CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT ARUSHA rCORAM: NDIKA. J.A.. KITUSI. J.A.. And MASHAKA. J.A.l CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 382 OF 2022 DANIEL SIJALA BAKARI @ DANIEL SIGILA.........................1st APPELLANT HUSSEIN HASAN @ MOHAMED.......................................... 2nd APPELLANT VERSUS THE REPUBLIC.................................................................. RESPONDENT (Appeal from the Decision of the Resident Magistrate's Court of Arusha at Arusha) fKamala, SRM-Ext Juris.) dated the 29th day of July, 2022 in Criminal Appeal No. 2 of 2022 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 29th November, & 11th December, 2024 MASHAKA, 3.A.: The appellants, were jointly and together charged and convicted before the Resident Magistrate Court at Arusha in Economic Crime Case No. 67 of 2016 with one count alleged to have been committed on 6th October, 2016. The charge was in respect of unlawful possession of Government trophy contrary to section 86 (1) and (2) (b) of the Wildlife Conservation Act No. 5 of 2009 (the WCA) read together with Paragraph 14 of the First Schedule to, and sections 57 (1) and 60 (2) of the Economic and Organised Crime Control Act [CAP 200 R.E. 2002] (EOCCA) as i amended by the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 3 of 2016. A full trial ensued and as alluded they were convicted as charged. Accordingly, they were sentenced to pay fine of TZS. 306,040,000/= or serve twenty (20) years' imprisonment in default each. Aggrieved by the decision, the appellants appealed to the first appellate court and Kamala, SRM with Extended Jurisdiction found no merit in their appeal and dismissed it. Still dissatisfied, they have preferred the present appeal seeking to demonstrate their innocence. Before we address the nature of complaint, it is crucial to narrate a brief account of what led to the present appeal. The prosecution relied on the evidence of four witnesses* and a number of exhibits to prove the charge which the trial and first appellate court believed to be true. From the evidence of the prosecution, the Wildlife and the Police Officers were ahead of the culprits, having been tipped earlier. Raymond Mdoe (PW3) a Wildlife Officer working with the Anti-Poaching Unit at Arusha while conducting operations on poaching at Kiteto was tipped by an informant that there were people doing business in government trophies namely a rhino horn and leopard skins at Miyemba village, Chamwino District. He informed ASP James Kilosa (PW4) a police officer stationed at the Central Police Dar es Salaam. They were together in the said operations and decided to make a follow up on the said tip. So, PW3 and PW4 posing as interested buyers of the trophies went to Miyemba village with the aim of arresting the suspects. On reaching the said village, PW3 communicated with the informant who connected him to the people doing the said business. While at the village, two people turned up in response and introduced themselves as Stephano Mudi and Mtani Kichefuchefu and the police also introduced themselves as the businessmen who want to buy the rhino horn and four leopard skins. They told PW3 and PW4 that the trophies were not at the village and only the two of them would accompany them to the bush because they were conducting illegal business and no more people could be involved. After the negotiations that the price would be fixed after seeing the trophies, PW3 and PW4 were led to the bush away from the villagers' residence. In the bush, they were met by two people who introduced themselves as Daniel Sijala @ Sigala and Hussein Hassan, the first and second appellants respectively and all four of them entered a bush and after some minutes returned carrying a blue sulphate bag. The appellants took out of the blue bag the trophies for sale to the decoy buyers to appreciate the merchandise. That is when PW4 3 introduced himself that he was a police officer and placed two of them under arrest while the other two ran from the scene. PW4 and PW3 seized the government trophies. In his evidence, PW4 adduced that he prepared a certificate of seizure at the crime scene which was signed by both appellants witnessed by PW3 and PW4 the arresting officer. The said certificate of seizure (exhibit P6) showed the seized items, namely four leopard skins, a fake rhino horn and a blue sulphate bag was tendered by PW4. Both PW3 and PW4 testified as to the control and handling of the seized Government trophies at the crime scene and upon handing them over to PW1. The appellants were subsequently taken to the Central police station Arusha for interrogations and eventually arraigned in court. In the defence case, the appellants unwaveringly distanced themselves from the allegations by the prosecution. Apart from denying being at the crime scene, they denied having been arrested in possession of the government trophies on the 06/10/2016 and they refuted knowing each other. DW1 Daniel Sijala Bakari @Daniel Sigila, the first appellant testified that he was arrested on 02/10/2016 while preparing to visit his father at Mkoka. The second appellant, DW2 Hussein Hassan @ Mohamed testified that he got arrested on 04/10/2016 along a road from Soloomi village after his motor cycle had broken down. As we earlier mentioned, the trial court was satisfied that the prosecution had proven the charge against the appellants. The appellants were found guilty as charged, convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of TZS. 306,040,000.00, the tenfold value of the trophies, or twenty years' imprisonment in default thereof. They unsuccessfully appealed to the High Court and still undaunted are before us in this second appeal. The appellants filed similar memoranda of appeal fronting same 12 grounds of complaint paraphrased hereunder: 1. That, the trial court and the first appellate court erred in law and fact by failing to note that the charge sheet laid against the appellants did not cite the provision o fsection 113(2) o f the Wildlife Conservation Act rendering the trial a nullity for want o fjurisdiction as the appellants were arrested outside Arusha Region. 