CHRISTOME JUDGMENT DRAFT EDITED 1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA (DAR ES SALAAM SUB-REGISTRY) AT DAR ES SALAAM CIVIL APPEAL NO. 19188 OF 2024 [Arising from the Judgement and Decree of the Resident Magistrates' Court of Dar es Salaam at Kisutu in Civil Case No. 241 of 2022, dated 26.06.2024. Before Hon. R.S Mushi: PRM]. CHRISTOME CHRISTOME TEMBO ……………………………….......APPELLANT VERSUS INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK (TANZANIA)………… RESPONDENT JUDGMENT 21st & 29th November 2024 MWANGA, J. This appeal arises from the decision of the resident Magistrate Court of Dar es Salaam at Kisutu in Civil Case No.241 of 2022, whereby the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent the sum of TZS. TZS.65,898,010/= was the outstanding amount from the overdraft as of 06/08/2022. Interest rates will be paid at a rate of 7% from the date of judgment to the date of full payment. General damages will be paid at TZS. 5,000,000/=. The costs of this suit will also be paid. In a nutshell, the brief fact of this case, as can be depicted from the records, is that the appellant was the employee of the respondent. During 1 the employment contract, the appellant, on different occasions, applied for and was granted a staff term loan facility. On 21st July, he took TZS 45,000,000 to be repaid within 60 months. In April 2019, he took TZS. Thirty-five million to be repaid within 60 months, and in December 2021, TZS.12,000,000 to be repaid within 10 years. The loan was secured by using the Appellant's motor vehicle to make grand Vitara, the title deed of his brother, and surveyed land located at Kihonda. The loans were to be paid monthly through the appellant’s salary. It occurred that, on 8th March 2021, the appellant resigned from his job and then defaulted on paying the monthly payments. All efforts of the respondent searching for him became fruitless. Thus, the respondent sold the mortgaged house for TZS. 15,000,000 and then filed Civil Case No. 241 of 2022 before the Magistrate Court of Dar es Salaam at Kisutu, claiming, among other things, payment of TZS 65,898,010.8, which was the outstanding amount from several overdraft facilities secured by the defendant. The trial Court decided in favor of the respondent and gave the orders as stated above. Aggrieved, the appellant preferred the instant appeal fronting seven (7) grounds of grievances going thus; 1. That the learned Principal Resident Magistrate erred in law and fact by misdirecting himself when he made a finding to the effect that 2 the Appellant was served with a notice of default while it was not; 2. That the learned Principal Resident Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to consider the evidence on record and consequently led to a miscarriage of justice, such that the last loan facility dated 12 th December 2019 was a top-up of the two previous loan facilities and it ought to expire on 19th December 2029; 3. That the learned Principal Resident Magistrate erred in law and fact when he made a finding to the effect that the Appellant did not make any proper arrangements to repay the loan facility while it is not; 4. That the Principal Resident Magistrate erred both in law and fact when he made a find to the effect that the Appellant property at Kigamboni was properly sold by the Respondent while the evidence on record reveals that the Appellant was not involved in the whole process of advertisement and subsequent sale on the auction of the Appellant's property; 5. That the Principal learned that Resident Magistrate erred in law and fact by misdirecting himself in awarding the Respondent general damages to the tune of Tanzania Shillings Five Million (Tshs. 5,000.000/=) while the Respondent did not prove its case to the standard required of the law and consequently led to a miscarriage 3 of justice; 6. That the learned Principal Resident Magistrate erred in law and fact by awarding 7% interest to Respondent on the decretal amount of Tshs. 65,898,010.8, the amount which was not proved in evidence by the Respondent and consequently led to a miscarriage of justice; 7. The learned Principal Resident Magistrate erred in law and fact by awarding costs to the Respondent while the Respondent's case was not proved to the standard legally required. On the strength of the above grounds of appeal, the appellant invited the court to allow the appeal and to quash and set aside the whole of the Judgment, Decree, and findings of the Lower Court. Hearing the appeal took the form of a written submission in which both parties had representation. The appellant was represented by Mr. Octavian Mshukuma, while the respondent enjoyed the legal services of Ms. Vaileth Mutake, both learned advocates. In his written submission, Mr. Mshukuma intimated before the court that he wishes to submit on his grounds of appeal seriatim. However, in his submission, he combined the first and second grounds, the 6th and 7th grounds, and submitted the rest separately. In reply, Ms. Mutake combined the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd ground and consolidated the 5th, 6th, and 7th grounds. 