Emmanuel Butenge v

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA MUSOMA SUB-REGISTRY AT MUSOMA LABOUR REVISION NO. 422 OF 2024 EMMANUEL BUTENG’E …………………………………………………1ST APPLICANT RAMADHANI HASSAN IDDY……………………………………….…2ND APPLICANT VERSUS GRUMETI RESERVES LIMITED…………….……………………………RESPONDENT JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 16/05/2024 & 14/06/2024 Kafanabo, J.: This is a judgment in respect of the Application for revision arising from an award of the Commission of Mediation and Arbitration for Musoma at Musoma (hereinafter the ‘CMA’) in a consolidated Labour Disputes No. CMA/MAR/MUS/107, 108, 109, 110/2023 dated 07/12/2023. A brief background of the matter is that the Applicants herein were the employees of the Respondent, employed on diverse dates, in distinct positions, and on fixed-term contracts. On 31st August 2022, one of the Respondent’s employees, Mr. Bryan English, ordered thirty (30) fleeces (jackets/sweaters) from South Africa that would be used by the Respondent’s chefs. After receiving the said fleeces, Mr. English in cooperation with his colleagues (other Respondent’s employees), kept (stored) the said fleeces safely in the PTJ back store which was being used by the Applicants and their colleagues in their routine work. 1 But on 05/09/2022 it was discovered that twenty-six (26) fleeces were missing from where the said store. The investigation was conducted, the Applicants and others who were working in the said store were interrogated. However, the Respondent found that the Applicants and others not part of this application lied to the Respondent intending to conceal the commission of the offence, and what transpired. As a result, on 10th October 2022, the Respondent’s Human Resources Manager served the Applicants with a charge sheet, cum notice requiring the Applicants to appear before a disciplinary committee on 13/10/2022 in order to answer the allegations levelled against them. The Applicants were charged with gross dishonesty and violating the code of ethics and conduct of the Respondent being the first offence/misconduct. As regards the 2nd offence/misconduct, the Applicants were charged with concealing information regarding the commission of and/or preventing reporting of the commission of an offence. The 3rd offence was as regards the 1st Applicant alone which was a failure to adhere to policy, rules, and general customs/practices of operations of the Respondent. The disciplinary hearing was conducted and on 15th October 2022, the Respondent found both applicants guilty of the first and second offences as charged. The Respondent decided to terminate the Applicants’ contracts of employment vide letters dated 15/10/2022. The Applicants and two others, not part of this application, being aggrieved by the Respondent’s decision of terminating their contracts of 2 employment, referred the matter to the CMA through consolidated labour dispute number CMA/MAR/MUS/107/108/109 and 110/2023. In the CMA, the Applicants challenged their termination of employment both procedurally and substantively. The grounds upon which the Applicants based their complaint were clearly set in each Applicant’s CMA Form No. 01. The said CMA Form No. 01 is, basically, a pleading initiating labour disputes in the CMA. On the aspect of procedural unfairness, both Applicants in their respective CMA Forms No. 01 claimed that they were not allowed to put forward mitigating factors before the employer decided to terminate their contracts of employment. Further, on the substantive aspect of unfair termination, they claimed that termination was not an appropriate sanction. The complaints were duly heard and the CMA determined the dispute according to law. In determining the dispute, the CMA, in consultation with the parties drew the following issues: 1. What was the nature of the relationship between the Complainants (now Applicants) and the Respondents; 2. Whether termination of the Applicants’ employment followed a fair procedure; 3. Whether termination of the Applicants’ employment was based on fair and just reasons; and 4. What reliefs are the parties entitled to? The CMA properly heard the complaint and on the 7th day of December 2023, determined the complaint in favour of the Respondent. The Applicants being dissatisfied by the CMA’s decision/award preferred this application for 3 revision on the grounds that: One, the CMA grossly misdirected itself on a point of law for pronouncing an award in favour of the Respondent in the absence of any evidence to disprove the dispute. Two, the arbitrator relied on matters that were not narrated by DW1 and DW2 in evidence during arbitration. Three, evidence from CCTV Camera never proved the said theft, furthermore that evidence was bad before the law i.e. the way it was taken and shown before the arbitrator. When the matter was called up for hearing Mr. Thomas Makongo Manyama, learned Advocate, represented the Applicants, and Mr. Godfrey Tesha, learned Advocate represented the Respondent. Before the hearing of the application commenced, the court, taking into account pleadings as lodged in the CMA and the pleadings before this court, advised the learned advocates that, when addressing the court on the grounds for revision, they