2. That, the trial court erred in law and fact in Economic Case No. 67 o f2016 to convict and sentence the appellants withoutnoticing that the consent and certificate conferringjurisdiction to the court were neither filed nor signed by the registry officer. 3. That, the first appellate court erred in law and fact to sustain conviction and sentence meted upon the appellants while during trial exhibits PI, P2, P3, P4, P5 and P6 were not properly identified during trial by the witnesses as they were already in their possession, and they are onesprayed to tender them as exhibits to the court. 4. That, the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by convicting the appellants without observing that there was noncompiiance with section 231 (1) o f CPA [Cap 20 R.E. 2022] as: i) The trial court failed to explain again the substance o f charge to the appellants before entering their defence, I) The trial court failed to inform the appellants o f their right to call witnesses under section 231(1) (b) o f CPA as there was no answerrecordedby the trialMagistrate regarding the same before calling them to enter their defence. 5. That, the trial and first appellate courts erred itj law and fact failed to note that the chain o f custody o f the alleged seized items was broken. 6. That, the trial and first appellate courts failed to scrutinize the prosecution evidence in terms o f alleged seized items to wit fake rhino horn and leopard skins as in what circumstance it was concluded that the said rhino horn was fake and leopard skins were real. 7. That, there was variance between charge and evidence adduced in terms o flocation as the charge mentions MIYEMBA VILLAGEbut the evidence suggests that it was outside MIYEMBA VILLAGE which rendered the charge defective. 8. That, the trial Court erred in law and fact to convict and sentence the appellants without considering that the prosecution side miserably failed to explain why an independent witness was not called to witness the said seizure as the evidence suggests that it was very possible to include the independent witness according to the circumstances o f alleged arrest and seizure. 9. That, the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in finding that PW3 and PW4 were credible witnesses without considering the vital shortcomings, contradictions and inconsistencies in their evidence. 10. That, the trial court and first appellate court erred in law and fact failed to note that the case against the appellants was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. 11. That, the trial court erred in law and fact as it summarized the defence o f the appellants and failed to accord due weight to it 12. That, the trial court erred in law and fact when it failed to note that there was a contravention o f the mandatory requirement o f section 38(3) o f the CPA. During hearing of the appeal, the appellants appeared in person unrepresented and the second appellant addressed the Court on behalf of the first appellant and on his own. After adopting the grounds of appeal and they opted to initially hear the submission of the respondent and to rejoin if need would arise. The respondent Republic had the services of Ms. Lilian Kowero assisted by Mr. Hendry Chaula, both learned Senior State Attorneys. Mr. Chaula addressed us and from the outset he resisted the appeal. 7 The complaint advanced in grounds one, two, four, seven, eleven and twelve of appeal encompasses procedural irregularities which we propose to determine first. Commencing with ground two, the appellants are challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court that it tried, convicted and sentenced them without knowing that the consent and certificate conferring it jurisdiction was not filed nor signed by the registry officer. To support their argument, they referred the case of John Julius Martin & Another v. Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 42 of 2020) [2022] TZCA 789 (8 December 2022 TANZLII) where the Court held that the trial court tried the case without jurisdiction because the consent and the certificate was neither endorsed as having been admitted by the trial court, nor does the record show that the documents were admitted, therefore the proceedings and decision were a nullity. Mr. Chaula, submitted in reply that the complaint was baseless as the record of appeal shows that a substituted charge accompanied by the consent of the Prosecuting Attorney in Charge and certificate of order for trial of an economic case in the Resident Magistrate's Court at Arusha were duly admitted by the trial Magistrate on 02/03/2020 after granting prayers by the Prosecuting Officer to file the said documents and substitute the charge. 