at Mangaka in Criminal Case No. 9 of2024) YASSIN AHAMAD HAMIS.................................................
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- Criminal Appeal No
- Court
- TANZLII
- Jurisdiction
- Tanzania
- Judgment Date
- 1 January 2024
- Source Language
- en
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA IN THE SUB-REGISTRY OF MTWARA AT MTWARA CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 33109 OF 2024 (Originating from the decision of the District Court of Nanyumbu at Mangaka in Criminal Case No. 9 of2024) YASSIN AHAMAD HAMIS.............................................. APPELLANT VERSUS THE REPUBLIC.......................................................... RESPONDENT JUDGMENT 17h February & 18h March, 2025 MPAZE, J.: The appellant, Yassin Ahamad Hamis, was convicted by the District Court of Nanyumbu at Mangaka on his own plea of guilty for the offence of animal stealing contrary to sections 258(1) and 268(1) and (3) of the Penal Code [Cap 16 R.E. 2022] (the Penal Code). He was sentenced to fifteen (15) years of imprisonment. The particulars of the offence which resulted to the conviction and sentence of the appellant alleged that; on 3rd March, 2024 at or about 03:00 hrs at Kilosa village in Mkangaula ward within Nanyumbu District in Mtwara Region, the appellant did steal six (06) cows valued at Tshs 3,200,000/= (Three Million and Two Hundred Thousand), the property of one Ajili Said Mlawe. i When the charge was read over and explained to the appellant, he pleaded; '/V/ kweli nilliba ng'ombe sita (6) tarehe 3/3/2024 ma/i ya Aji/i Said M/awe.' Following the appellant's plea, the trial court entered a plea of guilty, after which the prosecution proceeded to narrate the facts of the case. Upon completion of the narration, the appellant was asked whether he admitted the facts, to which he responded; 'AH that has been read and explained to me about the facts is true and correct. I admit them all.' As stated, his plea of guilty, coupled with his admission of the facts, led to his conviction and subsequent sentence. Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence, he has appealed to this court on two grounds; 1. That the learned trial magistrate erred in both law and fact by considering a plea of guilty to convict the appellant, which resulted from misapprehension or mistake as he did not understand the nature of the piea. 2. That the trial magistrate erred in both law and fact by convicting the appellant while the prosecution failed to prove the offence beyond a 2 reasonable doubt as required under section 3(2)(a) of the Evidence Act [Cap 6 R.E2022]. During the hearing of the appeal, the appellant appeared in person, while the respondent was represented by learned State Attorney, Mr. Edson Lawrence Mwapili, who opposed the appeal. When invited to submit on his grounds of appeal, the appellant argued that despite pleading guilty, the trial magistrate ought to have given him time to reflect on the implications of entering such a plea. He simply made this submission and proceeded to ask the court to consider his grounds of appeal as presented. In response, the State Attorney Mr. Mwapili argued that the appellant's conviction and sentence were based on an unequivocal plea of guilty. He relied on section 360(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act [Cap 20 R.E 2022] (the CPA), which states that no appeal shall lie where a conviction is based on a plea of guilty, except on the extent or legality of the sentence. He further cited the case of Lawrence Mpinqa v. R [1983] TLR 166, which laid down exceptions under which a person convicted on a plea of guilty may appeal. These include; 3 1. Even when considering the admitted facts, the plea was imperfect, ambiguous, or incomplete. 2. The appellant pleaded guilty as a result ofmistake or misapprehension. 3. The charge brought against the appellant did not disclose an offence known to law. 4. Upon the admitted facts, the appellant could not, by law, have been convicted of the charged offence. He also cited Michael Adrian Chaki v R (Criminal Appeal No. 399 of 2019) [2021] TZCA 454 (9 September 2021), where the Court of Appeal emphasized that a valid conviction on a guilty plea can only stand if the above conditions are met. Mr. Mwapili contended that the appellant's plea was unequivocal, as the charge was read and explained to him before he responded. His response, 'It is true that I stole six cows on 3/3/2024, the property ofAjiii Said Mia we,' demonstrated a clear understanding of the charge. Furthermore, when the facts were read out, he admitted them without hesitation. He also confirmed that the stolen cows belonged to Ajili Said Mlawe and had no objection when they were tendered as exhibits. Thus, the claim that he did not understand the proceedings was unfounded. 