should take into account the legal issues as addressed in the affidavit and counter affidavit, the nature and reasons of the complaint as lodged in the CMA and the decision of the arbitrator in the CMA. In support of the application, a starting point of the Applicant’s counsel was the adoption of the Applicants’ joint affidavit supporting the application as part of his submissions. The learned counsel for the Applicants addressed the court as to whether the termination of the Applicant’s employment followed a fair procedure as required by law. Referring to paragraph 4 of the Applicants’ joint affidavit, it was submitted that there was no evidence at all which proved a fair of termination, or grounds of termination. The termination of the Applicants was based on policy, honesty, and trust. The relevant policy 4 and/or code of good conduct of the Respondent was never tendered and/or admitted before the CMA as evidence, but the termination of the Applicants’ employment was based on them. The failure to prove the presence of and tendering the said policy as evidence renders the termination of the Applicants’ employment done by the Respondent unlawful. Responding to the first ground of revision Mr. Tesha, learned counsel for the Respondent, first adopted the Respondent’s counter affidavit, as part of his submission. He submitted that the issue of non-tendering of the Respondent’s policy/code of good conduct as evidence in the CMA being raised as reason/ground of unfair procedure in termination of the Applicants’ employment is an afterthought. This is due to the fact that Exhibit D4 collectively, contains the charge sheet which states categorically what policy was contravened. Also during the disciplinary hearing, the Applicants never raised the issue of being unaware of the policy. The Respondent’s learned counsel also submitted that according to the CMA Form No. 01, the Applicants never raised the issue of the Respondent’s policy and/or code of good conduct as part of their complaint. They were very specific in their claims. On the procedural issue, they complained that they were not given an opportunity to mitigate, and on the substantive issue, they said termination was not the appropriate sanction. Also during the hearing at CMA, the issue of policy was not raised and thus required no proof. Referring to the Evidence Act, Cap 6. R.E. 2022, the Respondent’s counsel submitted that the issues which are not disputed need not be proved. Since the Applicants did not dispute the knowledge of the policy 5 and/or code of good conduct during the disciplinary hearing and at the CMA, the Respondent did not need to prove the same. It was also submitted that the Applicants were not only charged against the policy but also contravened Part 2 Rule 3 of the Employment and Labour Relations Act (Code of Good Practice) Rules, GN. No. 42 of 2007, on offences that may constitute serious misconduct and may lead to termination of employees. Therefore, if the Applicants did not raise the issue of policy in the disciplinary hearing and the CMA, it means they were aware of the same. After hearing the parties’ submissions on the first legal issue as raised by the Applicant, it is now opportune to determine the relevant ground for revision. However, it is important to make it clear that the Applicant’s counsel had shifted the focus of the first ground of revision which made it multifaceted as will be demonstrated below. The first ground of revision, as stated in the affidavit in support of the application, is that the CMA grossly misdirected itself on a point of law for pronouncing an award in favour of the Respondent in the absence of any evidence to disprove the dispute. In expounding the submission, the Applicant’s counsel submitted that there was no evidence at all that proved a fair termination or grounds of termination. The termination of the Applicants was based on policy, honesty, and trust. Policy and trust were never produced before the CMA as evidence. Moreover, in the same vein, in the Applicants’ counsel’s submission supporting the application the learned counsel’s focus was much on whether 6 the termination of the Applicant’s employment followed a fair procedure as required by law, but referring to paragraph 4 of the Applicants’ affidavit which to some extent are unrelated. After a methodical analysis of the learned counsels’ submissions, this Court observes that there is no dispute that the Applicants were terminated because of gross dishonesty, concealing information regarding the commission of an offence, and/or preventing reporting of the commission of an offence and adducing false testimony/evidence. It is also on record that the Applicants were charged for violating the Respondent’s policy, but also by contravening the Employment and Labour Relations (Code of Good Practice) Rules, 2007. However, this court is not convinced to agree with the Applicants’ counsel that non-tendering of the policy in the CMA amounted to unfair termination. As rightly argued by the Respondent’s counsel the charge sheets served on the Applicants were very clear on what was violated which included the Respondent’s code of conduct and ethics, and the Employment and Labour Relations (Code of Good Practice) Rules, 2007. It is also clear that if the Applicants were not aware of the code of conduct, as alleged, they should have registered their concern during the disciplinary hearing, or during the CMA proceedings. However, as alluded to earlier herein above, the complaint against the policy and/or code of good conduct, features for the first time at this stage of revision. This is also evident from the hearing forms that were admitted as exhibit D5 collectively in the CMA proceedings. 