4 Submitting in the combined grounds one and two, Mr. Mshukuma argued that the evidence of PW1 from the Respondent clearly shows that only the guarantor was served with a notice of default—exhibit P2 on page 24 of the proceedings. When cross-examined on pages 29-30 of the proceedings, PW1 admitted to having served notice of default to the guarantor one Matheo Komba only, and no service of notice of default was made to the Appellant. He added that the loan facility is expiring in December 2029, and as such, it was yet to expire when Civil Case No. 241 of 2022 between parties was initiated in the trial court. According to him, the said loan facility was not categorized as a Non-Performing Loan (NPL) or bad debt to qualify for unjust demand from the Appellant by the Respondent and finally initiate legal proceedings against him in a court of law. He was insistent that the proceedings in the trial court occasioned grave injustice to the appellant. To cement his submission, he cited the case of The National Bank of Commerce Limited vs. National Chicks Corporation Limited, Issack Bugali Mwamasika, Harold Bugali Mwamasika, Atuganile Issack Mwamsika & Innocent Issack Mwamasika, Civil Appeal No. 129 of 2015 (reported in https; /tanzlii.org/judgements/ ), whereby when faced with a similar situation the Court of Appeal of Tanzania (CAT) at pages 36- 37 of the decision made a finding that, the notice of default must be sufficient and must be 5 served upon the borrower in terms of section 127 of the Land Act, No. 4 of 1999 and that, there must be evidence adduced to that effect. The counsel added that, during the trial of the present case, no evidence at all was led or adduced that the notice of default was issued and served upon the Appellant. Regarding the third ground, it was his submission that the record from pages 33 -34 shows clearly that the appellant had made efforts and was available, but the Respondent, for obvious reasons and without justifiable cause whatsoever, decided to initiate legal proceedings in the trial court without even issuing a notice of default to the Appellant. In rebuttal, Ms. Mutake contended that in civil disputes, the claim and reliefs sought by any party must be proven on the balance of probabilities. She submitted that, during the hearing of the Respondent’s case, PW1 testified that the Appellant was her customer and a former employee to whom she lent three staff loans at different times. All staff loan facilities were tendered in court as Exhibit P1. She added that, in Exhibit Pl, specifically within the staff term loan facility, the repayment clause specifies that each loan must be repaid in monthly installments until the entire amount of the three loans is fully paid off and parties agree on that term. She submitted further that all three loans must be repaid through the Appellant’s salary in monthly installments without skipping 6 payments. According to her, if the defendant faced termination or resignation, they were obligated to repay the entire debt within 30 days to avoid default, which would permit the Respondent to take further action to recover the debt at the employee's expense, as established in the agreement during the Appellant's employment and outlined in exhibit P1. The counsel clarified that the appellant tendered his resignation letter, marked as Exhibit DI, requesting that the respondent allow him to continue paying his loans at the same interest rate for six months. According to her, the request contradicts the terms of Exhibit Pl, which states that in the event of termination or resignation, the employee must clear his loan within 30 days; otherwise, the respondent would begin charging commercial interest rates, as agreed upon by both parties. Ms. Mutake went on submitting that, from the date the Appellant wrote the resignation letter, he never returned to the Respondent nor made any efforts to pay his debt, and he has not repaid his debt to date, instead remained silent during this entire period until 2024, which is over two years later, when he finally came forward with a proposal to settle after realizing that the Respondent had already taken other recovery measures to reclaim her debt. The case had already been filed in court. She contended further that the respondent herein is a financial institution, and to make a profit, there must be cash flow. If money is kept idle for a long 7 time, it becomes a loss. The respondent must adhere to banking regulations as a financial institution, especially when dealing with defaulted long-term loans. She said all three loans taken by the Appellant had already become Non-Performing Loans, as, since his resignation, there had been no payments made by him nor any appropriate measures made within 30 days after his resignation, hence breaching the Agreement. According to Ms. Mutake, the sanctity of a contract requires that once two parties enter into a contract, they must fulfill their obligations under that contract. This means that they must do what they promised in the contract and back out of the contract with consequences. She referred the court to section 37 (1) of the Law of Contract Act, Cap 345 R. E 2019, which indicates that the parties to a contract must, unless legally excused from performance, perform