dickson mangia another vs anna philipo moshi 2018 tzhc 2454 21 november 2018
The application was incompetent because it was brought under the wrong enabling provision; the Land Disputes Courts Act, not the Law of Limitation Act, governs extension of time for appeals from DLHT decisions.
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- dickson mangia another vs anna philipo moshi 2018 tzhc 2454 21 november 2018
- Parties
- Applicant: Dickson Mangia; Applicant: Elikanawe Philipo Moshi; Respondent: Anna Philipo Moshi (Legal representative of the late Priscila Zakayo Mfinanga)
- Court
- TZHC
- Jurisdiction
- Tanzania
- Judgment Date
- 21 November 2018
- Procedural Posture
- Miscellaneous Land Application / Ruling on Preliminary Objection Regarding Application for Extension of Time
- Outcome
- Application struck out with costs
- Legal Topics
- Extension of Time, Jurisdiction, Proper Enabling Provision
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Dickson Mangia
Applicant
Elikanawe Philipo Moshi
Applicant
Anna Philipo Moshi (Legal representative of the late Priscila Zakayo Mfinanga)
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Miscellaneous Land Application / Ruling on Preliminary Objection Regarding Application for Extension of Time
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether section 14(1) of the Law of Limitation Act is the proper provision to move the court for extension of time to appeal against a DLHT decision
- 2 Whether the application is competent before the court
Ratio Decidendi
The application was incompetent because it was brought under the wrong enabling provision; the Land Disputes Courts Act, not the Law of Limitation Act, governs extension of time for appeals from DLHT decisions.
Court Disposition
Application struck out with costs
Orders
- Application struck out for being incompetent
- Costs awarded to the respondent
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (ARUSHA DISTRICT REGISTRY) AT ARUSHA MISCELLENEOUS LAND CASE NO. 68 OF 2018 (Arising from Arusha District Land and Housing Tribunal; Application no. 37 o f2009) DICKSON MANGIA...................................... 1stAPPLICANT ELIKANAWE PHILIPO MOSHI.................. 2nd APPLICANT VERSUS ANNA PHILIPO MOSHI (Legal representative Of the late priscila Zakayo Mfinanga............RESPONDENT I. MAIGE, 3 RULING 1. This is an application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Arusha ("DLHT")in Application No. 37 of 2009. The application is premised on the provision of section 14 (1) of the Law of Limitation Act, Cap. 89, RE.2002 ("the LLA") and is supported by the joint affidavit of the applicants. i 2. The respondent has, through his advocate one Elikunda George Kipoko, deposed a counter affidavit opposing the factuality of the application. In addition, she has doubted, by way of a notice of preliminary objection ("PO"), the appropriateness of section 14(1) of the LLAin moving the Court for enlargement of time to appeal against a decision of the DLHT. 3. When the matter came for the disposal of the preliminary objection, advocate Lawena represented the applicant whereas advocate Juliana Moshi represented the respondent. I allowed the parties to address me on the PO by way of written submissions. The respondent through her counsel Kipoko filed her written submissions in due compliance with the Court order. The applicant did not. I took it that he was not contesting to the PO. 4. The submissions of Mr. Kindoko in support of the PO was very brief but precisely. He submitted that the time limit for an appeal arising from the decisions of DLHT is set out in the Land Disputes Courts Act. The power of the Court to extend time to appeal from such decisions is expressly provided for under section 41(2) of the Land Disputes Courts Act as amended by the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendment) Amendment Act (No.2) of 2016. 5. I have considered the submissions. With respect, I agree with the counsel for the respondent that this Court has not been properly 2 moved in entertaining the application. There being a specific law providing for application for extension of time, the LLA cannot by itself move the Court for the grant of the same. This is in accordance with the provision of section 43 (f) read together with section 46 thereof. 6. For those reasons therefore, the PO has merit and it is sustained. The application is hereby struck out with costs for being incompetent. I.taAJAaC JUDGE 21/ 11/2018 Ruling delivered this 21st day of November 2018 in the absence of the applicants and in the presence of the respondent in person. 3