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IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA GEITA SUB-REGISTRY AT GEITA LAND APPEAL NO. 1500 OF 2025 (Originating from the decision of the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Geita in Land Application No. 08 of 2019 dated 05 December 2024 before Kato-Chairperson) DAUDI PETRO KASAMBULA (Administrator of the estate of the late PETRO MICHAEL KALAGO) -------------------------------------- APPELLANT VERSUS VASTA ANDREA (Administrator of the estate of the late JOASH MPENDE) --------------------------------------------- 1st RESPONDENT VASTA ANDREA --------------------------------------------------------- 2nd RESPONDENT JUDGMENT Date of last Order: 07/03/2025 Date of Judgment: 21/03/2025 K. D. MHINA, J. This is the first appeal. It stems from the District Land and Housing Tribunal ("the DLHT") for Geita in Land Application No. 08 of 2019, whereby the appellant in the instant appeal, inter alia, claimed against the 1|Page respondents for ownership of the land located at Msalala Road Street within Kalangalala Ward in Geita District. Following that controversy, the appellant claimed before the DLHT the following reliefs; (1) A declaration that the applicant is a legal owner of the suit land. (2) Costs and (3) Any other relief (s) the Court may deem fit and equitable to grant. At the end of the trial, the DLHT dismissed on merits the applicant’s application. In dismissing the application, the DLHT held inter alia that the order of extension of time issued under section 44 (1) of the Law of Limitation Act (“the LLA”) by the Minister indicated that the extension was given to file a matter against Helena Mboje Bujimu and 16 others for a dispute arising in 1999, however; instead, he filed the dispute against the respondent for a dispute arose in 2014. Further, it held that the appellant failed to prove his ownership over the suit land. Undeterred by the DLHT judgment, the appellant the appeal with the following four (4) grounds of appeal; 2|Page i. That the trial Chairperson did not properly evaluate the evidence adduced by the appellant during the trial, especially in terms of the tendered documents; exhibit PE-3, that is, a letter of request for extension of the time limit and an order for extension of the period of limitation (all of which were admitted collectively). ii. That the trial Chairperson grossly erred in law and, in fact, by holding that the extension order within which the appellant was to institute a suit was issued only against one Helena Mboje Bajimu and 16 others in exclusion of the respondents. iii. That the trial Chairperson grossly erred in law and, in fact, by misdirecting himself that the cause of action in the present case arose in 2014, apart from the time indicated in the extension order. iv. That the trial Chairperson erred in law and fact by holding that the suit land being displaced/deserted by the appellant’s family for more than 29 years, the ownership of the land in dispute shifted to other persons who he failed to describe (in other words, the trial Chairperson left the question of ownership over the suit land unresolved). At the hearing, the appellant was represented by Mr. George Alfred, a learned advocate. On the other hand, the respondents were absent after the efforts to secure their attendance proved futile. The last service was by way of substituted service in Mwananchi Newspaper, dated 19 February 2025; thus, the appeal proceeded ex-parte against them. 3|Page In supporting the appeal, Mr Alfred abandoned the 3rd ground of appeal and started by arguing the 1st and 2nd grounds jointly. Amplifying the joint 1st and 2nd grounds, he submitted that the DLHT did not correctly evaluate exhibit PE3, a letter from the applicant requesting an extension of time and an order for an extension of time issued by the Minister by holding that the extension order had nothing to do with the respondents. He explained that the extension order mentioned only one name, Hellena Mboje Bajimu and 16 others, while the names of 16 others were not mentioned. However, the appellant’s letter requesting an extension (exhibit P3) requested an extension of time in relation to four different parcels of land. Furthermore, he argued that the DLHT was supposed to read the extension order together with the applicant’s letter to request an extension of time. In that letter, the DLHT could have discovered that one of the parcels of land in which an extension was requested was located at Msalala Road. 4|Page On the 4th ground, Mr. Alfred submitted that DLHT failed to determine the lawful owner of the disputed land. Thus, he prayed that this Court give directives by declaring the appellant a lawful owner. Having gone through the record of the DLHT and submission from the counsel for the appellant, I will start to deliberate and determine the 1st and 2nd grounds of appeal. These two grounds are intertwined; they both revolve around the issue of an order of extension of time issued by the Minister under section 44 (1) of the LLA. The complaints on the grounds are: One; the DLHT failed to evaluate correctly exhibit PE 3 collectively, a letter of request for extension of the time limit and an order for extension of the period of limitation and Two, the DLHT erred by holding that the extension order within which the appellant was to institute a suit was issued only against one Helena Mboje Bajimu and 16 others in exclusion of the respondents. On this, it is essential to go through the requesting letter from the appellant to the Minister requesting an extension of time and the order of the Minister for an extension of time, the documents which were admitted at the trial as exhibit PE3. 