8 In our considered assessment, we agree with the learned Senior State Attorney because as vividly shown at pages 3,4 and 50 of the record of appeal, the said documents were duly admitted by the trial Magistrate. The case of John Julius Martin & Another v. Republic (supra) is distinguishable as the situation in the above case is not similar to the state of affairs obtaining in this present appeal. Therefore, we hold that the trial court had the jurisdiction to try the economic case. Thus, ground two is baseless and we dismiss it. Moving to grounds one and seven of appeal, the complaint is that the charge failed to cite section 113 (2) of the WCA which renders the trial a nullity for want of jurisdiction as the appellants were arrested outside Arusha region. While in ground seven, they submitted that there is variance of the charge and the evidence regarding the scene of crime, as the charge stated Miyemba village while PW3 and PW4 stated it was outside the said village, hence the charge is defective. Mr. Chaula conceded that the charge as seen at page 3 of the record of appeal did not cite section 113 (2) of the WCA as it provides for the jurisdiction conferred on a court on Tanzania Mainland to try offences under the WCA. However, it was his contention that a charge is composed of a statement of offence which provides the section which creates the offence and the punishment and the particulars of offence which is not disputed. Therefore, it was not necessary to cite the said provision in the charge and notwithstanding, it is curable under section 387 of the Criminal Procedure Act CAP 20 R.E. 2019 (the CPA), he concluded. For ease of reference, we provide section 113 (2) of the WCA hereunder; '!Notwithstanding the provisions o f other written law, a court established for a district or area o f Mainland Tanzania may try, convict andpunish or acquit a person charged with an offence committedin any other district or area o fMainland Tanzania". We are persuaded by Mr. Chaula that it was not an omission to cite section 113 (2) of the WCA as it confers jurisdiction on a court established for a district or area of Mainland Tanzania to try, convict, punish or acquit a person charged with an offence committed on Tanzania Mainland. The law is settled and therefore variance of charge relating to where the offence occurred does not arise. We find grounds one and seven unmerited and we dismiss them. In ground four, the appellants' complaint is the failure by the trial magistrate to comply with section 231 (1) of the CPA founded on two 10 limbs; first, that the substance of charge was not again explained to the appellants before entering their defence, and second, they were not informed their rights to call witnesses in compliance to section 231 (1) (b) of the CPA as no answer was recorded by the trial Magistrate. Mr. Chaula countered that the record of appeal gathered from pages 85 to 86, the trial Magistrate complied with the dictates of section 231 (1) of the CPA. After having closed the prosecution case the trial magistrate ruled that the appellants had a case to answer, explained the substance of the charge and their rights to give evidence whether on oath or not and to call witnesses. Whereupon, each appellant responded that he would defend himself on oath and did not expect to call witnesses, which was duly recorded by the trial magistrate. Mr. Chaula implored us to dismiss this ground because it is baseless. We are in agreement with Mr. Chaula that the record of appeal speaks as to the compliance with section 231 (1) of the CPA at pages 85 and 86: "RULING Taking into consideration the prosecution evidence tendered above; this court finds that; prima facie case has been made out against both accused herein; ii 1. Daniel s/o Sija/a Bakari. 2. Hussein s/o Hasan @ Mohamed, and both o f them are called to defend their case. Section 231 o f the CPA CAP 20 P.E 2002 complied with. Signed: A. L. M ushi-SRM 09/06/2020 1stAccused - 1 will defend under oath. I will have no witnesses. 2ndAccused - 1 will defend under oath I will have no witnesses. I will defend myself...." From the excerpt above, the trial magistrate complied with section 231(1) of the CPA as the appellants were questioned and responded as reflected in the record of appeal. The ground is accordingly dismissed. In ground twelve, the appellants' complaint is that the trial court failed to note that there was contravention of the mandatory requirements of section 38 (2) of the CPA as no receipt signed by the appellants was issued, supporting their argument with the case of Pascal Mwinuka v. Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 258 of 2019) [2021] TZCA 174 (5 May 2021 TANZLII). They implored us to expunge exhibit P6. Mr. Chaula countered that the search was in accordance to section 42 of the CPA as 12 provided in exhibit P6 and not section 38 (3) of the CPA as contended by the appellants. Further, he asserted that since the search was conducted by a police officer of the rank of Inspector, then section 38 (3) was not applicable. Section 42 of the CPA provides for searches in emergencies where a police officer may search a person suspected by him to be carrying anything concerned with an offence. As clearly gleaned from exhibit P6, it was issued under section 42 of the CPA and not section 38 (3) of the CPA. Since PW4 issued exhibit P6 under the said provisions, we are settled that the procedure laid down under the provisions of section 38 (3) of the CPA could not be applied in the instant case. Thus, we are of the opinion that by virtue of section 42 of the CPA, no receipt was required to be issued and signed by the appellants. We find this complaint baseless and is dismissed. Next, we move to determine the complaint in ground ten whether the charge was not proven beyond reasonable doubt as alleged in grounds three, five and nine. In ground three, it is the contention of the appellants that exhibits PI, P2, P3, P4, P5, and P6 were not properly identified during trial by the persons who tendered them in evidence because the exhibits were in their possession and that they prayed to tender them as exhibits. 13 As this ground bears on ground five concerning chain of custody of seized items, we propose to determine them jointly. The appellants submitted in ground three that exhibits PI, P2, P3, P4, P5, and P6 were not properly identified by the prosecution witnesses and were not in the custody of the exhibit keeper (PW1). Further they argued that the chain of custody was broken because it is not known how and when the seized items were labelled before handing them over to PW1. Mr. Chaula countered that exhibits PI, P2, P3, P4, P5, and P6 were properly seized from the appellants by PW4 on 6thOctober, 2016 in a bush at Miyemba village after they introduced themselves to be dealing in government trophies and showed the fake rhino horn and 4 (four) leopard skins which were for sale. He further submitted that PW4 seized the items and filled exhibit P6 at the crime scene on the same day and both appellants signed it; the first appellant placed a thumb print and the second appellant signed and placed a thumb print. Also, he argued that PW3 signed as a witness to the seizure and at that very moment having been an experienced Ranger, Warden and Wildlife Officer for 16 years identified that the rhino horn to be fake and the leopard skins to be government trophies. Further in explaining how the officers were able to identify a real and fake 14 government trophy, he submitted that PW1 an experienced Game Warden with 36 years of experience at KDU office who testified that on 07th October, 2016 at his office, PW4 and the appellants entered his office with some government trophies. One of PWl's duties, Mr. Chaula argued, is to receive and keep in safe custody government trophies. Having received the alleged trophies form PW4, filled exhibit PI hatiya makabidhiano'the handing over form which stated that the seized items from the appellants on 06/10/2016 were four leopard skins, a blue sulphate bag and a fake rhino horn. He further showed that both PW1 and PW4 signed the said exhibit witnessed by the appellants who signed the same acknowledging that the seized items were handed over to PW1. Also, the first appellant placed a thumb print while the second appellant appended his signature and a thumb print. After filling exhibit PI, he presented that PW1 labelled the four skins of leopard and the blue sulphate bag used to carry them by the date of receiving them and were kept in the store for custody. Also, the fake rhino horn was handed over to him. On 08/10/2016, PW1 handed over to PW2 the four leopard skins for valuation and identification, both signed exhibit P2. On that same day, PW2 returned the four leopard skins in the blue sulphate bag and again both signed exhibit P2. A trophy valuation certificate exhibit P5 was issued on 08/10/2016 by PW2 15 confirming that the seized four leopard skins were indeed government trophies valued at TZS. 30,604,000.00 which equals the unlawful killing of four leopards. PW1 tendered the four leopard skins which were in one sulphate bag blue in colour and admitted in evidence as exhibits P3 collectively and P4 respectively, he concluded. During trial, the foundation and documentation of the chain of custody was laid by PW1 who tendered exhibits PI, P2, P3 and P4. Exhibit P5 was tendered in evidence by PW2 who also identified exhibit P2 and which was between him and PW1 as there was no requirement for the appellants to sign it. PW2 also identified exhibits P3 and P4. The seizure certificate exhibit P6 was tendered in evidence by PW4. Revisiting the whole evidence by the prosecution, we observe that PW3 and PW4 encountered the appellants in an illegal business deal to buy government trophies from the appellants who later confirmed that they had no permit from the Director of Wildlife. We are of the view that the appellants knew they were involved in selling government trophies without a permit as they had told PW3 and PW4 and recommended to conclude the deal in the bush away from the prying eyes of Miyemba villagers. PW4 arrested them and issued exhibit P6. It is acknowledged 16 that there was no independent witness and we will deal with it in ground eight of appeal in due course. As PW1 laid the foundation of the whole case after the arrest of the culprits and seizure of the trophies by PW4, it is our considered view that the chain of custody of the seized items which were kept in his custody, was not broken. We now move to determine whether or not the chain of custody of the exhibits was broken which is the complaint in ground five. There is evidence