7 Besides, after a thorough revision of the CMA Forms No. 01 of both Applicants herein, there is no complaint about the policy or that the Applicants were not aware of the same or any other procedural issue. The Applicants’ complaint on procedural unfairness, if it may be reproduced verbatim, is: “Employee was not given opportunity to put forward mitigating facts before decision for termination are(sic) made”. The exact phrase appears in both Applicants’ CMA Forms No. 01 as filed in the CMA. Given the nature of the reasons for revision as deposed in the affidavit in support of the application, and as argued by the Applicants’ counsel, it is a view of this court that the Applicants have totally departed from the complaint filed in the CMA by introducing a new matter which was not litigated in the CMA, which as a matter of law and procedure the Respondent had no chance of defending herself against. As mentioned earlier, the CMA Form No. 01 is the pleading initiating an employment dispute in the CMA. It is trite law in our jurisdiction that parties are bound by their pleadings. There is a plethora of Court of Appeal decisions on the matter. To start with in the case of Jordan University College vs Mark Ambrose (Civil Appeal NO. 267 of 2020) [2024] TZCA 433 (11 June 2024) it was held that: “We will rather proceed to stress that parties are bound by their pleadings (reliefs inclusive). And, whoever wants to get a relief from a court of law, he must establish its base from the pleadings and nothing more. Doing otherwise will make the suit uncertain and or give a room 8 for inviting extraneous matters. That means that, if there was no specific prayer in CMA Form No. 1, there was no room for making the award for payment of 25 months' salary. Also in Magnus K. Laurean vs Tanzania Breweries Ltd (Civil Appeal No. 25 of 2018) [2021] TZCA 578 (12 October 2021), it was held that: “In the instant case, we find no basis to interfere with the learned Judge's award. First and foremost, she was justified to vacate the order for reinstatement on the ground that it was not prayed for in the referral form.It is settled that generally an arbitrator or the High Court, Labour Division has no jurisdiction to grant a relief which is not prayed for in the referral form, the said form being understood synonymously with a plaint – see Security Group (T) Ltd. v. Samson Yakobo &Ten Others, Civil Appeal No. 76 of 2016; and Dew Drop Co. Ltd v. Ibrahim Simwanza, Civil Appeal No. 244 of 2020 (both unreported).” Moreover, in the Pius Secondary School vs Obadia Mwambapa (Civil Appeal No. 161 of 2021) [2024] TZCA 146 (1 March 2024), the Court of Appeal held, if I may quote in extenso, that: “In the light of the foregoing, we considered the contents of CMA Form No.l which initiated the dispute against the appellant for breaching the contract of employment and unfairly terminating the respondent's employment. It is quite obvious that the contents of CMA Form No.l run short of pleadings relating to the evidence 9 allegedly establishing torture and humiliation of the respondent by the appellant as the sufferings that he experienced, and the respondent being responsible for the massive failure of the students at the school. We neither find such pleadings at page 8 of the record of appeal bearing the contents of page 3 of the said CMA Form No. 1 on facts about the nature of the dispute, nor do we find such pleadings at page 10 of the record bearing the contents of page 5 of the CMA Form No.l on facts about special features/additional information on the cause of action. With such omission, we think that the finding by the High Court, that there was sufficient evidence adduced proving the respondent's sufferings from unfair termination justifying the award of general damages/ has no basis. Even if such evidence was truly adduced, it must be disregarded for being extraneous to the CMA Form No.l. We have no doubt, therefore, that the High Court took into account extraneous matters which it ought not to have taken into account and thereby arrived at a wrong decision. With this finding, then alleged sufferings by the respondent which were not pleaded could not, in terms of what we held in Flavio Ndesanyo (supra), be the basis in this case for raising the quantum of compensation for the unfair termination beyond the unexpired term of the two year term fixed contract breached by the appellant.” 