5|Page In the letter dated 2 February 2018, the appellant mentioned the parcels of land under dispute were located at Nyantorotoro, Nyankumbu, Mbugani and Msalala Road within Geita District; the cause of action arose in 2014. The letter did not mention the respondents. Further, the letter indicated that there were “intended applications attached”; however, those intended applications were not tendered at the trial. On the other hand, in the order of the Minister dated 5 November 2018, the extension was granted to file a land dispute against Hellen Mboje Bujimu and 16 others for a dispute that arose in 1999. The extension was granted to run from 30 October 2018 to 30 November 2024. From the above facts, the law in our jurisdiction, under section 44(1) of the LLA, is clear that the Minister responsible for legal affairs is empowered to extend the time to file suits in the Court of law. The section read as follows; 44.-(1) Where the Minister is of the opinion that in view of the circumstances in any case, it is just and equitable so to do, he may, after consultation with the Attorney-General, by order under his hand, extend the period of limitation in respect of any 6|Page suit by a period not exceeding one-half of the period of limitation prescribed by this Act for such suit. The Court of Appeal of Tanzania in Rajabu Hassan Mfaume vs Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly & Children (Civil Appeal 287 of 2019) [2022] TZCA 148 (28 March 2022), when explained the applicability of Section 44 (1) of the LLA; it pointed out three issues, which, when co-exist, justify the extension order. The issues are: - “One, the extension may be granted if the Minister is satisfied that it is just and equitable to do so in view of the circumstances of the case. Two, the grant should be made by the Minister after consultation with the Attorney General and Third, the allowable extension must not exceed one-half of the period of limitation for such a suit”. In the instant appeal, the extension order issued by the Minister under section 44 (1) of the LLA on 5 November 2018 clearly, as I previously alluded to, indicates that the appellant was granted an extension of time to commence proceedings against Helena Mboje Bujimu and 16 others for the 7|Page cause of action arose in 1999. Further, the extension order did not mention who were the 16 others. However, before the DLHT; One, the appellant lodged a dispute against Vasta Andrea (the administratrix of the estate of the late Joash Mpende) and Vasta Andrea, the respondents, in Land Application No. 08 of 2019, subject to this appeal. Two: the cause of action for the dispute filed between the appellant and the respondents arose in 2014. On this, while supporting the appeal, Mr. Alfred submitted that though the extension order mentioned only one name of Hellena Mboje Bajimu and 16 others, while the names of 16 others were not mentioned, the DLHT was supposed to read the extension order together with the applicant’s letter to request an extension of time. His reason was that had the DLHT read the letter with the extension order, it could have been discovered that one of the parcels of land in the request letter located at Msalala Road was the disputed land in the application at the DLHT. Based on the foregoing discussion, I have the following; 8|Page One, it is clear that what the applicant filed at the DLHT was contrary to what was ordered and contained in the extension order. In the extension order, the grant was to commence the proceedings against Helena Mboje Bujimu and 16 others for the cause of action that arose in 1999. On the other hand, at the DLHT, the appellant commenced proceedings against Vasta Andrea (the administratrix of the estate of the late Joash Mpende) and Vasta Andrea as the respondents for the cause of action that arose in 2014. Therefore, an act of the appellant was improper and unlawful because; First, in my view, the grantee of the extension order issued by the Miniter under section 44 (1) of the LLA has no power to go beyond the terms and conditions granted under the order. Second, the grantee of the extension order issued by the Miniter under section 44 (1) of the LLA is bound by the extension order. That means the grantee is duty-bound to act on the conditions canvassed in the extension order. The grantee is not allowed to file a case contrary to the terms and conditions given in the order. 