showing at the time of seizure and arrest, PW4 seized exhibits P3 and P4 as shown in exhibit P6 and later by exhibit PI handed over to PW1. The record shows that exhibits P3 and P4 were handed over to PW1 being the custodian of exhibits at KDU, Arusha and he tendered in court at the trial. We are alive to the fact that according to the evidence of PW3 and PW4, the seizure of the exhibits (exhibit P6) took place on 06/10/2016 and the next day PW4 handed over as shown by exhibit PI the seized items to PW1. Also, PW2 received exhibit P3 collectively carried in exhibit P4 for identification and valuation from PW1 through the handing over form (exhibit P2) and the trophy valuation certificate (exhibit P5) is proof that the four leopard skins were government trophies. There is no dispute 17 the prosecution established the fact that the chain of custody for exhibits P3 collectively and P4 was not broken. Thus, we find no doubt as each day was documented and accounted for and the chain of custody was intact. The prosecution proved that the chain of custody of the exhibits was unbroken as documented, which is an important component in proving the charge against the appellants. As alluded earlier, the appellants are complaining in ground eight of appeal that the there was no independent witness during the search and seizure after being arrested by PW4 on 06/10/2016 and supported their position by referring to the case of Pascal Mwinuka v. Republic (supra). In reply, Mr. Chaula conceded that there was no such witness on that day at the crime scene. He argued that the evidence of PW3 and PW4 showed that they did the deal away from the residential area in a bush as directed by the appellants because they were doing an illegal business. He contended that section 106 of the WCA does away with an independent witness where the offence committed is not in a residential area and maintained his position with the case of Papaa Olesikaladai @ Lendemu & Another v. Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 47 of 2020) [2023] TZCA 51 (20 February 2023 TANZLII). 18 We have traversed this area in a number of our decisions. It is undisputed that no independent witness was fielded by the prosecution in support of its case. PW3 and PW4 testified that they conducted the illegal business with the appellants in a bush. We agree with Mr. Chaula that in terms of section 106 (1) of the WCA, and as we held in Papaa Olesikadai @ Lendemu and Another v. Republic (supra) the presence of an independent witness depends on the circumstances of each case. If an offence is committed in a remote area, bush or forest where an independent witness cannot be procured, his presence can be dispensed with in terms of section 106 (1) of the WCA. See for instance Emmanuel Lyabonga v. Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 257 of 2019) [2021] TZCA 152 (29 April 2021 TANZLII), Matata Nassoro and Another v. Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 329 of 2019) [2022] TZCA 690 (2 November 2022 TANZLII) and Jason Pascal and Another v. Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 615 of 2020) [2022] TZCA 448 (19 July 2022 TANZLII). We find the complaint in this ground unmerited and we dismiss it. The next complaint by the appellants is in ground nine, that since the evidence of PW3 and PW4 was full of contradictions and inconsistencies, they were not credible witnesses for the trial court to rely 19 on and ground conviction. They picked on the differences concerning the size of exhibit P3 collectively and the difference of the colour of exhibit P4 as it was stated to be blue and the other description was ocean blue. Mr. Chaula contended that there were no inconsistencies nor contradictions in the evidence of PW3 and PW4. He expanded that they referred to the same date of occurrence of the offence, same crime scene Miyemba village in the bush, names of the appellants, name of the government trophy seized from the appellants and the steps taken thereafter. In conclusion, he urged us to find that they were credible and reliable witnesses to be relied upon by the trial court. The law demands that, where, in a trial there are contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, the trial court has to address them, and decide whether they are minor or go to the root of the matter. We are cognizant of the fact that the finding on this issue is vital to this case which is wholly dependent on the testimonies of PW3 and PW4. Their credibility is therefore not a matter to be taken lightly. We however bear in mind that not every contradiction and inconsistencies are fatal to a case, see for instance, Dickson Elia Nsamba Shapwata and Another v. Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 92 of 2007) [2008] TZCA 17 (30 May 2008 TANZLII). And that minor 20 contradictions are a healthy indication that the witnesses did not have a rehearsed script of what to testify in court. See for instance, Onesmo Laurent @ Salikoki v. Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 458 of 2018) [2022] TZCA 594 (30 September 2022 TANZLII). In the instant appeal, having carefully scrutinized the prosecution evidence, we agree that the discrepancies in the testimonies of PW3 and PW4 are minor in the circumstances of this case because three years had passed since they witnessed the event. In Mathias Bundala v. Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 62 of 2004) [2007] TZCA 16 (16 March 2007 TANZLII), the Court held in part that: "...when a witness gives evidence after a long interval, say six years, following the event, allowance ought to be given for minor discrepancies". We have found nothing in their evidence to lead us to any assumption that the same is improbable. Save for the appellants' bare denials, the evidence of PW3 and PW4 is above suspicion. We are of the opinion that the evidence of PW3 and PW4 was credible, reliable and coherent as the appellants did not assail the character of the witnesses. The discrepancies in terms of the size of the skins is minor as it was not alleged that there were no leopard skins. Additionally, the difference of 21 the kind of blue colour of exhibit P4, we find it pointless as they did not dispute that there was no sulphate bag which was blue in colour. We cannot see any contradictions or inconsistencies, let alone material ones, in the evidence of those witnesses. Consequently, it is our finding that the prosecution proved through PW3 and PW4 that the appellants were found in possession of exhibit P3 collectively which were carried in exhibit P4 without a permit from the Director of Wildlife. We therefore do not agree with the appellants on this ground and we dismiss it. After considering all relevant factors, we are satisfied that the integrity and evidential utility of the seized leopard skins remained intact. Further the experience and expertise of PW3 and PW4 as expounded well in their evidence were able to identify at the earliest that the rhino horn was fake and quite obvious not a government trophy as the appellants had questioned in ground six. Given the position we have taken in resolving all the complaints, we find that ground ten of appeal has no merit. Next for consideration is the complaint in ground eleven of appeal that the trial court failed to consider and give due weight to their defence evidence. The appellants did not elaborate more. Mr. Chaula in reply argued that the defence evidence as recorded by the trial court from 22 pages 87 to 90 of the record of appeal was a total denial of the prosecution evidence in terms of the charge that it was fabricated against them, had no knowledge at all of PW3 and PW4 who met and later arrested them and they did not know anything about the exhibits tendered in evidence. The appellants cross examined the prosecution witnesses but did not raise any doubt to the prosecution evidence. Mr. Chaula further argued that the trial court properly considered the defence evidence as gleaned at page 115 of the record and found that it raised no doubt to the prosecution case. The issue in question is on the consideration of the defence case by the trial court. It is settled that the trial court has the duty to summarize the evidence for both sides and subject the entire evidence to an objective evaluation. We held in Leonard Mwanashoka v. Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 226 of 2014) [2015] TZCA 294 (24 February 2015 TANZALII): "It is one thing to summarize the evidence for both sides separately and another thing to subject the entire evidence to an objective evaluation in order to separate the chaff from the grain. It is one thing to consider evidence and then disregard it after a properscrutiny or evaluation and another thing not to consider the evidence at all in the evaluation or analysis." 23 In the present case, the trial court summarized the prosecution and the appellants7evidence and analysed both the evidence. After the trial court had summarized the appellants' evidence at pages 108 to 109 of the record of appeal, it properly considered the evidence at page 115 of the record. We garnered at the said page that there was no omission as a critical analysis was made and the trial court had this to say: "7/7 their defence the accused persons have narrated different stories o f their arrest and they do not explain at aii on the issues o f them being found in unlawful possession o f government trophies. The duty o f the accused persons is to raise doubt on prosecution case. However, looking on defense evidence it raises no any doubt on the prosecution evidence." In our view, the trial magistrate considered the defence evidence as the appellants narrated different stories and did not explain how they were found in possession of the trophies, claiming that the prosecution fabricated evidence against them without assigning any reasons for the fabrication since they did not know them. The trial court rejected it and we find no reason to interfere with that finding. Thus, we find this ground of appeal lacks merit and we dismiss it. 24 In the circumstances, we find that the prosecution case was proved beyond reasonable doubt. So, we have no doubt that the appellants were rightly convicted of the offence charged and the sentenced imposed on them was the proper penalty. For those reasons, this appeal is dismissed in its entirety. DATED at ARUSHA this 10th day of December, 2024 G. A. M. NDIKA JUSTICE OF APPEAL I. P. KITUSI JUSTICE OF APPEAL L. L. MASHAKA JUSTICE OF APPEAL Judgment delivered this 11thday of December, 2024 in the presence of Appellants in persons - unrepresented and Ms. Tobiesta Chang'a, learned State Attorney for the Respondent/Republic is hereby certified as a true copy of the original. J. J. KAMALA DEPUTY REGISTRAR COURT OF APPEAL