their respective duties under the contract. She submitted that the Latin phrase "Pacta sunt servanda” means that "agreements must be kept. It was her submission, therefore, that it was appropriate for the trial magistrate to hold the appellant liable for this breach. Concerning notice, she submitted that, after noticing the breach, the Respondent decided to notify the guarantor of the Appellant. It is well known that without a breach, the guarantor has no role in the loan, and his involvement arises only when there is a breach; thus, the respondent 8 issued a default notice to the guarantor, which was exhibit P2, which was tendered during trial. According to her, this notice was received by the guarantor on April 29, 2021, known as Fulko Matheo Komba, and a copy of the notice was sent to the Appellant via postal address No. 14449, Dar es Salaam. In further view of Ms. Mutake, this postal box had been used by the Appellant throughout the duration of the loans. All staff term loan facility letters utilized that same address, and the Appellant never provided any notice of discontinuation of using that postal address. She contended that evidence of sending the default notice was tendered in court, including receipts from Tanzania Posts Corporation, all admitted without objection as exhibit P2. She added that the same affirms that the address was belong to the Appellant and that courier service was correctly affected, given that the courier address was not disputed or receipt of the stated post and even when the copy of receipt proving services was tendered, it was not objected therefore the Appellant was well notified as the proper service of a default Notice was done. Based on the above, her prayer was that the first, second, and third grounds of appeal be dismissed for want of merit. In a short rejoinder, the appellant reiterated his submission in chief. I have examined the rival submissions by the parties in light of the combined grounds of appeal and the weight they deserve. I have also 9 inquisitively scrutinized the trial court records availed before me. Before determining these grounds, I wish to point out from the outset that some issues still need to be disputed by the parties. Firstly, it is not disputed that the appellant was a respondent employee. Secondly, it is also not disputed that the appellant took overdraft loans from the respondent in terms and conditions evidenced by Exhibit P1. Thirdly, it is also not disputed that the said loan was secured using the Appellant's motor vehicle, grand Vitara, the title deed of his brother, and the surveyed land located at Kihonda. Fourthly, it is also common for the loans to be paid monthly through the appellant's salary. On that note, I will turn to determine the merits and demerits of grounds. In essence, in the first, second, and third grounds of appeal, the appellant's contention is based on two accusations: firstly, that the case was filed prematurely as the term of the loan was yet to mature, that the loan ends in 2029, and that he was not served with the notice of default. Starting with the allegation that the respondent filed a case pre-maturely, I had time to scrutinize the lower court record and exhibits tendered to it, in which it came to my findings that, as per exhibit P1 collectively, appellant took three different staff loans in which as per the term of contract he had to pay, monthly payment without skipping any installment. Yet there is another contract term, depicted in Clause (d) of 10 the agreement (Exhibit p1), which states that, in case of termination or resignation, the appellant had to pay the outstanding loan within 30 days to avoid defaults. Undoubtedly, under 37 (1) of the LCA, parties to a contract must perform their respective promises unless such performance is dispensed with or excused under this Act's provisions or any other law. It is also a trite principle of the law of contract that parties are bound by the agreement freely entered into and that there should be sanctity in the contract. This sound principle was stated in the case of Abualy Alibhai Aziz vs Bhatia Brothers Ltd [2000] TLR 288 on page 289, the case which was cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in the case of Simon Kichele Chacha vs Aveline M.Kilawe, Civil Appeal No 160 of 2018 and the case of Philipo Joseph Lukonde v. Faraji Ally Said [2020] 1 T.L.R. 556. For instance, in the latter case, it was observed that: “Once parties have entered into a contract, they must honor their obligations. Neither this Court nor any other court in Tanzania for that matter, should allow a deliberate breach of the sanctity of contract." Guided by the above authorities, it is apparent that, since the appellant entered into a loan agreement with the respondent and later breached the contract, and since he admitted that he resigned from 11 employment on 8th March 2021, he never serviced his loan. Since the loan terms required him to pay a monthly installment, and since the contract requires the appellant to pay the outstanding loan within 30 days to avoid defaults in case of termination or resignation, the appellant cannot claim that the loan term was yet to expire. Concerning services