9|Page Thus, the extension order is not an “open cheque” for a grantee to file the proceedings against whoever he/ she wishes or contrary to what was granted by the order. Two, the issue of reading the appellant’s request letter for extension and the order for extension together was/is of no help to the appellant, contrary to what Mr. Alfred had submitted. This is because, first, in my view, the extension order issued under section 44 (1) of the LLA is a stand-alone and “self-contained” order; it does not need to be read together with a letter of request from the grantee. There is no law directing such a requirement. The grantee is bound by the extension order and not a request letter for extension. Second, even if we consider the request letter, it still is of no help. This is because the appellant did not mention any person to whom he requested an extension to commence proceedings to be granted. The letter did neither mention the respondents nor “the 16 others.” Third, the letter indicates that the cause of action arose in 2014, while the extension order mentioned the cause of action occurred in 1999. 10 | P a g e Further, the issue by Mr. Alfred that the appellant, in his request letter, mentioned four parcels of land located at Nyantorotoro, Nyankumbu, Mbugani and Msalala Road and that one parcel of the land mentioned was connected with the land located at Msalala Road, a subject matter at the DLHT is of no weight, ambiguous and unreliable. The reason is that even the descriptions of the lands were not given in that letter. At least the description, such as title number if the land is registered, location, size and neighbours or boundaries, as that would clear the ambiguity and connect the lands mentioned in the request letter and the land subject matter at the DLHT and this appeal. Without such a description, it is not sufficient to connect the land mentioned in the letter of request for an extension order and the land, which was a subject matter of the application at the DLHT. From the above discussions, the 1st and 2nd grounds of appeal are meritless because the grantee was bound by the extension order, and nowhere “the 16 others” were mentioned, either in the extension order or the request letter. 11 | P a g e Therefore, the DLHT correctly evaluated the evidence, especially the documents exhibit PE-3, a letter of request for an extension of time and an order for an extension. Also, the DLHT was correct in holding the extension order issued was to institute a suit against Helena Mboje Bajimu and 16 others in the exclusion of the respondents. Thus, the 1st and 2nd grounds of appeal are dismissed. Reverting to the 4th ground of appeal, this should not detain me long. The main complaint in the ground is the DLHT left the question of ownership over the suit land unresolved. On this, in its decision dated, the DLHT dismissed the application on merits after it found the extension order was not in relation to the respondents and the appellant failed to prove the ownership of the suit land. Further, in their joint written statement, the respondents prayed for the applicant’s application to be dismissed. However, they did not file the counter-claim to seek the declaration of being a lawful owner of the suit land. Therefore, the DLHT was proper, and rightly, it could not declare the appellant as a lawful owner of the suit land since his case was dismissed. 12 | P a g e Equally, the DLHT was also proper in not declaring the respondents as the lawful owners of the suit land after dismissing the appellant's case. This is because the respondents did not plead ownership by way of the counterclaim, and as elementary law, which is settled, Courts will grant only a relief which has been prayed for as it was held in James Funke Gwagilo vs. Attorney General [2004] T.L.R. 161. See also Melchiades John Mwenda vs. Gizelle Mbaga (Administratrix of the Estate of John Japhet Mbaga-deceased) and two others, Civil Appeal No. 57 of 2018 (Tanzlii), where the Court of Appeal held that; “Given the above, we think the trial High Court fell into error when it declared the second respondent the lawful owner of the disputed land. We say so because, first, in addition to the reasoning in the foregoing paragraph, the evidence did not prove so on a balance of probabilities, and, secondly, the second respondent did not plead ownership by way of counterclaim. It is elementary law which is settled in our jurisdiction that the court will grant only a relief which has been prayed for”. [Emphasis provided] Therefore, as per the law, the DLHT was proper by not declaring the appellant or respondents who were the lawful owners of the suit land after dismissing the appellant’s case. 13 | P a g e Thus, the 4th ground of appeal is also meritless. Flowing from above, all grounds raised in a memorandum of appeal are meritless. Thus, the appeal is devoid of merits and consequently, it is dismissed with no order to costs. It is so ordered. K. D. MHINA JUDGE 21/03/2025 Court: The right to appeal is fully explained. K. D. MHINA JUDGE 21/03/2025 14 | P a g e