10 Also in the case of Paulina Samson Ndawavya vs Theresia Thomasi Madaha (Civil Appeal 45 of 2017) [2019] TZCA 453 (11 December 2019) the court of Appeal held that: ‘The other remark which we find ourselves compelled to make relates to pleadings. In doing so we cannot do better than reiterate what we said in James Funke Gwagilo vs. Attorney General [2004] TLR 161 whereby we underscored the function of pleadings being to put notice of the case which the opponent has to make lest he is taken by surprise. From that same decision we reiterated another equally important principle of law that parties are bound by their own pleadings and that no party should be allowed to depart from his pleadings thereby changing his case from which he had originally pleaded.’ In the light of the foregoing authorities, the Applicants were supposed to adduce and lead evidence proving that the termination of their employment was unfair because they were not afforded the opportunity to present the mitigating facts. However, in the light of the CMA proceedings, the applicants led evidence of general unfairness of termination, ignoring their major complaint which, unfortunately, was not proved. Moreover, it is the said complaint on the procedural issue that led the Respondent to prepare his defence, now introducing a new ground of complaint at the stage of revision goes against the rules of pleadings which 11 are handmaidens of justice and which parties are required to adhere to. The departure from pleadings also condemns the other party unheard as they could not marshal their evidence in defence. The Court of Appeal decision in James Funke Ngwagilo v. Attorney General [2004] TLR 161 is relevant on this point. Additionally, and as rightly submitted by the Respondent’s counsel the Applicants did not complain against the validity or cogency of the offence levelled against them, but the severity of the sanction imposed after being found guilty which the Applicants’ counsel did not address at all. Moreover, the charges against Applicants herein as evidenced in exhibit D4 were not only about the matter of the Respondent’s policy but also a matter of law. That is, the Applicants apart from being charged for violating the Respondent’s code of good conduct (which the Respondent never disputed its existence and/or awareness), were also charged with violating Rules 3, 9(1)(a) and 12(3)(a) and 13 of the Employment and Labour Relations Act (Code of Good Practice), G.N. No. 42 of 2007. Therefore, for the reasons adduced herein above, this court is not prepared to agree with the Applicants’ counsel that nontendering of the alleged Respondent’s policy and/or code of good conduct amounted to unfair termination of the Applicants’ employment. Another issue raised by the Applicants in their joint affidavit and as per the Applicants’ counsel’s submissions is that the evidence of the CCTV Camera video footage never proved the said theft. Furthermore, that 12 evidence was bad before the law i.e. the way it was taken and shown before the arbitrator. The Applicants’ counsel also submitted that as per the record of the CMA, the investigator who controlled and prepared the CCTV Camera footage was never called before the CMA to testify. This person was important to be called because he is the one who could tell how the recording of the CCTV camera video footage was taken. The counsel cited the case of Hemedi Said v. Mohamed Mbilu 1984 TLR, it was held that failure to call a material witness, an adverse inference may be drawn against that party who failed to call a witness. In the present case, the person who was called was not the one who operated the CCTV camera. It was further argued that the name of the one who was called to testify was different from the one who controlled the CCTV camera. Further submission was that the CMA ignored the difference of names between the witness and the person handling the CCTV camera. The case of Christina Mrimi v. Cocacola Kwanza Ltd, Civil appeal 112/2008 was cited to bolster the submission. It was also submitted that the evidence of CCTV camera video footage did not prove the said theft, and the CCTV camera video footage was tendered and admitted contrary to law, especially the Electronic Transactions Act, Cap. 442 R.E. 2015. Section 18(2) of the Act provides for conditions under which electronic evidence may be taken. The reliability of the evidence is questionable because the CCTV camera evidence did not adhere to the conditions of the law. The said evidence also did not prove that the Applicants committed theft as resolved by the CMA. The Applicant’s counsel argued that the Applicants were terminated based on assumptions 13 of breach of policy, honesty, and trust. That is why the Respondent never reported the matter to the police as they knew that there was no theft. Responding to the issue of tendering the CCTV camera video footage and the person who tendered it Mr. Tesha, the Respondent’s counsel, submitted that exhibit D1, which was the CCTV camera video footage, was accompanied by a certificate of authenticity which was sworn by one Mikoma Magata, where he stated that he is the one who retrieved the CCTV camera video footage. According to the CMA proceedings, on page 3, the 1st witness of the Respondent (DW1) was Mikoma Magata Nyerera. Therefore, Mikoma Magata testified in court and was the one who prepared the CCTV camera footage. The Respondent’s counsel also submitted that, on pages 6-7 of the CMA proceedings, the advocate of the Applicants raised a preliminary objection on the names of the witness testifying and the one contained in the certificate