of notice of default, I think the same need not detain me, as the records reveal that the notice was served to the appellant's guarantor, the copy was served to the appellant through his postal address, and there is also a receipt to prove the same as evidenced by Exhibit P2 collectively. Thus, the allegations that the appellant was not served with the notice of default are wanting in merit. In the event, the 1st, second, and third grounds of appeal lack merit and are dismissed forthwith. About the fourth ground, it was submitted that the evidence on record on pages 24-27 and pages 29 -30 of the proceedings shows clearly that the appellant was not involved in the auction and subsequent sale of the property at Kigamboni, which was pledged as security to secure the appellant' staff loan facility. In his defense, he contended that the appellant denied having been involved in the auction and subsequent sale of the said property. Thus, this ground of appeal should be allowed. In response, it was Ms. Mutake’s submission that, in paragraph 4 on page 6 12 of the Judgment PW1, when giving testimony during the hearing, PW1 stated that the auction of the property, which had been placed as security, was conducted after an advertisement was published in the newspaper Habari Leo on the 19th day of August 2021, the newspaper which was tendered during the trial and admitted as Exhibit P5. She added that, before the advertisement, a default notice had already been issued to the Appellant and the Guarantor. According to Ms. Mutake, even after the publication, the Appellant did not take any action to repay the debt, thus prompting the Respondent to engage a broker to continue the recovery process. She said a valuation regarding the said property pledged as security was conducted, and the valuation report was admitted as Exhibit P4. According to her, the highest bidder was found, and the plot was purchased for TZS. 15,000,000 shillings, consistent with the valuation report. The certificate of sale was issued and admitted as exhibit P6. In her view, there was no noncompliance with the provisions of the law. She went on to submit that the advertisement took place on 19 August 2021, and the auction was held on 3rd September 2021, which occurred 14 days after the expiration period. She concluded that the ground lacks merit and needs to be dismissed. Having considered the party's submission in this ground of appeal, and upon inquisitive perusal of exhibits tendered, especially 13 Exhibit P2 and P5, collectively, the same reveals that the auction was advertised in Habari Leo dated 19/08/2021 and that was done after the default notice exhibit P2 was issued to the appellant and his guarantor. Further, in his evidence, the appellant has never stated that he challenges the said auction anywhere, even at the trial court; thus, to me, this is an afterthought idea. Therefore, in my profound view, the appellant’s allegations that he was not involved in the whole process of advertisement and subsequent sale on the auction of the Appellant's property is wanting of merit, and the same is bound to fail. Next is the fifth ground of appeal, in which the appellant contends that the trial magistrate erred in awarding the Respondent general damages to the tune of Tanzania Shillings Five Million (Tsh. 5,000.000/=) while the Respondent did not prove its case to the required standard. Mr. Mshukuma submitted that general damages are awardable as compensation to put the injured party in the former position they would have been in before injury, and there must be proof that the party awarded has been injured. He referred the court to the case of CRSG(T) Trading Co. Limited vs Prashant Motibhai Patel, Misc. Civil Case No. 59 of 2021 (Reported tanzlii and Tanzania Saruji Cooperation vs. African Marble Company Ltd., 5(2004) T.L.155, 14 He argued that from the evidence on record, there is no breach of the staff term loan facility by the Appellant, as the respondent has never issued a notice of default to the Appellant. As such, the Respondent has not suffered any injury at all. Instead, the Appellant has sustained the injustice by the trial court. He added that the trial court did not assign any reasons for awarding the Respondent general damages to TZS. 5,000,000/=; thus, the same should be set aside. In response, Ms. Mutake submitted that Civil matters are proved on the balance of probability upon tendering evidence on the reliefs sought by the one who claims to be compensated as provided under the provision of section 110 (2) of the Evidence Act, Chapter 6 R.E 2019. She also referred the court to the case of Ernest Sebastian Mbele vs. Sebastian Sebastian Mbele and two others, Civil Appeal No 66 of 2019 (reported in https: / /tanzlii.org She argued that, based on the facts and evidence on records, it is clear that the Respondent successfully proved her case by demonstrating that there were loan facilities between the parties. This was evidenced by the three-term loan facilities, which were admitted as Exhibit Pl. Additionally, through Exhibit Pl, the Respondent provided evidence of a breach of repayment obligation after the Appellant resigned and failed to repay the loan