4 Regarding the second ground of appeal, Mr. Mwapili submitted that section 372 of the CPA bars an appeal based on the sufficiency of evidence where a plea of guilty has been entered. Thus, the trial court was not required to assess the sufficiency of evidence as the plea itself was conclusive proof of the offence. He prayed that the appeal be dismissed, and the conviction and sentence be upheld. On rejoinder, the appellant maintained that the charge was not proven because the alleged exhibits were never tendered in court, nor was the justice of peace called as a witness. Having considered the grounds of appeal, the submissions by the parties, and the record of the trial court, the main issue for determination is whether the appellant's plea was unequivocal and whether his conviction was proper in law. First and foremost, I am aware of the general rule that the law does not allow an appeal against a conviction based on a plea of guilty, except on matters concerning the extent or legality of the sentence. This principle is clearly stipulated under section 360(1) of the CPA, which provides; 5 '360 (l)No appeal shall be allowed in the case ofany accusedperson who has pleaded guilty and has been convicted on such plea by a subordinate court except as to the extent or legality of the sentence.' However, as rightly explained by the learned State Attorney, an appeal against a conviction based on a plea of guilty may be entertained under exceptional circumstances, as outlined in Lawrence Mpinga v. R {supra). In light of the principles established in Lawrence Mpinga, the Court in Michael Adrian Chaki v. R Criminal Appeal No. 399 of 2019 [2021] TZCA 454 (9 September 2021), reaffirmed that; 'Closely examined, the above criteria suggest that there cannot be an unequivocal plea on which a valid conviction may be founded unless these conditions are conjunctively met: - '1 . The appellant must be arraigned on a proper charge. That is to say, the offence section and the particulars thereofmust be properly framed and must explicitly disclose the offence known to law; 2. The court must satisfy itself without any doubt and must be dear in its mind, that an accused fully comprehends what he is actually faced with, otherwise injustice may result. 3. When the accused is called upon to plead to the charge, the charge is stated and fully explained to him before he is asked to state whether he admits or denies each and every particular ingredient of the offence. This is in terms of section 228(1) of the CPA. 6 4. The facts adduced after recording a plea ofguilty should disclose and establish all the elements of the offence charged. 5. The accused must be asked to plead and must actually plead guilty to each and every ingredient of the offence charged and the same must be properly recorded and must be dear (see Akbarali Damji vs R. 2 TLR137 cited by the Court in Thuway Akoonay vs Republic [1987] TLR. 92); 6. Before a conviction on a plea of guilty is entered, the court must satisfy itself without any doubt that the facts adduced disclose or establish all the elements of the offence charged.' See also; Hussein Rashid Jumanne v. R (Criminal Appeal No.55 of 2020) [2023] TZCA 17641 (22 September 2023) and Paskali Kamara v. R (Criminal Appeal 457 of 2018) [2022] TZCA 631 (13 October 2022). Turning to the case at hand, on the first ground, this court finds that the plea entered by the appellant was clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal. The trial court fully complied with section 228(2) of the CPA by reading and explaining the charge to the appellant. The appellant's response explicitly confirmed his admission to the offence. Further, the facts read by the prosecution fully disclosed the elements of the offence, and the appellant affirmed their correctness without raising any objection. 7 The claim that the appellant did not understand the nature of the plea is unsubstantiated, as he not only admitted the charge but also admitted to be found in the possession of the stolen cows. Furthermore, he raised no objection when the cows were tendered as exhibits. Thus, the first ground of appeal lacks merit. Regarding the second ground, the court agrees with Mr. Mwapili that section 372 of the CPA bars an appeal on the sufficiency of evidence where a plea of guilty has been entered. The appellant was convicted based on his own admission, making it unnecessary for the prosecution to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the second ground is legally untenable. In light of the foregoing, the court finds no merit in the appeal. The appellant's plea was unequivocal, and the conviction was properly entered. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed, and the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court are upheld. It is so ordered. Dated at Mtyvara^his 18th March 2025. / - \ . M.B Mpaze I1 Judge L * a \< / / 8 Court: Judgment delivered at Mtwara on this 18th day of March, 2025 in the presence of Mr. Edson Lawrence Mwapili State Attorney, and the appellant. 9