of authenticity. The preliminary objection was dismissed on the grounds of being based on technicalities which is not the spirit of labour law, and it was not based on the substantive evidence sought to be tendered by the Respondent. The Respondent’s counsel also submitted that according to the decision of the CMA, the issue of using two or three names was not material as far as the evidence was concerned. The witness whose name was being scrutinized testified before the CMA, and the Applicants, who were duly represented by an advocate, had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness on his name. The Applicant’s Advocate never questioned the name 14 of the witness to establish whether the witness and the person who retrieved the CCTV Camera footage were one and the same. The case of Bomu Mohamedi v. Hamisi Amiri, Civil Appeal No. 99/2018, unreported was cited as the consequence of failure to cross-examine a witness. It was also submitted that the CMA was right in holding that the failure of the Applicants to cross-examine a witness amounted to accepting both names of the DW1 given that the witness was called and testified before the CMA. The Respondent’s counsel distinguished the case of Christina Mrimi v. Cocacola Kwanza Ltd (supra) from the present one as it was referring to a legal person, a company, not a natural person. This is because the company could not appear in court to be questioned. But in the present case, the witness appeared in the CMA for questioning and he admitted both names were his. The learned counsel for the Respondent also submitted that the issue of not properly admitting the CCTV camera footage is also an afterthought because, during tendering and admission of the CCTV camera footage, neither the Applicants, nor their Advocate objected to the admissibility, reliability, integrity, originality or authenticity of the evidence. Also in his submissions, the Applicants’ Advocate in this Court, never indicated why the CCTV camera footage contradicted the Electronic Transactions Act. It is a settled principle of law that the unchallenged evidence is taken to be admitted. Exhibit D1 was admitted in the CMA without any challenge on its merits. 15 Moreover, it was submitted that it is a trite law that parties are bound by their pleadings. In labour disputes the pleading is the complaint as filled in the CMA Form No. 1. According to the said form in respect of the dispute before the Court, the Applicants assigned specific reasons as to why they were challenging their termination. On the procedural issue, as intimated earlier, they only raised the issue of mitigation. Exhibit D5 collectively indicates that they were given an opportunity to mitigate. Also, each of the Applicant’s termination letters show clearly what was their mitigation during the disciplinary hearing. The further submission of the Respondent’s counsel was that, according to the CMA proceedings the Applicants said they did not know what was mitigation whilst it was the basis of their complaint. On the part of substantive unfairness, the Respondent submitted that the sanction of termination was appropriate. This is because the Applicants were charged with gross dishonesty which translates to serious misconduct which may lead to termination of an employee in terms of Rule 9 of the Employment and Labour Relations Act (Code of Good Practice), G.N. No. 42 of 2007. Having duly considered the submissions of the parties as regards the evidence of the CCTV camera video footage there are a few issues to address. First of all, it is necessary to put the record straight with respect to the purpose of tendering the CCTV camera video footage (exhibit D1). The Applicants herein were not accused and/or charged with theft at the workplace. Exhibit D4 collectively (the charge sheets) is crystal clear, without restating the charges levelled against the Applicants herein, which also have 16 already been reproduced herein above, as per the record, the Respondent did not tender the CCTV camera video footage (exhibit D1) to prove theft against the Applicants. The CCTV camera video footage (exhibit D1) was tendered to prove that the Applicants lied to the Respondent, concealed information of the commission of an offence from the Respondent when it was lawfully demanded, and that the Applicants adduced false evidence during the investigation process. Pages 7 to 14 of the CMA proceedings are relevant. Exhibits D1 collectively, D3 collectively and D5 collectively are also key in understanding the nature of charges against the Applicants herein. Second, the issue of tendering the CCTV Camera Video footage/recording brings up two other burning issues. One, the issue of CCTV camera video footages brings forth again the issue of the parties being bound by their pleadings. It goes on evidence as the Applicants claim that the CCTV camera video footages did not prove theft at CMA. It was submitted by the Applicant’s counsel the evidence of the CCTV camera did not prove the said theft and it was tendered and admitted contrary to law, especially the Electronic Transactions Act, Cap. 442 R.E. 2022. Section 18(2) of the Act provides for conditions under which electronic evidence may be taken. The issue of pleadings comes in