as agreed within 30 days of the resignation. Following this 15 breach, the Respondent made various efforts to recover the debt of 65,898,010.88 TZS, as shown in Exhibit P3, which was admitted in court during the hearing. She further submitted that it is accurate that the Respondent provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the Appellant had failed to repay the loan. There was evidence presented to clarify what had been breached by the Appellant. Therefore, it was correct for the Learned Principal Resident Magistrate to hold that the Respondent has proved his claim against the Appellant on the balance of probabilities during the hearing. The Respondent is entitled to the reliefs sought. To buttress his position, she cited to the court the case of Faustine Constantine Mng'anya & 3 others vs Rashid Jafari & 2 others, Civil Appeal No. 120 of 2021 (reported in https://tanzlii.org/judgments/), where it was held that no one has the mandate to dictate to the court the amount to be granted as general damages to a party. This is because the assessment of general damages is at the court's discretion and depends on the circumstances of each case. She was insistent that there is no formula for calculating general damages. Therefore, based on the case circumstances that led to the award of TZS 5,000,000, the court considered all relevant factors before deciding on that amount. 16 Having keenly considered the parties' submission about this ground of appeal. As submitted by both parties, general damage is indeed awarded at the court's discretion. That aside, general damages are limited to those claims that the law presumes to be direct, natural, or probable consequences of the act complained of and not otherwise. It is the function of the Court to determine and quantify the general damages to be awarded to the injured party. Still, the claimant must also aver it during evidence that such damage was suffered. See the case of Peter Joseph Kilibika Vs. Patric Aloyce Mlingi, Civil Appeal No. 37 of 2009 (CAT) As a matter of principle, general damages are at the discretion of the Court and are compensatory in character. They need not to be proved. The aim of awarding general damages is to restore the injured party to the position they had been in before the wrongdoing. Nevertheless, the trial court must assign the reasons justifying the award in awarding general damages. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting the amount of Tsh 5,000,000 and that the same was granted without assigning reasons. Going by the records, it is true that the trial magistrate did not give any reason for deciding to award Tsh. 5,000,000/=This being the first appellate court, which enjoys the powers of re-evaluating the evidence and coming up with its findings, notably where the lower court has failed to take into consideration matters that 17 should have been taken into consideration, I will evaluate the evidence to find whether the amount is justifiable. As can be depicted from grounds 1,2, and 3, it is not disputed that the appellant took three different staff loans from the respondent, and after their resignation on 8th March 2021, he stopped servicing his loan. In that respect, it is my firm position that when the appellant withheld the respondents’ money by stopping paying monthly installments since March 2021, financially speaking, it meant that the respondent was unfairly denied an economic opportunity to invest her money in any other interest- generating scheme of her choice from which she could have earned a return on investment. In that regard, the trial court was correct in awarding the general damages to Tshs. 5,000,000. Next are the sixth and Seventh Grounds of appeal, where the appellant contends that the learned Principal Resident Magistrate erred in law and fact by awarding 7% interest to the Respondent on the decretal amount of Tsh. 65,898,010.8 the amount, which was not proved in evidence by the Respondent and consequently led to a miscarriage of justice, and that the learned Principal Resident Magistrate erred in law and fact by awarding costs to the Respondent while the Respondent's case was not proved to the standard legally required. Mr. Mshukuma submitted that, from the first, second, third, fourth, 18 and sixth grounds of appeal as submitted, it goes without saying that the trial court erroneously awarded the Respondent 7% interest on the decretal amount and costs of the suit without any justifiable cause because the Respondent did not prove her case to the balance required of the law. That is to say, the Respondent did not issue a notice of default to the Appellant, requiring him to remedy the default, if any. Meanwhile, the staff term loan facility is expiring in December 2029. He said that at the time of filing the suit, which is the subject of the present appeal, the said loan facility had yet to expire and could not be categorized as a non- performing loan as required by the law. In the preceding circumstances, it was his submission that the appeal be allowed with costs to the appellant. In response Ms. Mutake cited the case of Dominions Zimanimoto Makukula (The Administrator of the estate of the late Dommy Dominicus