again because the Applicants in the CMA, and according to the CMA Form No. 1 on the issue of substantive unfairness, the Applicants stated the reason being that “termination was not an appropriate sanction”. This means that the Applicants were not challenging the reason for termination as stipulated in their letters of termination, but the sanction imposed. However, in this application for 17 revision, the Applicants are challenging the decision of the CMA by relying on, and admission of the evidence of the CCTV camera video footages that it did not prove theft. The Applicant’s counsel's argument that the CCTV camera video footages did not prove theft as a basis for revision is, with profound respect, perplexing. This is because the Applicants are challenging the proof of the offence of theft which the Applicants were not charged with at the level of workplace. Further, the Applicants did not complain against the same in the CMA, that is, it was not part of their pleadings. This is against the rules of pleadings, it is unacceptable and should not be entertained by this court. Therefore, in the light of the authorities cited when determining the first ground of revision herein above including the cases of Paulina Samson Ndawavya(supra) and Jordan University College(supra) the Applicants cannot depart from their pleadings as it amounts to violating the Respondent’s right to be heard. Nevertheless, to clear the Applicants’ doubts the issues raised by the Applicants are addressed here under. It is a finding of this court that the person who investigated the CCTV camera footage Mwikoma Magata Nyerera, the security and safety officer of the Respondent is one and the same as Mwikoma Magata who signed the authenticity certificate. The said person is also DW1 whose testimony is available on pages 5 to 13 of the CMA’s proceedings. It is also noted by the court that DW1 appeared before the court and the Applicants’ counsel cross- examined the witness. This means that the Applicants had an opportunity to discredit the witness if he were, otherwise, not one and the same person as 18 alleged by the Applicants. Therefore, the case of Christina Mrimi v. Cocacola Kwanza LTD, Civil Appeal 112/2008 relied upon by the Applicants’ counsel is distinguishable from the circumstances of the present case. Moreover, the case of Hemedi Saidi v Mohamedi Mbilu 1984 TLR 113 relied upon by the Applicants’ counsel on failure to call a material witness is also distinguishable because in the present case, the material witness was called, testified, and cross-examined by the Applicants’ counsel. It is a view of this court that the Applicants’ counsel’s submission that the investigator responsible for controlling and preparing the CCTV camera video footage was not called to testify is misplaced as the person who signed the certificate of authenticity of the CCTV camera video footage is one and the same with DW1. The other limb of the argument as regards CCTV camera video footage is that it was improperly admitted as evidence contrary to section 18(2) of the Electronic Transactions Act, 2015. The said section provides that: “In determining admissibility and evidential weight of a data message, the following shall be considered- (a) the reliability of the manner in which the data message was generated, stored, or communicated; (b) the reliability of the manner in which the integrity of the data message was maintained; (c) the manner in which its originator was identified; and (d) any other factor that may be relevant in assessing the weight of evidence.” 19 The Applicants’ counsel argued that the CCTV camera video footage did not adhere to the provision above reproduced. It was added that the reliability of the footage is questionable. However, what was wrong with the reliability of the CCTV camera video footage did not come out clearly in the learned counsel’s submission. No fault as regards generation, maintenance, or the originator was categorically set forth by the Applicants’ counsel. However, the Respondent through DW1 made it clear that the said CCTV camera video footage came from the CCTV cameras installed at the place where the Applicants were working. He, through a sworn statement (the certificate of authenticity), though not a legal requirement, clearly stated that the CCTV cameras were properly working and that the same were not tampered with. This evidence was not challenged by the applicants and thus the evidence of CCTV camera video footage went on record unchallenged. Further, section 88(4)(5) of the Employment and Labour Relations Act, Cap. 366 R.E. 2019 gives the arbitrator the discretion to conduct proceedings and determine a dispute fairly and quickly with minimum legal formalities. Therefore, the Applicant’s counsel submission that the evidence of the CCTV camera video footage was wrongly admitted for contravening provisions of section 18(2) of the Electronic Transactions Act, 2015 is, with respect, misplaced. Moreover, another ground of the Application as advanced by the Applicants’ is that the CMA relied on matters that were not narrated by DW1 and DW2 in their testimony. However, the Applicants’ counsel did not provide any details of what matters were relied upon by the CMA but not narrated 20