Makukula) vs Dominica Dominicus Makukula and 3 Others, Civil Application No. 212/13 Of 2022 (reported in https://tanzlii.org/judgments//) at page 10 and submitted that, it must be emphasized that the exercise of the discretion to award costs is usually guided by the settled principle that costs must follow the event. Where a court of law departs from that principle by directing otherwise, it must give reasons in writing for that course, as stated in section 30 (1) of the 19 Civil Procedure Code, R.E 2019. According to her, the Court rightly assigned costs by condemning the losing party to bear the burden on the settled principle that costs follow the event. She concluded that the trial magistrate made a fair and just decision when granting reliefs sought by the respondent. The testimonies indicate that the Appellant breached the terms of the staff loan facility, and the Respondent proved her case on the balance of probabilities, as required by law. She prayed that the grounds of appeal be dismissed with costs, as they lack merit. I have keenly examined the contending submissions by the parties in light of these grounds of appeal, and I wish to start with the issue of interest. Undisputedly, interest is among the reliefs available to a party in a suit. Interests, at court rate as granted by the trial court, are statutorily provided, and the same is covered under section 29 and Order XX rule 21 of the Civil Procedure Code [Cap 33 R.E. 2019] (the CPC). In the same vein, Order XX rule 21 of the CPC provides that the rate of interest on every judgment debt from the date of delivery of the judgment until satisfaction shall be seven per centum per annum or such other rate, not exceeding twelve percentum per annum as the parties may expressly agree in writing before or after the delivery of the judgment or as may be adjudged by consent: 20 Therefore, Order XX rule 21 (1) fixes the court rate of interest at 7% per annum, which, if parties agree, can be increased to 12% per annum. In the instant appeal, the trial magistrate awarded 7 % of Tsh. 65,898,010/= from the date of judgment to the date of full payment, and the appellant contends that the outstanding amount was not proved; thus, awarding interest in that amount was wrong. I have inquisitively perused the trial court records and exhibit p2, the demand letter; by April 2021, the appellant had an outstanding amount of 66,667,000. This is also as per the evidence of PW1; it was also testified on page 27 of the proceedings that, after the mortgaged property was sold, the balance remained Tshs. 51,66,000 in September 2021, the respondent did not explain how the interest shot the debt to 65,898,010 within one year, that is, September 2021 to September 2022, when the plaintiff filed the case. Since no material explains how the debt reached that amount, the said amount needed to be proven; thus, the outstanding amount is 51,667,000. Therefore, the appellant should pay the interest at a court rate of 7% per annum from the date of Judgment to the date of full payment of the outstanding amount. Concerning costs, the rule is that awarding costs is not automatic; it is the court's discretion. In other words, costs are not granted to the successful party as a matter of course; it is entirely in the court's 21 discretion, and they are awarded according to the facts and circumstances of each case. This is well under section 30 (1) of the Civil Procedure Code [Cap 33 R: E 2022]. Although this discretion is vast, it must be exercised judiciously. When the court decides to deprive a party of cost, it must state the reasons. For instance, it was held that in the case of Mohamed Salimin vs Jumanne Omary Mapesa, Civil Application No. 04 of 2014 CAT at Dodoma. “Generally, costs are awarded at the court's discretion. But the discretion is judicial and has to be exercised upon established principles, and not arbitrarily or capriciously. One established principle is that costs would usually follow the event unless there are reasonable grounds for depriving a successful party of these costs. A successful party could lose his costs if the said costs were incurred improperly or without reasonable cause or by the misconduct of the party or his advocate. The list is not exhaustive. Each case would be dictated by its own set of circumstances”. In this appeal, the respondent, as a winning party, was awarded the costs of the suit. Applying the authorities above, it is apparent that the trial magistrate exercised its discretion and awarded costs to the respondent after satisfaction that she proved her case to the required standard, which is on the balance of probability. Thus, there was no need 22 to deprive the respondent of costs, and I see no need to interfere with that decision. Except for the outstanding amount, which has been reduced to TZS. 51,667,000, I find the appeal lacking in merit and dismiss it. The appellant bears the cost of the appeal. It is so ordered. MWANGA J JUDGE. 29/11/2024 COURT: Judgment delivered at Dar es Salaam in chambers this 29th November, in the presence of Mr. Octavian Mshukuma, counsel for the appellant, and Ms. Vaileth Mutake for the respondent. MWANGA J JUDGE. 29/11/2024 23